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ABSTRACT 
Authoritarianism has been the main political feature of Third World countries. 
Particularly, military authoritarianism - praetorian regimes - prevailed in newly independent 
countries. With the demise of colonialism in the aftermath of both World Wars, many 
overdeveloped military sectors in newly independent countries came to the forefront of power 
by means of military coups. This research focuses on two of the most salient examples of 
military authoritarian regimes in 1950s and 1960s -Nasser's Egypt and Park's Korea. 
This thesis compares between Nasser's and Park's leaderships and both regimes in 
terms of legitimacy, leadership characteristics, ideology and concrete output of economy. In so 
doing, a basic framework for classifying the representative military authoritarian regimes in the 
Middle East and East Asia can be invented. This thesis classifies Nasser's authoritarian regime 
as an `inclusive - extrovert' regime founded by Nasser's pro-populace attitude and his strong 
passion to gain regional hegemony. In diametrically contrast, Park' regime is described as an 
`exclusive - introvert' regime due to Park's exclusive administering without encouraging people. 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter deals with the theoretical 
framework and proposes the framework of comparison as a research proposition. The second 
chapter is a historical overview of Egypt and South Korea and in the following chapter; the 
legitimacy issue and leadership characteristics are explored. In chapter IV and V, both 
leaderships' ideological attitude and its application into domestic policies and economic policies 
are dealt with in a concrete way. In the last chapter, conclusive remarks and final word are 
proposed. Findings of this research provide us with reevaluation of the nature of two 
outstanding military authoritarian leaders' epistemologies and their performances. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Objectives of this Research 
With regard to taxonomy, this dissertation may be classified as a case study in 
comparative politics. As the term suggests, the basic methodology of comparative politics is to 
compare one polity with other political entities. The primary purpose of comparative politics is 
to widen and deepen the knowledge of certain political situations and to broaden the scope of 
paradigms of political analysis by comparing more than two polities in terms of political 
attributes such as political institutions, laws, political culture, performance of the regime, and 
leadership. 
One of the most popular subjects of comparative politics is the comparison of the 
hardware of political systems, such as their institutions and organisations. Comparative research 
into the various political institutions and organisations of certain regimes is an effective tool in 
understanding the peculiarities of different types of politics. In addition, the software of politics, 
such as political culture and the process of political socialisation, should also be considered to 
be an important subject for study. 
When it comes to theorisation of politics, one of the most beneficial outcomes of 
comparative research is the building of an epistemological bridge between the peculiarities of 
specific cases and theoretical generalisation. ' In addition to this, comparative research can 
construct guidelines to keep the facts within the relevant theoretical range, and it contributes to 
the verification and articulation of theory by examining the concrete cases in detail. 
As a matter of fact, the primary purpose of comparative research is to develop a 
`middle-range theory', rather than to create a grand theory which comprehends the whole range 
of political phenomena. This attribute of comparative research does not seek and examine the 
general causality of every single political phenomenon in certain areas, but focuses on specific 
comparable cases with the relevant comparative criteria, and traces trends of similarities or 
I Paul Diesing, Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Atherton, 1971) p. 184. 
I 
differences in order to find some consistent phenomena. 
Thus the comparative study of two authoritarian regimes, with which this dissertation 
is concerned, is not intended to establish a general theory, but rather to examine the differences 
between the two regimes, and to set up relevant models, in order to make a contribution towards 
related areas of research in comparative politics. 
A considerable amount of research has already been done on the role of military 
regimes in the newly emerging countries of the 1950s, when Nasser took power, and the 1960s, 
when Park came to the forefront of Korean politics. 2 This dissertation adds to the existing 
corpus of knowledge, by making a comparison between Nasser's military regime in Egypt from 
1952 to 1971 and Park's regime in Korea from 1961 to 1979. 
In the aftermath of World War II, as existing colonial orders in international politics 
collapsed, newly independent countries emerged in many parts of the world. These newly 
emerging countries faced serious difficulties in controlling their frequent political upheavals, 
since they did not have any internalised democratic experiences, which have usually been 
gained through the long and painful process of resolving such political conflicts and struggles. 
They transplanted political systems imported from outside without making any adjustments in 
line with the peculiarities of their own political situations. In these unstable political conditions, 
the military sectors of certain countries which had experienced colonial invasions were 
exclusively developed while the other sectors were not. This overdeveloped military sector 
tended to intervene in politics, justifying their intervention as a sacred mission to achieve 
stability and save the country from chaos. Free Officers in Egypt who were educated and trained 
by the British army, and Park and his colleagues, who were influenced and disciplined by the 
Japanese military system, are examples of this. 
These military regimes confronted the chaotic and unpredictable political atmosphere 
of a typical non-institutionalised and non-modernised newly emerging country. Thus, when it 
comes to analysing military authoritarianism in unstable newly emerging countries, it is less 
common to focus on formal features, such as the institutional factors of a political entity or 
2 Some researchers have regarded the military regimes of the Third World as the vanguard of modernisation of the 
developing countries; Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation, " in John J. Johnson, 
(ed. ), The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, 
The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Manfred 
Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1963). On the other hand, a negative view of the military regimes is expressed in Eric Nordlinger, "Soldiers 
in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non-Western States, " American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1970) pp. 1131-1148. For a comprehensive discussion of this matter, see 
Olatunde Odetola, Military Regimes and Development: a Comparative Analysis of African States (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, 1982) Chapter 1, and Mary Kaldor, "The Military in Development, " World 
Development, Vol. 4, No. 6. (1976) pp. 459-482. 
2 
general factors of the democratic system than to look at their informal features, such as the 
leader's peculiar personality, or the particular sentiments of the people towards their leader. 
Although the military sector may have been overdeveloped, its functional role was still under 
the influence of a patriarchal system, due to the overall holding back of modernisation, which is 
related to patrimonial traditions. 
With regard to the military regimes of Egypt and Korea, strongly personalised 
leaderships dominated the entire society, particularly the military sectors. Nasser's and Park's 
regimes could both be described as being highly personalised, and hence it is important to 
concentrate on, and to look closely into the leadership characteristics and the performance of the 
two Presidents. 
There are a number of reasons why the regimes of Nasser and Park were chosen as the 
subjects for this comparison. 
First of all, Nasser and Park's regimes were both extremely long-term examples of 
military government, which took power by means of a military coup in the 20`h century. Over 
eighteen years, they maintained their regimes and carried out their own specific policies. These 
cases are enormously different from the fragmentary short-term military regimes which 
disappeared after carrying out a few improvised policies. Nasser and Park maintained their 
regimes for almost two decades without facing any seriously fatal challenges to their power, and 
hence it is possible to follow regime developments and changes in policy, and to determine the 
characteristics of their forms of leadership. 
Secondly, the Nasser and Park's regimes may be considered to be the representative 
military governments of the Middle East and East Asia. Overall, Nasser's Egypt and Park's 
Korea are the most remarkable cases when it comes to doing research into military interventions 
in Third World countries for academic purposes. Indeed, Nasser could be described as a 
prominent figurehead in the Middle East, and the most influential figure in the Middle East and 
North Africa at that time. His ideology and performance have been the popular subjects of 
research. 
Park's regime, however, has not yet been thoroughly researched in worldwide level of 
academic arena, and it is therefore particularly worthwhile to examine the regime's makeup. In 
the region of East Asia, which is famous for its dramatic economic growth, Park's regime was 
the only regime which took power by means of a military coup. His regime achieved dramatic 
development in a short space of time. 
The third reason for choosing these two regimes is that there are similarities between 
them. Nasser and Park enjoyed absolute power for about the same length of time, albeit with a 
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ten year gap between the appearances of each regime. 3 In terms of historical background and 
career backdrops, Nasser and Park show remarkable similarities. They had both been through 
the colonial experience as adolescents, witnessed the hardships of their own countries, had a 
vocational background as high-ranking military officers, and had both come from lower-middle 
class social groups. Most of all, the processes of planning and executing their respective 
military coups, and taking the seat of the presidency were extremely similar. 
Lastly, despite the many similarities between Nasser and Park's regimes, as mentioned 
above, the outcomes of ideologies and policies that the regimes performed were remarkably 
different. Nasser's main ideology could be described as `Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism', 
which came to be the form of Arab unity movements and economic drives in accordance with 
state capitalism. Whereas Park's ideologies were `Economic Nationalism and Anti- 
Communism', and focused exclusively on economic development by means of the repressive 
drive of a strict anti-communist sentiment. Details of these remarkable differences are dealt with 
in Chapters IV, and V. 
This dissertation thus attempts to compare the leadership, ideology and performance of 
the two regimes. In order to do this, the key factor to consider as an independent variable for 
differentiating the two regimes is the matter of `personal legitimacy'. 
Generally speaking, politically developed states have their own institutionalised 
political system which has been established by a long process of trial and error in order to find 
the most appropriate system of politics. In most cases, the adopted systems are ostensibly 
democracy. Being outside the institutionalised democratic system, military regimes assuming 
the reins of government by means of a military coup have always been troubled by a lack of 
legitimacy, since any leadership established in this violent manner has obviously not gone 
through the process of consensus and agreement in selecting a leader. In the unstable political 
situation resulting from such a lack of legitimacy, it is obvious that achieving legitimacy is 
essential for the establishment of a stable government. 
Therefore, this dissertation assumes that there must be correlations between legitimacy 
and regime performance, such as ideology formation, and the policy-making process. In this 
context, the main purpose of this study is to compare Park's regime, which began with a serious 
lack of historical and personal legitimacy, with Nasser's regime, which had no serious problems 
of personal and historical legitimacy. In so doing, this dissertation attempts to highlight certain 
variations between each regime's ideology formation and detailed outcomes of policy-making. 
When it comes to comparative research, it is obvious that a consideration of all the 
3 Nasser's term in power was 18 years 2 months and 5 days (from 23 `d of July 1952 to 28`h of September 1970). 
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potential factors in the `cause-result relation' would be the best method of achieving a reliable 
result. Practically, however, it is impossible to consider every single variable in this way. In this 
context, it is essential to control the variables in order to determine the most relevant factor. 
First of all, the environment of international politics, which was dominated by the Cold War 
system, acts as an important independent variable. In addition, both leaders' personal 
inclinations and characteristics, and the cultural background of both countries are notable 
variables. 
However, as will be shown in the following chapter, it was the nature of Nasser's and 
Park's personal legitimacy that was the most influential factor in shaping their leadership 
characteristics. These differences in terms of leadership characteristics meant the two regimes' 
attitudes towards international and domestic affairs were in striking contrast to each other. In 
this dissertation, the personal legitimacy of both leaders is placed as an independent variable 
and the outcomes of both leaderships' different character, ideology formation, and regimes' 
performance are considered as dependent variables. 
Park's was 18 years 5 months and 10 days (from 16`h of May 1961 to 20h of October 1979) 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, theoretical basis related to Nasser's and Park's regime is proposed. 
After the World War II, representative feature of political leadership in the Middle East and 
East Asia had been non-democratic authoritarianism. In this context, Nasser's Egypt and Park's 
South Korea were not exceptional. Both regimes are described as an `authoritarian military 
regime'. Thus, the basic exploration into the authoritarianism and its consequence would be 
necessary in order to carry out more relevant analysis. In addition to the basic theoretical 
reviews of authoritarianism, one of the concrete forms of authoritarianism - Praetorianism, 
which indicates authoritarian regime based on military interventions, is dealt with. 
2.1. Authoritarianism as an Applicable Theory and Its Reflection in 
Egypt and Korea. 
2.1.1. The Concept of Authority 
The term `authority' has its origins in the Latin word `auctoritas'. The meaning of 
`auctoritas' is the personal influence which is based on the property and various activities of the 
Auctor (creator, founder, pioneer). Nowadays, this meaning has slightly changed to `a certain 
person's influence and dominance (potestas and imperium) over individuals and groups'. 4 
According to Weber's definition, the notion of authority implies the `right to 
command', and the first necessity in gaining authority is legitimacy. For rulers, possession of 
this authority guarantees the probability of the people's obedience. 5 
The source of authority varies. Certain factors such as a specific position in an 
organisation, property and financial capabilities, fame and eminence, and professional 
knowledge can be the basis for gaining authority. In political terms, authority can be used when 
it indicates the influence and dominance of sovereignty, such as with the president, premier, 
4 E. D. Watt, Authority (London: Croom Helm, 1982) p. 11. 
5 Max Weber, Economy and Society (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968) p. 53. 
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monarch, and other forms of the apex of political power. Even though this sovereignty itself can 
guarantee authority for a while, the more important factor in maintaining sovereignty is 
legitimacy, which can be influenced by the process of power attainment and the performance of 
the regime. 
Weber proposed the sources of legitimacy to be tradition, charisma (personal 
characteristics), and rationality. Generally, the traditional source of legitimacy is seen in the 
feudal system, rationality is emphasised in modern states, and during a period of political-social 
upheaval, charisma is the most important factor in legitimising a regime. In a chaotic society, 
crisis consciousness due to the instability of the central regime and feelings of ineffectualness 
caused by the non-institutionalisation of the political system prevail amongst the people. Those 
who have such a feeling of crisis require a charismatic leadership, able to break the anomic 
situation. 
The common way of gaining legitimacy in Third World countries is by achieving a 
mixture of traditional authority and charisma. Particularly in a praetorian society, charismatic 
leadership could be the easiest way to gain legitimacy. In this context, military interventions in 
Third World countries occurred frequently in order to break the anomic situations of society, 
and these interventions brought about strictly charismatic authoritarian regimes. 
2.1.2. Authoritarianism 
2.1.2.1. The Authoritarian personality 
In contrast to the notion and the usage of `authority', the term `authoritarianism' has a 
slightly negative image. The general definition of authoritarianism - not in a political sense - is 
the character and attitude of reigning over others through force. It frequently shows 
overconfidence and misappropriation of authority. 6 According to Theodor Adorno, the 
authoritarian attitude and behaviour internalised in certain leaders originate from an 
authoritarian personality. This personality has a double-sided character. In the face of superior 
authority, the authoritarian personality would take a stance of absolute obedience, while it tends 
to reign mercilessly over inferior authority? 
Consequently, if the majority of the people in a particular society have an authoritarian 
6 E. D. Watt, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
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personality, which has been internalised by cultural or political inheritance, that society could be 
characterised as a strict hierarchical authoritarian society, which is operated by the mechanism 
of `command and obedience' instead of `compromise and negotiation'. In addition, the political 
system tends to have a strict authoritarian hierarchical structure, far removed from the 
democratic system. 
In the case of Korea, aspects of the cultural background, such as the strict social strata 
system, caused the society to internalise this authoritarian hierarchical structure of politics as a 
matter of necessity for social stability and economic prosperity. 
2.1.2.2. The Authoritarian Regime 
1) Definition and General Characteristics of Authoritarianism 
According to the definition of Juan Linz, authoritarianism may be described as a 
political system in which a political leader or a certain small group exercises power without any 
formal limits. Authoritarian rule does not allow the people to have the two basic rights of a 
democratic system. These rights are the right to compete for power and the right to participate in 
the political process as citizens. Juan Linz categorised non-democratic systems as authoritarian 
if they were, 
Political systems with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, 
without elaborate guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, 
without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some 
points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small 
group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually 
quite predicable ones. 8 
In an authoritarian regime, it is difficult to form an effective political organisation by 
method such as creating political parties, and existing vested parties and political groups are 
usually dissolved, suspended or banned from performing any political activities. The regimes 
vary in the degree of institutionalisation of political organisations. 
Authoritarian regimes do not institutionalise a legal opposition for free political 
competition, but sometimes permit different forms of opposition on the premise of guaranteeing 
7 Theodor W. Adorno, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1950) pp. 1-11. 8 Juan J. Linz, "An Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain, " in Erik Allard and Stein Rokkan (eds. ) Mass Politics: Studies in Political Society (New York: Free Press, 1970) p. 255. 
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the security of the regime. However, some authoritarian regimes face strong opposition within 
the regime from those who have different goals, such as those who want to restore the extremely 
conservative ancien regime, or those who want radical democratisation. 
Authoritarian regimes limit people's freedom and engage in the political repression of 
their opponents. Frequently, in the authoritarian military regimes of Third World countries, 
political offenders are charged with criminal offences against the nation's security. These 
political offenders are put on trial through military tribunals, which do not provide the same 
protection of legal rights as civil courts do, and which can impose much heavier penalties. Even 
when applied by civil courts, authoritarian codes of law define certain actions as criminal 
actions that are legal in liberal democracies, for example, political propaganda, membership in 
progressive parties, and participating in strikes. 
Authoritarian regimes can be categorised according to a variety of factors, such as the 
regime's characteristics, political actors, guiding ideologies and so on. Amos Perlmutter 
examined the political dynamics of five authoritarian models - the Bolshevik, Nazi, Fascist, 
Corporatist and Praetorian models - according to the criteria of political support and 
mobilisation patterns .9 
In order to be able to analyse fully Egypt and South Korea under the rules of Nasser 
and Park, the praetorian model10 (personal-oligarchic rulership related to military intervention in 
politics) is deemed to be the most appropriate one to follow. 
2) The Ideological Attitudes of Authoritarianism 
Amos Perlmutter specified certain ideological attitudes characteristic of most 
authoritarian regimes. The ideology of most modern authoritarian movements, parties, and 
regimes has certain characteristic ideological attitudes. Amongst them, two noticeable features 
9 Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1981) pp. 31.44.: In addition to Perlmutter's categorisation, Linz defined the more detailed subtypes of 
authoritarian regimes as follows: i) bureaucratic-military regimes, ii) organic statist regimes, iii) mobilisational 
regimes including post-democratic and post-colonial societies, iv) personal rulership and v) post-totalitarian 
regimes with the criteria of the subject of rulership. 
to This model is strongly linked with the military base, which has the potential to dominate political system. The 
praetorian state draws its major support from the military establishment, though the military may not interfere in 
the administration of the state, the economy, the police, or the military party. It means that in a praetorian state the 
military plays a highly significant role in key political structures and institutions. Arab praetorians typically either 
create a military party or harness an established nationalist or radical party. In Latin America, the praetorians may 
tolerate a populist political party, although they retain the right to move from the barracks to the presidential 
palace if the party fails to comply with their demands. It is obvious that the military is the locus of power in the 
praetorian state, even if only a few officers are visible. 
9 
are: i) radical nationalism, and ii) anti-liberal democracy and anti-parliamentarism" 
When it comes to mobilising people, the first characteristic - radical nationalism - is 
one of the most effective and one of the easiest tools for the authoritarian regime to use. It was 
taken to extremes by Nazism and Fascism in the form of a malignly distorted resentment of 
other ethnic identities. Particularly for the military praetorians, nationalism is the most efficient 
instrument for controlling the people and society. The sentiments of xenophobia and radical 
nationalism have played a role as the fundamental platform of military regimes in the Middle 
East and North Africa. 12 Most military coups in the Middle East between 1936 and 1976 were 
carried out under the slogan of `genuine independence from the foreign powers'. 
Nasser and Park utilised this nationalist sentiment when they were designing and 
carrying out their respective military coups. After each coup, in the process of putting into 
practice domestic and foreign policy, nationalism was the deciding factor in persuading and 
mobilising the people to stand on the regime's side. 
The second ideological tendency of authoritarianism highlighted by Perlmuter was that 
of anti-liberal democracy, in the sense of the avoidance of genuine democracy. 13 The notions of 
liberal democracy and authoritarianism contradict one another. While liberalism suggests a 
concept of human enlightenment and unfettered development and self-expression, 
authoritarianism strictly prohibits resistance and protest against the despotic regime. It usually 
censors public opinion, and sometimes even fabricates facts in the interests of the regime. 
In this context, the concepts of non-interference of the state and laissez-faire are 
unacceptable to authoritarian regimes. Liberal democracy has rarely gained a foothold in the 
Middle East and Asia, where praetorian authoritarianism has been more the order of the day. 14 
The parliamentary system is one of the most representative features of modern liberal 
democratic countries. For the authoritarian regime, this system is an unwanted instrument which 
would obstruct the regime's arbitrary methods of administration. Even though, ostensibly, most 
authoritarian regimes actually have their own party system and parliament, the major 
characteristic of modern authoritarianism in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa is its profound 
contempt for genuine parliamentarism and party-centred government, which are considered 
tools of colonial rule and have been denounced as corrupt, irresponsible, reactionary, and 
contrary to the Arab cause. This attitude is reflected in Nasser's statement: 
tt A. Perlmutter, op. cit., pp. 78-84. Originally Perlmutter enumerated five features of the ideological attitude of 
modem authoritarianism: radical nationalism, anti-liberalism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-bourgeois ethos, and 
anti-Semitism and racism. 
12 Ibid., p. 80. 
13 Ibid., p. 81. 
14 Ibid., p. 82. 
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The dictatorship from which we have suffered under the name of 
democracy was the dictatorship of capital, feudalism, under the name 
parliament. Political democracy cannot be a reality unless there is social 
justice and social democracy and unless there are equal opportunity 
between the capitalist and the worker and between the feudalist and the 
agricultural labourer. One has plenty of money and can have a good 
dinner and one has no money to pay for dinner. Capitalists and feudalists 
want to hold general elections according to Western methods adopted by 
capitalist countries in which the minority enjoys all the influence and has 
an abundance of money. The political parties serve the interests of 
feudalists and capitalism. 15 
While Nasser hardly mentioned liberal democracy in his political discourse, Park took 
up the subject of liberal democracy frequently. However, his reference to democracy was just 
for show, and did not contain any genuine intention to put it into practice. Nasser did not allow 
the establishment of a multi-party system and managed domestic politics with dominant mono 
institutions such as the Liberation Rally (L. R. ), the National Union (N. U. ), and the Arab 
Socialist Union (A. S. U. ). These were not actual political parties, but apparatuses for mass 
mobilisation and control. In contrast, the appearance of the political organisations early on in 
Park's regime give the impression that Korean politics were similar to those of the U. S. 's 
democratic system, which permits a multi-party system, and which has an electoral system 
which allows for direct election of the President and members of Congress. Yet, operationally, it 
could be defined as only a quasi-democratic system. Especially after the enactment of the 
Yushin constitution in 1972, the political system in Korea was reduced to an absolute 
dictatorship - the Fourth Republic. 
2.1.3. Authoritarianism, Dictatorship and Totalitarianism 
There is a variety of concepts related to authoritarianism such as dictatorship, tyranny, 
autocracy, totalitarianism and fascism. All these concepts are used primarily as antonyms for 
`democracy' and as sub-forms of authoritarianism. Amongst these terms, dictatorship and 
totalitarianism are representative features of authoritarian regimes. 
The etymological origin of dictatorship is `dicere' (speak), implying that a certain 
15 President Gamal Abdul Nasse's Speeches and Press Interviews, January-December 1961 (Government Publication, 
1961) p. 396. quoted in Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: The Praetorian State (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 
1974), p. 139. 
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person or group has the exclusive right to speak. The audience has to listen to whatever the 
supreme power says and the orders have to be strictly obeyed. In other words, the practical 
meaning of the term dictatorship is that one particular leader monopolises the state's power 
exclusively and wields this absolute power arbitrarily without any hindrance. 16 The exclusive 
possession and arbitrary exercise of power are the principle characteristics of a dictatorship. 
An outstanding example of dictatorship is the praetorian system of the ancient Roman 
Empire. In case of war, rebellion, economic crisis or natural calamity in the Empire, dictatorship 
was tolerated by the people of Rome as a legitimate political action for the security of the 
Empire. 11 The offspring of the Roman praetorians in the modern world justified their 
dictatorships as necessary for the preservation of national security, and as being the only means 
for achieving economic development. 
Another of the sub-forms of authoritarianism is totalitarianism. Totalitarianism is 
associated with the characteristics of the political system itself in the authoritarian regime. 
Many scholars have tried to distinguish the concept of totalitarianism from that of 
authoritarianism. According to Linz, an authoritarian regime is a totalitarian system if it has the 
following attributes: 
i) There is a monistic but not monolithic centre of power, and whatever 
pluralism of institutions or groups exists derives its legitimacy from that 
centre, is largely mediated by it, and is mostly a political creation rather 
than an outgrowth of the dynamics of the pre-existing society. 
ii) There is an exclusive, autonomous, and more or less intellectually 
elaborated ideology with which the ruling group or leader, and the party 
serving the leaders, identify and which they use as a basis for policies or 
manipulate to legitimise them. The ideology has some boundaries beyond 
which lies heterodoxy that does not remain unsanctioned. The ideology 
goes beyond a particular program or definition of the boundaries of 
legitimate political action to provide, presumably, some ultimate meaning, 
sense of historical purpose, and interpretation of social reality. 
iii) Citizen participation in and active mobilisation for political and 
collective social tasks are encouraged, demanded, rewarded, and 
channelled through a single party and many monopolistic secondary 
groups. Passive obedience and apathy, retreat into the role of `parochial' 
and `subjects' characteristic of many authoritarian regimes, are 
16 Franz L. Neumann, "Notes on the Theory of Dictatorship, " in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, 
Comparative Politics (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986) p. 161. 17 Mark N. Hagapian, Regimes, Movements, and Ideologies (New York: Longman, 1978) p. 49. 
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considered undesirable by the rulers. 18 
Neumann described the distinctive features of totalitarianism as follows: i) a police 
state, ii) centralisation of power, iii) mono-party dictatorship, iv) a hierarchical relationship 
between state-society, and v) the frequent use of violence and terror as legal political 
instruments. 19 
In brief, totalitarianism is a more concrete and harder form of authoritarianism in terms 
of the extent of rigidity, simplicity, subordination, uniformity, monism, and verticality. 
However, these distinctions are just conceptual. In reality, it is impossible to draw a clear 
distinction between authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Thus, it may be said that 
authoritarianism and totalitarianism are not different types of political regimes, but rather that 
they are synonymous in the context of a non-democratic system. 
2.2. The Praetorian Model of Authoritarianism 
2.2.1. Military Intervention in the Third World and Its Role in 
Modernisation 
One of the most prominent trends in Third World countries is that of military 
intervention in politics. This trend is not a specific symptom in a certain region of the Third 
World, but a general tendency, which characterises the current political situation in a number of 
Third World countries. 
In the developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, military coups occurred frequently. 
Some research focused on the fact that military interventions in politics were linked to the 
modernising and industrialising process, and there have been some critical arguments about the 
advantages and disadvantages of military interventions for the development and modernisation 
of Third World countries. 
Bae Ho Han considered military intervention in some cases to be a positive political 
action. According to him, because the military system is equipped with a well-organised 
mechanism of order, regulation, and control, the military sector could provide the political 
18 Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, " in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds. ) Handbook of Political 
Science: Macropolitical Theory (Reading: Addison-Webley, 1975) pp. 191-192. 
19 Franz Neumann, op. cit., pp. 165.166. 
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regime with stability and security. With consistent and firm instructions, the military leadership 
could control the chaotic situations which were rampant in the Third World due to the ceaseless 
political conflicts. 20 
Particularly, the military leadership which had been influenced by colonial legacies of 
modernised sectors like military officers trained by colonial government - as a factor of 
overdeveloped state - played a crucial leading role in propelling modernisation by providing 
organised management skills and know-how in planning and programming projects 21 Lucian 
Pye asserts that after a coup, military officers were able to lead the government effectively with 
their modernised organisations and well-disciplined techniques. 22 This capability of military 
leadership made the state stable, and this stability raised the level of the state's creditworthiness 
and gave the state opportunities to attract foreign investment 23 In addition, Henry Bienen points 
out that, generally speaking, military leadership did not lean towards a particular ethnic 
background or political faction but sought the state's interest as a whole'24 though there are 
some exceptions such as Sadam Hussein's Iraq and Hafez al Assad's Syria. 
The opposing point of view of the military's role in modernisation is that military 
leadership did not affect the state's development. While positive interpretations of the military's 
role in the state's development came up mainly in the 1960s, negative viewpoints emerged in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. 
One of the outstanding analyses regarding this viewpoint was made by Eric 
Nordlinger. 25 Nordlinger analysed seventy-four cases of military government in the Third World 
and concluded that there were no significant correlations between military intervention and 
socio-economic modernisation. He points out that because the military leaderships tended to 
pursue their own interests and security, they were thus relatively conservative in the face of 
social change, and that kind of conservatism does not produce the radical reformation needed 
for modernisation. 
20 Edwin Liuwen, "The Military: A Revolutionary Force, " Annals, No. 334 (1961) pp. 30-40, quoted in Tae Dong 
Chung, "The Civil-Military Relations in the Third World: A Viewpoint for the Comparative Research, " in Bae Ho 
Han (ed. ) Politics of the Newly Emerging Countries (Seoul: Jung Eum Sa, 1983) p. 63. 
21 Dong lice Lee, Military Institute of Korea (Seoul: Il Jo Gak, 1982) p. 327. 
22 Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization, " in Jason L. Finkle and Richard W. Gable 
(eds. ), Political Development and Social Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971) pp. 277-283. 
23 James H. Mittleman, "Dependency and Civil-Military Relations, " paper presented at the Conference on Civilian 
Control of the Military: Myth and Reality in Developing Countries (Buffalo, October 1974) quoted in T. D. Chung, 
op. cit., p. 71. 
24 Henry Bienen, "Armed Forces and National Moderniser: Continuing the Debate, " Armed Forces and National 
Development: Proceedings of the Ist Wharangdae International Symposium (Seoul: Korea Military Academy, 
1981) p. 6. 
25 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule upon Economic and Social Change in Non- 
Western States, " American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December, 1970) pp. 1131-1148. 
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In Robert Jackman's analysis of the comparative research into civil and military 
regimes in terms of modernisation, military regimes were no more efficient in promoting the 
modernisation process. Exploring seventy-seven cases in Third World countries from the 1960s 
to the 1970s he was able to demonstrate four facts: i) military intervention in the Third World 
had no specific influence on economic development, ii) social changes were not dependent on 
the extent of military intervention but relied on the level of economic development, iii) while it 
was true that some African countries under military regimes were able to increase their GNP, in 
other countries of the Third World there were no noticeable changes in the GNP statistics, iv) in 
cases where the military regimes were unstable in political power struggles, this had a 
detrimental effect on the economy. In short, Jackman concluded that there were no noticeable 
correlations between military regimes and economic development 26 
However, whether military intervention in Third World countries made a contribution 
to modernisation and development or not, it is clear that the emergence of military leaderships 
in Third World countries changed the shape of political systems enormously by overthrowing 
the existing political orders and systems of ancien regimes. This sudden change in political 
systems opened up a new type of political dynamics in the Third World. The military regimes of 
both Nasser and Park demonstrated the dynamics of military government. In fact, it became a 
tendency developed for the military sector to intervene in politics with a passion for 
restructuring their country. This tendency may be called the `new professionalism' of the 
military sector. 
2.2.2. New Professionalism and Military Intervention 
In general, military officers have a sense of their own superiority to other sectors. They 
are excessively sensitive to chaotic situations and security crises, and sometimes tend to act on 
impulse when they feel critically unstable. Thus, if the society they belong to is faced with a 
critical situation that might threaten the continued existence of the state, military officers 
intervene in politics in an attempt to prevent the state from collapsing. These military elites tend 
to have a hatred for chaotic situations and disorder. It is this hatred which stimulates military 
elites to try to intervene in politics, and this can be an important factor in a coup. 
Morris Janowitz enumerated the ideological characteristics of the military sector as 
26 Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Government and Social Change in the Third World, " 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 4 (December 1976) pp. 1084-1097; A similar analysis was 
performed by R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, and their results were exactly the same as Jackman's. 
R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "Performance and Instability in Military and Non-Military Regime Systems, " 
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push factors of military intervention as follows: i) hyper-nationalism, ii) puritanism, iii) 
collectivism, and iv) anti-politics (or anti-democracy). According to Janowitz, through these 
sentiments, military elites are predisposed to regard themselves as the destined protectors of a 
state that faces the threat of incapable politicians, corruption, political chaos, and security 
crises 27 
These tendencies encouraged the military elites to develop a new vocational 
consciousness of professionalism, which consisted of an aspiration to participate in politics in 
order to intervene in matters of domestic security. One example of military intervention from 
this point of view was proposed by Alfred Stepan. He analysed the coup of 1964 in Brazil 
against the background of an emerging new professionalism and expansion of military 
influence 28 
Under the slogan of `domestic stability and security from inner threats', military 
officers were trained as professionals in various sectors of state administration. As a result of 
this training, the military sector was able to play a key role in administering the state. The first 
concern of the military elites was no longer national security in the face of external enemies but 
domestic stability and the establishment of an efficient administration. This is `New 
Professionalism'. 
Strictly speaking, Nasser's regime cannot be seen as an example of this new 
professionalism, since the main motivation of Nasser's coup was the eradication of Western 
imperial influences and the expulsion of King Farouk's monarchy, and was thus a form of anti- 
colonial movement or independent resistance. However, after the Free Officers took the core 
positions in the government and became more professional in various parts of the state 
administration, they came to dedicate themselves in the professional areas of government 
administration as military bureaucrats. 
It can be argued that the case to which new professionalism is most relevant is that of 
Park's regime. His explicit pledges announced immediately after the coup of 1961 were to build 
political stability and to establish a professional, effective government by purging old politicians 
and bureaucrats under the surveillance of the military junta. His main interests were domestic 
issues such as economic development, shaping a new political system, amending the 
constitution, and developing foreign relations with Japan and with the U. S. in particular. All 
ministerial positions were filled by military officers, and even after the power transference to a 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, No. 3 (September 1976) pp. 850-864. 27 Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (Phoenix Books: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1974), pp. 64-65. 
28 See Alfred Stepan, Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973) 
p. 130. 
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civil government through the presidential election, when General Park was elected as a civil 
President of Korea, the influence of military elites increased in every part of the government. 
2.2.3. The Main Concept of Praetorianism 
The typical starting point for military intervention is a coup. The meaning of a coup 
d'etat is a political upheaval where the army overthrows the vested powers and takes the helm 
of state affairs by using military force. The first example of this is the coup initiated by the 
praetorian guard of the Roman Emperor. The praetorian guard took power by means of armed 
force, and exercised sovereign power as military officers. From this origin of the terminology, 
military leaderships, which come to power by means of a coup, may be called praetorian 
leaderships, and the political systems led by the military leaderships are praetorian systems. 29 
According to the analysis by Perlmutter and Linz above, it is pertinent to define the 
regimes of both Nasser and Park as `oligarchic - corporatist praetorian model' 30 Despite the fact 
that both regimes were largely dependent upon the personal charisma of the individual leader at 
the early stages, they formulated strong coalitions with other actors. Nasser encouraged the 
lower-middle class to join political organisations such as the National Union or the Arab 
Socialist Union. Few members of the military junta played an autonomous role in Nasser's 
government. Other political actors and agents were subordinate to the personalised leaderships 
without any significant autonomy. Park assembled the ruling coalition from military elites, big 
business conglomerates, and professional technocrats. His regime showed the characteristics of 
exclusionary corporatism. To analyse these two regimes in terms of authoritarian governance 
demands the appropriate typology - oligarchic and corporatist praetorian authoritarianism. 
In a modern praetorian state, military elites are inclined to intervene and to have the 
ability to control government officials. The political conditions in such states support the 
29 Ho Jin Kim, The Korean Political System (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1997) p. 143. 
30 Amos Perlmutter classified the praetorian system into three modal types: i) the personalist praetorian model, ii) the 
oligarchic praetorian model, and iii) the corporate praetorian model. The personalist model is when one military 
leader has absolute power to rule the country exclusively. The status of the military sector in this model is 
subservient to the leader. The oligarchic model refers to the case where the military leader takes political power 
and forms a ruling group of the military junta. The autonomy of the military sector is relatively stronger than in 
the personalist model. The corporate model is the collective ruling of the military as a dominant group without a 
specific military leader. In this system, the military sector has to form a coalition with bureaucrats, technocrats, 
scholars and various interest groups in society. Nasser's and Park's cases may be described as the personalist 
praetorian model because both leaders' influence and representation were unchallenged. At the same time, both 
regimes' military sectors were relatively strong and had autonomy. Thus, these regimes may be categorised as 
oligarchic praetorian as well; Amos Permlutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers (London: Frank Cass, 1981) 
pp. 41-44, pp. 13 0-131. 
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development of the military elite as the nucleus group and encourage its expectations of 
becoming the ruling class and political elite. In Nordlinger's words, military elites are 
`managers of force', `experts in violence' and `armed bureaucrats'. Only with the armed forces, 
can the military sector acquire the key positions easily. 31 
31 E. A. Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 1142. 
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3. Framework of Comparison - Research Modelling and 
Propositions 
On the basis of the theoretical background examined above, this section briefly 
examines the praetorian authoritarian characteristics of Nasser's regime in Egypt and Park's 
regime in Korea. Then, in order to make the comparison of both regimes clear, two models are 
proposed, for the purpose of providing an appropriate explanation of the distinctive features of 
each regime. 
According to Perlmutter's analysis, both Nasser's and Park's regime may be 
categorised as praetorian authoritarianism with a military power base mixed with corporative 
praetorian characteristics and oligarchic praetorian characteristics, as mentioned above. It is true 
that both authoritarian regimes possessed corporative aspects and oligarchic features. In this 
context, it is possible to classify this praetorian model by detailed and clarified models with the 
use of the relevant criteria, which are related to the personal, historical, and situational 
background of both leaders. 
3.1. Two Criteria for Comparison - Inclusionary / Exclusionary and 
Extrovert / Introvert Characteristics 
3.1.1. The Concept of the Inclusionary / Exclusionary Regime 
The concepts of `inclusionary' and `exclusionary' regimes are taken from the 
classification of the characteristics of state corporatism, proposed by Alfred Stepan. He defined 
inclusionary corporatism as the pro-working class and pro-peasantry attitude of state's elites 
amongst various interest groups. Favoured groups of working class and peasantry are included 
in the regime's process of constructing political support groups. Through the political activation 
of the lower-middle classes, those classes are absorbed by the regime for the purpose of gaining 
stability. By contrast, exclusionary regimes attempt to debilitate the people's influence, repress 
trade unions and incapacitate any labour movements. The elimination of working class and 
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peasantry groups from the political arena is one of the most prominent characteristics of the 
exclusionary regime. 
The detailed application and evaluation of the corporatist features of Nasser and Park's 
regimes are not dealt with in this dissertation. As mentioned previously, the reason for this is 
that there were some corporatist - oligarchic characters in both regimes, and the issue of 
relations with the working / peasantry classes would have to be the explanatory criterion for 
scrutinising the differences between the two regimes. 
The positive relationship between the state and the working / peasantry classes may be 
defined as an inclusionary relationship. This inclusionary regime consists of a populistic 
coalition of labour and national capital in opposition to the imperial intervention of foreign 
powers and capital. By forming such an inclusionary coalition, the state is able to mobilise the 
working class and peasantry in order to expand state autonomy. At the same time, such a 
coalition makes it easier to control those classes effectively. Thus, activating these classes and 
gaining their support could be the main prop of the state in terms of achieving national security 
and maintaining legitimacy. 
In short, the peculiarities of inclusionary regimes are summarised as follows: 
i) state elites attempt to form a political coalition with the working and peasantry 
classes, ii) the first priority of distribution is the interest of the propertyless classes, iii) the 
regime which proclaims itself nationalist tries to consolidate with the working class and 
peasantry, and formulates a nationalist coalition in opposition to foreign capital, iv) the 
inclusionary regime shows itself to be a populist regime and possesses a high level of people's 
support which is the basis for gaining legitimacy 32 
In contrast to an inclusionary regime, an exclusionary regime emerges with the crisis 
consciousness of state elites, who believe that the people's influence and power could 
undermine the regime's security. This regime intends to incapacitate the people's coalition and 
repress the lower classes with the aim of preventing them from standing against the regime. The 
peculiarities of the exclusionary regime may be summed up as follows: 
i) state elites regard the workers and peasantry as an obstruction to the regime's 
intentions, ii) state elites attempt to form a coalition with small numbers of specific industrial 
bourgeoisie, the monopolised business sector, military sector and technocrats, and oppose 
populism, iii) no distributive policies are found, and the state concentrates on the rapid 
expansion of total accumulation without fair distribution. 33 
32 Myung Soon Shin, The Third World Politics (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1988) pp. 414-415. 33 Min Sun Park, "Corporatistic Society Control in the Developing Countries: Comparative Research between Latin 
America and Korea, " Ph. D. dissertation, Seoul National University (1983) pp. 89-90. 
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The exclusionary regime eliminates the autonomy of the working and peasant classes 
and controls these classes under the surveillance of the state. However, this kind of regime runs 
the constant risk of being overturned by the dissatisfied people's protest when overall economic 
conditions worsen or the quality of life deteriorates. There is the constant possibility of 
labourers' revolts against the repressive regime. As the crisis consciousness of the state elites 
escalates, the coalition of the exclusionary regime becomes consolidated and at the same time 
more repressive. When repression reaches a peak, the stability which had been secured by the 
repressive methods finally collapses. 
The clear distinction between Nasser and Park is to be found in their attitudes towards 
the working and peasant classes. Park adopted the economic strategy of unequal development in 
cooperation with a small number of conglomerates, repressed labour movements and ignored 
the demands of equal distribution. By contrast, Nasser chose socialistic populism as his main 
strategy. The state directly managed the entire economic sector in favour of the working and 
peasant classes. Consequently, there was no dissatisfaction concerning distribution, and 
Nasser's regime got enormous support from the lower-middle classes, which were composed 
mainly of workers and farmers. However, the decline in the efficiency of economic 
management had an effect on the overall productivity, and this lower productivity created 
critical problems for the regime's security. 
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Table I. I. The Two "Poles" of Corporatist Regimes 
Inclusionary Regime 
State elite's initial reaction to 
already activated, or 
potentially salient worker 
and/or peasant groups 
Attempts to incorporate into 
support coalition for new 
political and economic system 
sought by state elites and to 
encapsulate cooptatively into 
state corporatist associational 
organisations 
Dominant state policies used to 
encapsulate salient worker and 
peasant groups 
State elite's policy toward 
functions of state apparatus 
Primarily, distributive, symbolic 
and group-specific welfare 
policies; secondly, coercive 
measures 
Attempts to expand distributive, 
regulative, arbitrative, control 
and planning capacities 
Exclusionary Regime 
Attempts to exclude those 
autonomous organisations and 
demand making practices from 
the political arena that might 
obstruct the new political and 
economic system sought by 
state elite and to coercively 
encapsulate into state 
corporatist associational 
structures 
Primarily, coercive measures; 
secondly, group specific 
welfare policies and virtually 
no distributive policies in 
initial stages 
Attempts to significantly 
expand scope and death of 
coercive, control, and planning 
capacities 
State elite's characteristic 
National bourgeoisie and newly International bourgeoisie and 
coalitional partners encapsulated workers and technocrats peasants 
Characteristic enemies of state Oligarchic, and traditional (non 
Populist and radical political 
elite's coalition industrial) foreign capital 
leaders and autonomously 
organised working class 
State elite's characteristic 
stance towards structural 
reforms 
Normally some nationalist and Few or no nationalist or 
domestic reforms are made as domestic reforms. Emphasis on 
part of the `constituent acts' of `post-populist, ' or 'post- 
the regime polarisation' consolidation 
Attempts to sponsor limited 
State elite's orientation toward controlled mobilisation against 
mobilisation of worker and coalitional enemies and into 
peasant groups state chartered associational 
structures 
Characteristic legitimacy 
principles of state elite vis-ä- 
vis its coalitional partners 
Political populism and 
economic nationalism 
Diffuse support that contributes Maximum he&emonic to hegemony of new political 
possibilities vis-a-vis salient structures and facilities effective 
working class control at relative low coercion 
levels 
Attempts to dismantle the 
organisational capacity of 
workers or peasant to mobilize 
against the policies of the 
coalitional partners and to 
demobilise into state chartered 
associational structures 
Political order and economic 
efficiency 
Hegemony virtually 
impossible, passive 
acquiescence heavily 
dependent on coercive 
mechanisms 
Source: Alfred Stepan, The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) pp. 76-77. 
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3.1.2. The Concept of the Extrovert / Introvert Regime 
The other criterion that this dissertation proposes for the typological classification of 
both regimes is the concept of the `extrovert / introvert' regime, which is judged according to 
the regime's attitude towards external powers. 
In fact, the first aim of most praetorian military regimes which have taken power by 
means of an armed-forces coup is to guarantee the regime's security and its stability, because 
they might be troubled by a reaction on the part of the ancien regime and of people who are not 
satisfied with the new regime's performance. In this context, with the intention of securing the 
regime's stability, new military regimes have a desire to demonstrate the positive outputs of 
their own policies as quickly as possible. 
These outputs are produced at two levels, the level of `performance' and the level of 
`dignity'. The first level concerns the domestic performance and productivity, which can 
improve the people's quality of life. The other concerns autonomy and real independence in 
relation to foreign powers. In particular, those who have experienced a colonial period are likely 
to have unforgettable and traumatic memories of losing national dignity to foreign oppressors. 
They are thus inclined to be extremely sensitive about national dignity and genuine 
independence. 
In this context, the regime's `introvert or extrovert' character could be a useful 
standard for comparison when examining the preference of the regime. The extrovert regime, 
which lays emphasis on international relations, intends to expand its regional influence through 
regional hegemony. By achieving hegemony, the extrovert regime is able to secure its own 
stability. On the other hand, an introvert regime focuses only on domestic affairs and internal 
tasks. This regime's priority is placed on task achievements without a deep involvement in 
foreign affairs. 
The extrovert regime pursues autonomy in international relations without any foreign 
intervention. With this autonomy, it tries to gain regional hegemony, and finally it attempts to 
use this hegemony as a method for domestic mobilisation. Some Third World countries, for 
example, tried to get interest and protection for their countries from political and economic 
dependence by standing in a neutral position between the Eastern and Western blocs. 
The introvert regime does not attempt to gain autonomy in the arena of international 
politics, and takes a subservient position to certain foreign powers. Being in a subordinate 
position, it is unable to put into practice its policies without any intervention from outside, but 
such a regime may get full political support and financial aid from an external power. With this 
support, the regime can concentrate on the domestic development programme. 
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Nasser and Park's regimes are especially good examples of regimes to which a 
comparative approach may be applied using these criteria. While Nasser intended to become a 
bona fide Arab leader, going for regional hegemony by playing a leading role in the process of 
Arab unification, Park set up the main line of his administration in subordination to the U. S. and 
Japan in order to acquire military support for national security from the U. S. and financial aid 
for rapid economic growth from Japan. However, Park's subservient policies to the U. S. and 
Japan irritated those people who were resentful of colonial intervention. As peoples' opposition 
became more and more severe, the regime's attitude toward them became simultaneously more 
oppressive. 
3.2. Two Models for Comparison 
When it comes to the regimes' attitude and outputs of policies, there are many 
differences between Nasser and Park's regimes. Consideration of these differences can provide 
a distinctive clarification of the nature of each of these regimes. First of all, in terms of the 
attitude of both regimes attitude towards the grass-roots class, clear distinctions may be found. 
Nasser's leadership may be defined as an inclusionary praetorian regime model, while 
Park's regime can be seen as an exclusionary praetorian regime. Nasser gained enormous 
political support from the grass-roots class for his regime, which strengthened the government's 
capability to administer the state. Nasser's ability to mobilise the masses provided a solid power 
base from which to maintain the regime's security. 
Because Nasser's pro-working class and pro-lower middle class propaganda and policy 
making process focused on the peoples' needs and satisfaction, his regime was not troubled by 
legitimacy problems caused by any lack of popularity of the leadership or any lack of support 
by the people. 
On the other hand, Park's repressive and coercive authoritarian regime used violent 
methods toward those who protested against the military government and those who demanded 
a democratic arrangement. His regime was made up of military officers who belonged to the 
clandestine cadres of the coup, a small number of monopolistic capitalists who were allowed to 
retain their monopolised interests by the regime, and some pro-regime intellectuals. 
Although there were some similarities to Nasser's regime, such as the patriarchal 
oligarchy which was a charisma-based cohesive ruling coalition, differences can be identified. 
While Nasser's regime was based upon popular support and the gaining of popularity, Park 
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ruled the country with the support of an extremely exclusive ruling coalition that was strictly 
confined to a very small number of political actors. 
The other factor to consider when it comes to the characteristics of each regime is that 
of extroversion and introversion. Nasser's main concern and the prime feature of his reigning 
period was the ultimate target of Arab unity and prosperity. In his efforts to achieve Arab 
unification, he aimed to become the representative leader of the Arab world. The prompt 
achievement of regional hegemony was his primary goal. This goal inspired his regime's 
extrovert attitude. In particular, he publicised his regime's foreign policy as non-alignment, 
standing by neither the Western nor the Eastern bloc, in order to secure the regime's autonomy 
in international relations. As the figurehead of the Arab region, he intervened militarily in 
Yemen and Palestine, and proclaimed Egypt's central role in the liberation of African, Arab and 
Islamic countries. 
By contrast, Park's regime focused only on the domestic task of economic 
development. In the immediate aftermath of his coming to power, he did not have any autonomy 
to participate in international politics as an influential actor, but rather concentrated on domestic 
matters. 
Consequently, it is possible to identify these two regimes as the `Inclusionary - 
Extrovert' regime, which Nasser directed, and the `Exclusionary - Introvert' regime led by Park. 
Setting up these two different models can help distinguish sharply between the two regimes, and 
expand our horizon of understanding of the praetorian authoritarian regime which appeared in 
the Third World. 
3.2.1. Nasser's Egypt - `Inclusionary - Extrovert Regime' 
: The populist regime of pro-lower middle class - The pursuit of regional hegemony 
Nasser's establishment of the new praetorian regime began with the coup of 1952, to 
protest against the incompetence and to overthrow the despotic monarchy of King Farouk. In 
addition to this, he presented himself as a warrior resisting Western colonialism, which had 
exploited Egypt for a long time. As serious grievances towards the powerless King Farouk and 
resistance against Western colonialism increased, it is understandable that the Free Officers who 
were trying to make an effort to transform their country from its miserable state into a dignified, 
genuinely independent country, would execute the military coup on the basis of new 
professionalism. In the historical context, these were the circumstances in which the Free 
Officers could temporarily solve the endemic problems arising from the anti-colonial sentiments 
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and discontentment with King Farouk among the people. Nasser had a pro-socialist attitude. He 
inaugurated the land reform, which was supported by the lower class, and showed himself to be 
people-oriented and open towards the labour and peasant strata, instead of forming alliances 
with the oligarchic groups of the bourgeoisie with their vested rights. He presented himself as 
an anti-bourgeois figure. His policy was based on socialist ideals and he was good at using 
people's resentment against the propertied class under King Farouk. Against this backdrop, his 
regime may be seen as a people-based populist regime. 
In addition, the fact that he had a good command of rhetoric and a very impressive 
propaganda machine related to mass mobilisations enabled him to receive strong political 
support from the people. It seemed that Nasser's policies, and even his slightest movements, 
were closely watched by the people. Consequently, he did not encounter any crisis of legitimacy, 
which was often caused by the lower classes in Third World countries until his defeat in the 
War in 1967. 
It is broadly known that he practised one of the most popular leaderships in Third 
World countries in the sphere of non-alignment movements by proclaiming Positive Neutralism. 
In terms of popularity, Nasser's leadership can be described as a heroic regime and people 
regarded him as a messianic figure who would break the fetters of colonialism and release them 
as a saviour to them from affliction. In this context, his political ambitions were extended to 
include bona fide leadership of the Arab world, and he became energetically involved in the 
international affairs of the Arab region. By his involvement in Arab politics, he showed himself 
to be an international leader and political fighter against colonial powers in the genuine interests 
of Arabs. His attempts to acquire hegemony in the region characterise his regime as an extrovert 
one. 
Consequently, in this research, Nasser's regime will be categorised as an `inclusionary 
- extrovert' regime. `Inclusionary' means that, although there were oligarchic aspects to his 
regime, he aimed to have the consensus of all classes, except some extreme opposing clans such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood, and certain influential established groups such as the feudalists. 
This categorisation is linked to another term concerning popularity orientation, implying that the 
origins of his power were at the grass-roots. `Extrovert' character of his regime meant that his 
intention to become regional leader and his attempts at building a concrete hegemonic regime in 
the Arab area pushed him to focus on the movement of Arab unity and foreign intervention. 
3.2.2. Park's Korea - `Exclusionary - Introvert Regime' 
: The exclusive pro-conglomerate regime - The pursuit of national security by means 
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of domestic repression 
Park's regime showed completely different characteristics from that of Nasser in 
several respects. While the Egyptian coup led by Nasser was organised under the slogan of 
`eradication of feudalism and termination of colonialism', Park's coup was executed under the 
slogan of `controlling the social chaotic frustrations and putting off the invasion of North Korea 
under the situation of social confusion'. However, this coup failed to obtain a sufficient degree 
of legitimacy. The reason for this was that, just thirteen months ahead of Park's coup in 1961, 
there was a successful student revolution, which put an end to the dictatorship of President of 
the First Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee, forcing him to abdicate, and a totally new 
democratic government of the Second Republic of Korea led by Prime Minister Myun Chang 
was launched. In this context, many descriptions and evaluations of Park's military coup of 
1961 have suggested that his regime could have been a kind of reactionary coup d'etat. 
Apart from this domestic background, under the Cold War system Park had to depend 
on the United States for military support and to raise national loans. Although there was 
probably no way to be completely independent of the U. S. at that time, his attachment to the 
U. S. inspired anti-colonial, anti-American sentiments in many intellectuals and people at the 
grass-roots who had been ardently longing for total independence and real democracy. Worse 
still, Park's government was forced by the U. S. to normalise the official diplomatic relations 
with Japan on the pretext of getting war compensation from Japan. This tactic was just part of 
the U. S. 's strategy for containing Soviet influence in the East Asia. Park had no other option but 
to accept the U. S. 's `suggestion'. 
Since the Korean peninsula was under permanent threat of war from North Korea, and 
the fear of communisation was increasing, Park had to depend on the U. S. 's directions. He used 
the threatening situation to oppress most anti-regime protest movements. However, in terms of 
legitimacy, which rests on the voluntary support of the people, it may be said that Park's regime 
was very weak and fragile. 
Through the Economic Development Plan (E. D. P. ), rapid economic improvement had 
been achieved. This dramatic economic growth made South Korea one of the New 
Industrialised Countries (N. I. C. s). The most notable progress was achieved during this period. 
In the process, Park bestowed monopolistic privileges on a limited number of capitalists and 
landowners. This association produced a coercive ruling coalition consisting of the military, 
monopolistic capitalists, and a few intellectuals patronised by the regime. Most policies were 
decided by this coalition and there was no possibility of the autonomy of civil society or of the 
protection of people's interests. This showed a relatively exclusive attitude towards other 
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political actors, which characterised Park's regime as an exclusionary one. 
In the icy bi-polar atmosphere caused by the Cold War, Park's government developed 
a strict, menacing anti-communist policy, similar to that of the notorious McCarthyism. Foreign 
policy and diplomacy were controlled totally by the U. S. There was no diplomatic autonomy in 
the South Korean government. In this subordinating situation, Park directed all the actions of 
the government administration into solely domestic matters, which can be described as 
`introvert' in character. 
In this context, in order to maintain his regime, Park had to impose repressive 
measures and strengthen the solidarity of his ruling coalition. For this reason, in contrast to 
Nasser, who obtained support and legitimacy from his people, Park controlled his regime with a 
kind of exclusive, oppressive attitude towards the people, and demonstrated the characteristics 
of an introvert, dependent regime in terms of foreign relations. This gave rise to esoteric 
coalitions. 
3.3. Three Dimensions of Comparative Analysis on Nasser & Park 
It is worthwhile comparing the two different types of regime by means of the two 
models of comparison proposed above. Although Nasser and Park's regimes originated in the 
different political, cultural, and social backgrounds of the two countries, their personal 
backdrops and appearances were very similar in some ways. However, the performance and 
outputs of the two regimes were diametrically opposed. 
It is therefore important and necessary to understand the concrete differences between 
them and to examine the causes of these dissimilarities. This dissertation attempts not only to 
enumerate the important characteristics of both regimes, but also intends to describe the factors 
which caused the different traits by means of the method of comparative analysis. In this way, 
this research examines the reasons for the differences between two praetorian authoritarian 
regimes. 
In order to clarify the causality of differences between the two regimes more efficiently, 
three dimensions of comparison are proposed in this research. By means of making comparison 
in these dimensions, the natures of both regimes can be clarified lucidly. Those dimensions are: 
i) `Legitimacy and Leadership Characterisation', ii) `Formation of Ideology and Its 
Applications' as the regimes' epistemological natures. iii) `Economic Outputs' as a concrete 
exemplification of policy making. 
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The first dimension of legitimacy and leadership characteristics is dealt with in Chapter 
III. By making comparison between the two regimes in terms of legitimacy issues, the 
researcher attempts to clarify the consequent differences in the formation of leadership 
characteristics of both regimes. Secondly, in Chapter IV, comparative analysis between the two 
regimes is carried out in terms of ideological attitudes of both leaders. In so doing, the 
epistemological positions of both leaderships and domestic applications as the form of 
materialisation of ideology can be exemplified. The third dimension of comparison is outputs of 
economic strategies of both regimes, which are dealt with in Chapter V. Clear differences in 
economic performance between Nasser and Park's regime is presented as the form of `state 
capitalism in Egypt and state-led capitalism in South Korea'. 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, historical background of Egypt and Korea is dealt with in chronological 
order. As noted in the preceding chapter, there is a need for an overview of the historical 
background of Egypt and Korea in order to provide a more vivid depiction and sequential 
pictures of the dynamics of both leaders' backgrounds before embarking on the full-scale 
examination of both leaders' regimes. 
Egypt was one of the cradles of civilisation. Although her glorious moment of 
Pharaonic era and Saladin's heroic domination ended and was dominated with French and 
Ottoman Empire, Egypt continuously maintained her dignity as a prominent figurehead of 
Mediterranean world. While Egypt had been coming into the spotlight throughout the world 
history, Korea had been relatively isolated being located in Far East and had been called the 
`Hermit Kingdom' due to her recluse history without opening to the world except to China and 
Japan. In this context, the representative feature of Korean history may be described as 
`toadyism'. 
Entering the modern era, the colonialism of super powers influenced both Egypt and 
Korea enormously. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as British colonialism invaded in 
Egypt, anti-Western sentiment arouse amongst the Egyptian people. In this context, Nasser and 
his colleagues came to the front of Egypt's politics as leading figureheads for Egypt's genuine 
independence. 
Korea, where there had been troubles of ceaseless interventions of Chinese dynasties 
and invasion of Japan for a long time, had to still confront the influence of outer powers. The 
climax of those troubles was the division of peninsula. Park's military regime, which appeared 
in that circumstance, had to adhere to the super power's control. 
In this chapter, detailed historical incidents are not thoroughly dealt with, but drawing 
outlines of brief history is carried out from the medieval era to the end of Nasser and Park's 
period. In so doing, the concrete ideas and pictures of both leaderships could be portrayed. 
30 
2. Egypt: A History 
2.1. History of Egypt's Ancient Period and Middle Age Era34 
The geographical features of Egypt, with the majority of the population living in the 
Nile Valley and the Nile Delta, surrounded by the deserts of Libya, Sahara and Sinai, have 
produced a high degree of cultural individuality. In contrast to her internal geographical 
remoteness, situated as she is on the border between Asia and Africa, 35 Egypt has been the focus 
of the attentions of foreign powers from a strategic point of view. 
As the starting point for our brief examination of the history of Egypt, Pharaonic Egypt 
endured from the end of 4000 BC until conquest by the Assyrians in 671 BC. The Egyptian 
people regard the Pharaonic era as the most prosperous period of Egyptian history. A great 
number of Egyptian scholars and historians have expressed their nostalgia for this period. Many 
symbols remain of the glory of the ancient Egypt. The building of the pyramids and other relics 
in around 3000 BC signify a powerful dominion commanding great resources. After the rule of 
Rameses the Second, Egypt's strength and glory began to decline. After the Assyrian conquest 
in 671 BC, the native regime was restored until 525 BC, when Persia conquered Egypt. 
The Persian kings were good at controlling conquered peoples. They patronised the 
indigenous religions of their subjugated territories and were officially regarded as Pharaohs. 
Another change took place in 332 BC when the Persian Empire surrendered to Alexander the 
Great, who was acknowledged as a pharaoh and who founded the city of Alexandria. After 
Alexander's death, Egypt came under the control of General Ptolemy, whose dynasty was Greek 
in origin and appearance. 
After the demise of Cleopatra in 30 BC, Egypt came under the sway of the Roman 
Empire and became a province of the great Mediterranean Roman Empire. Christianity was 
introduced, but the Coptic church of Egypt adhered to its monotheism, which conflicted with 
the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, in spite of being accused of heresy. 
With the exception of a brief Sasanian (Persian) invasion in 616, Egypt remained under 
Byzantine domination until the Arab soldiers under the direction of Amr ibn al-As invaded 
Egypt from Syria. The Islamic advance was virtually complete by 641. Although Islam was a 
34 For detailed history of ancient Egypt, see Ian Shaw (ed. ), The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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completely different religion, the Coptic Christians did not resent the Islamic conquest since 
they disliked the tyrannical leadership of Byzantine though. As time went on, Egypt became an 
Arabic-speaking country with a Muslim majority, though there remained a Coptic Christian 
minority. For over two centuries, Egypt was dominated by the Abbasid caliphate of 
Baghdad, 
but the Tulunid and Ikshidid dynasties were regarded as virtually independent regimes between 
868 and 969. The domination of the Ikshidid dynasty came to an end in 969 with the invasion of 
the Fatimids from Tunisia. The Fatimids were Shia Muslims and Egypt remained under the 
leadership of the Shiite regime until 1171. 
During the early period of the Fatimids' rule, Egypt was prosperous and wealthy. The 
country was administered efficiently, and subsequently became an area of strategic importance. 
Cairo was well-developed, and the al-Azhar mosque was founded, later becoming a world 
famous centre of Islamic thought. And when the Kurdish Salah ad-Din ibn Ayyub, known to 
Europe as Saladin, appeared on the stage of politics as a sultan over Egypt, he became one of 
the most famous leaders in the Arab world. 
After the death of Saladin in 1193, the Egyptian Ayyubids took over his position. The 
French King Louis the Ninth invaded Egypt in 1249, but met with a crushing defeat in the battle 
of al-Mansura in 1250, and withdrew his troops. From then on, Egypt was governed by Mamluk 
sultans until the Ottoman Empire conquered the world at the beginning of the 10h century. 
By the beginning of the 1e century, the Ottoman Turks had already made dramatic 
advances. Constantinople was captured by them in 1453, and early in the 16th century the Turks 
invaded Vienna and almost occupied it. In their expansion southwards, the Turks defeated the 
Mamluks at the battle of Marj Dabiq, north of Aleppo, in 1516, and overthrew the last Mamluk 
sultan in a second battle, outside Cairo, in 1517. Egypt became one of the provinces of the 
Ottoman Empire, but the Ottoman allowed the country a good deal of autonomy. 
At the end of the 18`h century, Egypt was in trouble again, this time as a result of the 
conflict between France and Britain. Napoleon's aim was to disrupt the basis of British 
commercial wealth derived from her many colonies. Napoleon's imperial gaze had been drawn 
to Egypt as a means of threatening the growing British power in India. 36 He finally landed at 
Alexandria in 1798. However, all his efforts came to nothing due to the resistance of the British 
and Ottoman forces in 1801.37 
35 Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 3- 
36 Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985) p. 9. 
37 This incident was critical in determining the shape of modern Egypt in the arena of international politics. The 
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in terms of colonial competition brought Egypt to the attention of Europe, 
beginning that process of European intervention in the country which has never really ended. 
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2.2. The Muhammad Ali Dynasty 
After the withdrawal of the French troops, an Albanian mercenary officer of the 
Ottoman Empire, Muhammad All, took power in Egypt. Although he was a foreigner, he was 
able to establish a virtually independent stable regime in Egypt. 38 He drove out the British 
forces stationed in Alexandria in 1807, and between 1820 and 1822 annexed most of northern 
Sudan. He was an outstanding political leader in modem Egypt, who led a breakthrough for the 
country, turning his back on the past and introducing new and irrevocable changes. 39 
Then, next three successors to Muhammad Ali were, Abbas I, Said Pasha, and Khedive 
Ismail. During the period of their rule, foreign intervention in Egypt deepened, and the Egyptian 
economy declined. These rulers were not concerned with the welfare of the Egyptian peoples 
and they were incapable of administering the country. 
Said granted Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer, the privilege of building the 
Suez Canal in 1854, and the whole construction was completed in 1869. During the construction 
period, Said was succeeded by Ismail, Ibrahim's son. Ismail was overambitious. He invested 
excessive amounts of money in the construction of infrastructure such as railways and telegraph 
lines, in order to improve the Egyptian economy. In so doing, he incurred a debt of £93 million 
in fourteen years. Between 1863 and 1876, Egyptian indebtedness rose from £7 million to 
nearly £100 million 40 In an effort to repay both his personal and the national debt, Ismail sold 
shares in the Suez Canal to the British government for a cash payment of £4 million. It is 
obvious that Ismail was in serious financial trouble, but a more significant aspect of the affair 
was that, from that time on, French influence decreased and Britain began to expand its sphere 
of influence in Egypt, which was now in debt and in need of loans from the European powers. 
Consequently, financial control by the British government increased. According to Goldschmidt, 
more than half the state revenues had to go to the Debt Commission, and all other government 
38 Even though Muhammad Ali was an illiterate and uneducated mercenary officer from outside Egypt, he had a 
vision of a modem powerful and independent Egypt. He made efforts to establish a modernised and prosperous 
Egypt. He reformed the economy, focusing particularly on building up the base of economic development such as 
factories, an improved irrigation system, and the introduction of cotton cultivation. In addition to the economic 
sector, he tried to improve the education system, military preparation, and technology. However, his 
overambitious projects brought about the creation of rich social strata, a large bureaucracy and foreign merchants. 
The excesses of those groups were the fundamental causes of Nasser's coup in 1952. Derek Hopwood, op. cit., 
p. 10 
39 Ibid., p. 9. 
40 P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 86. 
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expenditures had to be pared to the bone 41 
Tawfiq succeeded his father Ismail. He controlled Egypt by the repressive method of 
military force. Like his father's regime, his government was dominated by Western powers. A 
French and a British controllers exercised strict financial control over Egypt. At the same time, 
a nationalist attitude began to grow amongst Egyptians who had been influenced by the West, 
many of whom regarded the Khedive, Tawfiq, as a puppet of France and Britain. In 1881, Orabi 
Pasha, whom Egyptians honour as the first genuine hero for national independence from the 
West42, presented a petition to Tawfiq's government calling a reduction in the influence of the 
Western powers. He forced Tawfiq to form a new ministry and to call on the Chamber of 
Deputies (Mujlis Shura al-nuwwab), a consultative body originally set up by Ismail. However, 
in this situation of escalating tension, neither France nor Britain made any concessions to 
conciliate Egyptian public opinion. Feelings in Egypt hardened, and in 1882 the Khedive had to 
appoint a nationalist ministry with Orabi as Minister for War. At that time, Orabi was the most 
significant leader. France and Britain dispatched naval squadrons to get rid of hardliner Orabists. 
Although France subsequently withdrew from this attack, a British expeditionary force landed at 
Ismailia and routed the Egyptian army at Tel el-Kebir. Cairo was occupied and Tawfiq's 
authority was restored, to be exercised subsequently under British control. 
After the restoration of Tawfiq's power, Britain's original intention had been to set 
Egyptian affairs in order and then pull out, however, the economic hardship caused by financial 
indebtedness made Britain stay in Egypt much longer than expected. In the aftermath of the 
expulsion of the Orabists, from 1883 to 1907, Tawfiq's government was dominated by the 
British Agent and Consul General, Sir Evelyn Baring, who became Lord Cromer in 1891. 
Tawfiq was succeeded by his son Abbas II in 1892. Abbas II resented British influence in Egypt, 
particularly Cromer's authority. At the same time, a nationalist movement began to develop 
under the leadership of Mustafa Kamil, a young lawyer. Kamil did not have any argument with 
the Ottoman's nominal sovereignty over Egypt, but resented the practical domination of Britain. 
The slogan for his movement was `Egypt for the Egyptians'. 43 Resentment against British 
influence escalated. 
In 1907, Sir Eldon Gorst replaced Lord Cromer as Consul General. Gorst tried to 
establish peaceful relations with the Khedive. He was followed by Lord Kitchener in 1911. 
When the Ottoman Empire took part in World War I in November 1914, Egypt was still 
41 Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr. Modern Egypt - the Formation of a Nation-State (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p. 38. 42 Derek Hopwood, op. cit., p. 11. 
43 Abbas Kelidar, "The Political Press in Egypt, 1882-1914, " Contemporary Egypt: Through Egyptian Eyes - Essays in honour of P. J. Vatikiotis, Charles Tripp (ed. ) (London: Routledge, 1993) p. 16 
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nominally a part of that Empire, despite the fact that she was practically under Egyptian control. 
Egypt was drawn into the vortex of the World War, and was declared a British protectorate, 
with a British High Commissioner, and Britain assumed responsibility for the defence of the 
Suez Canal. 
In December 1914, Abbas II was dethroned. The British government backed Hussein 
Kamil, the brother of Tawfiq, as the new leader of Egypt who was willing to be led by the 
British government. When Hussein died in 1917, he was succeeded by his brother Fouad. The 
nationalist movement had flourished under wartime conditions, and in November 1918 the 
nationalist leader Saad Zaghloul presented the High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wingate, with 
a demand for autonomy, which Britain refused. The nationalists became known as the Wafd 
(delegation). 44 After that time, negotiations on the matter of Egyptian autonomy between Britain 
and the Wafd continued, but at first a negotiated resolution was not forthcoming. As a result, 
demonstrations and riots broke out periodically over the next three years, with the Wafd 
demanding total independence for Egypt and Sudan. Dramatically, on 28`h of February 1922, 
Britain unilaterally abolished the protectorate. More than that, Britain recognised Egypt as an 
independent sovereign state, with the condition that Britain would retain responsibility for 
communications for the British Empire in the country, defend Egypt against direct or indirect 
aggression, safeguard foreign interests and national minorities in Egypt, and protect Sudan. This 
was underwritten by the Egyptian constitution, promulgated in 1923.45 
2.3. Portents of Military Revolution 
Between the gaining of Egyptian independence and the Second World War, there was 
a triangular struggle between the King, the Wafd and the British government. The Wafd tried to 
carry out a revolution to establish a republican government, but the King owed his throne to the 
British. General elections usually gave the Wafd a majority, but a Wafd administration was 
unacceptable to King Fouad, who had the support of the British government. 
As the last King of Muhammad Ali's dynasty, King Farouk acceded to the throne in 
1935. Just a year later, the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of twenty years' duration was concluded. This 
treaty terminated the British occupation but empowered Britain to station forces in the Suez 
44 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., op. cit., p. 56. 
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Canal Zone until the Egyptian army was in a position to ensure the security of the canal a6 
During the Second World War, the British government regarded Egypt as a vital point 
in terms of military strategy in the Middle East. The Wafd preferred and supported co-operation 
with the British without hesitation. In this context, in order to gain the solid support of the 
Wafd, 
Britain forced Farouk to agree to the formation of a Wafdist government under the leadership of 
Nahas Pasha in 1942. Nahas became increasingly enthusiastic about the achievement of Arab 
unity, and he was energetic in setting up the Arab League. But his government fell two years 
later. 
Immediately after the end of the war, there was a traumatic upheaval in the Middle 
East; this upheaval resulted from the foundation of an Israeli state in Palestinian territory. Egypt 
joined Iraq, Syria and Jordan in military action following the declaration of the State of Israel in 
May 1948. However, they were defeated. King Farouk's popularity had declined. The political 
situation became chaotic in the absence of any proper authority. At the same time, the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a puritanical religious body, had become a threat to the regime's security, and 
communism had gained new adherents. The discredited regime made a last effort to obtain 
popular support by re-nominating Nahas Pasha as Prime Minister. He abrogated the Anglo- 
Egyptian treaty of 1936 without notice in 1951, and began a popular struggle to eject the British 
troops. This led to mounting violence, culminating in battles between Egyptian and British 
troops, the eruption of mob violence in January 1952, and his government's loss of the power. 
Following the July 1952 coup all political parties, including the Wafd, were dissolved 47 
2.4. The Process of Power Attainment (The Revolutionary Period) 
On 23rd of July 1952, a group of young army officers, the `Free officers', who had 
been planning a military coup d'etat for a long time, seized power in Cairo. After the coup, they 
collaborated with All Maher, a veteran politician, to establish a government under the control of 
the military junta, and secured the abdication of King Farouk in favour of his infant son, Ahmed 
45 Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (London: Macmillan, 1996) p. 336. 
46 The outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935 made Britain amenable to redefining Anglo-Egyptian ties. The 
result was the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1936, valid for twenty years. It gave Britain the exclusive 
right to equip and train the Egyptian military. While it required Egypt to expand its transport and communications 
facilities and make them available to the British forces, it entitled Britain to build as many new air bases as it 
wished. It signified a formal end to the posting of British troops outside the Suez Canal zone, subject to Egypt 
building up its defence capabilities to a sufficient level. British troops were to be stationed specifically to guard 
the Suez Canal until such time that the two signatories agreed that Egypt could do the job alone. Britain retained 
the right to take over all defence and communications facilities in the event of war. Ibid., pp. 14.1 S. 
47 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. op. cit., pp. 84-88. 
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Fuad II on 26 July. King Farouk sailed into exile, and a year later, the rule of a foreign dynasty 
in Egypt officially came to an end. 
General Muhammad Neguib, a leading associate of the Free Officers, 48 was a 
representative figure of the revolutionary army. He was well-known for his constant resistance 
to King Farouk's regime. He had incurred the enmity of the palace and had earlier made himself 
popular by his courageous condemnation of British actions in 1942. Because of his nationwide 
reputation, the revolutionary army selected him as their representative. Neguib took up the 
position of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and became head of the military junta. 
Counter-revolutionary political sectors attempted to regain power. Particularly, the Wafd was in 
the vanguard of the attack on the military junta. However, on 7`h of September, all the attempts 
made by old regime's political power had come to nothing when General Neguib assumed the 
office of Prime Minister of Egypt, replacing All Maher. Real power, however, lay with the nine 
officers who formed the Revolutionary Command Council (R. C. C. ). 
As the first step towards gaining support from the people, a land reform law was 
announced in September, which stated that land ownership was limited to 200 feddans per 
household. The primary intention behind the promulgation of this law was to debilitate the 
power of the feudal class, which had dominated Egyptian political life for a long time. In 
addition, the property of the royal family was confiscated. On 10`h of December, the 
Constitution was terminated, and on 160h of January 1953, all political parties and organisations 
were dissolved. It was announced that there would be a three-year transition period49 before 
representative government which had proper legitimacy was restored. On 18th of June, the 
monarchy was abolished and Egypt was declared a republic. General Neguib took three crucial 
positions in the government: President, Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, and Abdul 
Hakim Amer was appointed Commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. 
Although General Neguib now appeared to have absolute power in Egypt, a serious 
conflict developed between General Neguib, a man of Sudanese origin, a devout Muslim and 
very conservative, and Nasser, who planned the coup behind the scenes and who had a secular 
vision of politics. On 25`h of February 1954, Neguib was expelled from the critical positions of 
President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the R. C. C., and at the same time was accused of 
48 When Nasser was working as an instructor at the Staff College, he organised a clandestine group of officers for 
Egyptian revolution - the Free Officers. In the meeting of October 1949, they made a fresh determination of the 
revolutionary scheme by which they would try to establish an anti-colonial regime by means of the total 
eradication of British influence within Egyptian territory. Their ideal vision of the state was the democratic 
parliamentary system based on modernised military support. Core members of the Free Officers group led by 
Nasser were the leaders of five individual committees. They were Abdul Hakim Amer, Kamal ed-din Hussein, 
Salah Salem, Zakaria Mohieddin, and Anwar Sadat. Robert Stephens, Nasser -A Political Biography (London: 
Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1971) p. 90 
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having attempted to concentrate power in his own hands. Nasser became Prime Minister and 
Chairman of the R. C. C. in his place, but Neguib returned to the position of President and took 
back both the other posts, only to be ousted again as Prime Minister by Nasser in April. 
However, as a matter of fact, the influence of Neguib had been declining; especially he suffered 
from rescinding his enthusiastic liberal measures. When a member of the Muslim Brotherhood 
attempted to assassinate Nasser in October, S° the organisation's leaders and core members were 
convicted of attempted assassination and six members were sentenced to death. 5' On 141, of 
November 1954, Neguib had to step down from the position of President on suspicion of being 
involved in a Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy against the regime. It was alleged that during the 
investigations and trials of the Muslim Brotherhood and other so-called subversive elements, 
President Neguib had been in touch with them. Neguib was put under domiciliary confinement, 
and Nasser rose to the position of ultimate power in Egypt. After 1954, there was no legal 
opposition to Nasser's policies 52 
After Nasser had secured his position, Egypt began to assume an important role in the 
arena of international politics. Nasser emphasised Egypt's crucial roles in three areas - the 
Islamic, the African and the Arab circle - and Nasser's historical visit to the Bandung 
Conference in 1955 added a fourth - the `non-aligned'53. Egypt explicitly protested to the 
World 
Powers against the circumstances of the Cold War. In this context, Nasser led opposition 
amongst certain Arab states to the Baghdad Pact (later to become the Central Treaty 
Organisation), which the U. S. designed for the purpose of organising a worldwide chain of anti- 
Soviet alliances. After that, in September 1955, Nasser announced an arms deal with 
Czechoslovakia, in return for cotton and rice. It is obvious that this arms deal had the 
49 From 17`h of January 1953 to 16`h of January 1956. P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 379. 
50 On 26`h of October, while Nasser was addressing a rally in Alexandria to celebrate the signing of the Evacuation 
Agreement with Britain, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, a plumber called Mahmud Abdul Latif, tried to 
assassinate him. This incident was the starting point for a series of conflicts between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Nasser's regime. From the start, Nasser's secular regime did not have any common consensus with the radically 
religious group of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
51 In all, the People's Court tried over 875 persons and the military courts over 250 officers. Six members of the 
Muslim Brotherhood were executed, amongst them three lawyers, one merchant, a preacher and a plumber. As a 
result of this incident of treason, there were over 3,000 political prisoners in the country by 1955. P. J. Vatikiotis, 
op. cit., p. 384. 
52 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., op. cit., p. 101. 
53 Nasser got the inspiration for non-alignment as the basis for Egypt's strategy in international relations when he 
participated in the Bandung Conference. An encounter with President Tito of Yugoslavia was particularly 
influential in shaping Nasser's foreign policy. Tito had survived by aligning himself neither with the West nor the 
communist world. Together he and Nasser developed the concept of non-alignment for the purpose of maximising 
the Third World's interests in the context of the Cold War system. Tito became his closest colleague and 
influenced Nasser's policy line, notably when Nasser adopted a socialist, but not a totalitarian communist, system 
for Egypt. Derek Hopwood, op. cit., p. 44. 
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connections with the Soviet Union. 54 
On 16`' of January 1956, a constitutional foundation for Nasser's authority was 
established. The New Constitution, which provided for strong presidential power, was 
proclaimed in January. On 23`d of June, this Constitution was approved by a plebiscite, 
in which 
the citizens of the Egyptian Republic also elected Nasser as the President of Egypt. 
2.5. Period of Nasser's Administration 
2.5.1. The Suez Crisis and Its Consequences: 1956-1957 
President Nasser's non-alignment policy, which implied a willingness to deal equally 
with both power blocs of the East and the West, was linked with the Egyptian intention to 
obtain funds for the ambitious construction programme of the Aswan High Dam. By this 
programme, Nasser intended to enlarge the cultivable area and generate electricity for 
industrialisation. Land and energy were the main solutions to the problem of Egypt's increasing 
population. Following offers of financial assistance from the U. S. and Britain and, separately, 
from the U. S. S. R., the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I. B. R. D. ) 
offered a loan of $200 million in February 1956, on condition that the U. S. and Britain provide 
it with credits of $70 million to meet the hard currency costs of constructing the dam. 55This was 
an indication of the Western intention to hold onto Egypt. 
However, Nasser's consistent attitude of non-alignment appeared pro-Soviet from the 
point of view of the West. In April 1956, Nasser's government officially recognised the 
People's Republic of China in spite of explicit opposition from the U. S. government. This was a 
provocative action as far as the U. S. and the West were concerned. Particularly, to the U. S. 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who was a strong minded and inflexible Calvinist who 
regarded Nasser with hostility, Nasser's action was the last straw. 56 The U. S. finalised its 
54 The precise terms of this deal have never been disclosed. According to an American official estimate, Egypt 
purchased between 80 and 100 Mig jet fighters, 30 and 45 Ilyushin-28 light jet bombers, 100 Stalin and T34 tanks, 
hundreds of troop carriers, as well as artillery and ammunition. The value of this deal was estimated at 
approximately £150 million. Humphrey Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution (London: Macmillan, 1970) 
p. 33. quoted in Robert Stephens, op. cit., p. 161. 
55 Dilip Hiro, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
56 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. op. cit., p. 106. 
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decision to withdraw financial aid for the Aswan High Dam on 19th of July. 57 A week later, on 
26th of July, Nasser announced the nationalisation of the Universal Suez Maritime Canal 
Company, adding that all revenues from the Canal management would be invested in the 
construction of the Aswan High Dam. 
This announcement produced an immediate response from the international powers. 
Britain, France and the U. S. protested strongly at this decision. An emergency international 
conference on the matter was held in London in August, and immediately afterwards, a 
committee, presided over by the Prime Minister of Australia, visited Cairo to submit proposals 
for a new scheme for Canal operation in collaboration with an international consortium. Nasser 
firmly rejected internationalisation. In the aftermath of this attempt at internationalisation, a 
series of subsequent attempts at compromise also ended in failure. 
Britain and France had an anxious period after losing their vested rights in the Suez 
Canal. In this context, they finally resolved to take military action in conjunction with Israel. 
After the disclosure on 24th of October when an Arab allied military command had been 
established by Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, Israeli forces encroached on the Egyptian territory of 
Sinai on 29th of October, ostensibly to assault fedayeen bases of Egyptian army, and advanced 
towards the Suez Canal. On 30th of October, at a meeting of the U. N. Security Council, Britain 
and France vetoed the U. S. and Soviet resolutions calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal. 
The Anglo-French air strike began on 31st of October, followed by a full-scale invasion 
by airborne and marine corps on 5th of November. In the meantime, on 2nd of November, the 
U. N. General Assembly demanded an immediate cease-fire. On 6th of November, as a result of 
continual pressure from the U. S., the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, decided to 
announce the cessation of hostilities. The withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces was completed 
in a month. Israeli forces, which had occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula, withdrew from all 
areas, apart from the Gaza strip, which was retained for the purpose of securing a potential 
military base for the future, and Sharm al Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, in order 
to secure the sea route to Eilat. 
The Suez Canal was reopened under the full control of the Egyptian Canal Authority at 
the end of March 1957. This reopening respected the Constantinople Convention of 1888, which 
stipulated that the Suez Canal should be open to vessels of all nationalities at all times. 
The Suez War could be seen as a military defeat but a political victory for Nasser. 
Although the Egyptian army lost some credibility and most of its military preparations, Nasser 
became the foremost warrior against imperialism and Zionism in the eyes of most Egyptians 
57 There was other interpretations of the reasons why the U. S. withdrew aid: The pro-Zionist lobby, and pressure 
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and Arabs. 58 
2.5.2. Pursuit of the Integration of the Arab World - Union of Egypt and 
Syria 
A general election was held in July 1957 in accordance with the 1956 Constitution. 
The first convention of 350 members elected was not expected to exert much influence over 
Nasser's government, since the candidacy of most members was controlled by Nasser. 59 As a 
matter of fact, Egyptian parliament under Nasser's regime could be seen as an amenable rubber 
stamp for Nasser's administration. Finally, it was dissolved in March 1958 immediately after 
the establishment of the United Arab Republic (U. A. R. ) through the union with Syria was 
proclaimed on ls` of February 1958. 
Both countries were on the same side against the West and at the same time, pro- 
Egyptian sentiments in Syria were increasing with the rise in Nasser's popularity due to the 
Suez crisis. Although the first announcement of the union between Egypt and Syria was 
released in February 1958, it was not until21s` of July 1960 that the first National Assembly of 
the U. A. R. was convened in Cairo by President Nasser, after many complications. 
However, the inauspicious destiny of the U. A. R. was revealed by Syria's withdrawal 
from the U. A. R. When Nasser replaced the two Regional Executive Councils and the Central 
Cabinet of the U. A. R. with a single central government for the purpose of enhancing his 
influence in the U. A. R. in August 1961, Syria became dissatisfied, and on 28`h of September, 
the Syrian army seized control in Damascus, and Syria officially seceded from the U. A. R. After 
the failure of an attempt to restore the Union, Nasser said that he would not oppose recognition 
of Syria's independence. The secession of Syria from the U. A. R. severely damaged Nasser's 
leadership in the Arab region. 60 
Nasser set about trying to redeem the situation. The U. A. R. (Egypt retained the full 
title) was reformed on 18`h of October and a new system of proportional representation was 
proposed. A National Congress of Popular Forces, consisting of 1,750 delegates, representing 
from the cotton farmers union, mainly from the southern states of the U. S., Robert Stephens, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 
58 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. op. cit., p. 1 10. 
59 Over half of total of 2,500 candidates were disqualified after screening by the government-appointed National 
Executive Committee of the National Union which was established in May 1957. P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 399. 
60 On the UAR and its problems, including Syria's secession, see Patrick Seal, The Struggle for Syria (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 327-334; Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War, 2nd Edition London, (London: 
Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1967), pp. 2-58; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The 
Egyptian Army in Politics- Pattern For New Nations, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961) pp. 140-186. 
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not geographical constituency but economic and vocational interests, was convened in Cairo on 
21" of May 1962. Nasser presented the National Congress with a draft National Charter 
outlining his programme for developing the U. A. R. along the lines of Arab socialism. A new 
democratic system of government was introduced, based on the Arab Socialist Union (A. S. U. ) 
(replacing the National Union) and including popular councils at least half the members of 
which would be workers or farmers 61 
A series of political upheavals in Syria and Iraq brought about a new phase of U. A. R. 
The Syrian coup and the overthrow of the Qassim regime in Iraq effected great changes in 
power in Syria and Iraq, which brought both nations into closer alignment with Egypt. On 170' 
of April 1963, the formation of a federation of the three countries under the name of the United 
Arab Republic was announced. However, rivalries arose in both Baghdad and Damascus 
between `Baathists' and `Nasserists'. Consequently, Nasser withdrew from the agreement, 
claiming that the Baathists had plotted Baathist dictatorships in Syria and Iraq and had ignored 
Nasser's suggestions for a wider nationalist representation. 
Being at a standstill in the Arab union movement, Nasser took an important initiative 
in Arab league affairs by presiding over two Arab summit meetings in Egypt, which dealt with 
Arab policy on the international water issue related to the River Jordan, and also strengthened 
the armies of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. A further E£ 1 million was set aside for the formation 
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (P. L. O. ). Nasser continued his attempts at Arab 
reconciliation, and appealed for the united actions to continue until the spring of 1965. Iraq, 
Kuwait, Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon agreed with Nasser's appeal, but Syria criticised the 
vagueness of anti-Israeli attitude. Despite this, as a result of his concerted efforts to take the 
initiative in the Arab world, Nasser may be considered to be one of the most prominent figures 
of Arab leadership. 
2.5.3. Difficulties in Domestic Affairs and Economic Hardship 
Nasser's popularity was absolute. However, he was bound, eventually, to be 
confronted with domestic hardship caused by poor economic performance. Even though Nasser 
polled over 99% of the votes in the presidential election of March 1965, there were more signs 
of dissatisfaction in the U. A. R. than at any time since he had come to power. When Nasser 
visited Moscow in August 1965, in a speech to Arab students, he revealed that an attempt to 
61 P. F. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, pp. 400-401. 
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assassinate him had been discovered, casting suspicion on the Muslim Brotherhood's 
involvement. This suggested an overall dissatisfaction in Nasser's performance. 
In September 1965, after the new cabinet, presided over by Zakaria Mohi ed-Din, was 
formed, administrative characters changed and the security system was tightened up. Taxation 
was increased and measures of reduction of expenditure were activated due to increasing 
economic difficulties, particularly the severe scarcity of foreign exchange. For although wheat 
supplies were continued, and credit was obtained from both the International Monetary Fund 
(I. M. F. ) and foreign countries, the level of imports, particularly food to feed the growing 
population, and the debt resulting from the first Five-Year Plan (F. Y. P. ), caused a serious drain 
of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, the U. A. R. faced a balance of payments crisis. 
In this context, the second F. Y. P. was revised and extended over seven years, and 
President Nasser explained to the people that sacrifices were necessary in every field due to the 
scarcity of foreign currency. Yet although he had problems with foreign debt, he did not go 
back on his expensive commitment in Yemen, which demonstrated his desire for a regional 
hegemony in the Arab world. Zakaria Mohi ed-Din had to resign in September 1966, because of 
his disagreement with Nasser's retrenchment measures. When the U. A. R. defaulted on its 
settlement to the I. M. F. in December 1966, Egypt was on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
economic performance of Nasser's government is dealt with in detail in Chapter V. 
2.5.4.1967 War, Its Consequences, and the End of Nasser's Regime 
The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 erupted as a result of Nasser's request for the withdrawal 
of the U. N. Emergency Forces from Sinai. Immediately after this request was granted by the 
U. N. on 16th of May 1967, on 23`d of that month, Nasser closed the straits of Tiran to place a 
ban on Israeli navigation, in order to blockade the crucial Israeli port of Eilat. His reputation in 
the Arab world was greatly enhanced by his anti-Israel actions. Israel, who proclaimed that the 
Gulf of Aqaba was an international sea lane, regarded Nasser's action as an overt declaration of 
war. In this context, King Hussein of Jordan finally signed a mutual defence agreement with the 
U. A. R. despite Israel's strong demand that he maintain a neutral position, as he had during the 
1956 war. The armies of Iraq, Syria and Jordan began to mobilise along the Israeli border. 62 
On 5`h of June, Israel launched massive air strikes at the Arab allies' air fields, and at 
the same time, the Israeli land army invaded the Gaza strip, the Sinai Peninsula and the West 
62 Lawrence Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary (Oxford: ABC-CLIO Information Services, 1984) pp. 360- 
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Bank of Jordan. The outcome of the war was determined within a few hours of the air strikes, 
which destroyed the main body of the Arab air forces, enabling the Israeli land army to advance 
successfully on its target area. It was an unambiguous victory for Israeli. 
By 10`h of June, when all participants in the war accepted the resolution for an 
immediate cease-fire made by the U. N. Security Council, Israeli troops had occupied the whole 
the Sinai Peninsula as far as the Suez Canal (including Sharm al Sheikh), the West Bank of the 
Jordan (including Old Jerusalem), the Gaza strip, and Syrian territory extending 12 miles from 
the Israeli border. Nasser announced his resignation, but appeals from the population forced him 
to withdraw it 63 He dismissed a number of senior army officers and himself took over the duties 
of Prime Minister and Secretary General of the A. S. U. 
It was estimated that the loss of revenue from the Suez Canal, from the oil wells in 
Sinai and from tourism amounted to approximately E£ 12.5 million per month, or almost half 
Egypt's foreign currency revenue. Also, the withdrawal of a large part of the Egyptian force in 
Yemen damaged Nasser's influence as a prominent leader in the Arab world. 
On 22nd of November 1967, after recurring violations of the cease-fire by both sides, 
the U. N. Security Council adopted a British resolution for a permanent peace establishment in 
the Middle East, and authorised the appointment of a U. N. special representative to assist in 
bringing about a settlement. This was Resolution 242,64 which was slightly revised by the U. S. 
mediator, and later came to be known as the Roger Plan, after U. S. Secretary of State William 
Roger. 65 This plan has subsequently formed the basis for the creation of a peaceful atmosphere 
in the Middle East. 
In the meantime, Nasser had to confront economic and political difficulties. A strict 
curtailment in the budget took effect in July 1967. The cost of restoration of the armed forces 
forced him to cut investment, despite Soviet aid and assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 
But the people were ready to tolerate austere measures in order to overcome the hardships of a 
near-bankrupt economy. 66 The continuing problem of a foreign exchange shortage obliged 
Nasser to turn to the West. Under these circumstances, diplomatic relations with Britain were 
restored in December 1967. As a result of reconciliation with the West, Nasser was able to 
obtain bridging loans from British, West German and Italian banks in February 1968, which 
enabled him to settle the outstanding debt to the I. M. F. 
361. 
63 Robert Stephens, op. cit., p. 507. 
64 In essence, U. N. Security Council resolution 242 advised Israel to make peace with the Arabs by returning the 
territory it had occupied after the war. The resolution stressed "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory 
by war, " implying that all of the captured lands had to be returned. Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. op. cit., p. 130. 65 P. J. Vatikiotis, History of Egypt, p. 410. 
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As a result of widespread demonstrations by students and workers throughout the 
country, Nasser became aware of the people's desire for state reform. On 30`h of March 1968, he 
launched a scheme of state reconstruction in Egypt in line with the principles of democracy, 
science and technology. Even though he maintained the single party system, free elections 
throughout the A. S. U. were introduced and enormous changes were promised to the people. By 
the referendum on 2"d of May, the `Declaration of 30`h of March Programme' was 
overwhelmingly approved and officially promulgated. However, despite Nasser's schemes to 
reform the political system, the people were not satisfied. Further student demonstrations took 
place in November 1968. After closing the universities, Nasser became isolated and exposed. 
Due to the shortage of foreign exchange caused by the continued closure of the Canal 
and the decline in the tourist industry, the U. A. R. had to be dependent on aid from Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Libya, and on Soviet assistance. This dependency was humiliating for those who 
had strong nationalist sentiments. In this context, scepticism of Nasser's socialist line increased. 
There were indications that the civilian economic bureaucrats favoured some relaxation of 
stubborn state control in various economic sectors and more encouragement of private sectors 
and foreign investment. This need for reshaping the economic and political systems indicated 
that Nasser's policy line was coming to an end. 
Nasser's death, on 28`h of September 1970, came as a profound shock, and it was 
feared by many that it would reduce the opportunities of achieving peaceful atmosphere in the 
Middle East. One of the closest associates of Nasser and Vice-President at the time of Nasser's 
death, Anwar Sadat, was immediately appointed provisional President by the A. S. U. and cabinet 
members, being later elected official President in a national presidential election, and by mid- 
1971 he was firmly in control of the government of Egypt. Sadat subsequently eradicated all 
Nasser's policies and his legacy, and turned towards a pro-Western, open-door policy. 
66 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. op. cit., p. 130. 
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3. South Korea: A History 
3.1. The Middle Ages in Korean Peninsula - the Koryo (936 -1392 
AD) and Chosun (1392 - 1910) Dynasties: Germination and 
Growth of Confucianism in Korea as a Dominant Ideology 
The etymological origin of Korea is `Koryo' which means `high level of beauty'. It 
was originally the name of a dynasty which came to the forefront of Korean history in the 
central area of the Korean peninsula in 918, after the collapse of the `Post-Three Kingdoms and 
United Shilla Kingdom era' (Husamgook, Tong-il Shilla Shidae). During the Koryo dynasty 
period, the political system became similar to that of China, and in the 13th century Korea came 
under the sway of the Yuan dynasty of China. 
Having been disgraced for a long while, the declining Koryo dynasty was terminated 
by General Song Gye Yi in 1392. He established the Yi dynasty and renamed the kingdom 
Chosun, with Seoul as the new capital. The Yi dynasty was able to achieve the unification of the 
Korean Peninsula under its rule, and it governed the kingdom with the strict ideology of 
Confucianism, supported by an exclusive elite class of scholar-officials. Chosun was not really 
an independent state. She became increasingly Confucianised as a vassal to China, then under 
the Ming dynasty. 
Confucianism penetrated into the Korean Peninsula and provided the main ideological 
standard for ordinary life. It spread slowly but, after the establishment of the Tang dynasty in 
China in the early seventh century, Confucianism became much more influential in Korea. Most 
of the traditional relationships depended on Confucian principles, which were amended to take 
into account the peculiarities of the cultural situation in Korea. The appearance of revised 
Confucianism as the state creed, and rapid Confucianisation of political and social patterns and 
institutions during the Yi dynasty period brought about a sudden decline in Buddhism, which 
had been dominant ideology under the Koryo dynasty. At the same time, the growing number 
of public and private Confucian institutions resulted in an increase in the numbers of the 
educated elite class, the Yangban (literally, `two categories of elites' - civil and military - but 
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referring to the civilian gentry, or upper class) 67 From that time on, Confucianism could 
be 
described as the dominant ideology of the Korean Peninsula, since the core elite class, Yangban, 
adhered to the doctrinal standards of Confucianism. 
In this context, the Yi dynasty of the Chosun Kingdom came to be dominated by the 
elaborated ideology of Confucianism in more concrete ways. However, there was a problem 
in 
that Confucian doctrines contain the possibility of inner conflicts amongst elites educated along 
the lines of Confucian conservatism. These became the Dang Pa (Sect Conflicts), which 
subsequently took the form of protracted struggles in Korea. The power struggles amongst the 
Yangbans and between the monarchy and bureaucracy undermined the foundations of the 
dynasty. As the dynasty became weaker, Korea became vulnerable to Japanese invasions led by 
Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the late 16th century. Although Korea finally drove out the Japanese 
army, the Korean people suffered severely from the trauma of war. After a short while, Korea 
was at war again, this time against the Chung dynasty of Manzhou in the early 17th century. 
Following the opening of Korea to the West in 1882, international power struggles and 
conflicts arouse in the Korean Peninsula, as first China and Japan, then Russia and Japan, 
fought each other for control of this geo-politically strategic point in East Asia, the unexpected 
Japanese victories in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-1905 virtually decided the destiny of Korea, although nationalistic reformists like Ok 
Gyoon Kim and Young Hyo Park made every effort to maintain national independence. 
3.2. The Colonial Era of Korea under Japanese Domination (1910- 
1945) : Humiliating Experiences under the Harsh Colonial Regime 
of Japan 
One of the most tragic experiences of the Korean people throughout their history was 
the hardship caused by the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1905, and her forced annexation to 
Japan in 1910. 
Even in the face of recurring invasions by foreign powers anxious to occupy the fertile 
peninsula, Korea had been able to uphold her sovereignty and to preserve her inherited land. 
However, Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905, according to the forced Eu1sa (the 
67 David I. Steinberg, The Republic of Korea - Economic Transformation and Social Change (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989), p. 30. 
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name of the year according to the Korean traditional calendar) agreement with Japan. Finally, as 
Korea was officially annexed by Japan in 1910 with the abdication of Emperor Kochong, the 
last king of the Yi dynasty, Korea's independence came to an abrupt end. The Japanese colonial 
government in Korea (Chosun Chongdok Bu) was exceedingly brutal and exploitative. The 
basic freedoms of speech and the press were denied, the human rights of the Korean people 
were completely disregarded, farm lands were confiscated under various pretexts, economic and 
educational opportunities were extremely limited, and Korean workers and peasants alike were 
exploited under the repressive rule of the Japanese. 
The Koreans started to rise up against the Japanese colonial government in various 
ways. The first and the most noteworthy uprising against Japan was the March i' movement 
(3.1 Woondong). On the Ist of March 1919, almost two million Korean people demonstrated 
peacefully, expressing their desire for genuine independence from Japanese colonialism under 
the principle of self-determination which was proclaimed by Woodrow Wilson, the President of 
the U. S. It was a completely spontaneous action propelled by the entire nation's earnest desire 
for freedom. A provisional government of Korea in exile (established in Shanghai in April 1919 
under the influence of the March i movement), and various non-violent as well as militant 
organisations of overseas Koreans, kept alive hopes for the eventual restoration of the Korean 
nation. The important fact to be noted is that Park was an officer in the Japanese army which 
operated massive military actions to destroy the liberation army for Korean independence in 
Manchuria. This vocational experience of Park's left a humiliating blot on his career which 
caused serious legitimacy problems when he came to power. 
The Japanese endeavoured to implant their ideology in Korea by forcing the Korean 
people to adopt Shintoism, which is a Japanese traditional religion intermingled with Japanese 
cultures. In order to do this, the Japanese government took the first step towards Japanising 
Korea by distorting Korean history in a project called `Project on the Historical Re-edition of 
Chosun' (Chosunsa Pyunsoosa Saup), and compelled the Korean people to change their own 
names to Japanese names (ChangSsee Gae Myung, meant `creating surname and changing given 
name'). Worse than that, the Japanese government tried to destroy the unique aspects of Korea, 
such as her traditions, culture, religion and even her language. One of the most notorious 
provocations was `the ordinance prohibiting Korean hair style' (Dan Bal Ryung). The traditional 
hairstyle of Chosun was a symbol of nobleness and self respect, so this law was extraordinarily 
humiliating for the Korean people, who respected their own culture and customs according to 
Confucian values. In addition to this, a religious ritual for worship of Japanese gods was 
enforced as part of the brainwashing process (Shinsa Cham Bae and Dong Bang Yo Bae). 
48 
3.3. Restoring Independence and Nation Building (1945 - 1950): 
The Period of U. S. Military Administration68 and The Establishment 
of the First Republic of Korea 
15`h of August 1945 was a day of jubilation for the Korean people, with the 
unconditional surrender of Japanese to the Allied forces. Immediately, the Japanese colonial 
government withdrew from Korean territory. The Cairo Declaration of November 1943, issued 
by the British Prime Minister, Winston L. S. Churchill, the President of the U. S., Franklin 
Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek of China, proclaimed that `in due course, Korea shall become 
free and independent'. This declaration painted the Korean people a picture of genuine 
independence, but the truth behind it was that world leaders intended to occupy Korean 
territory. 69 Under the circumstances, the Soviet Union accepted the Cairo agreement on 
condition of the trusteeship by dividing the Korean Peninsula into two parts, while proposals 
made by the U. S. in 1945 led to the division of Korea into two military zones: the area south of 
the 38th parallel under U. S. occupation, and the northern area under Soviet control 70 From that 
time on, the Korean Peninsula has suffered from this division of the country. 
In those days, nobody could predict what direction affairs in the Korean Peninsula 
would take. The political situation was absolutely chaotic. In this context, Mr. Abe Nobuyuki, 
the last Japanese Governor-General in Korea persuaded Un Hyung Yeo, a prominent left-wing 
nationalist, to form a political organisation to maintain law and order at the end of the period of 
Japanese colonial rule, in order to protect Japanese people in Korea and to guarantee their safety 
in the whole process of withdrawal. With these efforts by Nobuyuki, the Committee for the 
Preparation of the National Construction of Korea (C. P. N. C. K., Geon Gook Joon Bi Wiwonhoe) 
was launched into a political vacuum. Various levels of organisation appeared. Provincial, 
68 The U. S. military government was not formally organised until 4th of January 1946. Early civil-affairs teams were 
task forces until that time, however, after 12th of September, under Military Governor Major General A. V. Arnold. 
69 The phrase 'in due course' has been controversial. No firm consensus had been reached about when independence 
was to be realised or in what stages. Roosevelt had said after Cairo, at the Teheran meetings with Stalin, that it 
was to be "lengthy" and that Korea would "need some period of apprenticeship before full independence... 
perhaps forty years. " Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: an Intimate History (New York: Enigma Book, 
2001) p. 777. At Yalta, he spoke to Stalin of twenty to thirty years. A State Department of the U. S. government 
briefing paper for Yalta supported a four-power trusteeship of Korea "as a single unit until such time as the 
Koreans are able to govern themselves. " See Carl Berger, The Korean Knot -a Military Political History 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968) p. 38. 
70 There have been serious arguments concerning who should shoulder responsibility for causing the division of the 
Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel. For details of these arguments, see Wan Bhum Lee, The Truth behind 
the Demarcation of the 38`h Parallel (Seoul: Ji Shik San Up Sa, 2001). Lee revealed that U. S. military officers 
were mainly responsible for the demarcation of the 38th Parallel. 
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district and local committees were organised to control the country. On 6`h of September 1945, 
two days before the arrival of the U. S. occupation forces, the committee called a `National 
Assembly' and established a `People's Republic of Korea', claiming jurisdiction over the whole 
country and aiming at the establishment of a socialist government. In the meantime, 
Soviet 
troops, which had entered Korea in early August, quickly moved southward, and within a month 
the entire northern half of the Korean Peninsula had been occupied by the troops of the Soviet 
Union. 
On the other hand, when the U. S. occupation authority arrived in the Korean Peninsula, 
in contrast to the Soviet authorities in the North, the U. S. authority refused to recognise the 
legitimacy of either the `People's Republic' proclaimed by C. P. N. C. K. led by Yeo, or the 
Korean Provisional Government (K. P. G. ) led by Ku Kim, based in China 71 While the People's 
Republic of Korea was established in the North, The United States Army Military Government 
in Korea (U. S. A. M. G. I. K. ) was established in the South and operated until the proclamation of 
South Korea's independence in August 1948. And this government was proclaimed to be the 
only legitimate governing authority in South Korea 72 This was the critical moment when the 
nation was divided. From that time on, the Korean people have suffered numerous severe 
hardships brought about by this unexpected and tragic national division. One of the most tragic 
incidents produced by the division was the Korean War in 1950. 
Towards the end of 1945, a number of political leaders in exile, such as Dr. Syngman 
Rhee from the U. S., Ku Kim and Dr. Kyu Sik Kim from China, and 11 Sung Kim and other 
communists who had been released from Japanese imprisonment were on their way home. The 
returning communists rushed to establish a communist party in the South part of the Korean 
Peninsula, which was called South Korean Labour Party (S. K. L. P., Nam Ro Dang). S. K. L. P. 
was established by the coalition of three prominent communists Hun Young Park, Un Hyung 
Yeo, the leader of C. P. N. C. K., and Nam Woon Back, the famous socialist economist. Later 
when the S. K. L. P. was banned by the U. S. A. M. G. I. K., 73 it went underground and became the 
headquarters of the communist movement in South Korea. In 1947, Chung Hee Park joined this 
71 Despite advice from the State Department advisors in Seoul that the K. P. G. should be returned forthwith, that 
trusteeship should be abandoned, and that the K. P. G. should be installed subject to U. S. A. M. G. I. K. 's veto, the 
return was blocked for about a month until a written promise was extracted from Ku Kim and made to General 
Albert C. Wedemeyer in Chungking that he and his group would not return as a government. Gregory Henderson, 
Korea - the Politics of Vortex (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978) pp. 129-130. 
72 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (S. C. A. P. ), Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan and Korea, 
No. 1 (September 1945) p. 177. 
73 The freedom of political activity permitted by U. S. A. M. G. I. K. resulted in a proliferation of political parties and 
social organisations of all political orientations, each vying for prominence. U. S. A. M. G. I. K. attempted in vain to 
bring about a coalition of moderate nationalists and the non-communist left wing as the Cold War conflict against 
the Soviet Union intensified in international politics. 
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secret party planning a communist revolution. In addition to the blot on his career caused 
by his 
participation in the Japanese military, opposing the Korean liberation army, this record of 
participation in the S. K. L. P. was the fatal weak point for Park when he became President of 
South Korea. 
In December 1945, three ministers representing the U. K., the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. 
entered into the Moscow Agreement. That agreement proclaimed a five-year trusteeship 
for 
Korea under a four-power regime including China. The objective of this agreement was stated 
as being "to guide the Korean people towards full independence. "74 Despite violent anti- 
trusteeship demonstrations against the agreement from both right and left-wings, the Allied 
occupation authorities resolved to put the Moscow plan into practice. The communists 
unexpectedly changed their attitude in favour of the Moscow plan, splitting the Korean people 
into two conflicting camps. In the South, where the U. S. A. M. G. I. K. ruled, communist 
movements were strictly prohibited under the pretext that such left-wing movements incited the 
people to violence. In fact, communist-directed labour strikes became pervasive in South, and 
intimidation by both ideological camps became out of control. 
There were several attempts to stabilise this chaotic political situation. A joint 
commission of the U. S. and the Soviet Union was set up to establish a national government of 
Korea in consultation with Korean political and social organisations. The first session of the 
joint commission was held in Seoul, the capital of the South, in March - May 1946. The Soviet 
delegate insisted that only `democratic' organisations should participate and that only 
organisations which supported the Moscow agreement were `democratic'. It became clear that 
the Soviet Union sought to establish a national government of Korea dominated by the 
communists. After the breakdown of the first session in 1946 over consultation issues, the 
second session of the joint commission, held in the northern capital Pyongyang in May 1947, 
also failed to achieve any agreement, and in June, the commission's business was suspended 
indefinitely. 
When the impossibility of building a genuinely unified Korea became clear, 
U. S. A. M. G. I. K. made a decision to establish a democratic republic, which would be a pro- 
American regime, just in the South. At the same time, the Soviet occupation authority likewise 
proceeded to establish a satellite regime under the leadership of 11 Sung Kim, young communist. 
All anti-Soviet and anti-communist organisations were eradicated unless they became 
subservient to the communist leadership. By this means, a centralised communist state was 
established in the North, as II Sung Kim formed his own party in defiance of Hun Young Park, 
74 Department of State Publication 5609, The Korean Problem at the Geneva Conference (Washington D. C., 1954) 
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leader of the S. K. L. P., whose headquarters were in Seoul, in South Korea. 
The U. S. A. M. G. I. K. established a South Korean interim Legislative Assembly on 12`h 
of December 1946. Subsequently, an interim Administrative Government was set up. Both 
organisations, which were composed mainly of moderate middle-of-the-road right-wing 
nationalists, were obliged to read- U. S. A. M. G. I. K. 's mind on every occasion. Both these 
establishments were resentfully criticised by right-wing leaders such as Dr. Syngman Rhee and 
Ku Kim, who had explicitly demanded genuine independence. The relationship between the U. S. 
and those leaders took a turn for the worse, while anarchist movements which had been 
sceptical of both parts of the Korean Peninsula in terms of their ideological positions stirred up 
uncontrollable demonstrations. Under these conditions of extreme chaos, neither the interim 
Legislative Assembly, nor the interim Government, was able to play their roles effectively. The 
reason for this was that neither organisation had ever had any autonomy from the 
U. S. A. M. G. I. K. to tackle the impending problems, and both were regarded by the conservative 
nationalists as U. S. proteges attempting to extend the U. S. military occupation of South Korea. 
Even though U. S. A. M. G. I. K. had made a great deal of its intentions to assist the process of 
Korean unification, prominent leaders in the South had remained sceptical. 
On 23`d of September 1947, the question of the unification and permanent government 
of the Korean Peninsula was submitted to the General Assembly of the U. N. After intense 
argument, the U. N. General Assembly formed the U. N. Temporary Commission on Korea in 
November to observe the political process in general, and authorised it to supervise national 
elections in Korea to establish an official national government over the whole of the Korean 
Peninsula. 75 
Both the U. S. and South Korean leaders accepted the U. N. resolution concerning the 
official formation of the nation by means of a U. N. -supervised election. However, the Soviet 
Union, which occupied North Korea, rejected the U. N. resolution and the U. N. Temporary 
Commission was refused permission to visit North Korea to arrange the schedule for the general 
election. It became obvious that the U. N. resolution would not work over the whole of the 
Korean Peninsula, and the Commission had to choose an alternative plan, to hold elections in 
those areas where it was possible, to be precise, in South Korea only. It seemed that the 
Commission must have assumed that U. N. -sponsored and supervised elections would take place 
in the North as well in the near future, that a National Assembly created by the first democratic 
elections in Korea would represent the entire country in terms of legitimacy, that the 
government to be established would be that of all Korea, and that the people in the North would 
p. 2. Quoted in Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 131. 
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elect their representatives to the National Assembly at a later date. Those assumptions were 
mistaken, due to a lack of knowledge about the North Korean situation, and to a 
misunderstanding of their intentions to build a solid communist regime under the circumstances 
of the intensifying Cold War. 
While the right-wing nationalists, with Dr. Syngman Rhee at their head, welcomed 
such an alternative plan, 76 the moderate and progressive nationalists, such as Kyu Sik Kim, the 
head of the Democratic Independence Party, as well as Ku Kim, and extreme right-wing 
nationalists, vehemently opposed it, fearing that it would turn the temporary division of Korea 
into a permanent political partition. They visited North Korea and talked with It Sung Kim and 
other communists, but failed to achieve their objective 77 
According to their power-building schedule, the authorities of the Soviet Union in the 
North Korea had already begun to transfer power to the Supreme People's Assembly and the 
Central People's Committee, both established in early 1947. Dr. Rhee's personal organisation, 
the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence, pushed the U. S. A. M. G. I. K. 
to take immediate action for the genuinely self-governed independence of South Korea. The 
first general election in the entire history of Korean politics was conducted only in South Korea 
on 10th of May 1948, which produced a National Assembly, dominated in the main by the right 
wing. 78 Since this first Assembly enacted the first Constitution of the Republic of Korea, it has 
been called the Constituent National Assembly (Je Hun Eui Hoe). About 7.5 million people, 
constituting 75% of the electorate, voted for their representatives in every constituency. By 
means of this election, the first General Assembly was established. 198 representatives in all 
were elected from the South, while 100 unfilled seats were reserved for North Korean 
representatives. 79 The National Assembly established a democratic Constitution for the First 
Republic of Korea. In the initial stages of drafting the Constitution, the parliamentary 
government system may have been considered the most suitable system for the Republic of 
75 Ibid., p. 134. 
76 This decision was made with the approval of Dr. Seung Man Rhee, who was the most prominent leader at that time. 
He strongly suggested that the government of South Korea should be established before anything else. Thus, 
many commentators and historians criticised Dr. Rhee for his greed for obtaining power in South Korea. With 
regard to the responsibility of Dr. Rhee for the national division, see Kun Ho Song, "The Failure of the 
Establishment of the Unified Nation and the Opening of the Era of National Division, " A Re-appraisal of Forty 
Years from the Liberation (Seoul: Dol Bae Gae, 1985). 
77 Gregory Henderson, op. cit., p. 134. 
78 The participation of left-wing politicians in the election was strictly prohibited by U. S. A. M. G. I. K. for the purpose 
of preventing the intervention of North Korean communists, and moderate nationalists boycotted the election to 
protest against the incompleteness of the election. Prominent political leaders such as Kyu Sik Kim and Ku Kim 
refused to take part in the first general election. Consequently, the first general election on 10`h of May 1948 could 
be described as a half election, both geographically and ideologically. Central Election Management Committee, 
The History of Election in the Republic of Korea (Seoul: CEMC, 1973) p. 298. 
79 Han Kook Ilbo (The Daily Korea) 26`' of October 1985. 
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Korea, but this changed dramatically, and the Presidency system was finally chosen. 
80 
According to the first Constitution, Dr. Rhee was elected the first President of this First 
Republic of Korea, whose legitimacy was immediately recognised by the U. N. as the only 
legal 
legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. On 15th of August 1948, the First Republic of 
Korea was inaugurated, and the U. S. occupation came to an end. 
In August 1948, the communists in the North held an election and established the new 
527-member Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(D. P. R. K. ), which was proclaimed on 90' of September. From this time on, the 
Korean 
peninsula has been divided formally, and represents an unresolvable conflict. 
3.4. The Korean War (1950 - 1953) 81 
The three year Korean War was the most tragic incident throughout the whole history 
of the Korean Peninsula. Its impact was not limited to Korean territory alone. Its political, 
economic and military implications have been quite serious in the arena of international politics 
as well. 82 
The U. S. forces were withdrawn from South Korea in June 1949, leaving only a small 
military mission. The military forces of South Korea at that time were considerably weaker than 
those of the North, which had been strengthened with the help of the Soviet Union, in line with 
Khrushchev's regional strategy against the containment policy83devised by George Kennan of 
8o This dramatic change of political structure was due to Dr. Rhee's strong intention to dominate the country by 
means of absolute power. Jin Oh Yoo, Reminiscences of Founding Constitution (Seoul: 11 Cho Kak, 1981) p. 92. 
81 In this thesis, the details of the origins of the Korean War are not dealt with. There have been many arguments on 
this issue which have attempted to establish real responsibility for this disastrous war, see Hak Joon Kim, Sino- 
North Korean Relations, 1945-1984 (Seoul: The Korean Research Centre, 1985) Ch. 3,4 in Part I; Nikita S. 
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, with an Introduction, Commentary and Notes by Edward Crankshaw, (tr. & 
ed. ) Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1970); I. F. Stone, The Hidden History of the Korean War (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1952); Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, 
and the Politics of the Korean Civil War (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the 
Korean War (2 Vols. ) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), Vol.! (Liberation and the Establishment of 
the Separate Regimes). 
82 Hak Joon Kim, "Korean War" Modern Korean Politics, Korean Political Science Association (ed. ) (Seoul: Bup 
Moon Sa, 1987) p. 167. 
83 The Containment policy was the main aspect of the foreign policy of the U. S at the time of the Cold War. The idea 
of containment of the Soviet threat originated under George Kennan. He provided the foundation for all 
subsequent geo-strategic policy doctrines for U. S. military police actions around the globe. Kennan underlined 
containment and patience as the means to meet and combat Soviet expansionism. "For ideology as we have seen 
taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty to overthrow the political forces beyond 
their borders. "(X, Foreign Affairs, 1947) Kennan was developing a notion of a mutually sustained antagonism 
between two opposites, that the Soviet Union was the exact opposite of the U. S. in ideology, and culture. Ile later 
concluded that the Soviet Union would fall due to its overdeveloped military and underdeveloped economic 
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the U. S. in the situation of the Cold War. Increased tensions between the North and the South 
culminated in the outbreak of the Korean War on 25`s of June 1950, when a North Korean 
force 
of over 60,000 troops, supported by Soviet-built tanks, crossed the 38`'' parallel and. invaded the 
South. Four days later, the North Koreans advanced furiously, finally capturing Seoul, the 
capital of the South. In the meantime, U. S. forces, whose assistance had been requested 
by the 
South Korean government, arrived on 30`h of June. 84 
In an immediate response to North Korea's invasion, the U. N. arranged a collective 
defence action in support of South Korea. Armed forces from sixteen countries of the U. N., 
attached to a unified command under the U. S. army, were dispatched to help drive back the 
incursion. Meanwhile, the North Koreans kept driving southwards, advancing so rapidly that 
they came to occupy most of the territory of South Korea, leaving the U. N. troops confined to 
the south-east corner of the peninsula. The Incheon landing operation on 15`s of September was 
a major breakthrough leading to a reversal of the deadlocked situation in the U. N. troops' favour. 
The People's Army of North Korea was driven back, and U. N. troops advanced into North 
Korea. With an irresistible force, U. N. troops captured Pyongyang, and arrived at the Chinese 
frontier on the Yalu (Ap Rok) River in November. 
On 50' of November, the first report of Chinese intervention in the war was received. 85 
The People's Republic of China sent troops to assist North Korea. Approximately 200,000 
Chinese crossed the Yalu River into Korea, forcing the evacuation of South Korean and U. N. 
troops. The Chinese then advanced into South Korea, but were driven back by a U. N. counter- 
attack on 15th of March 1951. 
Peace negotiations began in July 1951, but hostilities continued until an armistice 
agreement was concluded on 27th of July 1953.86 This tragic war left more than 800,000 
casualties in South Korea, and enormous damage to property. The cease-fire line which was 
drawn on 27th of July 1953, roughly along the 38th parallel, remains the official boundary 
between North and South Korea, with a narrow De-Militarised Zone (D. M. Z. ) separating the 
two frontiers. 
system trough the ceaseless containing the Soviet. 
Taken from http: //www. geocities. com/s011023/coldwar3. htm 
84 For details regarding the U. S. troops' entry into the war, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 
1950 (New York: Free Press, 1968) 
85 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu: the Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1960) p. 15-27. 
86 There were intense arguments about how to finish the war. General Douglas MacArthur strongly advocated 
expansion of the War to drive out all the Chinese troops and to build up a unified Korean government. By the 
contrast, President Harry Truman did not want to escalate this regional conflict into a World War III. As the result 
of vehement arguments between General MacArthur and President Truman, General MacArthur retired. After that, 
a new commander, General Matthew B. Ridgeway pushed forward with the armistice agreement programme. Hak 
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3.5. The First and Second Republics (1948 -1961) 
The First Republic of Korea, led by the first President Syngman Rhee, who was elected 
as President by the first general election in 1948, embarked upon a new phase as an independent 
state both nominally and in reality. However, the First Republic had to confront threats from 
communist movements which tried to overthrow the right-wing government. At last, a very 
serious communist-inspired military rebellion broke out in the southern area of Korea in 
October 1948. The rebellion was finally suppressed, but it demoralised the nation and increased 
the repressive character of the government. The democratic aspirations and trends of the pre- 
Korean War period diminished as President Rhee's government became more and more 
autocratic during and after the Korean War. Political and social conditions became chaotic as 
economic hardships multiplied. 
As crises increased, President Rhee and his Liberal Party (L. P. ) suffered from an 
obsession with communist threats. As a result of this psychological complex, Rhee's regime 
acted domineeringly towards its opponents, and various constitutional amendments were forced 
through the National Assembly. On 4`h of July 1952, President Rhee forced the National 
Assembly to amend two articles of the Constitution which regulated the details of the election of 
the President. 87 This amendment has been called `the selected amendment bill to the 
Constitution' (Bal Chwe Gae Hun An) which has had a disgraceful reputation. Taking 
advantage of these newly amended articles, President Rhee was able to maintain his regime in 
power. In 1954, the National Assembly adopted another series of amendments, including the 
exemption of the incumbent President from the two-term constitutional limitation in office, and 
the abolition of the post of Prime Minister. 
In the 1956 presidential election, an opposition Democratic Party (D. P. ) had a good 
chance of winning the election. However, the sudden death of Ik Hee Shin, the presidential 
candidate of the D. P., ensured victory for Dr. Rhee once again. The D. P. candidate for vice- 
president, Myon Chang, defeated the LP candidate, Ki Boong Lee. 
As corruption inside the regime increased and repression by the police grew more 
severe, a strong desire for change prevailed, particularly amongst urban voters. At elections to 
Joon Kim, "Korean War, " op. cit., pp. 178-179. 
87 Jung Huh, Testimony for Tomorrow (Seoul: Saem Tu, 1979) p. 22. 
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the National Assembly in 1958, the D. P. substantially increased its number of seats. 88 Aware of 
the danger of losing dominance, the L. P. -dominated National Assembly established a new 
national security law on 240' of December 1958, in order to control all the political actors under 
the pretext of anti-communism. 
The death of the D. P. candidate, Dr. Pyohng Ok Cho, some weeks before the fourth 
presidential elections, again ensured the re-election of Dr. Syngman Rhee on 15"' of March 1960. 
However, popular reactions against the corruption and non-democratic performance of Rhee's 
regime were increasing and student riots erupted throughout the country. The student uprising 
of 19th of April, known to Korean as the 4.19 Revolution, forced President Rhee to resign. Jung 
Huh was appointed provisional leader for the preparation of a genuinely democratic government. 
In June, the National Assembly decided to amend the Constitution in order to adopt a 
parliamentary system instead of a presidential system, in order to prevent the kind of personal 
dictatorship which Rhee had assumed in the First Republic. In August, the National Assembly 
elected Dr. Myon Chang as Prime Minister. This was the Second Republic of Korea. 
Apart from the Land Reform Law of 1949, the First Republic had been unable to 
achieve any positive successes in terms of economic reforms. A protracted depression prevailed 
and deepened during the whole period of the First Republic. Even though basic investment in 
the production of items indispensable to life was carried out with aid from U. N. agencies and 
the U. S. government, South Korea remained economically depressed, suffering from shortages 
of energy, food and consumer goods. 
Even though the Second Republic was established on the basis of the people's passion 
for democracy, it met with a series of difficulties: it had no mandate from the people, and 
neither nominal President Bo Son Yuri nor Prime Minister Myon Chang showed a sufficient 
level of fortitude and practical ability in public administration. 
Chang's new government of the Second Republic was indecisive in dealing with the 
legacy of Rhee's autocratic regime, and proved unable to deal effectively with serious 
ideological and social differences amongst various sectional groups. At the same time, it seemed 
unable to obtain new support or the loyalty of the people. 
In this unstable situation, a split within the ruling D. P. emerged, and effective solutions 
to economic and social problems did not appear. With the exception of the F. Y. P., Chang's 
administration was unable to take appropriate measures for solving the country's serious 
economic problems. Meanwhile, there were continuous demonstrations throughout the country, 
as communist influence spread amongst students and intellectuals. Demands by students for 
88 L. P. took 126 seats, D. P. took 79 seats out of 233 seats. After the general election of 1958, two-party system 
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immediate contact with their North Korean counterparts, aimed at reunification, compounded 
by 
economic hardships in the South, increased the apparent threat to national security and stability. 
In a situation of unstable political authority due to the ceaseless discord within the 
parliamentary system, every social sector tried to satisfy its own interests, and became 
involved 
in politics with the sole purpose of expanding hegemony. This kind of situation could 
be 
described as a praetorian society, which tends to incur military intervention. 89 The Second 
Republic finally came to an end with the military coup carried out by Park. 
3.6. Power Attainment and Military Rule (1961 -1963) 
On 16`h of May 1961, a small group of young army officers led by General Chung flee 
Park overthrew Chang's government. The military junta put an end to any political action. The 
National Assembly was dissolved, all political activities were strictly prohibited, and martial 
law was proclaimed throughout the country, prohibiting student demonstrations and enforcing 
censorship of the press. The Chief of Staff, General Do Yong Chang, became Chairman of a 
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction immediately after the coup. President Yuri 
remained in office, but Chang's government was controlled by the military officers. Pledges 
were announced by the Supreme Council, safeguarding anti-communism and adherence to the 
U. N., with the intention of strengthening links with the U. S. and the Western bloc, and 
promising a full rage of economic and political reforms, as well as the eventual restoration of 
civilian government after the political situation had been stabilised. 
The Supreme Council had full powers over the military government and it acted as an 
official legislative organisation, and a `National Reconstruction Extraordinary Measures Law' 
(Gookga Jaegun Teukbyul Jochi Bup) replaced the defunct Constitution of the Second Republic. 
In July 1961, when General Chang was arrested and convicted of anti-revolutionary conspiracy, 
General Park took up the chairmanship of the Supreme Council. In August, General Park 
announced that all levels of political activity would be permitted by early 1963, as a sign of a 
return to civilian governance. In December 1962, there was a constitutional amendment to 
restore an exceptionally centralised presidential system, while limiting the presidential term of 
office to a double four-year duration. 
Taking into account the people's desire for a civilian government, the revolutionaries 
anchored in Korean politics. 
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hatched a plan for launching an ostensible civilian government. They intended to maintain 
power by involving the civilian regime. In January 1963, the Democratic Republican 
Party 
(D. R. P. ) was established by the initiation of military officers, 90 and it elected General Park as 
its 
presidential candidate. In mid-March, however, an alleged secret attempt to overthrow the 
military was exposed and Park announced that a national referendum would take place in order 
to obtain ratification for a four-year extension of military rule. The people's reaction was one of 
strong indignation. Consequently, Park was compelled to promise the establishment of a civilian 
government within one year. 
In order to participate in the presidential election, in August, Park retired from the army 
and became the presidential candidate of the D. R. P. Freedom of political activity was restored 
for those who had no record of any political crime. In this election, the opposition was riddled 
with power struggles, and thus, divided. Finally, Bo Son Yuri, came to the forefront as the 
candidate of the Civil Rule Party. Park, candidate of the D. R. P., won the election by a very 
narrow margin. In the general election of the National Assembly in November, the D. R. P. won 
a crushing majority of the seats. Officially, civilian constitutional governance was restored on 
17'h of December 1963, with the inauguration of President Park and the opening of the National 
Assembly. 
3.7. Period of Park's Administration 
3.7.1. The Third Republic (1963 -1972) 
Although the people's strong hope for a civilian government, The Third Republic, 
came true at last, all the crucial ministerial positions in the government were occupied by ex- 
military officers, and an absolute majority in the National Assembly was held by the D. R. P. 
Although Park's strong ambition of rapid economic development was realised under a series of 
state-led F. Y. P. (1962-1966,1967-1971), the Third Republic had to confront quite a few serious 
89 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968) p. 194. 
90 The D. R. P. could be described as a prefabricated political party formed by the military intelligence agency of 
Park's military government. Confronted by the people's strong passion for the restoration of civilian government, 
the revolutionaries were forced to justify their power maintenance. Their final solution was Park's participation in 
civilian government after his retirement from the Army. Consequently, Park established a party as his advance 
guard for gaining power as a civilian leader. This was the D. R. P.. Out of 70 charter members of the D. R. P., only 7 
members had political careers. David Cole and Princeton Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics 
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difficulties in internal politics. 
The most serious thing was the vehement resistance to the Korea-Japan Talks on a 
national scale. In March 1964, large-scale student demonstrations broke out in Seoul, 
in protest 
against negotiations with Japan to normalise official diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. Despite these demonstrations, the government decided to participate in an external 
war by dispatching troops to Viet Nam in co-operation with the U. S. Park proclaimed martial 
law in June 1965, and concluded the treaty normalising relations with Japan. 
In order to deteriorate the influence of the ruling party, minor parties united in the form 
of coalition against D. R. P. in January 1967. It was the germination of the New Democratic 
Party (N. D. P. ). However, in the May 1967 presidential election, the President Park defeated Bo 
Son Yuri, candidate of the N. D. P., by a large margin, and the D. R. P. was able to occupy a 
substantial majority of seats in the National Assembly. After some incidents of disclosure of 
electoral violations involving the Park's D. R. P, the N. D. P. strongly demanded the nullification 
of the results and called for re-election for presidency. 
In urban areas, as repugnance to dictatorship of Park's regime increased, the political 
influence of the N. D. P. was amplified. Subsequently, quite a few progressive intellectuals and 
students came to support the N. D. P. In this context, Park must have felt crisis consciousness. 
Consequently, the D. R. P. proposed a constitutional amendment in order to allow the incumbent 
President to serve a third term of office. (Sam Sun Gae Hun) A national referendum, which was 
manipulated by Park's hyperbolical propaganda of national crisis, approved the amendment. In 
the seventh presidential election, held in April 1971, President Park defeated Dae Jung Kim, 
candidate of the N. D. P. 
On 4th of July 1972, Seoul and Pyongyang simultaneously announced a joint 
communique which stated the mutual corresponding between North and South to achieve 
national unification by peaceful means without outside intervention. A South-North Co- 
ordinating Committee (Nam Buk Jo Jul Wiwon Hoe) was established for the purpose of 
propelling the peaceful communication. Although this was the first historical moment of visible 
attempt for reunification from the both sides, many commentators regard this announcement as 
Park's disguising measure for overcoming domestic dissatisfactions caused by irregularities of 
presidential election in 1971. 
and Economics, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 50. 
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3.7.2. The Fourth Republic: Autocratic rule by the Yushin Constitution 
(1972 -1979) 
With the strong drive of economic development of the two F. Y. Ps, during the period 
1962-1971, Park was able to construct sound foundation, and the economic future of the nation 
seemed brighter. The sudden changes in the international situation, due to the peaceful 
atmosphere of detente and new developments in South-North relations since 1972 in 
corporation with the Nixon doctrine, provided the D. R. P. with convenient pretexts to perpetuate 
President Park's regime. After the consideration of international affairs, Park attempted to set up 
his life-time Presidency by means of another Constitutional amendment. A new Constitution 
was proposed by the Extraordinary State Council (Bi Sang Guk Ga Wiwon Heo) and enacted in 
November 1972. It was Yushin Constitution which was notorious for its role of supporting 
Park's harsh dictatorship. 
Yushin Constitution abrogated the direct presidential election, and candidacy limits for 
the president was abolished. This Constitution guaranteed the President's exclusive and 
expanded powers, authorising him to issue emergency decrees and to establish the National 
Conference for Unification (N. C. U. ) as an electoral college for the Presidency. In December 
1972, N. C. U., was established, and it elected Park to be the President for another six year. 
In the general election in 1973, the D. R. P. could take 71 of the 146 seats of the 
National Assembly. Meanwhile, a new political movement, named Yushin Jung-Woo Hoe 
('Political Colleagues for Revitalising Innovation') was established as a subservient apparatus 
of the D. R. P. Seventy three of its members were elected by the N. C. U. President's 
recommendation made them members of National Assembly automatically despite they did not 
run for general election to be a member of National Assembly. Consequently, President Park 
was able to assure an absolute majority in the parliament. 
Park's regime fulfil the targets of economy successfully during the period of the third 
F. Y. P. (1972-1976) and the fourth F. Y. P. (began in 1977), accompanied by successful 
industrialisation and an increase in per capita income. This, in turn, brought about remarkable 
educational and cultural development. However, the nature of Park's autocratic regime became 
more oppressive and violent. 
The shameful incident happened in 1973. Exiled opposition leader Dae Jung Kim, who 
had been campaigning against Park in the U. S. and Japan, was kidnapped by secret agents of the 
Korean Central Intelligence Agency (K. C. I. A. ). They attempted to assassinate him, but failed. 
This incident created serious problems for Park's regime with the U. S. and Japanese 
governments. The incident of attempt of Kim's assassination set a fire on anti-government 
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demonstration and caused furious demands for the abolition of the 1972 Yushin Constitution. 
This chaotic situation continued to cause political instability in 1974 and after. In order to tackle 
the extremely chaotic situation, Park banned all anti-government activities and agitation for 
democracy, rendering the political situation more unstable. Against this background of political 
chaos, the first lady, President Park's wife, was killed on 15th of August in an assassination 
attempt against Park by a North Korean agent Sei Kwang Moon. Political situations were 
getting worse. 
In May 1975, the Presidential Emergency Measure for Safeguarding National Security 
(Guk Ga Anbo Bi Sang Jo Chi) was declared in order to suppress the political opponents 
although its ostensible reason of enactment was to strengthen national security against a 
mounting threat of aggression from North Korea, following the fall of South Viet Nam. The 
measure brought about additional prevention on opponents and banned all kinds of political 
demonstration. In May 1978, N. C. U. elected President Park to be the President of Korea again 
almost unanimously. As the result of this non-democratic process of presidential election, the 
political situation of South Korea lapsed into greater turmoil of chaos. 
3.7.3. Crisis and Park's Death 
The Yushin Constitution could be described as the fundamentals of Park's remarkable 
achievement in economic development. However, it also played a role for supporting Park's 
notorious dictatorship. As time went on in the Fourth Republic, Park's regime under the Yushin 
Constitution came to a political crisis. 
In July 1979, young N. D. P. leader Young Sam Kim was expelled from the member of 
National Assembly on a charge of anti-government speeches and negative comments at press 
interviews with Time. In subsequence, all the N. D. P. member of the National Assembly handed 
in their resignations in protest. Although Park attempted to demonstrate his conciliatory attitude 
toward opposition party members by means of releasing more political prisoners, ended in a 
failure. Vehement protests and demonstrations did not stop. Finally, in this political turmoil, Jae 
Kyu Kim, director of the K. C. I. A., assassinated President Park on 26`h of October 1979. Park's 
18 year regime came to an end all at once. 
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4. Summary 
This chapter made a general survey of historical background of Egypt and Korea by 
focusing on the advent of Nasser and Park and their performance. Although Muhammad Ali's 
series of attempts of restructuring Egypt were effective in fact, incompetent successors of him 
could not continue the predecessor's achievement. In this historical circumstance, Nasser came 
to the front by overthrowing King Farouk's regime at the last resort and became a prominent 
leader in Arab world. However, Nasser's keenly enthusiastic attempts to achieve the regional 
hegemony by means of Arab unification ended in failure. The U. A. R. 's collapse, inefficient 
economic performance and defeats in 1967 War debilitated him. It is obvious that Nasser may 
be regarded as a great Arab leader, but his ultimate aims of Arab unity and Arab socialism were 
not achieved. 
Before the modern era, Korea maintained her own strict social orders of Confucianism. 
As time goes on, she came to have experience of harsh invasion of modernised Japan. For thirty 
six years, Korean people had to suffer from disastrous colonialism of Japan. In the aftermath of 
World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided as the result of the U. S. and the Soviet Union's 
intention of mandatory rule. When it comes to investigation in Korean history in 20`h century, 
the two salient keys to understand Korean history were the Japanese colonialism and division of 
peninsular. 
While Nasser solidified his political foundation by means of expressing his neutrality 
under the Cold War system, Park used the severe tensions between North and South. On the 
pretext of constant threats from the North, he justified his dictatorship and oppressed all 
democratic movements. The culmination of his dictatorship was the Yushin Constitution which 
contained Park's intention of lifetime presidency. 
Nasser and Park's regimes were outstandingly in contrast in terms of their leadership 
characteristics, ideology and its domestic implications and economic strategy. This contrast 
between both leaders was based on the different traces of modern history between Nasser' 
Egypt and Park's Korea. 
The next chapter is a discussion of the issue of legitimacy and leadership 
characteristics of both regimes as an analytical framework. In this discussion, legitimacy is 
illustrated as an independent variable for shaping leadership characteristics. This exploration 
will help to explain the causalities of both leaderships' performance and regime's style. 
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III. LEGITIMACY AND LEADERSHIP 
CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Introduction: The Personalisation of Power 
One of the most frequently used terms in comparative politics is `institutionalisation'. 
From time to time, it has been used as an indication of the extent of political development. The 
term `institutionalisation' indicates a lack of that personal arbitrariness which could be a main 
cause of non-democratic politics. Thus, `institutionalisation' can be set up as a prime target to 
be aimed at for those who want to establish genuine pluralism. 
Therefore, in a well-institutionalised political system, where concrete and stable 
political institutions have taken firm root and are being managed by systematic regulations, 
political leadership is less likely to be determined by the personal characteristics of a particular 
leader. Although the most influence over the administration of the political system is obviously 
wielded by the person in the highest rank, the system itself plays a massive role in an 
institutionalised political system because of the existence of a consenting election system. Thus, 
individual leaders' characteristics and their idiosyncrasies are not the most influential factor in 
shaping a regime. Rather, political entities such as parties or interest groups are important 
factors in characterising the regime's makeup. 
However, in Third World countries, the situation is different from that of most 
developed Western countries, which have institutionalised political systems. In the regions of 
the Middle East91 and East Asia, 92 personalism has prevailed throughout the history of politics. 
91 Bill and Springborg analysed the tradition of personalism in the Middle East politics originating from the Islamic 
root, which was established on the basis of the divine leadership of the prophet Muhammad. Secularist 
leaderships which were acknowledged by religious authority could achieve legitimacy and regime security 
without serious restriction. In some cases, these guaranteed regimes appeared as charismatic leaderships in line 
with the patrimonialism of the modern world. Kemal Ataturk in Turkey, Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran and Nasser are 
good examples of those cases. James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, Politics in the Middle East (New York: 
Longman, 2000) pp. 101-130. 
92 While the personalism in the Middle East originated in the religious foundation of Islam, Park's personalism could 
be considered as depending upon the Confucian background of Korean politics, characterised by a completely 
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The prevalence of political personalism in the Middle East and East Asia could be attributed to 
the absence of any idea of people's sovereignty, and to the effect of the absolute political power 
wielded by certain dynasties and personal leaderships, which were intermingled with religious 
and cultural discourses rather than with an institutionalised political system as a rationalised 
process. Thus, the first step in the analysis of the political situations in these regions is to take a 
careful look at the aspects of personalism in politics, that is to say, their leader's characteristics, 
noticeable idiosyncrasies, ideological attitude, and so on. 
Neither the regime of Nasser, nor that of Park, was democratic. Both regimes could be 
categorised as praetorian regimes based on military authoritarianism. In terms of personal 
characteristics, neither man showed any disposition towards the essential aspects of modern 
democracy, which Karl Mannheim proposed to be `security, tolerance, openness, spontaneity, 
adaptiveness, and cooperation'. On the contrary, the most significant features of their regimes 
were the archetypal features of most authoritarian regimes: `insecurity, intolerance, rigidity, and 
unfailing conformity' 93 
Although the regimes of Nasser and Park had many of similar features of a personal 
military leadership, and could be defined as military praetorian authoritarian regimes, there 
were significant differences between the two regimes as well. First of all, the existence of these 
differences could be attributed to various situational variables, such as aspects of international 
politics, economic conditions, and the domestic conflicts both regimes faced. In addition, the 
different characteristics of each leader are also important factors to be considered. Consequently, 
a combination of a situational approach with a traits analysis would provide the most concrete 
assessment of leadership characteristics. It is therefore essential to explore the historical 
background and personal experiences of both men, in order to determine the decisive factors 
behind the leadership characteristics of each regime: Nasser's `Inclusionary - Extrovert regime' 
and Park's `Exclusionary - Introvert regime'. 
To discover the most crucial factor in determining leadership characteristics is not an 
easy task. As mentioned above, in order to carry out a precise analysis of particular leaderships, 
the leaders' personal traits and all surrounding situations should be considered simultaneously. 
Every single relevant variable which might affect the formation process of leadership 
characteristics should be considered in turn. However, this apparently ideal method, of 
subservient attitude toward the superior powers. Even though the prevalence of the axioms of Confucianism has 
influenced dominant dynasties of the Korean peninsula and the East Asian countries, Park's was not able to utilise 
those traditions of unconditional respect for power effectively, since his coup overthrew a democratic and 
legitimate regime - the Second Republic of Korea. 
93 Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in An Age of Reconstruction, trans. Edward A. Shils (N. Y.: Iiarcourt, Brace & 
World, 1940), p. 68. quoted in Ho Jin Kim, op. cit., (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1997) p. 109. 
65 
considering all relevant factors, and collecting and applying every single variable, could cause 
difficulty in finding that variable which is more important than any other in terms of its 
influence on the formation of leadership characteristics. Thus, in spite of the risk of over- 
generalisation, the legitimacy, as an independent variable, has been taken to be the most critical 
factor in determining leadership characteristics. The reason why the legitimacy factor was 
selected is that, despite the many characteristics out of all the similarities both leaders shared in 
common, there was a clear distinction between the two regimes in terms of legitimacy from the 
first moment of power attainment. The process of legitimacy formation of both regimes 
reflected situational factors such as the historical background. And both leaders' individual 
traits may be revealed by looking at how they responded to and tackled the issue of legitimacy. 
In this chapter, as seen in Figure 3.1, legitimacy is regarded as the main independent 
variable to differentiate aspects of Nasser and Park's leaderships such as personality, leadership 
orientations, regime characteristics and distinctive outputs of ideology and economic policies. 
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Figure 3.1. Legitimacy and Leadership Characteristics 
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2. The Issues of Legitimacy and Regime Security 
For every regime, legitimacy is essential for gaining sufficient support from the people 
and for maintaining the regime's security. Those leaders who come to power by non-democratic 
means are particularly sensitive to the legitimacy issue. As Emma Murphy has pointed out, "for 
all states legitimacy is considered to be a critical ingredient for preserving political stability and 
regime's long-term survival"94 
Legitimacy has been one of the most crucial subjects when it comes to classical 
comparative politics. Commentators have dealt with the term `legitimacy' as the key subject in 
the analysis of a particular regime's performance. According to David Easton, legitimacy can be 
described in three different ways: the consented ideology structure, solid fundamentals of 
morality, and legal justice, which every political elite should firmly maintain. 95 Seymour M. 
Lipset defined legitimacy as `the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that 
the existing institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society' 96 Juan Linz suggested 
that legitimacy should be regarded as the most important indispensable precondition for 
securing a regime's stability and even the continued existence of a nation, because legitimacy 
performs a critical political symbolising function which can guarantee the regime's achievement 
of consensus, support, obedience and respect from the people. 97 
According to Lipset, the lack of legitimacy may bring about vulnerability in the 
stability of a regime. This vulnerability could develop into a security crisis of regime. Lipset 
listed examples of the bases for legitimacy problems as follows98: i) when power has been 
obtained through violent methods rather than by the fair competition of a democratic system, ii) 
when the regime's attitude towards the policy making process ignores democratic mechanisms, 
and neglects its duty to protect mass interests, iii) when the bureaucrats and regime's elites 
show inefficiency when it comes to the carrying out of an economic development programme, 
and iv) when people are aware of the instability of political situation. 
Nasser's and Park's regimes are similar in terms of the power attainment process. Both 
94 Emma C. Murphy, "Legitimacy and Economic Reform in the Arab World, " The Journal of North African Studies, 
Vol. 3, No. 3, (Autumn, 1998) p. 72. 
95 David Easton, "A Re-assessment of the Concept of Political Support, " British Journal of Political Science, No. 4 
(October, 1975) p. 452. 
96 Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963) p. 64. 
97 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes-Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978) p. 45. 
98 Seymour M. Lipset, op. cit., p. 80. 
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leaders carried out a military coup for the purpose of gaining power and were finally able to 
usurp the place of the former regime by military force. Consequently, it is possible to say that 
both regimes were far from genuine democracies in terms of legitimate power achievement. 
This is one of the main causes of their lack of legitimacy. Particularly, under military 
authoritarian regimes like Nasser's and Park's, since there were no institutional buffering 
systems to prevent social conflict and struggles amongst various political sectors, there existed 
the constant possibility of a crisis, in which the slightest mistake or inappropriate performance 
could exacerbate the regime's instability without any alleviating procedures. However, when it 
comes to Nasser and Park's legitimacy in terms of background to their coups, there were 
exceptional differences. Nasser overthrew King Farouk's regime, which had been criticised as a 
puppet of British imperialism. On the other hand, Park pulled down the only democratic 
government Korea ever had. Even though both leaders used the method of military violence, 
only Park's regime was in danger of being attacked as a reactionary regime which had destroyed 
the people's hopes for democracy. 
According to Raymond Grew, a legitimacy crisis is the decisive factor behind the 
sequential crises threatening a regime's life. Without a sufficient level of legitimacy, a regime 
may confront major crises of identity, participation, penetration and distribution as shown in 
Figure 3.2. Amongst these four types of crises, the identity crisis caused by the lack of a feeling 
of belonging to a certain regime as a member, and the participation crisis, caused by a lack of 
enthusiasm for participating in political activity, are most influenced by legitimacy. In short, a 
regime's failure to secure legitimacy could quite possibly bring about the crises which cause the 
regime's collapse 99 
99 Raymond Grew, "The Crises and Their Sequences, " Crises of Political Development in Europe and the United 
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Figure 3.2. Reciprocal Relations of Crises 
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Linz also stated that the relationship between political development and legitimacy is a 
positive functional relation of reciprocally direct proportion. Without ensuring a sufficient level 
of legitimacy, no regime would be able to carry out administrative programmes successfully. 
Thus, in order to strengthen a regime's competence, legitimacy should be ensured. For newly 
emerged regimes in particular, legitimacy is essential. 
As Linz pointed out, efficacy and effectiveness of a regime are directly proportional to 
its stability and performance. According to Linz, the problems caused by insufficient legitimacy 
could be settled by improving the regime's efficacy and effectiveness. Consequently, the first 
aim of regimes which suffered from a lack of legitimacy would be to try to increase the 
effectiveness and efficacy of various policies. Improved efficacy and effectiveness of policies 
help regimes to escape the legitimacy problem. In this context, a regime's security and stability 
might be settled when legitimacy problems are solved, as shown in Figure 3.3100 As a matter of 
fact, Park's regime, which suffered from an initial lack of legitimacy, was forced to take this 
line in order to acquire legitimacy. Thus, Park's first move was to strengthen the efficacy and 
effectiveness of his regime's administration. The targets of rapid economic development and of 
improving the quality of life had to be achieved as quickly as possible. 
States (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. 25. 
100 Juan J. Linz, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes - Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration, p. 19. 
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Figure 3.3. Structure of Causality of Leadership and Stability 
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Lipset emphasised the complementary mechanism of the functional relations between 
the effectiveness of a government's administration and legitimacy. He suggested that a regime's 
stability must be dependent upon whether or not the regime could attain effectiveness and 
legitimacy. Regimes which have secured effectiveness and legitimacy may be categorised as 
stable regimes and those which have not as unstable regimes. Lipset presents this suggestion in 
the following Figure 3.4101 
Figure 3.4. Correlation between Legitimacy and Effectiveness 
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There is a vicious circle regarding the issue of legitimacy and effectiveness. If a 
regime's legitimacy is inadequate, effectiveness cannot be achieved. In this context, a weak 
regime which does not have an adequate level of legitimacy will try to obtain it by setting 
impracticable targets and tasks. A weak regime will try to emphasise the outward features of its 
policies for the purpose of tackling the legitimacy problem. This proclivity to showiness could 
drive the regime to concentrate on display effects or pretensions. In this kind of situation, the 
reasonable processes of policy making and evaluating feedback do not work properly due to the 
exclusion of the people from participation and criticism. This is one of the typical characteristics 
of authoritarian regimes. 
Particularly, when it comes to the process of administration of policy, military 
authoritarian states adopting dependent developmentalsim as their main economic strategy 
could be in danger of being confined within exclusive sectoral interests such as those of the 
military, domestic monopolised capitalists, technocrats and multi-national companies. 
Consequently, in most military authoritarian states, the rationality and effectiveness of the 
state's administration tend to decline, and reach the bottom line of inefficiency. This process of 
decline may weaken the overall capability of the regime, the foundation of the regime would be 
too fragile to maintain its security. 
According to the literature on legitimacy, military regimes tend to embark upon new 
governance, carrying the problem of a lack of legitimacy from the beginning. In order to secure 
the regime's stability and to gain support from the people by overcoming this legitimacy 
problem, a military regime tries to force improvements in effectiveness and efficacy. These 
efforts, however, are eventually replaced by complacency and a disregard for the people's 
interests. In the end, the people refuse to accept the regime's governance, and the regime 
becomes more and more authoritarian, which in turn cause a loss of legitimacy. This whole 
process then is a kind of vicious circle. 
In other words, the lack of legitimacy and the non-democratic features of a military 
regime make worse the situation of political instability and prevent the institutionalisation of a 
political system. Although there have been several cases of military coups that came into power 
with an emphasis on stability and the restoration of political order, in the long term, military 
intervention in politics has a detrimental effect on political stability. Ironically, military 
intervention is in inverse proportion to political stability. Irma Adelman and Cynthia T. Morris 
analysed this inversely proportional relation between the political influence of military regimes 
and political stability. They looked at 74 countries between 1950 and 1964 and calculated the 
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inverse proportion as r=-. 44.102 
At the very first moment of a military coup, army officers adopt the rhetoric of their 
sacred mission to save the country, a sense of moral superiority over existing politicians, and a 
strong will to reform the old regime. However, having seized power, most military regimes tend 
to be poised on the edge of delinquency, due to the behaviour of core members, who abandon 
themselves more and more to corruption as time goes on. 103 
Samuel Finer argues that a military regime would not be able to gain any legitimacy at 
all, in the long run, even if the regime's outward appearance is that of a democratic and 
legitimate political process. This is because military regimes rely on the armed forces and use 
officially-sanctioned violence as their main tool of governance. '04 
Therefore, as mentioned before, as this problem exists from the outset, the military 
regime is obliged to focus on elevating the efficacy and effectiveness of governance in order to 
secure its stability. If after this the regime is unable to establish an appropriate bridgehead, it 
will either develop a new shape of authoritarianism, like extreme fascism, or a loose type of 
authoritarianism, 105 or collapse. 
However, aside from this general presumption of the usual destiny of military 
authoritarianism, there are two notable exceptions to the generalised relationship between a 
military regime's destiny and legitimacy. These exceptions are the regimes of Nasser and Park. 
Nasser carried out a military coup and overthrew the Farouk monarchy. Despite his 
carrying out the coup with the use of the armed forces, Nasser's coup was accepted as legitimate 
by the people. King Farouk, who was forced to abdicate by Nasser's new regime, had been 
regarded as a puppet who served British interests in Egypt. As a result, Nasser's new regime 
was automatically awarded legitimacy. Nasser was seen as a leader at the forefront of the 
struggle against foreign intervention, and as a saviour from the feudal system in Egypt. He was 
regarded as the hero who could bring real independence to Egypt. In this context, Nasser's 
military coup in 1952 was seen in some ways as national liberation from imperialism, and could 
be described as the first step towards the total eradication of colonialism. 
By contrast, Park's government was quite a weak regime. It had similar features to 
what Finer and Nordlinger describe as a `typically unstable military regime'. Because Park had 
102 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development (Baltimore: Johns Ilopkins Press, 
1967) p. 282. 
103 Samuel E. Finer, The Man on the Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962), 
pp. 10-11. E. Nordlinger, op. cit., pp. 126-128. 
104 Samuel E. Finer, "The Retreat to the Barracks: notes on the practice and the theory of military withdrawals from 
seats of power, " Third World Quarterly, Vol. 7, No. I (January 1985), p. 16. 
105 Juan J. Linz, "The Transition from Authoritarian Regimes to Democratic Political Systems and the Problems of 
Consolidation of Political Democracy, " paper presented at IRSA Tokyo Round Table (March 1982) p. 14. 
73 
some serious stains on his career, it was impossible for him to be an attractive 
figure in the eyes 
of the people. Worse than that, he had overthrown the Second Republic of Korea, which was the 
first and only genuine democratic government in Korean history. The Republic that 
Park 
overthrew was established by the sacrifice of students' lives in the student revolution 
in April 
1960. There was no way to rationalise or legitimise Park's military coup. 
Thus, Park was troubled with the problem of legitimacy from the outset, and he put the 
issues of effectiveness and efficacy at the front of his mind in order to escape from this problem. 
This is the reason why Park gave priority to his economic development strategy, in order to 
show his regime's capability and efficacy. Under the circumstances, Park chose to adopt the 
iron fist method of governance. His regime was notorious for its repressiveness and cruelty. He 
suppressed the opposition and those people who longed for genuine democracy. He did not try 
to persuade people to support his regime with a benign attitude but instead used coercion. 
However, in contrast with most repressive military authoritarian regimes as mentioned 
above, in spite of serious legitimacy problems, Park's regime did not immediately collapse, but 
instead enjoyed unrestricted domination of the country for eighteen years. Park was well aware 
of his vulnerability that forced him to adopt exclusive and repressive measures when it came to 
economic development policies, which involved small numbers of capitalists, technocrats and 
military officers. 
Unlike Finer's predictions concerning the destiny of military authoritarianism, Park's 
regime was retained for eighteen years without any significant challenge from the opposition, or 
critical threats to its security. His economic developmentalsim was dramatically successful in 
taking advantage of the highly charged atmosphere in the Korean peninsula and the mutual 
hatred between the North and South. He made use of a strict anti-communist policy to control 
the people and depended totally on the U. S. 's Far East strategy in the Cold War era. At that time, 
South Korea was the faithful front-line agent of the U. S. 106 
In short, even though there were various similarities between the Nasser's and Park's 
regimes, such as in the power attainment process, the designing of the military coup, and the 
attitudes of the military elites, the characteristics of the two leaderships were quite different, 
106 One would assume that the U. S. 's foreign policy would adhere to ethical principles and the universal values of 
human rights and democracy. But the U. S. government rarely criticised Park's repressive performance as a 
dictatorship. No matter how Park's regime perform, the only interest the U. S. had was in securing the stability of 
a strong military government sticking to anti-communism in South Korea, which could provide a crucial bulwark 
under their East Asian security strategy. For Park's regime, the U. S. 's military support and U. S. troops stationed 
in Korea were essential in order to secure his regime's existence. But, as the repression by Park's regime became 
more severe, the U. S. President Jimmy Carter's government intervened in Korean politics and began trying to 
withdraw U. S. troops from the Korean peninsula. In the middle of the tough period, the friendly relationship 
between the two countries was driven to the point of collapse, and Park was assassinated in October 1979, by his 
confidant General Jae Kyu Kim, the director of the central intelligence unit. 
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because of the variable of legitimacy. 
2.1. The Legitimacy of Nasser's Regime 
In terms of mass support and de facto recognition, Nasser had no trouble with 
legitimacy. Although he carried out a military coup with the armed forces, he was able to gain 
enormous support from people. Emma Murphy classified corporate values in the Arab World, 
which have provided legitimacy for regimes, as follows: i) Traditional and/or inherited rights to 
rule, ii) Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, iii) Arab nationalism, iv) Populism and 
economic reform, v) Islam and religion, vi) Democracy and popular consent. 107 
With regard to traditional and inherited rights to rule, due to the introduction of the 
concept of democracy and modernised values, the traditional monarchical system in the Middle 
East had been declining in terms of practical power and influence for several decades. 
Particularly, certain despotic monarchies which were in league with foreign powers were 
seriously wakened due to their loss of legitimacy. One of the best examples is King Farouk's 
regime in Egypt which was brought down by Nasser's coup in 1952. King Farouk's humiliating 
subservience to the British power, corruption inside the palace, and incapability of ruling the 
country had proven destructive of his regime's security. Even though it is obvious that this 
traditional and inherited right to rule is one of the sources of legitimacy in the Middle East, 
incompetent and degenerate monarchies or traditional regimes could not maintain the 
appropriate legitimacy. 
As Emma Murphy describes, "The legitimacy of Nasser was undoubtedly initially 
greatly derived from his early success in persuading the British to withdraw from Egypt, both 
through treaty and ultimately through successful resistance to the Suez invasion. "108 With regard 
to foreign relations, adopting a firm attitude of `Anti-colonialism and Anti-imperialism' was the 
right way to go about acquiring legitimacy. From the point of view of the Egyptian people, 
Nasser's coup, in overthrowing the old regime of King Farouk, was a heroic symbol of the 
eradication of a humiliating subservience to Britain which had been the culmination of 
imperialism and colonialism in the country. Above all, the dramatic nationalisation of the Suez 
Carnal in 1956 was the trigger for encouraging the Arab people to have confidence in the 
107 Emma Murphy, op. cit., pp. 73-77. 
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possibility of genuine independence. His taking of an anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance 
functioned as the most important basis of legitimacy for Nasser's regime. 
In addition to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism in line with the 
Arab unification movement, and economic policies in line with populism were important 
foundations for Nasser's legitimacy. 
Nasser's main problem in establishing legitimacy concerned the relationship between 
Islam and his secular regime. Islam obviously played the most important role in integrating the 
Arab people. It regulated the way of life of Muslims in the Middle East. For the leaderships in 
the Middle East countries, Islam had become an essential mechanism by which to direct people, 
as well as the basis for their spiritual lives. Consequently, Nasser attempted to accommodate 
Islam and its leaders by spreading propaganda about his sincerity and faithfulness to Islam as a 
passionate Muslim. However, as the conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood escalated, Islamic 
political movements began to oppose Nasser's government. The highlight of this conflict 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser was the attempt to assassinate Nasser. After that 
incident, Nasser began a harsh suppression of all political actions of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
In a sense, the weak point of Nasser's legitimacy lay in his relations with Islam. 
The establishment of democracy was not an important agenda for Nasser. Nasser's 
regime was obviously a military authoritarian government, far-removed from any idea of 
democracy from the very start. However, Nasser was able to strengthen his regime with his 
emphasis on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism and the populist economy 
drive. Since those attitudes exactly satisfied the people's demands, the characteristic features of 
Nasser's authoritarian `Inclusionary - Extrovert Regime' appeared. 
2.2. Legitimacy Vulnerability of Park's Regime 
The mechanisms for acquiring legitimacy for leaderships in Korean politics since the 
Korean War may be categorised as follows: i) Career of anti-Japanese resistance, ii) Explicit 
attitude of anti-communism, iii) Participation in student revolution and movement for 
democracy in 1960, iv) Improvement in quality of life through rapid economic development. 
As shown in the previous chapter II on historical background of Park, he did not have 
108 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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the necessary characteristics for acquiring legitimacy as the leader of the South Korean 
government due to his stained career. 
First of all, one of the greatest concerns in modern Korean history after gaining the 
independence from Japan was the conviction and purging of the pro-Japanese perpetrators 
during the Japanese colonial era. After the restoration of independence in 1945, the most 
influential political leader Dr. Syngman Rhee, who later became the first President of South 
Korea, selected pro-Japanese, such as secret police members, bureaucrats, military officers, tax 
officials etc., who had worked for the Japanese colonial government in Korea, and appointed 
them to crucial positions in the government of the newly liberated South Korea. These were 
people responsible for various types of cruelty and violent atrocities during the colonial era. 
Although the new government desperately needed the help of those with administrative 
expertise, the Korean people were incensed by these appointments, many of them having 
suffered traumatic experiences at the hands of these same pro-Japanese officials during the 
previous administration. 
Thus, the fact of having worked for the Japanese colonial government came to be 
noticeable drawback for any political leader. Park was no exception. He had attended the 
Manchuria military academy, which was a Japanese puppet institute situated in Manchuria as a 
base for the invasion of China. He was appointed an officer of the Japanese army after 
graduation and participated in a punitive force to extirpate the Korean liberation army which 
fought against Japan for Korean independence. In the end, this shameful episode in his career 
had come to trouble Park. But his subconscious might have continued to be influenced by pro- 
Japanese sentiment, in spite of his attempts at concealment. After taking power, he frequently 
praised the Japanese military culture which had inspired World War II, and later even tried to 
imitate the national reforming programme for revitalisation, the Meiji Restoration in his own 
Yushin Constitution, which was notorious for its repressive and anti-democratic structure. 
The second problem relating to Park's legitimacy had to do with his association with 
the communist movement. While working for the Korean army as a lieutenant after the 
restoration of independence, he joined the secret communist party organisation of S. K. L. P. 
(Nam Ro Dang) which was strictly banned from performing any political activity. However, 
after the incident of the officers' rebellion in 1949 in the region of Yosu and Suncheon, he was 
arrested and convicted of treasonable acts. In this moment of personal crisis, he escaped from 
the danger of execution by revealing the list of his colleagues' names and the secret structure of 
S. K. L. P., and was eventually released. Ironically, after taking power, Park assumed a 
formidable anti-communist stance in another attempt to compensate for his lack of legitimacy. 
Thirdly, Park's destruction of the genuinely democratic government that preceded him 
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also stood in the way of his acquiring legitimacy. During the Korean War, Park returned to the 
army. From that time on, he often expressed his enmity towards the communist movement. 
After the coup, he announced that the reason for his military intervention into politics, resulted 
from his concern that the chaotic situation under so-called the democratic government might 
cause another North Korean invasion. His propaganda implied that South Korea was not yet 
ready for democracy. However, overthrowing the first democratic regime Korea had ever had 
was not a trivial act. The Second Republic of Korea, which had been established with the 
sacrifice of many students' lives, was a legitimate government. Park obliterated this first 
historical step towards real democracy in Korea. 
In the end, Park's troubled regime had no option than to choose performance on which 
to base its legitimacy. Within a very short space of time, Park had to justify his coup and 
provide reasons for breaking up the democratic regime. Under the circumstances, he was forced 
to focus only on the regime's performance, on material results that people could visualise easily, 
which were manifested as rapid economic development. This situation drove him to suffer from 
an obsession with concrete results. He had thus chosen the narrow road to short-term efficiency 
by turning his back on the chance of a friendly relationship with the people. This attitude was 
behind his `Task-oriented' characteristics, which were linked to the `Exclusionary - Introvert' 
characteristics of his regime. 
In conclusion, of the functional relations of two choices available in developing 
countries between political participation orientations and policy seeking orientations, which 
Samuel Huntington devised'09, Park's regime could be described as a bourgeoisie model 
because his regime basically tried to make a strong exclusive coalition of a small number of 
capitalists and elite bureaucrats for the purpose of rapid development. Under his regime, all 
political participation was strictly limited and monitored by the regime, and social and 
economic inequality had to be allowed in order to propel economic growth. By contrast, Nasser 
adopted the populist model in order to concentrate on social and economic equality. 
109 Samuel Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice: Political Participation in Developing Countries 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976) pp. 27-33. Huntington provided four models for the development of 
developing countries; Bourgeoisie Model, Autocratic Model, Technocrat Model and Populist Model. 
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3. Leadership Characteristics 
Amongst all the variables that influence the success or failure of political development, 
the human factor must be one of the most crucial even in a `well-institutionalised political 
system'. The human factor is the key to the achievement of democracy or other types of 
political development which have been sought for so long throughout the history of politics. 
And amongst all those involved in a nation's political life, it is obviously the leaders who are 
the most influential. The political leaders play critical roles in deciding the destiny of political 
development and the stability of their own political community, more than any other factor. 
Many scholars of comparative politics, such as Glenn D. Paige, Gabriel Almond, Dankwart 
Rustow, and James M. Burns, have emphasised this fact. 
In the developing countries of the Third World which did not have any institutionalised 
political system, the variables of the characteristics and capabilities of the leadership were 
particularly important in deciding the destiny of those regimes. Therefore, to trace and analyse 
the characteristics of Nasser and Park's leaderships will be helpful in painting a concrete picture 
of the political situations in Egypt and Korea at that time. As mentioned above, the variable of 
legitimacy influenced enormously the nature of both regimes. Considering that variable, general 
approaches to the leadership theories and particularities of both regimes are dealt with below. 
3.1. Definition of Leadership 
When it comes to the management of communities or societies, some form of 
leadership is essential. In other words, leadership must exist for any society to be maintained 
and mobilised. No matter whether the society is the family unit, fellowship group, an ethnic 
community or a group of children playing, wherever a group exists, there is always a form of 
leadership. 
Since the unit of the nation has become the biggest and the most influential unit among 
the many communities and societies of the modern world, political leadership occupies a 
position particularly worthy of study amongst the various types of leadership that exist today. 
Thus the performance of leaderships in nation states has become the most important variable in 
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the analysis of the nature of polities. Political leadership may be defined in various ways 
according to its function and its method of approach. 
Julius Gould and William Kolb described leadership as "a behavioural process 
consisting of stimulating persons... to act integratively toward the achievement of group goals". 
They see the basic principle of leadership as a tool for achieving the regime's aims by 
mobilising the members of the society it rules. 110 
Similarly, D. Cartwright, and A. Zander described leaderships "the performance of 
those acts which helps the group achieve its objectives, moving the group toward its goals, 
improving the quality of the interactions among the members, and bringing the cohesiveness of 
the group of making courses""' Hemphill, Halpin, and Windor defined leadership in the 
simplest way: "behaviour of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group toward a 
shared goal"' 12 
With regard to the diverse definitions of leadership, according to Fleishman, who tried 
to classify the different types of leadership, over the last five decades, there have been as many 
as 65 different classification systems developed to define the dimensions of leadership. 113 Those 
classification systems can be categorised in broad point of view: i) focus of group process, ii) a 
personality perspective, iii) act - behaviours of leadership and iv) power relationship. 
For the most part, the general `leadership' has been taken to refer to the leading power 
with the highest political position. For example, in the case of countries adopting the president- 
centred polity, the position of president is the most important in terms of leadership approach. 
The ideal type of political leadership sets the legality of power and legitimacy forth as an 
essential premise. 114 Kenneth Janda emphasises the issues of legitimacy and legality as being 
necessary factors in genuine leadership. He describes the concept of leadership simply as `the 
110 Julius Gould & William C. Kolb in Murray G. Ross & Charles E. Hendry, New Understanding of Leadership: A 
Survey and Application of Research (N. Y.: Association Press, 1957); C. G. Brown & T. Cohen, The Study of 
Leadership (Illinois: Interstate Printing Co., 1958); Alvin W. Gouldner, Studies in Leadership (N. Y.: Harper & 
Brother, 1950); quoted in Seung Jo Han, Viewing Korean Political Leaders through the Leadership Theory, 
(Seoul: Dae Jeong Jin, 1992) p. 22 
111 D. Cartwright & A. Zander (ed. ), Group Dynamics - Research and Theory (N. Y.: Row Eterson, 1953) quoted in 
ibid., p. 23 
112 Hemphill, Halpin & Windor in C. A. Gibb, "Leadership, " Handbook of Social Psychology (cd. ) by G. Lndzeg 
(Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1954) quoted in ibid., p. 24. 
113 E. A. Fleishman, "Taxonomic efforts in the description of leaders' behaviour: A Synthesis and functional 
interpretation" Leadership Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4,1991, pp. 245-287. 
114 There are subtle differences between leadership and headship. Leadership is the activity of influencing people to 
cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable. The unique emphasis in the idea of leadership is 
upon the satisfaction and sense of self-fulfilment secured by the followers of the legal and legitimate leader. In 
contrast, headship does not use the mechanism of persuasion or acceptance, rather it tries to fulfil the goal through 
compulsive extortion. In the strict sense of the term, 'headship' is representative of an authoritarian regime's 
performance, even though the terminology 'leadership' is consistently used in this thesis. 
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legitimate power'. 115 Generally speaking, most military regimes which come to power through 
the use of military force confront a serious crisis due to a lack of legitimacy. Thus, it is unlikely 
that military regimes would express the genuine meaning of leadership. However, as long as a 
military regime maintains its security and performs well, its suppressive character could change 
into genuine leadership which is supported by the majority of the people. That is the reason why 
Park concentrated on the performance exclusively. 
3.2. Approaches to Nasser and Park Leaderships 
- Traits Approach and Situational Approach 
Nasser and Park were good examples of personalised leadership in a praetorian regime, 
and it is quite true that their personal influence over politics and the policy making process was 
exceptionally great. In contrary to developed countries, which have a functionally 
institutionalised political system, the leaders of personalised military regimes are able to wield 
their power without any restrictions. They have unlimited autonomy in domestic leadership. 
When it comes to leadership analysis, two tools may be used to analyse the substantial 
attributes of leadership. These are the traits approach and situational approach. The traits 
approach deals with the personality of a particular leader, which could influence the political 
leadership's performance. The situational approach emphasises the specific circumstances 
encompassing the political situation. These two approaches are mutually complementary when 
attempting to determine the real nature of the leadership. It may be assumed that the highly 
personalised polity tends to be much more affected by the traits of the leader than by the 
situation. 
Personalisation and centralisation of power could not be regarded as appropriate 
techniques for achieving democracy in modern politics. One of the most important tasks of 
modern politics is to decentralise political power to the various levels of institutions in political 
entity and to institutionalise diverse political actions into a constant and stable form. The 
effective method of analysing modern politics looks not only at the political actors but also at 
political systems, institutions, and processes, and so on. But in the case of a military praetorian 
polity like Nasser's and Park's regimes, the personalisation of political power must be the major 
premise. In this context, the most important aspect of leadership analysis concerns the leader's 
personality. 
115 See Kenneth F. Janda, "Toward the Explication of the Concept of Leadership in terms of the Concept of Power, " 
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However, when examining Nasser's and Park's regimes, the traits approach and the 
situational approach should be applied simultaneously, since although both regimes could 
be 
described as highly personalised praetorian regimes dominated by two prominent figures, at the 
same time, the importance of their geo-political situations in the context of post-colonial era and 
the Cold War system should not be underestimated. The situations in Egypt and Korea were 
closely connected to the strategies of international actors such as the U. S. or the Soviet Union. 
3.2.1. The Traits Approach and Its Application to Nasser and Park 
The traits approach focuses exclusively on the leader, and not on the followers or the 
situation. "' Taking the traits of the leader as the most relevant variable, this approach analyses 
politics within the framework of the leader's characteristics and with regard to how they 
influence into the political situation. 
Representative examples of this approach are Thomas Carlyle's `heroism', the 
`Charisma theory' of Max Weber, Niccolo Machiavelli's `The Prince', Confucius' `Wiseman' 
and Plato's `Philosopher's politics'. This approach focuses on the quality, talent, and 
characteristics of certain outstanding figures. But there exists a risk of overvaluation by giving 
them too much credit, and by becoming excessively absorbed in individual stories. For instance, 
Thomas Carlyle's heroic leadership theory'" is a work typically overestimating the probability 
of a particular individual's influence and its consequences. Another weak point of the traits 
approach is that one cannot deduce a general theory from an examination of individual cases by 
this method. Basically, it is impossible to classify human characteristics scientifically according 
to general standard, since each individual is influenced by different, highly complex situations. 
Therefore, no matter how remarkable a particular leader appears to be, he or she should always 
be examined according to the context of his or her situation. 
Despite these limits to the traits approach, it remains one of the most popular 
methodological approaches to leadership analysis. In this context, Peter Northouse identified 
certain typical traits of leadership as the result of diverse experiments in traits leadership 
research. According to Northouse, five important traits are worthy of consideration when 
leadership characteristics are analysed. These are i) Intelligence, ii) Self-Confidence, iii) 
Human Relations, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1960). 
116 Peter G. Northouse, Leadership - Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 1997) p. 18. 
117 Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1966). 
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Determination, iv) Integrity, and v) Sociability. ' 18 
This classification of a leader's traits is meaningful when applied to the cases of Nasser 
and Park. Between the two leaderships, there are noticeable differences in terms of self- 
confidence, integrity and sociability, amongst the five traits. The most influential factor 
in 
causing these differences is the issue of legitimacy. As mentioned above, since Park had a 
psychological complex119about his lack of legitimacy, it might be presumed that his attitude 
towards the outside world would become relatively reserved. Amongst the five traits Northouse 
identified, therefore, self-confidence, integrity and sociability could be considered to be affected 
by the issue of legitimacy. 
i) Intelligence 
Intelligence or intellectual ability is positively related to leadership. 
Having strong verbal ability, perceptual ability, and reasoning appears to 
make one a better leader. Although it is good to be bright, the research 
also indicates that a leader's intellectual ability should not vary too much 
from that of his or her subordinates. In situations where the leader's IQ is 
very different from that of the followers, it can have a counter-productive 
impact of leadership. Leaders with higher abilities may have difficulty in 
communicating with followers because they are preoccupied or because 
their ideas are too advanced to be accepted by their followers. 
ii) Self-Confidence 
Self-confidence is another trait that helps an individual to be a leader. 
Self-confidence is the ability to be certain about one's competencies and 
skills. It includes a sense of self-esteem and self-assurance and the belief 
that one can make a difference. Leadership involves influencing others, 
and self-confidence allows the leader to feel assured that his or her 
attempts to influence are appropriate and right. 
iii) Determination 
Many leaders also exhibit determination. Determination refers to the 
desire to get the job done and includes characteristics such as initiative, 
persistence, dominance, and drive. Individuals with determination are 
willing to assert themselves, they are proactive, and they have the 
capacity to persevere in the face of obstacles. Being determined includes 
showing dominance at times and in certain situations where followers 
need to be directed. 
118 Peter Northouse, op. cit., pp. 17-18. 
119 About psychological analysis of political leadership, see Margaret G. Herman (ed. ), A Psychological Examination 
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iv) Integrity 
Integrity is another of the important leadership traits. Integrity is the 
quality of honesty and trustworthiness. Individuals who adhere to a 
strong set of principles and take responsibility for their actions are 
exhibiting integrity. Leaders with integrity inspire confidence in others 
because they can be trusted to do what they say they are going to do. 
They are loyal, dependable, and not deceptive. Basically, integrity makes 
a leader believable and worthy of our trust. 
v) Sociability 
A final trait that is important for leaders is Sociability, which refers to a 
leader's inclination to seek out pleasant social relationship. Leaders who 
show sociability are friendly, outgoing, courteous, tactful and diplomatic. 
They are sensitive to others' needs and show concern for their well being. 
Social leaders have good interpersonal skills and create cooperative 
relationships with their followers. 
Out of the qualities listed above, Nasser and Park both possessed the traits of 
intelligence and determination, both of which are necessary for the charismatic leadership of 
personalised regimes. However, in contrast to Nasser's populist attitude, which was supported 
by his integrity, sociability and self confidence, Park did not have a high enough level of these 
traits. It is clear that this deficiency could be attributed to his natural characteristics. In addition, 
there is the strong possibility that Park's complex about his background as a pro-Japanese 
military officer, his participation in the communist movement, and his overthrow of a civilian 
democracy, influenced his traits as a leader. As a matter of fact, in the course of his career 
before seizing power, he did seem to have self-confidence, integrity and sociability to some 
degree. However, once he came to power, he changed gradually into a much more reserved 
character and adhered strictly to the single aim of economic development and improvement in 
the quality of material life. Many scholars, including Ho Jin Kim, have suggested that the 
dramatic changes in Park's character after he came to power were caused by the legitimacy 
problem which he had throughout the period of his regime. 120 
Table 3.1 illustrates the overall layout of major traits differences between Nasser and 
Park. 
of Political Leaders (New York: Free Press, 1977) 
120 Ho Jin Kim, "Leadership and Ruling strategy of Chung Hee Park, " How To Review the Modern History of Korea 
- Chung Hee Park & 5.16, Dong-A Ilbo (Dong-A Daily Newspaper ed. ) (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) pp. 36.38. 
84 
Table 3.1 Major Traits of Nasser and Park 
Traits Nasser Park 
Intelligence Strong Strong 
Determination Strong Strong 
Self-Confidence Strong Weak 
Integrity Strong Weak 
Sociability Strong Weak 
Nasser and Park shared the characteristics of intelligence and determination. As 
prominent leaders, their verbal ability and shrewdness were beyond the ordinary level. During 
their periods in office, both leaders showed clear-cut judgement when confronted with a critical 
decision. They both had determination to achieve their aims for their countries' future. Although 
in outward appearance their policy lines were strikingly in contrast, they shared the same 
tenacity of purpose. 
However, in terms of self-confidence, integrity and sociability, there was remarkable 
contrast between the two leaders. Park was less self-confident than Nasser. Park was somewhat 
pessimistic and passive. Due to his lack of self-confidence, Park did not attempt to persuade 
people into actively supporting his regime. On the other hand, Nasser seemed to be full of self 
confidence. Despite several failures, and despite suffering the blows of severe defeats in a series 
of wars, he was brimming with confidence, that is, until his defeat in the 1967 War. 
Integrity is revealed in a leader's adherence to a strong set of principles, and concerns 
the honesty and trustworthiness of a leader's behaviour and pledges. Nasser had no trouble at all 
in this matter, but Park at times showed a lack of integrity, and lost credibility, for example by 
his inconsistency in political pledges, and several deceptions such as a couple of fraudulent 
amendments to the Constitution for the purpose of his life-time presidency. 
Sociability is an index of a leader's relationship with the populace. According to Jeong 
Ryum Kim, ex-chief-secretary of the Presidential office, Park was definitely introvert and did 
not have an affinity with the public. 121 He tended to avoid standing in front of the public, and 
preferred office work, devoting himself to administration like a bureaucrat. By contrast, Nasser 
had massive support from the populace. It seemed that Nasser did not have any problems with 
his sociability. 122 
121 Jeong Ryum Kim, Chung Hee Park (Seoul: Joong Ang Ilbo Sa, 1997) p. 136. 
122 Interview with Dr. Hoda Abdul Nasser, President Nasser's daughter (8`h of March 2000, at Al Ahram Newspaper 
Company, Cairo, Egypt) 
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3.2.2. The Situational Approach and the Reciprocal Action Approach 
When it comes to leadership analysis, one of the most widely acknowledged 
approaches is the situational approach. The substance of this approach is simple. Different and 
complex situations require different kinds of leadership. Northouse illustrated the fact that to be 
an effective leader requires that an individual adapt the leadership's characteristics to the 
demands of different situations. '23 
In other words, as well as the leader's traits, situational factors should be regarded as 
independent variables in this approach. David C. Korten considered situational variables to be 
major factors in forming leadership characteristics. He explained the process by which 
leadership characteristics reflect situational change. The advantage of the situational approach is 
that it prevents researchers from ignoring even trivial data which might be relevant to the 
analysis. 
However, as with the traits approach, it is impossible to produce general theories with 
the situational approach. Situations may come to the fore at any time, at any place, without any 
limitations. Consequently, it is difficult to use situational factors as decisive variables for 
determining leadership characteristics. In a sense, the empirical procedure and inductive process 
should include consideration of all situations. In this context, the reciprocal action approach, 
dealing with mutual relations between the traits variables and situational factors, is worthy of 
attention. 
Based on the reciprocal action approach, Glenn D. Paige identified six basic variables 
which explain leadership behaviour. Those variables are leader's personality (P), role (R), 
organisation (0), task (T), value (V), and situation (S). In addition, he devised a theoretical 
formula using these variables to determine the political leaders' behaviour, as below: 
PLB (Political Leader's Behaviour) =f (P, R, O, T, V, S) +e (c= various variables) 124 
Paige shows the functional relations between the factors which shape a political 
leader's behaviour. He supposes that the six basic factors simply play the role of independent 
variables to cause the formation of the political leader's behaviour (PLB), a dependent variable 
affected by six factors P, R, O, T, V, S and some other variables. It is clear that those six factors 
influence the formation of leaders' behaviour. However, in order to look at the formation of the 
123 Peter Northouse, op. cit., p. 53 
124 Glenn D. Paige, The Scientific Study of Political Leadership (New York: The Free Press, 1977) 
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leadership behaviour of Nasser and Park, the legitimacy variable should be considered. In this 
context, this formula could be revised and applied to the case studies as follows: 
PLB of Nasser and Park =f {f(L), O, S} +e 
f(L) = P, R, T, V 
L(Legitimacy) = f(PC, P') (PC = Personal Career, P' = Performance) 
The political behaviours of Nasser and Park could be determined by the intermingled 
actions of the various factors as mentioned above. In order to apply the legitimacy variable, a 
sub-functional relation formula should be activated. Making an exception of situational factor 
(S) and organisation factor (0), the rest of variables - P, R, T, V - could be considered to be 
affected directly by the issue of legitimacy of leaders. The formation of legitimacy depends 
upon a leader's personal career and performance. In short, personal career and performance 
establish the legitimacy of the leadership, and the functional relations of this legitimacy affect 
the formation of P, R, T, V except Situational factors. Functional relations of legitimacy and 
situational factors finally play the role of determining leadership behaviour, as mentioned above. 
According to the functional relations above, there was no difference in basic matters of 
organisation. But other variables such as personality, role, task, and value were significantly 
different. Those differences were determined by the issue of legitimacy. Therefore, this 
reciprocal action formula suggests that the starting point for the formation of political leadership 
behaviour is the issue of legitimacy. 
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4. Typology of the Leadership of the Two Regimes 
There are two dimensions in the classification of leadership. The first is the individual 
leader's idiosyncrasies which produce a personality stereotype. The other dimension is the 
classification of leadership on the basis of their roles as decision makers. 
4.1. Idiosyncrasies of Personality 
The issue of legitimacy was crucial in determining the style of political leadership of 
both Nasser and Park. Both leaders had a similar home background, growing up poor, country- 
bred, and both had similar vocational experiences as military officers as well. However, while 
Nasser adopted the line of Egypt's liberation from British colonialism, Park opposed the Korean 
liberation movement for restoring independence from Japan. In addition, since he overthrew the 
first civilian democratic regime by his military coup, he was forced with the problem of a lack 
of legitimacy. The difference in terms of legitimacy between the two leaders caused their 
distinctively different styles. Based on the personality models of political leadership devised by 
Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, 125 three categories of leadership personality are 
dealt with here in order to clarify Nasser's and Park's personal leadership idiosyncrasies. 
4.1.1. Doctrinaire Nasser vs. Opportunist Park - Adherence to Leader's own 
Ideology and Belief 
Every leader has his or her own ideologies or beliefs, no matter whether those 
ideologies are well articulated or not. Every ideology has its own explicit ideal to aim at, and 
clearly states the appropriateness and pertinence of this ultimate goal. Leadership may be 
characterised according to the attitude held by the leader toward that ideology. In Nasser's and 
Park's cases, we see the contrast between doctrinarism and opportunism. A doctrinaire leader 
adheres to the ideology or belief system and obstinately persists in his or her own way without 
125 Ki Taek Lee, The History of the International Politics - Theoretical Review (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1987), 
pp. 309-329. 
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compromise. In contrast, an opportunist leader does not show a consistent adherence to a 
particular ideology. As the situation changes, the leadership's ideological fundamentals or belief 
systems may be altered. This could be said to be a pragmatic tendency, but frequent changes in 
political position can also cause credibility problems. 
This factor of attitude toward ideology may be approached from two points of view, 
which are the leader's emotional commitment to his beliefs, and the rational use of these beliefs 
to form concrete strategies in practical matters. In Nasser's case, both his emotional 
commitment and his rational application were relatively strong. He consistently adhered to his 
own beliefs - Arab nationalism and Arab Socialism - except at the very first moment of the 
seizing power. Although there was a process of trial and error in his efforts to realise Arab cause, 
and although he sometimes even showed uncertainty and vacillations in executing his policies, 
the core of the Arab cause was not affected. This consistent adherence to the doctrinal principle 
of Arab cause makes him a doctrinaire. 
On the other hand, Park basically had the attitude of opportunism. This is demonstrated 
by his career: he was a military officer in the Japanese army during the World War 11, but after 
the War he became a strict anti-Japanese official. And, in spite of his background in joining the 
communist movement before the Korean War, after the Korean War he betrayed his colleagues 
in the communist movement of South Korea, S. K. L. P. - Nam Ro Dang, and abandoned his 
passions and beliefs in favour of his safety. As soon as he assumed the reigns of government in 
1961, he tried to play down his former characteristics. Using the rhetoric of `Korean Style 
Nationalism', he mobilised the people of Korea to share the common goal of rapid economic 
development that had been set up by his regime. At the same time, he consistently expressed 
fanatical adherence to the policies of anti-communism. At first glance, he might appear to have 
doctrinal characteristics, but he had no absolute values or ideals. In terms of ideology, he 
focused exclusively on developmentalsim, which could indicate that Park had no solid and 
concrete ideology except anti-communism. 
4.1.2. Idealist Nasser vs. Realist Park 
The classification of doctrinaire and opportunist is derived from the attitude of the 
leader towards an ideology, as described above. The second classification in terms of 
idiosyncrasies concerns the idealist and realist categories which are determined by the 
feasibility of realisation. It is true that a leader who takes full responsibility for a regime cannot 
be categorised as either a pure idealist or a pure realist. Every political leader must have some 
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realist characteristics, and he or she is required inevitably to stand in the middle of the spectrum 
dividing idealism and realism. 
However, examples of both the idealist and the realist ends of the spectrum do exist. 
On the whole, particularly in foreign policy, idealists tend to put universal and eternal values 
before any other values. In contrast to idealists, the interests and benefits of their own 
community or nation take priority over all other things. 
In terms of priority in policy making, idealist leaders tend to devote themselves to the 
improvement of the welfare system and the expansion of the social security network. Realist 
leaders concentrate on rapid economic development. Economic growth is the most important 
factor to be considered for realist leaders. 
In this context, Nasser could be described as an idealist, and Park as a realist character. 
Under the slogan of Arab cause, Nasser intervened in the Palestine Liberation War and took part 
in the Yemen War. Realist Park showed exactly the opposite tendency to the idealist Nasser. 
When Park had to decide whether the South Korean army should take part in the Viet Nam War 
or not, Park first waited to see the U. S. ' promise to provide financial support was going to be 
kept, and only when the U. S. ambassador, Winthrop G. Brown announced U. S. ' military 
support to Korea as compensation for entry into Viet Nam War did Park send his troops in. 126 
4.1.3. Fighter/Gambler Nasser vs. Planner/Prudent Park 
This classification of styles relates to outward appearance when it comes to putting 
into practice various policies. This classification can be seen particularly when a leader confront 
problems in policy execution, when he or she may be seen to have the style of a fighter or that 
of a planner. A fighter style leader tends to act according to his or her intuition, and tackles any 
challenges, even in deadlocked situations, recklessly and without reluctance, especially in 
situations related to national dignity. A planner style leader could be described as a commercial 
126 With regard to Korea's participation in Viet Nam War, two aspects had to be considered. First of all, in order to 
maintain security in the Korean Peninsula, and to assist Park's economic development drive, two divisions of the 
U. S. army and one division of the air force were required in the Korean Peninsula as a 'tripwire' to prevent the 
collapse of the military balance. When the U. S. showed its intention of moving one or two of these divisions to 
Viet Nam, Park had to decide whether to enter the Viet Nam War. The Brown memorandum guaranteed that the 
U. S. would not move any of its forces to Viet Nam if the Korean army joined in the war. Chosun Daily 
Newspaper, 10th of March 1966,29th of June 1965, quoted in Dong A Ilbo Sa, flow To Review the Modern 
History of Korea (Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) pp. 204-213. Secondly, financial benefit from the U. S. was 
considered to be the main motivation for taking part in the war. As a result of the participation of the Korean army 
in the Viet Nam War, from 1965 to 1970, the U. S. government supported $9.27 billion total. That amount of 
money was critical for re-vitalising the Korean economy. Gap Je Cho, Spit on My Grave - Biography of Park 
Chung Hee Vol. 6, (Seoul: Chosun Ilbo Sa, 2001) pp. 366-357. 
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leader who would be interested in calculations of profit and loss. This type of leader does not 
want to be the principal actor but would prepare to operate behind the scenes. Sometimes, the 
planner style of leadership can be said to be discreet leadership which is somewhat indecisive. 
Nasser was one of the most prominent examples of fighter style leaders. At crucial 
moments, he played for high stakes in spite of the existence of risks. 127 The most prominent 
example is the series of incidents about the time of the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956. 
Right after the withdrawal of financial support by the U. S. for building the Aswan High Dam, 
Nasser turned more determinedly toward the U. S. S. R. With the help of the U. S. S. R., Nasser was 
emboldened to nationalise the Suez Canal. In fact, in the eyes of Britain and France, Nasser's 
regime was considered a real threat to the vested rights of Western colonial powers in the 
Middle East. Thus, the Suez Canal Crisis provided the British and French with an opportunity to 
eradicate Nasser's regime and his influence in the Middle East. They tried to seize the Suez 
Canal and the surrounding area. Their plans were aborted, because the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. 
intervened in order to prevent any unexpected escalation. 128 
Park's leadership style was that of a typical planner. His main consideration at every 
stage of policy enforcement was the statement of profits and losses as a result of policy 
execution. Outwardly, his strong economic development drive appeared to be led by a fighter 
style leadership, but, as a matter of fact, the economic development programme was a carefully 
drawn up plan, and it was carried out according to minutely detailed smaller plans without any 
digressions. His calculations were extremely detailed. In developing four stages of economic 
development programmes, Park played the role of expert official in charge of every phase as 
well as that of President. He performed elaborate analyses and predictions concerning the 
overall agenda for public administration like an experienced bureaucrat. 129 
Park managed overall national security issues in a cool, unemotional manner. When a 
North Korean guerrilla attempted to assassinate Park at his presidential residence on 21st of 
January 1968, the threat of war hung over the Korean Peninsula. Park managed and controlled 
this crisis in collaboration with the U. S. The assassination of the first lady Young Soo Yook by 
a North Korean secret agent in 1974 at the ceremony for National Liberation Day, and the brutal 
murder of two American officers by North Korean soldiers at the Panmunjom which is the 
neutral area for conferences between North Korea and the U. N. Commission Officers in the 
127 Interview with Mr. Sami Sharaf, former director of central intelligence unit in Nasser's government. (6`h of March, 
2000 at Heliopolis, Cairo) 
128 Lawrence Ziring, op. cit., pp. 358-359. 
129 In Park's autobiography State, Revolution and Me, there are far more references to economic statistics and 
numerical statements than there are to his personal experiences. Particularly, Chapter lI of that book covers the 
details of the economic situations and the targets of the development programmes which were carried out by Park. 
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Joint Security Area in 1974, seriously threatened the security of the Korean Peninsula. However, 
Park cool-headedly managed to prevent the outbreak of war. Many commentators evaluated 
Park's actions at those moments as the deeds of a well-trained leader who is good at handling 
the practical details of politics and who does not lose his temper. 
4.2. Role Orientation of Leaderships 
The other criterion for classification of leadership characteristics is the `role 
orientation' of leaders, which refers to the central concern leaders choose for their strategy. This 
criterion directly influenced the formation of the two regimes' characteristics. 
By using this criterion, two comparable leadership tendencies may be identified, which 
are the popularity-oriented (follower-centred) leadership and the task-oriented bureaucrat 
leadership. Popularity-oriented leadership has a solid base of mass support from the people and 
various other sectors in the country, and it exercises autonomous and active leadership. A task- 
oriented regime sets up a national agenda for concrete programmes as the most important target 
to be fulfilled, and concentrates on the performance of various programmes by putting much 
emphasis on tasks. This type of leadership tends to be able to achieve an efficient performance 
by the regime much more easily. 
Even though Nasser's regime consisted of a military authoritarian government, it was a 
follower-oriented populist regime which gained massive support from the people. Consequently, 
despite a certain amount of disorganisation and inconsistencies in economic and foreign policy 
during the first stage of the regime, Nasser never lost people's support during his reign. 
Park's regime, on the other hand, was a typical task-oriented regime. It had the 
character of an entrepreneurial state. Not only did Park lack mass support from the people, he 
was also troubled by strong anti-regime sentiments that spread amongst intellectuals and 
students. He suppressed and controlled anti-regime sentiments and the people's passion for 
democracy with the tools of a formidable anti-communist ideology and a strong drive towards 
economic development. He perceived that the regime's life would rely on the success of 
economic development programmes. Thus, he consistently stood at the forefront of economic 
development and formed an exemplary task-oriented leadership of an entrepreneur state. 
4.2.1. Nasser's Popularity-Oriented (Follower-Centred) Regime - Political 
See Chung Hee Park, State, Revolution and Me (Seoul: Ji Gu Chon, 1997)pp. 95-138. 
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leader as Statesman 
As mentioned above, Nasser's leadership, according to the role orientation criteria, 
could be categorised as a `popularity / follower - oriented' leadership. His regime's reform 
programmes and the emphasis of his administration were determined by his aim to satisfy the 
desires of the people and to govern in their interests. Nasser's Egypt was one of the populist 
regimes. 
The foundation of Nasser's follower-oriented regime was the fact that Nasser had 
gained sufficient legitimacy to secure autonomy without the problems which the old regime or 
the propertied classes might have caused. Park was only concerned with the pursuit of profit and 
rapid development with the help of a small number of capitalists and technocrats, and he totally 
ignored the concerns and interests of the people. By contrast, Nasser blamed the bureaucrats and 
politicians for their corrupt nature and incompetence. He tried to establish a new people-centred 
political system. Examples of this attempt were the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the 
Arab Socialist Union. 
Nasser conducted a land reform policy for the purposes of eradicating the feudal 
system and captivating the peoples' hearts. In the aftermath of land reform, he designed a series 
of populist `state capitalism' policies in order to create populist state. Although it might have 
been mere rhetoric, his catchphrase `Arab cause' for Arab Nationalism penetrated the minds of 
people throughout the whole country. In this context, his appeals for the Arab cause were very 
persuasive. 
In his foreign policy, he took into account Arab pride and Egyptian dignity as well as 
actual benefits. Under the severe Cold War system, his policy of non-alignment as a prominent 
leader of a post-colonial country put him high in public estimation. For example, the Suez Crisis 
was the incident which restored Arab pride and eradicated defeatism in Egypt once and for all. 
In addition, his persistent refusal to join the Baghdad Pact was seen as a courageous action. 
However, there were limitations in his populist drive and in his efforts to create a 
socialist economy. Those limitations caused the problems of inefficiency which undermined the 
solidity of the regime without, however, seriously affecting its security. In addition to this 
inefficiency, immoderate foreign projects, such as the intervention in Yemen, and enormous 
support for the liberation of African states like Algeria are now seen as excessive. 130 These 
cases are examples of inconsiderate actions caused by Nasser's over-passionate idealism, which 
130 Interview with Dr. Muhammad Said Selim, Faculty of Politics and Economics (5th of March, 2000, Cairo 
University) Dr. Selim argues that the excessive ambition of Nasser to be a regional leader in the African, Arab, 
and Islamic circles caused structural inefficiency and financial crisis in Egypt. 
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would not be found in the entrepreneur-type leadership of a task-oriented regime like Park's. 
With this follower-oriented populist leadership, Nasser established the `inclusionary - 
extrovert' characteristics of his regime. Seeking regional hegemony was the main target of 
Nasser's regime. 
4.2.2. Park's Task-Oriented Regime - Political leader as Entreprencur131 
Park's regime could be categorised as a `task-oriented' leadership which disregarded 
people's desires and expectations, and sought his own ends. This leadership could be called an 
entrepreneur leadership due to its similarities to the C. E. O. (Chief Executive Officer) leadership 
of private companies. He proclaimed a moratorium in improvements to the welfare system, the 
social security network, fair distribution, human rights and freedom, and justice and equality, 
until the economic situation had fulfilled various stated conditions. In stead of realising 
improvements in these areas, he focused on the improvement of the regime's efficiency and on 
its security. 
He described the most important role of the President of Korea as that of supervisor of 
economic development. 132 Consequently, he adhered to his master plan for development 
throughout the whole administrative system. He would personally supervise all plans, processes 
and results. Indeed, he played the roles of planner, executive, and supervisor, as an entrepreneur 
type leader. 
Park's leadership style can be described as that of an authoritarian who saw himself as 
a sort of guide in a patriarchal society. He constantly examined detailed programmes of 
economic development and examined every doubtful point. Although, he had an authoritarian 
ruling style, he was quite different from the pre-modern authoritarian leaders who were 
influenced by the Confucian mentality of patrimonialism. Rather, he played the role of President 
of Korea as a chief businessman or planner of public administration. The most important factor 
for him was the regime's security and stability, and he was of the opinion that he could not 
maintain his regime without proper legitimacy acquired through popularity. Ile decided to make 
his own propaganda for the target fulfilment and attainment of his goals through rapid economic 
development. 
In other words, as a result of his initial lack of legitimacy, the only type of leadership 
open to Park was the task-oriented type of leadership. The most feasible way to gain stability for 
131 Eugene Lewis, "The Political Leader as Entrepreneur, " in Political Leadership, Barbara Kcllcrman (ed. ) 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986) pp. 250-264. 
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a leadership which did not have adequate legitimacy or charisma was to demonstrate positive 
results to the people as soon as possible. Temporarily gained popularity, made by showmanship 
or any particular disguising gestures to impress the people, without solid support base from the 
people's attachment, was not making any difference at his situation. Therefore, he took the way 
of task-oriented leadership to direct the developmental ism. 
Despite its various problems, it is true that Park's regime achieved a high rate of 
economic growth and improved the overall quality of life throughout the country. From 1962 to 
1978, the Korean economy showed consistent growth by achieving an average annual growth 
rate of 9.4%. To say the least, in the field of economic development, Park's task-oriented 
leadership was successful. However, serious problems still existed, such as the lack of 
democracy, human rights and fair distribution. The strong emphasis on efficiency was the 
reason behind Park's choice of an excessive centralised organisation and mobilisation system. 
As a result of this excessive centralisation, the policy making process became stiff, and the 
apparatus for collecting public opinions came to became closed. In addition to that, the concept 
of profit became the most precious value throughout the country, which consequently became 
dominated by an excessively competitive spirit. That excessive competitive spirit caused inter- 
regional and inter-industrial inequality, and elite centralism. 133 
132 Chung Hee Park, op. cit., p. 45. 
133 Ho Jin Kim, op. cit., p. 437. 
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5. Summary 
This chapter examined the matter of legitimacy and explored a typology of the 
leadership of the two regimes in order to clarify both regimes' difference and its implication. 
The concept of legitimacy was exemplified as an independent variable for leadership 
characteristics formation as well as an influential factor for regime's security and stability, 
followed by proposition of the approaches to Nasser and Park' leadership traits. 
It has been noted that many studies about the legitimacy and leadership have been 
carried out in order to understand the nature of political power relations. In developing countries 
which demonstrate highly personalised political regime, the legitimacy issues are crucial for 
regime's stability and security due to low-level of political institutionalisation. 
In this chapter, with the comparative framework of legitimacy and leadership 
characteristics, the different features between Nasser and Park and noticeable typology of traits, 
idiosyncrasies, and role orientation of both leaderships were proposed. As the result of 
exemplification, the nature of Nasser's leadership may be described as `sufficient level of 
legitimacy - doctrinaire / idealist / fighter style - popularity oriented' leadership. In 
contrast, Park's leadership can be classified as 'insufficient degree of legitimacy - 
opportunist / realist / planner style - task oriented' leadership. These sequential differences 
in typology of both leaderships caused the regime's characteristics - 'Nasser's inclusionary / 
extrovert regime and Park's exclusionary / introvert regime'. 
In this context, following chapter is to demonstrate the ideology formations and its 
domestic applications of both regimes. In order to explain both regimes' nature in a concrete 
way, the following chapter emphasises Nasser and Park's ideologies as their solid 
epistemological attitude and subsequent applications in domestic policy as a tool of finding 
shape of both regimes' intrinsic attributes. 
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IV. FORMATION OF IDEOLOGY & ITS DOMESTIC 
APPLICATIONS 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, the epistemology of both regimes is dealt with in terms of ideology 
formation. Exploring and analysing the ideology of a particular regime is an essential part of the 
process of understanding the regime's characteristics, since most of the policies and outputs of 
political regimes are formed on the basis of an ideology. 
The approach adopted when analysing the ideology of a Western country where 
democracy is practised is quite different from the approach adopted when analysing the 
ideology of non-democratic Third World country. One of the most important roles of ideology 
in Western countries lies in providing various options of policy-making to the people, who then 
have the right to choose by means of the voting system. From a wide spectrum of policies they 
are able to choose whatever they want in line with the genuine needs of the situation. The 
ideological spectrum may provide the people with many options. This is the typical role of 
ideology in Western Europe. By this mechanism of ideology, the various demands of the people 
converge into an appropriate policy through the institutionalised voting system. 
On the other hand, in Third World countries, particularly in newly emerging countries 
or those with new military governments, ideology functions in totally different ways from in the 
West. The roles of ideology in Third World countries lie mainly in integrating and mobilising 
the populations. Through frequent and incremental political upheavals over a long period of 
time, Western countries have been able to achieve a high level of integration through the 
democratic process. However, in many developing countries in the Third World, the 
possibilities of achieving political consensus are relatively rare, because in many cases political 
regimes rose to power through sudden political upheavals. In this context, because national 
integration was seen as the crucial element for a regimes' security, many leaders of Third World 
countries tried to develop mechanisms which would achieve such integration. 
According to Dekmejian, the two obstructions to national integration are the absence 
97 
of a strong sense of personal and national identity and the lack of a concordance between 
subjects and rulers. 134 He described ideology as a method of providing the people with a set of 
values and myths that would lead to national integration. He examined this idea in the context of 
the Third World. 135 In Dekmejian's view, a minimum of ideology is essential before the task of 
nation-building can even begin. 
In this context, one of the major functions of ideology is to unite `idea (thought)' and 
`practice (action)'136. Ideology legitimises a regime's actions. While in developed countries, 
policies are made through the discussions and considerations that are produced by ideological 
premises, in Third World countries ideology performs the role of justifying the actions and 
policies of the government on the basis of their `superior morality' and `rationality'. They 
persuade and sometimes even force people to accept their policies by means of an ideology that 
they have constructed for their own sake. 
By using this process repeatedly, the government's ideology acquires legitimacy and 
becomes a powerful tool in ruling the people. After an ideology is widely propagated and 
internalised, it acquires its own dynamics, whereby it restricts thoughts and limits actions. 
Regimes in countries that came into being after World War II made particular efforts to 
establish their legitimacy as quickly as possible. They tried to create concrete ideologies to 
satisfy the people. Nasser and Park were in this position. 
In this chapter, the two major ideologies introduced by Nasser and Park are examined. 
In order to investigate the nature of each of these regimes, the first important step is to track 
their ideological attitudes and their maturing process. By doing this, it is possible to draw a clear 
distinction between Nasserism -a positive and offensive ideology and Parkism -a negative and 
defensive ideology. 
134 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt under Nasir -a Study in Political Dynamics (London: University of London Press, 
1972) p. 48. 
135 Ibid. 
136 George I. Blanksten, "Ideology and Nation-Building in the Contemporary World, " International Studies 
Quarterly Vol. 11, No. l (March 1967) pp. 3-4. 
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2. Overall Review of the Ideologies of the Two Regimes 
The term `Nasserism' has been broadly accepted and used in the academic arena of 
Middle East Politics. Nasser's political ideology may be categorised as one of the most 
important in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s. As recently as 1997, a conference on 
`Nasserism' held by the Moshe Dayan Centre in Israel testified to the significant implications 
and profound impact of Nasserism, in spite of fact that Nasser had passed away almost 
30 years 
previously. 
As seen by the hyperbolic expression of Muhammad Hassanain Heikal, "In Egypt, 
Nasserism was hukm (rule), but elsewhere in the Arab world, it was hulm (a dream)" 137, 
Nasserism has various implications in Middle East politics and was one of the most important 
key points from which to access the core of Middle East politics in the 1960s and the 1970s. 
Nasser's ideology aimed to play the role of compass, in order to find a way to the ultimate 
destination of the Arab people's prosperity, and in order to seek the crucial map which would 
show the glorious future of the Middle East at that time. 
However, nowadays, three decades after his death, Nasserism is considered to be a 
moribund ideology. Even though some nostalgia remains, Nasser's successor, President Anwar 
Sadat, tried to obliterate Nasser's legacy by replacing Nasserism with an open-door policy 
(infitah), and by taking a pro-Israel stance. This was a new phase in Egyptian politics. Sadat 
aimed to extinguish all the passion and ambitions of Nasser and to adopt the policies of Western 
capitalist states in order to introduce a new dependent development strategy with capital aid 
from the West. This was diametrically opposed to Nasser's policy of non-alignment and 
commitment to Arab cause. The present President Hosni Mubarak has adopted the same 
approach as Sadat. In the final analysis, many commentators have concluded that Nasserism is 
defunct. In their opinion, none of the variables of Nasserism remain relevant vis-a-vis the 
Middle East. Particularly since the collapse of the Cold War system, the outstanding features of 
Nasser's non-alignment policy seem to have lost their meaning. 
Nevertheless, there are still many people who have a strong attachment to Nasser. 138 
Certain people at the grass roots even regard him as Salah al-Din's (Saladin) reincarnation. 
137 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) p. 68, quoted in Woodward, 
op. cit., p. 97. 
138 For young students, Nasserism is considered to be one of the effective alternative methods for creating prosperity 
in the Arab countries even nowadays. At Cairo University, there are some active groups doing research on 
Nasser's ideology who aim to realise Nasser's philosophy in Egypt. They call Nasser 'Nasser the Great'. 
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Muhammad Said Selim analyses this symptom with regard to the present situation of 
deprivation in Egypt. 139 After Nasser's death, there arose a mentality amongst the Egyptian 
people that Egyptian national honour had been besmirched and that her self-respect as an 
outstanding Arab leader severely damaged. In this context, it is worthwhile taking a close 
look 
into Nasser's ideology and its formation process, in order to understand the nature of his regime. 
Whether Nasserism was a well-organised ideology or not, it may nonetheless be regarded as a 
picturesque ideology expressing the Arab mentality. 
Especially now, having been through such turmoils as the Gulf and Afghanistan Wars, 
the Arab people have begun seriously to question the basis of their self-respect. It seems that the 
Arab cause is on the brink of catastrophe. In these circumstances, Nasserism could yet be one of 
the empirical options to be considered as a methodological alternative for restoring prosperity of 
the Arab world. 
It was also necessary for Park's regime to engineer a relevant ideology. However, in 
Park's case, there were no explicit features in the formation of his ideology. Whereas Nasser 
proclaimed a striking policy of non-alignment, and took the initiative in the Middle East with 
the notable ideologies of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism, Park had very few options to 
choose from for his own regime. After the Korean War, in the ongoing quasi-war situation, he 
had to follow the Eisenhower doctrine as leader of the front-line country of the U. S. This was 
the only choice open to him if he wanted to keep his regime secure with help from the U. S. 
Consequently, Park carried out his own policies in strict accordance with the U. S. 
initiative. With this devotion to U. S. strategy, he was able to obtain financial and military 
support from the U. S., which allowed him to concentrate on domestic affairs. In comparison 
with Nasserism, Park's ideology could be described as a self-defensive and passive ideology. In 
this context, strict anti-communism along the lines of McCarthyism140 prevailed throughout 
139 Interview on 5th of March 2000 at the Department of Politics and Economics, Cairo University, 
140 Throughout the 1940s and 1950s America was overwhelmed with concerns about the threat of communism 
growing in Eastern Europe and China. Capitalising on those concerns, a young senator named Joseph McCarthy 
made a public accusation that more than two hundred "card-carrying" communists had infiltrated the United 
States government. Though eventually his accusations were proven to be untrue, and he was censured by the 
Senate for unbecoming conduct, his zealous campaigning ushered in one of the most repressive times in 20th- 
century American politics. 
While the House Un-American Activities Committee had been formed in 1938 as an anti-Communist organ, 
McCarthy's accusations heightened the political tensions of the times. Known as McCarthyism, the paranoid hunt 
for infiltrators was notoriously difficult for writers and entertainers, many of whom were labeled communist 
sympathisers and were unable to continue working. Some had their passports taken away, while others were jailed 
for refusing to give the names of other communists. The trials, which were well publicized, could often destroy a 
career with a single unsubstantiated accusation. Amongst those well-known artists accused of communist 
sympathies or called before the committee were Dashiell Hammett, Waldo Salt, Lillian Hellman, Lena Horne, 
Paul Robeson, Arthur Miller, Aaron Copland, Leonard Bernstein, Charlie Chaplin and Group Theatre members 
Clifford Odets, Elia Kazan, and Stella Adler. In all, three hundred and twenty artists were blacklisted, and for 
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South Korea. Park tried to set up a system of controlled capitalism with just a few military- 
based elites and capitalists who were obedient to the government. In doing this, he needed to 
stick to a strongly anti-communist ideology in order to coerce those who protested against the 
government, and this drove him to develop a rigid ideological attitude. 
Some intellectuals who sought to establish genuine democracy felt a deep hatred of the 
government's repressive anti-communist ideology. Ironically, however, over the past decade, 
Park's rigid ideology, hated so much by elites at the time, has become the object of adoration 
amongst modern elites, due to the incompetent performances produced by the civil democratic 
governments since the collapse of the military regime. 
As mentioned before, while Nasser's ideology may be categorised as an active and 
dynamic one, Park's ideology could be described as possessing a passive and negative character. 
These characteristics of the ideology adopted by each regime played an important part as 
independent variables. These ideological differences led to different outputs of policies as 
dependent. variables. Before discussing these differences in detail, however, it is important to 
examine the nature of ideology in general. The first task of this chapter is therefore to explore 
the general concepts of ideology, which will make it easier to understand both regimes' 
characteristics. 
many of them this meant the end of exceptional and promising careers. 
During this time there were few in the press willing to stand up against McCarthy and the anti-Communist 
machine. Amongst those few were comedian Mort Sahl, and journalist Edward R. Murrow, whose strong 
criticisms of McCarthy are often cited as playing an important role in his eventual removal from power. By 1954, 
the fervour had died down and many actors and writers were able to return to work. Though relatively short, these 
proceedings remain one of the most shameful moments in modern U. S. history. 
Taken from http: //www. pbs. org/wnet/americanmasters/database/mccarthyism. html 
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3. Theoretical Review of Ideology 
3.1. The Concepts and Origins of the Term `Ideology' 
The term `ideology' was brought into existence by post-Enlightenment thinkers and 
ideologues. They regarded this term as indicating a `Science of ideas'. For them ideology was 
just a temporary means for eradicating illusionary prejudices and for getting to the truth. 
As Yoo points out "all the ideas of human-beings originate from the senses"141, all 
ideas start from the senses. Senses that are consistent and logical produce organised thought. 
This type of thought then constructs a series of beliefs, ideas, and values that produce the 
reasonable attitudes of man. 
Whenever people organise their senses, the essential first step is to have consistent 
criteria for observing, analysing and evaluating their own senses. It is impossible for man to 
speculate without concrete criteria. Because without criteria, standards, creed and a dogmatic 
framework, men cannot have their own views, and it is necessary to have an ideological outlook 
when political situations are analysed. 142 Inside every dynamic society, there must be a 
systematic network of faiths, values, objects and traditions. Ideology plants this network into 
every member of a society. The internalised network is ideology. 143 
In other words, ideology is an organised belief system of society members towards 
politics and political values. 144 Although Daniel D. Raphael satirises ideology as "prescriptive 
doctrine that is not supported by rational argument", 145 internalised systems of ideology are 
important amongst the criteria needed to appreciate political situations and to legitimise certain 
political actions. One of the major roles of ideology is that of mediator between a government 
and the people. 146 
141 Joon Soo Yoo (ed. ), Modern Society and Ideology (Seoul: Koryo Won, 1983) p. 11. 
142 David Flasker, Marxism, Ideology and Myth (New York: Philosophical Library, 1971) pp. 8-9. 
143 Daniel Bell, "Ideology and Soviet Politics, " in Richard Cordell (cd. ), The Soviet Politics System: A Book for 
Reading (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) p. 105. 
144 Karl Lowenstein's description of ideology is that of an integrated pattern to explain the human attitude toward the 
life and existence of man in society. Karl Lowenstein, "Political Systems, Ideologies and Institutions: The 
Problem of Their Circulation, " The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 4 (1953), p. 691. Quoted in Geuk 
Chan Lee, Politics (Seoul: Bupmoon Sa, 1987) p. 301. 
145 David D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1990) p. 17. 
146 Duk Kyu Chin, Modern Politics (Seoul: Hakmoon Gwa Sasang Sa, 1993), p. 216. 
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3.2. Constituent Factors of Ideology 
Goran Therborn enumerates the constituent parts of ideology by asking the following 
three questions. 147 First, `What exists in real? ', and `What does not exist? ' In other words, 
`Who am IT, `What is this world? ', `How were nature, society, human being created? ' Being 
faced with these questions and trying to find the answers, the substantial identity of real 
existence may be established and we analogise what the real world is. This is the first 
epistemological step of ideology formation, which can act as a basis for understanding our 
present situation and historical context. Nasser and Park must have tried to consider and 
evaluate their own situations, and this would have been the starting point for the formation of 
their ideologies. This is related to the interpretation of the present situation as a epistemological 
function of ideology. 
Because ideology contains the mechanisms for responding to present situations, it must 
also contain the criteria for analysing and interpreting the political situation. With these criteria, 
ideology makes conjunctions with real situations. Ideology does not transcend the political 
realities and historical context. 
Secondly, `What is good? ' `What is real justice, beauty, attraction and what is worth 
seeking? ' and `What are the opponents of those? ' By asking these questions, what we want and 
seek can be visualised. At the level of regime, leaders try to set up their ideal values in order to 
run their own governments, according to their idea of the ideal state, the values of ideology, and 
regulations in line with their concepts of justice. 
Ideology draws a picture of a utopian situation. At this point, ideology has to ask itself 
`What ought to be? ' As Sargent comments, ideology presents a general ised map about what one 
should do and what society should be to the people. It simplifies the complicated world in order 
to make it more understandable. 148 It is necessary to explore Nasser's and Park's epistemology 
of aims (ideal states) in this thesis. 
Thirdly, `What is possible and impossible? ' By considering this matter, ideology can 
be more realistically and feasibly formulated. It is thus related to the concrete, practical method 
of making the ideology come true, and includes various methods, prescriptions, institutions, and 
procedures. Ingersoll states that ideology has its own evaluating system and viewpoint of the 
future. For a better future, every strategy to be adopted by a particular regime is controlled by 
147 Goran Therborn, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology (London: Verso, 1980) pp. 18-19. 
148 L. T. Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies, rev. ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 1. Quoted in 
Myung Nam Lee, "A Study on the Structure and Functions of Political Ideology, " Ph. D. dissertation, (Seoul: 
Yonsei University, 1985), p. 43. 
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ideology. He emphasises this practical strategy as being the core of ideology formation. These 
strategies are manifested as various types of policy. 149 
3.3. Process of Ideology Formation 
The formation and evolution of a ruling ideology is not merely the product of the 
thinking of a small number of elites or ideologues. It also requires various foundations and 
situations on which to develop. On these foundations, consistent and logical ideas will be 
organised by ideologues. And these ideologues firmly believe that people in society should 
accept these ideas. Through people's acceptance, a universal dominant ideology for the era 
could emerge. 
Figure 4.1. Stages of Ideology Formation150 
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149 David E. Ingersoll, Communism, Fascism and Democracy (Ohio: Charles E. Merril, 1971), quoted in Myung Nam 
Lee, op. cit., p. 43. 
150 Duk Kyu Chin, op. cit., pp. 224-225. 
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According to Figure 4.1, the basic necessary conditions for ideology formation are 
historical context, people's desires, and traditions. All the foundational conditions converge into 
a general discourse that reflects all the situations of the society in question. If this general 
discourse is accepted by the society, it develops into a systematic theory. Social elites make 
policies in line with this theoretical infrastructure. The performance of these policies is 
reviewed and evaluated afterwards. After going through these dialectic processes certain 
paradigms are constructed. These paradigms could evolve into a systematic epistemology. This 
ideology has to be revised and modified through continuous feedback in line with the situations 
of the society. If there are great changes in the historical context, then a new discourse might 
come to the fore, and ideology transition could occur. 
In this general process, a point worth nothing is the role of the specific leaders in non- 
institutionalised countries. The critical choice of policy is in their hands and they can intervene 
in the process of constructing a discourse, and sometimes manipulate public opinion. As in the 
cases of Nasser and Park, this kind of action makes the ruling ideology subservient to the 
regime. 
Sometimes, there are struggles and conflicts in the process of constructing this ruling 
ideology, when leaders try to impose a particular ideology without gaining consensus from the 
people. This might cause a crisis for the regime. The management of ideology and its imposition 
are crucial tasks for leaders of newly emerging countries. 
3.4. Dominant Ideology vs. Ruling Ideology 
One of the important features of the ideological analysis in this chapter is the 
differentiation between `the ruling ideology' and `the dominant ideology'. The ideological 
suffix `-ism' denotes the long history of an ideology. Sometimes, an `-ism' evolves into new 
phases according to circumstances, and sometimes certain `-isms' disappear. Consequently, this 
kind of ideology is the reflection of a society's overall situation and the accumulation of a 
society's views. This comprehensive ideology dominates a society no matter who the leader is. 
This is known as the dominant ideology. 
Dominant ideologies are formulated through a long process of frequent feedback. 
Historical contexts and situations are fused into dominant ideologies. Members of a society 
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should sympathise with this ideology. These dominant ideologies are related to causality of the 
social structure. For example, the dominant ideology of Marxism sets the existence of a 
dominant class - capitalist - forth as a premise. 151 Such an 
ideology is not simply an '-ism', but 
was reflected in the features of a society which served to defend the ruling class. 
Thus 
ideologies were the `legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic' principles that 
reinforced capitalist society. 152 
Dominant ideologies are formed from various political situations, cultural backgrounds, 
and people's consciousness, etc. Eysenck classified the process of dominant ideology formation 
and its effects on society. He suggested four stages of ideology formation, which has a pyramid 
shape: i) acknowledgement of the facts, ii) having certain opinions on those facts, iii) activating 
attitudes to respond to those facts, iv) ideology. Eysenck suggested that from the very first stage 
of awareness of a specific fact to the final stage of the completion of a particular ideology, the 
process of accepting and rejecting certain issues continues. Through this process, a form of 
ideology may finally be set up. 153 This is a typical point of view of the inductive process of 
ideology formation. Most dominant ideologies have been developed through this process. 
The other main type of ideology is the ruling ideology, which is defined as a specific 
regime produced in a short while for effective ruling performance. It is made by regimes and 
disseminated by them without considerable time for review. Nasser and Park's ideologies can 
be categorised as this type of ideology. Illogical and irrational ideologies have rare chances to 
become established and accepted by the people. So those who devise and introduce a ruling 
ideology into their respective societies must consider the fact that they have to develop their 
ideologies into the shape of the dominant ideology in the future. 
Every regime should have consistency, concrete targets that need to be achieved and 
articulated logic with which to persuade the people. Those who create ruling ideologies are 
constantly considering this formation. Nasser and Park both gained power by means of coups, 
and they needed to construct their respective ruling ideologies as quickly as possible. Due to 
the sudden collapse of the ancien regimes, chaotic situations of political unpredictableness 
followed right after the coup in both countries. In these circumstances, each leader had to 
explain why he had to come to the forefront of politics, what he was going to do, and decide 
how to demonstrate his capability to eradicate all the corruption and incompetence of the 
outgoing regime. For each of them, ideology was simply any kind of symbolic pattern that 
151 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Moscow: Progress Press, 1976) p. 67.; The argument about 
dominant ideology in Marxism may be found in Nicolas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill & Bryan S. Turncr, The 
Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980) pp. 7-11. 
152 Karl Mark & Friedrich Engels, Selected Works in One Volume (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1984) p. 5. 
153 Hans. J. Eysenck, The Psychology of Politics (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1968) pp. 111.113. 
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served to provide the people with a political identity and direct their political attitudes, whether 
it had special distinguishing features or not. 
In a developed society, it is believed that a particular ideology that supports a radical 
political movement will perish. When Daniel Bell predicted the end of ideology, he asserted that 
the 20th century would not be motivated by outmoded ideology but activated by technology and 
new modes of systems. 154 He thought Marxism was invented and introduced under the impulse 
of a radical revolutionary drive. It is true that Marx and Hegel discussed this kind of impulse. 
He suggests that once a particular ideology acquires a concrete form, the ideology 
itself will disappear. But when he declared the end of ideology in 1962, the whole world was 
suffering from the mutual resentments of the two greatest ideological alliances. More 
importantly, many ruling ideologies which were devised by the Third World's leaders, such as 
Nasserism and Parkism, were embarking on a new phase of realisation. 
This kind of ruling ideology was far from such dominant ideologies as Liberalism, 
Democratism, Capitalism, and Socialism. The ideologies introduced by the Third World 
military regimes were to a certain extent improvised. Their sequences of logic were weak. 
Nevertheless, there is still reason to explore these ruling ideologies, however improvised, since 
they provide a touchstone for understanding and evaluating the regime's characteristics. It is 
necessary to observe how the ideologies changed and where they were headed. 
In short, the process of creating ruling ideologies is deductive. Such ideologies could 
be said to be transplanted ideologies, which have been devised in response to the specific 
intentions of leaders or ideologues. In a chaotic society, newly emerging leaders of that society 
would invent or import a particular ideology in order to guarantee their regime's security and to 
attain their own goals. 
Roger Eatwell invented the appropriate category of 'ideology as elite power'. This 
approach relates more to the way in which elites seek to ensure conformity and support. In the 
past - Nasser and Park's era - this may have focused on physical repression, but at present, 
media moguls, or even the state education system, are more typically seen as the basis of 
conformity. 155 Nasser and Park's ideologies, which are explored in this thesis, may be 
considered to be ideology standing on the personal intentions as Eatwell proposed above. As 
ideologies of leader's power, Nasserism and Parkism are surely the ruling ideologies. 
154 Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fillies (N. Y.: Collier Books, 1962) 
155 Roger Eatwell, Contemporary Political Ideologies (London: Pinter, 1999) p. 3. 
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3.5. Prominent Ideologies in the Middle East and East Asia 
3.5.1. Ideologies in the Middle East 
In the Third World countries, particularly the newly emerging regimes of the Middle 
East, the power to influence was limited. The new regimes' own authority did not work properly 
in governing the countries. People's concerns and participation were limited to parochial 
matters. Political actions and feedback worked only at the level of small communities or village 
unit. 156 The central governments of newly emerging countries experienced difficulties in their 
desire to acquire strong public support, and there was a lack of efficiency in government 
administration. Amongst the people there was concern that their authentic political discourse 
would be damaged by Western influences. '57 Under these conditions, religion-based identity and 
ethnicity-based identity came to the forefront of the ideological spectrum in the Middle East. 
One of the main reasons for the rising importance of a religion-based ideology such as 
Islam, and an ethnicity-based ideology such as Arab nationalism, was the radical change in 
traditional values and norms caused by the impact of the modern world. Robert Bellah argues 
that traditional values contradicted the developmental logic of the modern world. 158 He notes 
that traditional society had been controlled by a prescriptive value system. In his view, the 
important thing in that type of society was to keep the system running by the `mechanism of 
prescription and obedience', not by `democratic mechanisms'. This value system had a 
comprehensive and broad influence over traditional society, which has been associated with the 
catechisms of religion or attachment to ethnic homogeneity. Thus, rigid leaders who retain these 
traditional values tend to stick to the fundamental ideology of religion or nationalism. 
Bellah suggests that major changes would be necessary in these societies in order to 
overcome the rigid traditional values and to proceed to a new phase of political and economic 
development. Movements propelled by sacred religious initiatives, for example, rather than 
external value systems could challenge the traditional society more successfully. ' 59 One of the 
reasons behind the dramatic emergence of Islam fundamentalism in the Middle East lies in this 
context. 
156 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. Modernising the Middle East (New York: The Free Press, 
1958), p. 47. 
157 Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System, " in David Apter (ed. ), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The 
Free Press, 1964), p. 64. 
158 Robert Bellah, "Religious Aspects of Modernisation in Turkey and Japan, " in Jason. L. Finkle and Richard. W. 
Gable, Political Development and Social Change (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 183-190. 
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The term `social solidarity' is an important one to consider with respect to the identity 
of the Middle East. Primordial factors like language, ethnicity and tribe are related to the 
production and maintenance of social solidarity and individual identity. The nationalism of 
Third World countries is an embodiment of those primitive factors. There were severe identity 
and culture crises in the Middle East after World War II, where independence movements 
prevailed. Nationalism functioned to alleviate these tensions and strengthen solidarity. The best 
way to establish the authority of a new government in the Middle East was through nationalism. 
It merged all the primitive identities of the society into one consenting synthesis - the nation, 
which prevented societies from system break-up. Arab nationalism, which is one of the most 
outstanding features of ideology in the Middle East is in the same category. In the process of 
moving from anti-imperialism to post-colonialism, the nationalist idea of the `Arab cause' 
gained in influence, and played an important role in creating solidarity amongst the Arab 
peoples against imperialism. 
Bruce Borthwick classified the significant features of ideology transformation in the 
Middle East under the heading `ideological changes after 1798'. He itemised four major 
features of the ideologies in the Middle East, which are liberal democracy, Islamic 
fundamentalism, Arab socialism and communism. 160 
Liberal democracy, which culminated right after World War II, was the best option for 
those who were desperate to be liberated from the oppressions of Shahs, Sultans and Kings. It 
was introduced as an enlightened ideology which could be used to destroy the exploiting system 
that had been handed down by the Ottoman Empire. It was considered as an efficient tool for 
providing economic prosperity by propelling technological progress in conjunction with 
affiliation with the West. However, some countries which adopted the democratic ideology as a 
constitutional law had to face side effects, such as an economic crisis and the instability of the 
regime. Particularly, the defeat in the first Middle East War caused an extreme crisis of 
confidence and loss of self-respect amongst the populations. Consequently, many people in 
those countries tried to find an alternative ideology for themselves. 161 
Some advocates of the modernisation of the old system by importing Western values 
believed in the superiority of technology and overall capabilities of the West from their 
observations of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. However, the reckless acceptance of 
European liberalism without contemplated contextualisation and proper criticism resulted in a 
159 Ibid., p. 189. 
160 Bruce Maynard Borthwick, Comparative Politics of the Middle East (Englwood Cliffs: Prentice I Tall, 1980) pp. 
61-62. 
161 Ibid., p. 66. 
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failure to achieve prosperity. 
As a result of this failure to adopt liberal democracy, the religious aspects came to the 
forefront as an efficient factor in ideology formation. Islam had been the single most influential 
factor in the lives of those who lived in the Middle East. They had a deep nostalgia for the 
Rashidun Caliphs'162 era. Against this background, people in the Middle East felt as if Western 
influence was impinging upon prosperous heritage their own history. This kind of resentment 
brought about resurgence in Islamic revivalism as the ultimate solution. The advocates of liberal 
democracy were a few intellectuals, landlords, and some capitalists. On the other side were 
those who strongly embraced Islamic revivalism, who included farmers, small craftsmen, and 
merchandisers. Sentiments of resistance against elites and government leaders built up among 
those who supported Islamic revivalism, because they felt that the advocates of liberal 
democracy were incapable, corrupt and were allowing and even encouraging the proliferation of 
the filthy Western culture to which they were opposed. 
The Muslim Brotherhood movement was one of the most influential movements of 
Islamic revivalism in this context. Islamic revival movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood 
emphasised the negative aspects of Western influence and pointed to Islam as the inevitable 
choice for the main ideology of the Middle East. Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim 
Brotherhood movement, pointed out that one of Egypt's most serious problems were the 
uncontrolled expansion of Western culture and a lack of Islamic passion on the part of the 
leaders of the country. He declared that for this reason the secular leaders of the Muslim world 
were unsuitable for the Middle East. 163 
This view of resistance clashed with the secular regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood 
plotted to overthrow the pro-British King Farouk's regime and tried to destroy all the legacies of 
Western culture. After being outlawed by Nasser in 1954,164 the Muslim Brotherhood resorted 
to underground activity to resist Nasser's regime. At present, Islamic revivalism appears to be 
an efficient alternative ideology once more. It has been gaining in popularity at grass roots level. 
Another prominent ideology in the Middle East was Arab Nationalism, which rose in 
importance after the failure of both liberal democracy and the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 
162 When Muhammad the Prophet died, a caliph -successor- was chosen to rule in his place. The caliph had temporal 
and spiritual authority but was not permitted prophetic power; this was reserved for Muhammad. The caliph could 
not, therefore, exercise authority in matters of religious doctrine. The first caliph was Abu Bakr. Ile was 
succeeded by Umar, Uthman and Ali. Sunni Muslims recognise these first four, or Rashidun (the rightly guided). 
Muslims regard this era as the most prosperous and the most legitimated period. 
163 Ibid., p. 70 
164 In 1954, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to assassinate Nasser for his secular hard line policy against Islam. Nasser 
had commented, "I do not know at all how I can rule the country by the holy Quran". This comment was 
provocative to the Muslim Brotherhood and to all Islamic revivalists. And even he described the struggle with 
Islamic revivalists as a Holy War. J. Lacouture, op. cit., p. 128. 
110 
The two best examples of Arab nationalism are Baathism, which was founded by Michel Aflaq 
and Salah al-Din Baytar, and Nasserism. 
Baathism's slogans were `unity', `freedom', and `socialism'. It was clearly stipulated 
in the party constitution that the socialist doctrines they espoused were fairness in distribution, 
economic justice, the reformation of means of production, and civil equality. 165 Although the 
Baathists aimed to establish a socialist government in the Middle East, their first step was to 
build Arab nationalism. It was believed that through the integration of the entire Arab 
population, genuine socialism could be achieved. Through the establishment of a genuine united 
Arab country, a glorious and prosperous era could be achieved for Arabs. This kind of 
nationalist movement attracted most Arabs. 
As for Marxism in the Middle East, any kind of communist movement has generally 
been banned, although, ironically, communist ideology had a great influence on the people in 
the Middle East. Marxists reproached the monarchical regimes in the Middle East, such as that 
of King Hassan of Morocco, King Hussein of Jordan, and the ruling family in Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf areas, for being `reactionary' and `feudalist'. In addition, communists criticised 
`bourgeois nationalists' such as President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and President Hafiz al-Assad 
of Syria for leading regimes that `promote anti-communism, anti-democracy, and extremely 
chauvinistic nationalism'. 166 
In the Arab world, the most radical thought came from a number of young radical 
intellectuals. The disastrous defeat for the Arabs in the war with Israel in June 1967 stimulated 
these intellectuals. To the radical intellectuals, this humiliation was caused by serious 
inadequacies in the values and structures of Arab society, such as the state of `tribalism', the 
traditional patriarchal society, where all decisions are left to the `father or elder' or some other 
important person, and by the misunderstanding of science and technology, which leads "to 
merely benefiting from the fruits of modern science without touching its roots or achieving a 
serious understanding of its motivating forces. "167 
The radical intellectuals called for revolt against the past and the present-day values 
and structures of Arab society. To them Arab nationalism and liberal democracy have failed 
because they are semi-revolutionary. Marxism best expresses their radical mood and promises a 
165 Michel Aflaq, Fi: Sabil al_Ba'ath (In the way of Baath), (Beirut: Dar al-Talia, 1959), p. 210 quoted In Chong 
Pyong Park, A Study on Nasser's Authoritarian Regime - Political Economics View, Ph. D. dissertation (Seoul: Kyong flee University, 1994) p. 94- 
166 B. Borthwick, op. cit., p. 80. 
167 Abdul Daher, Current Trends in Arab Intellectual Thought, Rand Publication No. RM-5979-FF (December, 1969) 
pp. 22-23, quoted in ibid., p. 81. 
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thorough and complete revolution. 168 However, that radical paradigm of seeking revolutionary 
change in the Arab world has been criticised by the people who have attached themselves to the 
Islamic world view and its value system. 
In this context, Borthwick describes ideologically undetermined situation in the Middle 
East as follows: 
By the year 1979, after a century and three quarters of Western influence, 
change in some form has come to all the countries of the Middle East. 
They have acquired advanced weapons, organised their armies along 
modern lines, and established modern ministries and government 
departments with staffs of educated persons. They have imported large 
quantities of consumer goods, and in some countries established 
industries of their own. The material change and modernisation of the 
government and administration have been significant, but an overarching 
belief system to integrate all this and give meaning to society has not yet 
been found. While liberal democracy is now pretty much a historical 
phenomenon, nationalism, Marxism and Islamic revivalism are very 
much alive, and their proponents are competing for popular support and 
state power in just about every Middle Eastern country. 169 
3.5.2. Ideologies in East Asia 
The ideological features of East Asia are quite different from those of the Middle East. 
In the Middle East, the appropriate ideology has been pursued by a process of trial and error. 
However, post-World War II East Asia has been a fierce battlefield under the difficult 
conditions of the Cold War. 
By means of the revolution, Mao Zedong took power in China after defeating Chiang 
Kai-shek's regime, and the People's Republic of China played a major role in the Cold War 
system. As most communist regimes do, the Chinese government swept away all kinds of 
capitalist legacies, chauvinistic nationalism, and religions etc., which meant that there were no 
longer many opportunities for different ideologies to gain a foothold in China. 
In Japan, after World War II, only pro-American liberal democrat regimes have come 
to the forefront of politics. In spite of the existence of the communist and socialist parties, 
Japan's major ideology has not changed at all. Since Japan has been a country of strategic 
importance in the U. S. foreign policy of containing the Soviet Union, the U. S. government has 
monitored and manipulated the Japanese government in maintaining their ideology. 
168 Ibid., p. 28. 
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Needless to say, both Korean regimes are attached to their own ideology - communism 
in the North and liberal democracy in the South. There has been no room for other ideologies. In 
this context, both regimes have used ideology as a tool for mass control. 
In East Asia, the hottest fighting front of the Cold War was the Korean Peninsula, 
where the severe tensions between two camps - the communists and the pro-West capitalists - 
prevailed. The communist camp covers North Korea, China, and the Russian line, and the 
liberal camp covers Japan, South Korea and the Taiwan line. In this tense context, there is 
unlikely to be a chance for other types of ideology to appear in either camp. 
The Chinese and North Korean communist camps adhered strictly to dogmatic 
communism, so they prohibited any kind of revisionism such as cultural and structural 
approaches to real politics. The Chinese `Cultural Revolution' performed by Mao, and `Joo Che 
Sa Sang' (Independent thought) carried out by Il Sung Kim in North Korea, are good examples 
of that kind of ideological tenacity. 
In Japan and South Korea, the first target of both regimes was rapid economic growth 
with the help of the U. S., and neither country had any autonomy to choose an alternative 
ideology. 
After World War II, therefore, it was possible for Middle East regimes to explore and 
test a wide spectrum of ideological features. In East Asia, on the other hand, the tense, 
confrontational situation produced by the Cold War made it difficult for countries to try out 
alternative ideologies. That is one of the reasons why Park did not propose and create a 
ideological era immediately after his coup. 
169 B. Borthwick, op. cit., p. 82. 
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4. Two Dimensions of Ideological Analysis - Nationalism & 
Socialism 
In order to clarify the differences between Nasser and Park's regimes, two comparative 
ideologies are dealt with - nationalism and communism / socialism. The classical subject for 
discussion in an ideology argument is the `left-right' issue. The most popular ideology that 
newly emerging regimes are inclined to use is nationalism. Nasser and Park explicitly stated that 
their regimes aimed to bring about national prosperity through the building of a concrete 
nationalism. However, on the left-right issue, their points of view and practice were quite 
different. 
4.1. Nationalism 
Before dealing with the comparison of both regimes in terms of the ideology of 
nationalism, an exploration of modern nationalism in the context of the French revolution is 
necessary. French nationalism could be described as the archetypal nationalism in the modern 
history. 170 One of the most prominent features of French nationalism is that it came into being 
spontaneously without any external influence. In other words, Western nationalism arose from 
the confrontation between political, economic and cultural modernisation on the one hand, and 
feudalism on the other. As civil rights increased, the bourgeoisie expanded. European 
nationalism was propelled by these newly emerging middle class citizens. They wanted to 
change the class system and feudal order into a new modern order regulated by law and the free 
market system. 171 This kind of new order also succeeded in putting alienated classes such as 
workers and peasants who had no political rights under the system of absolute monarchy, into 
the new political system as members who had genuine political rights. This was the moment 
when European nationalism was born. 172 This nationalism was based on liberalism, which was 
reflected in the idea of the interest of civil citizens. 173 So the European nationalism inspired by 
170 Duk Kyu Chin, op. cit., pp. 230. 
171 Ki Byuk Cha, Nationalism, (Seoul: Han Gil Sa, 1990) p. 146. 
172 Hans Kohn, "The Concept of Nationalism, " Nak Chung Back (tr. & ed) What is Nationalism (Seoul: Changjak 
Gwa Bipyung Sa, 1988) p. 18. 
173 Peter Alter, Nationalism (London: Edward Arnold, 1994) p. 19. 
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the French revolution in the 18`h century has been called `civil nationalism'. 174 
In the 19th century, a new type of nationalism that was different from civil nationalism 
appeared in Europe. The peculiarity of this later version of nationalism lies in its external 
origin. 175 This type of nationalism was inspired and established by the few elites who were 
stimulated by external factors. The most typical example of this type of nationalism was 
German nationalism, which was stimulated by the threat of Napoleon the First. 176 After the 
Napoleonic War, Germany was falling behind England and France in the development race. 
While England was dominating the international scene through the industrial revolution, and 
while France had a new visionary phase of development after the French revolution, Germany 
could not be united as one nation. She was a peripheral state in Europe, confronting external 
threats. 
This type of nationalism that was stimulated by external factors progressed at two 
levels. The first level was a cultural one. Ideologues needed to encourage the people by 
elevating their self-respect. The best way to increase self-respect was to exalt their cultural 
superiority. They emphasised on excellence of national idiosyncrasies and the positive 
characteristics of the people's traditions, which was backed by Herder's proposition. 177 This 
approach concentrated on the unity of the nation, sacredness, fame, and even on blood and 
language. This nationalism tended to be personalised and exaggerated to incorporate divine 
elements on occasion, and thus may be referred to as extreme cultural nationalism. 178 
The other level was economic. A policy for enhancing wealth and military strength 
was essential for Germany, since she lagged far behind other competitors for colonial hegemony. 
List, an outstanding German economist in the Historical School, proposed the industrialisation 
of the national economy, and suggested an economic development strategy led by strong 
intervention and control from the state, which was different from the neo-classical approach that 
prevailed in Europe at that time. 179 This approach became the foundation of `economic 
nationalism'. With this concept of nationalism, Germany was able to achieve rapid economic 
development under the supervision of Bismarck's cabinet. The state's active intervention in the 
whole economic system accelerated the speed of development. This German nationalism that 
emphasised state intervention was a role-model for many developing countries. Indeed, Park's 
174 Yong Hee Lee and Jae Bong Roh, Korean Nationalism (Seoul: Su-Moon Dang, 1977) p. 15. 
175Ibid., p. 16. 
176 Ki Byuk Cha, op. cit., p. 151. 
177 Ibid., p. 154. 
178 Hun Mo Gil, "Problems of Historical Studies in Nationalism, " Public Lecture Series of Korean history I (Seoul: 
II Cho Gak, 1995) p. 156. 
179 Joo Sung Lee, Study on the Economic Thoughts of List (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1994) pp. 61-85. 
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economic policy originated from this model. 
In general, the reason why economic nationalism made the policy of industrialisation 
the first priority was because industrialisation could be an efficient starting point for economic 
development. Its far-reaching effects influence entire sectors of the related economy. Economic 
nationalists regarded industrialisation as the key to political and economic autonomy. In 
addition, developments in industry are the basis of military power and thus play an important 
role in national security. "' 
The third type of nationalism, apart from civil nationalism and economic / cultural 
nationalism is `protest nationalism' which may be found in Third World countries. This type of 
nationalism emerged from the vortex of the independence movements in the Third World 
countries. From a broad perspective, this type of nationalism may be categorised as a form of 
economic / cultural nationalism, inspired by Germany. Protest nationalism was stirred up by 
external factors such as the miseries of the colonial situation and resistance to colonial legacies. 
This nationalism is not moved by civil society but by a few elites and exclusive members of a 
military junta. The difference between economic / cultural nationalism and this protest form of 
nationalism is that protest nationalism is produced under conditions of a total deprivation of 
national dignity by external invaders. 181 Therefore, the ultimate aim of this form of nationalism 
is the achievement of political independence by escaping from colonial exploitation. Thus, it 
may be called `political nationalism'. 182 In the 20th century, after World War II and as the 
colonial era ended, there were attempts to transform protest nationalism into an economic / 
cultural nationalism in certain Third World countries. This was in order to achieve rapid 
development under the catchphrase of `the wealth and military strength of the country'. 183 
However, many countries in the Third World were unable to overcome their `protesting 
behaviours' which had been internalised during the long period of the independence 
movement. 184 
In general, Nasser's nationalism may be categorised as `protest / political nationalism' 
although it also contained features of his passion for economic development and related policies. 
Other peculiarities may be found in his nationalism, apart from this category. lie did not only 
180 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987) 
Moon Goo Kang (tr. ) (Seoul: In Gan Sarang, 1991) p. 63. 
tat Yong Hee Lee and Jac Bong Roh, op. cit., p. 26. 
182 Ibid., p. 20. 
183 In Nasser's Philosophy of Revolution and in Sukarno's Ruling Ideology, features of economic nationalism may be 
found quite frequently. Mary Matossion, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialisation, " in Jason L. Finkle & Richard 
W. Goble, op. cit., pp. 47-58. 
184 In their relations with old colonial rulers, emotional resentments obstruct the newly independent countries from 
getting on with their ole masters and stepping forward on a mutually beneficial basis. 
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focus on the national identity of Egypt (al-Wataniyya) but also on the expanded ethnic identity 
of the Arabs (al-Qawmiyya). In order to do this, he used an ornate diplomatic rhetoric to deal 
with the issue of Arab unity. 
In contrast, Park's nationalism was a type of `economic / cultural nationalism'. Even 
though he seemed uninterested in the ideology of nationalism, his development strategy 
depended on the logic of `national potentiality' that was related to state-led capitalism. In order 
to reach the target of economic development, the putting into practice of all other precious 
political values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights was postponed. 185 
4.2. Class Consciousness & Socialism 
In terms of the `left-right' view of ideology, Nasser's regime was diametrically 
opposed to Park's. While Nasser's socialism was not dogmatic but practical, Park's extreme 
anti-communism was quite the opposite. 
Both regimes are similar in the sense that they used the identity of the `nation' for the 
sake of their regime's security with the intention of integrating the people. However, their 
nationalism was affected by the tense international atmosphere. In the case of Park, he had no 
free will to choose his own ideology, because as an important agent and a leader of a strategic 
bulwark for the U. S. during the Cold War, Park's regime was forced to adopt a hard-line anti- 
communism as a formal ideology. 
At that time, newly emerging countries and military regimes were bound to be 
influenced by the bipolar international system. As the Cold War grew fiercer, the two major 
representatives of each camp, the U. S. and the Soviet Union, were in fierce competition to win 
countries over to their side. Therefore, newly emerging countries were forced to join one of the 
major camps and were then obliged to become a faithful of that camp. 
The new regimes were unable to decide which side to join on the basis of their own 
inclinations or beliefs, but instead, had to choose on the basis of national interest or matters of 
regime security. One good example of this is Park's case. He was a strict socialist when he was 
in his 20s, but ironically his regime's ideology was extreme anti-communism. Nasser's case was 
different. At first, he tried to build up a strong nationalism, but when this failed, he transformed 
his nationalism into a socialist ideology by mixing nationalism and socialism. 
185 The reason why Park's nationalism can be seen as similar to `economic nationalism' is that he pushed forward the 
Korea-Japan talks about compensation for war and colonial sufferings in 1963, despite the nation's strong 
opposition. 
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5. Nasserism - Pursuit of Regional Hegemony: Arab 
Nationalism and Socialism 
5.1. Ideological Influences on Nasser 
5.1.1. Consciousness of National Identity 
It is necessary to explore Nasser's life in terms of ideological stimulation in order to 
pursue deeper levels of analysis. As Hopwood points out, "Nasser throughout his life was 
subject to a series of political influences which helped to shape his eventual ideology. His point 
of view was modified as the external circumstances which shaped it changed"186 
When examining Nasser's ideology, two important subjects must be discussed. The 
first is nationalist mentality and the other is socialist mentality. Nasser experienced harsh British 
colonial governance throughout his adolescence. During this period Nasser thought that Egypt 
was a tragic victim of the colonial system and believed that Egypt had been troubled with 
deprivation because of imperialism. For him, the ultimate solution for escaping from this agony 
was to liberate Egypt from Britain. Anti-Western sentiment and resentment to colonialism were 
probably beginning to grow when he was very young. 
His favourite reading when he was a little boy was the biography of great figures in 
world history such as Alexander the Great, Mahatma Ghandi, and Napoleon Bonaparte. 
Outstanding figures that dedicated themselves to the national interest moulded his heroic 
idealism and gave him the opportunity to think about leadership. 
His uncle Khalil Hussein Kalil had a particularly strong influence on him. Kalil had 
been jailed frequently on charges of organising and participating in anti-British demonstrations. 
He was also convicted as a planner of serious riots in Alexandria in 1921.181 
During the year Nasser lived with his uncle, he received many practical lessons in how 
to be a revolutionary, which provided him with substance for innumerable boyhood dreams. '88 
Through these experiences, Nasser became able to understand the problems of Egypt which had 
186 Derek Hopewood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1981 (London: George Allen & Unwinn, 1982) p. 102. 
187 Robert Stephens, Nasser -a Political Biography (London: Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1971) p. 26. 
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been caused by British and Western intervention and exploitation. In addition, his political 
sensibility increased. 
This period enlightened him with regard to the Arab cause and some broader issues. 
After the experience of his uncle's arrest, he seems to have found time for a good deal of 
reading, mostly history, politics, and biographies of famous men by Arab and Muslim 
nationalist authors - biographies of Prophet Muhammad, Jamal ed-din al-Afghani, and 
Muhammad Abdu etc. He especially enjoyed the writings of Mustafa Kamil, who was perhaps 
Nasser's chief hero of the East, the brilliant young demagogue who founded the Egyptian 
National Party (E. N. P. ). 189 His own paradigm of the real situations of Egypt and the Arab world 
began to grow from this time onwards. 
As he entered El Nahda School in 1935, a political movement occurred. From that time 
on, his political character came to the forefront of public life. He took part in various student 
demonstrations. At that time, various student political movements were active from the extreme 
left wing to the extreme right and from extremely secular movements to religious 
fundamentalism like the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Nasser did not have the chance to join the Muslim Brotherhood, but he worked for the 
Wafd party, and Misr el Fatat (Young Egyptian movement). However, his main involvement 
was with the National Party founded by Mustafa Kamil. This party urged people to withdraw 
from all British influence unconditionally. This satisfied Nasser's passion for genuine 
independence from Britain. Nasser attached himself to this party, which was more belligerent 
and more rigid than other political movements or organisations in Egypt. 190 His passion 
regarding the genuine independence of Egypt from Britain could be found in a letter that he had 
written to one of his colleagues. He cited this letter in his book `Philosophy of the 
Revolution'. 191 
By the time he reached manhood, he had chosen a life as an army officer. With the 
modern military education that was introduced into Egypt by Britain, he might have taken a 
neutral position, but he still felt resentment towards Britain and Western imperialism. Britain 
was still the biggest obstruction in his mind, and during World War 11, he sympathised with the 
188 Robert St. John, The Boss (London: Arthur Barker Ltd., 1960) p. 20. 
189 Robert Stephens, op. cit., p. 32. 
190 Ibid., p. 34. 
191 "Today the situation is critical and Egypt is in an impasse. It seems to me that the country is dying. Despair is 
great. Who can end it? Where are the men ready to give their lives for the independence of the country? Where is 
the man who can rebuild the country so that the weak and humiliated Egyptian can stand up again and live free 
and independent? Where is dignity? Where is nationalism? Where are the so-called activities of our youth? They 
say the Egyptian is a coward, that he is afraid of the slightest sound. Ile needs a leader to lead him in the struggle 
for his country. By this means this same Egyptian would become a thunder-clap which would make the walls of 
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Axis in a similar fashion to Italy, although he did not express similar feelings. Interestingly, 
when the military junta seized power in Egypt in 1952, many of them thought that they should 
imitate the system of the Fascist military regime as their prototype for building a new state. 192 
Nasser's anti-imperialism was ignited by the humiliating Abdin Palace affair. This 
incident and the events which followed opened the gates for the next wave of revolutionary 
nationalism which was to break the king's morale and his popular influence, and showed that 
the 1936 Treaty was built on force, not friendship. According to Sadat, this incident was one of 
the main triggers for a revolution. Nasser and his closest colleague, Abdul Hakim Amer, were 
determined that Egypt would never again suffer such a humiliation. The real revolutionary 
conspiracy dates back to this time. The movement had now passed from the theoretical to the 
militant phase. 193 
The other factor that influenced Nasser's nationalism was Israel, when David Ben 
Gurion proclaimed unlimited immigration and immediate independence. This contradicted the 
slow-steady independence plan of Dr. Chaim Weizman. The result was the Palestinian War. 
Nasser participated in this war and his resentment of imperialism escalated. 
It is worthwhile noting the gap between Egyptian nationalism and Arab nationalism. 
Nasser had his eyes opened to the wicked acts of imperialism through the agonies that Egypt 
had experienced. Egyptian people tend to think of Egypt as superior to any other Arab country. 
They take pride in the glorious and prosperous history of the Paranoiac era. Lee refers to this 
feeling of superiority: "amongst the Egyptian people, there have been some common feelings 
about their superiority to other countries"194 Even though Nasser's nationalism was transformed 
from Egypt-centred nationalism into the new phase of Arab nationalism, becoming Nasser's 
representative ideology, the very first stepping-stone of Nasser's nationalism was his Egyptian 
identity. 
5.1.2. Consciousness of Class 
tyranny tremble.... " 
192 Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975) p. 48; Reports have 
appeared from time to time indicating the dependence of the military regime in Egypt since 1952 upon German 
advisers in military training and the operation of mass media. What Is Interesting about these reports Is the 
allegation that German personnel in the service of the U. A. R. Government were of Nazi background. In a famous 
political biography of President Nasser., The Boss: the Story ofGama! Abdul Nasser, the author Robert St. John 
intimates that key German personnel in Egypt adopted Egyptian names. Another work, Behind the E; Dptian 
Sphinx: Prelude to World War III? (Philadelphia and New York: Chilton Co., 1960), by Irving Sedar and Ilarold 
Greenberg, suggests an alliance between a rising Germany and a Nasser-dominated U. A. R. 193 Anwar Sadat, Revolt on the Nile (London: 1957) p. 41. 
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In Khatatba where Nasser was brought up, there was poverty and squalor, as there had 
been everywhere else he had lived, and the houses were just as dark and dreary, and the filth in 
the road was no different, but this was the country. 195 In such surroundings, it is only natural to 
have strong feelings about matters of equality, and wealth and poverty, which then develop into 
class-consciousness. Nasser's ideology was not formed by imagination alone, but also by real 
experiences and a critical mind. There is a strong possibility that his experiences and 
observations of desperate indigence were connected to his class-consciousness. In that 
environment, it was quite natural for him to have primitive socialist sentiments. However, there 
are no signs any attachment to classical scientific socialism. His first concern was the dignity of 
Egypt, which is found in his speech "they had the right to hold their heads up as the foundation 
of the Egyptian nation". 
Although the foundations for socialism were strong in Egypt, scientific socialism was 
not successful enough to become a major ideology. Egyptians thought that the problem of 
colonialism was much more serious than the class conflict, and hence their resentment was 
aimed at external invasive powers rather than at internal capitalists. Even Moscow was regarded 
as one of the colonial power bases, like London or Washington, by the Egyptians. 196 
5.1.3. Pursuit of the New Ideology 
Legitimacy is the moral basis of authority. 197 Without appropriate legitimacy, a 
regime's long-term survival and its political stability cannot be guaranteed. 198 So the formation 
an ideology is a first step towards legitimacy. In Egypt, an acceptable formula for the orderly 
transfer of power from one group to another did not really exist. Non-democratic action to many 
people, therefore, seemed to be the only means of change available. 199 Ilowever, regimes that 
take power through non-democratic action are critically unstable, and lack proper mechanisms 
to persuade people to acknowledge them. 
In this context, as a practical measure, the Free Officers attempted to formulate an 
ideology that would justify the coup. More than that, with this formal ideology they hoped to be 
194 Ki Taek Lee, The History of International Relations, (Seoul: Bak Young Sa, 1987) p. 211. 
195 Robert St. John, op. cit., p. 18. 
196 Peter Woodward, Nasser (London: Longman, 1992) p. 33. 
197 lirair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1985) quoted in G. Hossein Razi, "Legitimacy in the Middle East, " American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, 
No. 1 (March, 1990) p. 70. 
198 Emma C. Murphy, op. cit., p. 71. 
199 Derek Hopwood, op. cit., p. 85. 
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able to persuade the people to support them, despite the uncertain future. 200 With the Suez 
incident in 1956, when Nasser's regime was asked to express ideological viewpoints, Nasser 
became eager to construct a new ideology. Leaders of Nasser's government were relatively 
open-minded and willing to explore and experiment with alternative ideological principles. 
They did not adhere blindly to authentic ideologies but tried to be eclectic and pragmatic 201 
Nasser announced that he was embarking on a search for a new ideology to suit Egypt in 1958. 
He asserted that this ideology should not be a copy of any external ideology, but that it should 
be an indigenous ideology that would be a creative and flexible principle for Egypt's prosperity. 
This attitude is expressed well in Nasser's speech: 
It is no easy task for we have to design the structure of our new society as 
we build it. Our circumstances differ from those of other nations and this 
is why we cannot imitate the pattern of any other society; as each 
community follows the mode of evolution and the pattern best suited to 
its circumstances. Our blind imitation of any system would ignore the 
nature of our society and the different factors influencing it and would 
thus be incompatible with the needs of this people. 
We are required to study the experience of other nations and to benefit by 
it but under no circumstances can we copy it. This is why we say that we 
not only build our society but we also design its pattern as we go. This 
pattern is modified by the nature and circumstances of our changing 
societies and its requirements. This is why it is a continuous process. The 
broad lines of this pattern are socialism, cooperation and democracy, and 
our task is to adapt these principles to our circumstances and to proceed 
with the work of building a growing integrated society. 202 
George Lenczouski divided the formulation process of Nasser's ideology into four 
stages: i) the phase of Egypt centrism 1952-1955, ii) the pan-Arab phase, 1955-1958, iii) the 
domestic socialist phase, 1958-61, iv) the pan-Arab socialist phase 1961-1964.203 
According to Lenczouski, for the first half of Nasser's regime, he appeared to adhere to 
a nationalist ideology. After World War 11 and the Korean War, as the Cold War becoming 
more intense, Nasser mobilised people under the slogan of the `Egypt and Arab nation'. But due 
to the failure of the establishment of the U. A. R., Nasser had to embark on a new journey with a 
200 Ibid., p. 84. 
201 R. Ilrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Nasser: a Study In Political Dynamics, (London: Univ. of London Press, 1972) 
p. 64. 
202 President G. A. Nasser, Speeches and Press Interviews, 1958. (Cairo: UAR, Information Dept. ) pp. 291.292. 203 George Lenczouski, "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism, " in Jack II. Thompson & Robert D. Reischaucr (ed. ) Modernisation of the Arab World (Princeton: D. Von Nastrand Company, Inc., 1966) p. 198. 
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new identity, that of a `socialist ideology'. From that moment on, Nasser tried to 
integrate 
`Arab' and `Socialism'. 
5.2. Arab Nationalism 
In developing countries, nationalism is the easiest ideology to establish in a short time. 
It does not require complicated theoretical background as socialism does. With merely the 
sentiment of coalition and unity in a nation, nationalism can be established without serious 
conflict, because instincts that are linked by the same ethnic background can be much stronger 
than any other ingredients in the formation of an ideology 204 Nasser recognised this. 
5.2.1. From Egyptian Nationalism to Arab Nationalism 
Arab identity is the most important characteristic of this region. However, lacking a 
sense of national identity, the initial reaction of Egyptian intellectuals to European imperialism 
(political and economic) manifested itself in the pan-Islamic movement presided over by the 
non-Egyptian, non-Arab, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani 205 
After the Abdin Palace incident, the major motivation behind Nasser' coup in 1952 
was anti-British nationalism, that had hitherto not been developed. Suppressive ruling and 
exploitative intervention by Britain was the optimum environment for anti-British nationalism 
to appear. As a result of this, the easiest and the most efficient way to move the people was 
through nationalism. 
The two identities which constitute nationalism must first be addressed. The first is 
ethnicity-based identity - al Qawmiyya, and the other is individual nation-based identity - al 
Wataniyya. In the very first stage of Nasser's governance, it seemed that his priority was 
Egyptian nationalism, but his overall rhetoric about nationalism concerned the Arab cause. This 
indicated that that Arab identity (qawmiyya) was a more efficient basis on which to unify 
Egyptians, since Arab identity was broadly linked with the Islamic ummah community identity 
that had taken root in all Egyptians. Islam prohibits Muslims from following an individual 
state's own interests. 
204 R. Hrair Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 50. 
205 Ibid., p. 83. 
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As Arabic intellectuals who had studied abroad and been influenced by modern 
nationalist ideology returned to their countries, nationalist movements appeared in full scale. 
They elaborated nationalism, in order to make it more acceptable and applicable in the Middle 
East. 
With this development of nationalism, a critical issue was raised in the Middle East 
concerning what kind of regime would be best suited to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, early Arab nationalism began with the Arab elites' 
consciousness of the Ottoman's Turkish nationalism. They regarded Turkish nationalism as a 
critical threat to Arab safety. In this context, Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad All of Egypt, 
introduced a total equality policy to the region, no matter what one's ethnic background, 
immediately after he had annexed Syria. There was no discrimination under the governance of 
Ibrahim Pasha in Egypt. 
However, as soon as he lost power, certain Christian intellectuals brought the Arab 
cause to the forefront. Those who had studied abroad in places like the American University in 
Beirut were worried about the dominance of Islam in the Middle East. Ironically the first step 
taken for Arab nationalism was by Christian intellectuals with the intention of avoiding Islamic 
influences and Turkish nationalism. As European intellectual influences on Egypt intensified, a 
number of diverse movements came into being to replace the worn-out tenets of pan-Islamism. 
In this context, before the establishment and organisation of a concrete form of Arab 
nationalism, Egypt-centred nationalism was at the front line of ideology 206 This kind of Egypt- 
centred sentiment in ordinary Egyptian people might have been caused by nostalgia for the 
glorious moments of the Paranoiac era, and the Ptolemaic Empire. As Nadav Safran observes, 
"It was still necessary to provide an ideological rationale for a specifically Egyptian 
nationalism... "207 In an attempt to endow the new state with a distinctively Egyptian "cultural 
personality", the Paranoiac past was revived and revitalised. Amongst the intellectuals who 
advocated an `Egypt first' policy based on Pharaohism were some of the country's foremost 
journalists, especially Fikri Abaza, Ihsan Abd al Quddus, and Mustafa Amin - who continued to 
press their case well into the early period of the revolution 208 
With this mentality, Egyptian intellectuals made every effort to transform the mythic 
206 It is obvious that Nasser did not emphasise Egyptian nationalism alone. Ile asserted that with its strong 
attachment to Arab identity, Egypt should play a leading role in the Arab world. An Egypt-centred interpretation 
of history was highlighted by giving examples of Arab heroes from Egypt such as Salah al-Din, al-Ayubi. Against 
this background, Nasser proclaimed a Cairo-centred movement of Arab unity. There were beliefs among the 
ordinary Egyptian people that Salah al-Din was reincarnated in the body of Nasser. R. I I. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 80. 
207 Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961) 
p. 143.; R. H. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 87. 
208 Ibid., p. 87. 
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features of Egyptian nationalism into reality by emphasising Orabi's Egyptian nationalist 
movement rather than Muhammad Abdu's Islamic reformative revivalism. However, this effort 
was not successful. The tenets of Egyptian nationalism that they tried to establish were 
constructed in line with Western values that did not fit the Egyptian mentality. Also the Muslim 
ethos arose amongst the people. In this context, intellectuals who tried to adopt Western forms 
of nationalism were alienated. In short, Egyptian nationalism had been found to be irrelevant to 
the Egyptian situation. Its direction and underpinning imparted a sense of artificiality with 
respect to the existing Egyptian ethos. Hence, the duplication of European ideas and forms 
became a great disappointment for Egypt. 
At this moment, Nasser's personal identification with Arabism pushed the remaining 
supporters into the background. The predominant theme expressed throughout April 1953 was 
Egyptian nationalism. However, during 1953 Arab nationalism already slightly exceeded that of 
Egyptian nationalism. After 1953, Arab nationalism maintained its yearly cumulative 
preponderance over Egyptian nationalism and starting in 1955 registered a sharp increase, while 
Egyptian nationalism became relatively insignificant 209 
5.2.2. The Evolution of Nasser's Arab Nationalism 
Nasser's idea of nationalism was pragmatic rather than theoretical or dogmatic. For 
him, an ideology was not an absolute solution, but was flexible and adjustable to the changing 
situation. His ideology had been influenced by his experience of certain crucial incidents. A 
series of incidents like the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 210 the attempt to assassinate the Egyptian 
209 Ibid., pp. 93-95. 
210 The outbreak of the Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935 made Britain the dominant foreign power in Egypt, amenable to 
redefining Anglo-Egyptian ties. The result was the signing of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in 1936, valid for 20 years. 
It gave Britain the exclusive right to equip and train the Egyptian military. While it required Egypt to expand its 
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decisively. Reflecting the popular mood, which sought to avenge the humiliation suffered by the Arabs in the 
Palestine War, the Wafd government pressed Britain to withdraw its troops from Egypt. When London 
stonewalled, Cairo unilaterally abrogated the 1936 treaty in October 1951. The ensuing official non-cooperation, 
reinforced by popular guerrilla actions, made the British base in the Suez Canal zone virtually inoperative. The 
tussle between London and Cairo paved the way for the overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy in less than a year. 
The Nasser regime was anxious to see the departure of the 70,000 British troops who were occupying 300 sq. 
miles of Egyptian territory. It signed an agreement with London in October 1954 for a British withdrawal by the 
end of the year. Dilip Hiro, Dictionary of the Middle East (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996) pp. 14-15. 
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Prime Minister in February 1942, and the Palestine War in 1948, all affected the development of 
Nasser's particular brand of nationalism. 
Most of all, the Palestinian War awoke him to the plight of the Arabs. In Part III of the 
Philosophy of the Revolution, the first traces of the evolution of Egyptian nationalism into Arab 
unity nationalism begin to appear. 211 Furthermore, at the level of international politics, Arab 
unity was essential for them to protect themselves from foreign powers under the conditions of 
the Cold War. Arab unity was thus imperative because of economic, political, geographic and 
especially military reasons. Nasser became more interested in Arab nationalist ideology, based 
on al-Qawmiyya identity, than in Egyptian nationalism, founded on al-Wataniyya identity. 
As Dekmejian points out, Nasser's Arab nationalism depended on an emotional 
attitude, so it may be said that his nationalism was not the result of refined procedures of 
theorisation but of intuition and experience 212 It is relatively easier to progress in an emotional 
way, full of resentment towards a particular regime, or with a sense of deprivation, towards the 
establishment of nationalism, than on a theoretical basis. This emotional type of nationalism 
might, however, be vulnerable to various criticisms. 
Abdallah at Rimawi criticised Baathism as unscientific romanticism, which had 
emotional origins. He asserted that Nasser's conventional logic of Arab nationalism needed to 
be turned into a genuine scientific revolutionary nationalism. 213 Accepting this kind of assertion, 
Nasser adopted the Hegelian view of history to formulate his nationalism. In the tradition of 
Marx and Hegel, history is viewed as an inevitable process, in Nasser's case moving toward 
Arab unity. 214 He reached the conclusion that the ultimate stage of Arab development is a united 
Arab nation. 215 
In short, the ultimate aim of Arab nationalism is to have one Arab nation. The U. A. R. 
Charter mentioned this hope and possibility in more explicit terms: 
Unity... is identified with the Arab existence itself. Suffice it that the 
Arab Nation has a unity of language, forming the unity of mind and 
thought. Suffice it that the Arab Nation is characterised by unity of 
history creating unity of conscience and sentiments. Suffice it that the 
Arab Nation enjoys unity of hope, the basis of the unity of future and 
fate. 216 
211 R. H. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 101. 
212 Ibid., p. 102. 
213 Abdallah al-Rimawi, Nationalism and Unity (Cairo, 1961) p. 44, quoted in ibid, p. 102. 214 United Arab Republic, Arab Political Encyclopedia (Cairo: January - February, 1962)p. 155 quoted in ibid., p. 104. 215 United Arab Republic, Press release of the U. A. R. mission to U. N., Oct. 1961, p. 6., quoted in ibid., p. 104. 216 United Arab Republic, Charter (Cairo: Information Department, n. d. ) p. 93, quoted in ibid., p. 105 
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And this hope was supposed to be embodied by establishing the United Arab Republic. 
5.2.3. The United Arab Republic 
Even though there were many efforts to unite the Arab region into one nation, over a 
long period of time, these attempts at integration were not very successful. It may be said that 
the most significant attempt at Arab unity was the United Arab Republic, despite its short-term 
destiny. The United Arab Republic was the product of the efforts made by the Syrian Baath 
party and Nasser's government. 
5.2.3.1. The Arab Baath Socialist Party 
The officially-named the Arab Baath Socialist Party emerged in March 1954. The 
Baath party was the product of the amalgamation of two political parties - the Arab Baath party 
and the Arab Socialist Party. The original Arab Baath Party led by Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar 
was established in 1943 under the slogan "The establishment of one Arab nation which has an 
eternal mission". Aflaq and Bitar had connections with the communists in Paris, where Aflaq 
lived as a student. However, after a short while they realised that communism did not suit Arab 
nationalism, and so broke off all relations with the French communists. A residual Marxist 
influence made them choose a slogan which included `socialism' when they organised the Baath 
party. 217 The other faction that composed the Baath party was the Arab Socialist Party, based at 
Hama, north of Syria. Akram Hourani led this party. 
The Baath party was composed of a well-organised army and well-educated 
intellectuals. Although its headquarters were located in Syria, its branches were scattered across 
Lebanon, Trans Jordan and Iraq. Baath was a pan-Arabic party both nominally and in reality. 
Until 1947, the dominant political trend related to the issue of Arab unity. Baath 
noticed this trend and promoted Arab unity through the official propaganda of the party. In 1952, 
Baath joined the military regime of Adib Shishakli who intended to unite Syria and Egypt, and 
to set up good relations with Saudi Arabia. From this time on, the Baath party came to 
prominence as a major actor in the Arab unity movement. 
Baath advocated Arab United Nations under the federation system, in which individual 
states would have the right to administer their own domestic affairs. With regard to ideological 
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fundamentals, Baath insisted on socialism. Most of the members of Baath were moderate 
socialists who believed in a peaceful social evolution. 
The implications of the emerging Baath party may be summarised as follows. First, in 
addition to proclaiming Arab unity as their ultimate aim for the sake of the Arab peoples, their 
attitude concerning how to achieve this aim was flexible. They eschewed fantasies like the 
glorious Arab Empire, and focused on a loose type of federation of the Arab states. Secondly, 
Baath was the first political party that had multi-national branches with a single aim - Arab 
unity. Lastly, Baath was the only party proclaiming Arab unity that took the reigns of 
government 
5.2.3.2. Concrete Action for Arab Unification 
During the first stage of the revolution, Nasser experienced big political fluctuations. 
He dismantled the political parties in Egypt and suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood. He also 
experienced severe conflicts with General Neguib after the coup, and controversial land reform 
policy, amongst other issues. His abilities to deal with these fluctuations were demonstrated to 
the Arab people, and thus he was able to assume a solid position as a prominent leader of the 
Arabs. A remarkable incident, which allowed him to win over massive support from the Arab 
people, occurred when he refused to accept and join the Baghdad Pact. Nasser's refusal to join 
the Baghdad Pact despite pressure from the West was seen as a heroic action in the eyes of the 
Arab people. 218 
Incidentally, one of the main reasons Nasser did not join the Pact was because he did 
not want to have his efforts disrupted by external intervention when he tried to establish an 
Egypt-centred pan-Arabism. 219 Even though such duplicity existed behind his attitude towards 
the Pact, his actions were interpreted as resistance to Western imperialism by the people. At any 
rate, Nasser's confrontation with Western power was impressive from the point of view of the 
Arab people. The agreement in 1954 between Egypt and Britain on the withdrawal of British 
troops from Egyptian territory made a huge impression on the Arab people. From that time on, 
Egypt started to play the most important role in the Arab world 220 
The Bandung Conference was a critical moment for Nasser. His `positive neutralism' 
came to be his trademark in the arena of international politics. Nasser used this approach not 
217 Their official slogans were "Freedom, Unity and Socialism" 
218 G. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 200. 
219 R. W. Baker, op. cit., p. 38. 
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only as a principle in foreign policy but also as a propeller for the Arab unity movement. 
According to Nasser himself, if any Arab governments had a negative opinion about his positive 
neutralism, this government should be regarded as an adversary of the Arabs 221 
With this legitimacy, Nasser consolidated his ideas on the Arab unification movement 
from 1953, one year after the coup. Until 1958, when the United Arab Republic embarked on a 
new phase in world politics, Nasser's regime solidified the fundamentals for Arab unity and 
disseminated propaganda for this unity on a large scale. On 27"i of September 1955, Egypt 
concluded that the Egyptian-Saudi Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia would be the 
first step in approaching Arab unity. In April 1956, Yemen joined this agreement. The 
Collective Solidarity Treaty was signed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on 190' of 
January 1957. Then followed the third and fourth Arab Culture Councils in 1957 and 1959. 
The culmination of Nasser's steps towards legitimising Arab unity was the Suez Crisis 
in 1956. Britain, France, and Israel, responding the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in July 
1956, succeeded in occupying Egyptian territory, but were defeated in the political arena in 
terms of international relations. For Nasser, this war became a crucial diplomatic triumph. In 
contrast to the Orabi's revolutionary movement in 1882, which resulted in British troops' 
occupation of Egypt, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal brought about the withdrawal of 
Britain from Egypt. Britain's attempt to overthrow Nasser's regime by means of the military 
action of the Suez War totally failed, 222 and this attempt reaffirmed amongst the Arab people the 
idea that imperialism and Zionism should be their first enemies. All these circumstances 
provided a fertile nursery for the growth of the Arab unity movement. 
5.2.3.3. The Establishment, Evolution and Collapse of the U. A. R. 
In February 1958, Egypt and Syria finally agreed to join together to form the U. A. R. 
At that time, the political situation in Syria was extremely unstable. For the Syrian Baath party 
and the government, the only way to tackle the troublesome internal situation seemed to be by 
merging two countries together. Part of the reason why the political and military leaders of 
Syria sought a union with Egypt was to forestall the rise of the communist movement in 
Syria. 223 Communist leaders like Deputy Prime Minister Khalid al-Azm strongly opposed the 
union with Egypt, because that kind of nationalist movement on the basis of specific ethnic 
220 L. Binder, Ideological Revolution in the Middle East, p. 211. 221 G. Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 200. 
222 Arthur Goldschmidt Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979) p. 110. 
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background was prohibited according to communist principles. 
Nasser was proclaimed President of the U. A. R., and Cairo was established as its 
capital city. In March, one of the monarchical states in the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, joined 
in 
a loose federation type union with Egypt, which created the United Arab States. Nasser became 
a figurehead of the Arab unity movement. 
However, this union had only a brief life-span. Once Syria had been affiliated with the 
U. A. R., its president, Nasser, extended to the Syrian region his own policy of nationalising all 
banking systems, insurance, finance companies and major industries. Many members of the 
Syrian elite felt alienated and isolated from the policy-making process. Significantly, the most 
important political positions of the U. A. R. were allocated to Egyptian bureaucrats. Immediately 
after the establishment of the U. A. R., former Syrian President Shukri Quwatli stepped down 
from his presidency as the `first registered citizen of the U. A. R. '. Former Syrian Prime Minister 
Sabri Asali was appointed as a trumpery Vice President in Cairo. 
In the early stages of unification, it was not obvious to what extent the Baath party 
intended to share power with Egypt. However, at that time, Syrian Baath was losing its 
influence and popularity with the Syrian people in the fight against the communists. In these 
circumstances, the only option the Baath Party had was to join the U. A. R. with Egypt. Nasser 
banned all political parties in Syria and merged all the parties into a monolithic organisation - 
the National Union - that was a monopoly party in the U. A. R. Even the Baath party, which was 
a major participant on the Syrian side, had to be dissolved. 
The establishment of a unified military command, in which Syrian military officers 
were relegated to subordinate positions, created widespread disaffection amongst the officer 
corps. As a result of the election of 1959, the mass resignation of Syrian officials from the 
U. A. R. government brought about vehement arguments between Nasser and the Baathists 
concerning who should have the initiative in Syrian politics. From that moment on, the 
Baathists came to realise that Nasser was not being cooperative with the Baath Party, and that 
he was only concerned with the acquisition of Syria. 
Consequently, these factors created broad discontent with Nasser's arbitrary decisions 
and his exclusive behaviour that lacked proper consideration for his Syrian partner. This led 
Syria to withdraw their participation in the U. A. R. in September 1961 amid growing animosity 
against Egypt. Yemen dissolved its federation with the Union of Arab States in December the 
same year. 
223 D. Hiro, op. cit., p. 330. 
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5.2.3.4. Summit Conference of Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963 
After the Syrian secession from the U. A. R. in September 1961, the Baath party tried to 
find a way to unify Arabs once more. However, the Syrian government did not have any 
potential, nor any feasible plans for Arab unification. So two prominent leaders of Baath, Aflaq 
and Bitar came to the conclusion that Arab unity could not be accomplished without Nasser's 
cooperation. They believed that Nasser might realise his mistake when his efforts to unify the 
Arabs through the U. A. R. had ended in failure. 
On 1s` of March 1963, the military wing of the Baathist movement took control of the 
country and established a National Revolutionary Command. This meant that, for the first time, 
the Baath party could take the helm of the whole state. A new Syrian revolutionary cabinet was 
organised. Most core positions of the new cabinet, including Prime Minister, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Minister of Domestic Affairs, and Minister of Economic Development were 
held by sincere Baathists. Amongst the twelve cabinet members, the Baath party appointed five 
Nasserists, which indicated the Baathists' intention of renewing relations with Nasser in order to 
find a way of uniting the Arabs once more. At the same time, the majority of the cabinet 
members of Abdul Salam Muhammad Arif's revolutionary cabinet in Iraq were Baathists who 
sought Arab unity. 
In early March 1963, the tripartite talks amongst Egypt, Syria and Iraq for the 
unification of Arabs were held. At these talks, there were dissenting opinions about the form 
Arab unity should take between Nasser and the Baathists. The Baathists tried to stick to a form 
of Arab federation that would guarantee each participant in the unity equal political rights, but 
Nasser wanted to a return to the original form of the U. A. R. in 1958. However, eventually 
Nasser agreed to the Baathists' proposal of a federation-type Arab unity. 
The most difficult issue that needed to be discussed concerned the party system for the 
new republic. The Baathists supported a multi-party system, whereas Nasser was firmly in 
favour of a monolithic super-party system like the Liberation Rally, the National Union and the 
Arab Socialist Union. Nasser thought that it was necessary to set up a monolithic party for mass 
mobilisation in order to confront more effectively any possible reactionary movements. 
However, the Baathists were unwilling to accept Nasser's idea of a monolithic super-party 
system, because in their experience, the National Union, which was established in Syria due to 
Nasser's urging in 1958, had stripped Baath of its own rights and freedom. 
Vehement arguments on this matter did produce slight progress towards the creation of 
a possibility of resurrection of the United Arab Republic, but after five months of discussion 
without agreement the talks ended in failure. The main reason for this failure was the 
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disagreement about who should assume the core of the power in the new republic. 
5.2.3.5 The Failure of the Arab Unity Movement and Its Implications 
After the collapse of the U. A. R., and the failure of another attempt at unity, Nasser 
faced political turmoil. Houari Boumedienne overthrew one of the most important pro-Nasserist 
regime, Ahmed Ben Bellah's government in Algeria, in 1965. In Iraq, after Arif's sudden death, 
anti-Nasser Baathists regained influence in Iraqi politics after General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr 
seized power in 1968 and asked the Iraqi Baathists to help form his government. In addition, 
Kuwait had withdrawn from the Arab common market and moved into cordial relations with the 
Saudi Arabia of King Faisal who represented the strongest opposition to Nasser. 
Many countries of the Arab League, such as Jordan, Sudan and Lebanon, were 
experiencing problems of domestic instability. Magreb countries, such as Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Libya, were maintaining their individual standpoints apart from Nasser. In Syria, anti-Nasser 
sentiments prevailed throughout the country. There was not a single country to back up Nasser's 
Arab unity movement except North Yemen. 
In terms of population, industrial development, and military power, Egypt was the 
most powerful nucleus state as a matter of fact. However, the economic situation in Egypt was 
deteriorating, which meant that Egyptian influence in the Arab countries concerning the 
building of one Arab state decreased. 
As a matter of fact, the U. A. R. was the amalgamation of only two nations out of 
twenty two other countries in the Arab League. From a hypothetical point of view, the 
possibility of the success of the U. A. R. was not very high from the beginning, because 
conservative regimes in the region and progressive secularist regimes had been very unlikely to 
agree to the idea of making one Arab polity. 
As time went by, the passions of pan-Arabism and Arab unity decreased, but the 
identity of individual states grew inside the region. In this context, the struggles at the level of 
individual Arab states deepened, and this frustrated those who were strongly in favour of Arab 
unity. 
For Nasser, the Baathists, and other leaders who were committed to the Arab cause, 
unification remained imperative for economic, political, geographic, and especially military 
reasons. Yet Nasser's preferred means of achieving unity were quite different from the ideas of 
other leaders, who tried to set up a loose type of Arab confederation on the basis of the secured 
rights of each individual state, as shown by the first effort to build the U. A. R., and by the 
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Summit Conference in 1963. Nasser's Egypt-centred unity, 224based on the logic of the `nucleus' 
state Egypt's main role was not accepted by the major partner, Syria. Besides this, although all 
those who were in favour of Arab unity felt passionately about it, unity movements went wrong 
because of the lack of a well-planned time schedule for unification process, and a lack of 
properly thought out arguments with which to persuade the Arab people. 
In conclusion, the power struggle concerning Arab unity was a crucial matter. The 
management of core power holds the key to the solution of Arab unity in the future. 
5.3. Arab Socialism 
At the very beginning of Nasser's regime, in the immediate aftermath of the coup, 
Nasser drove forward his economic development plan in association with the industrial 
capitalists. He showed a very pragmatic attitude in choosing his major approaches to economic 
development. At this stage, his first aim was to eradicate the colonial legacy by the expatriation 
of foreign influence. His domestic development method seemed to be a kind of capitalist 
strategy. 
After his efforts to get financial support to build up Egypt's economy to a competitive 
level were rejected, his disillusionment with Western capitalist states deepened. According to 
Dekmejian, the growing unattractiveness of the Western model, coupled with the elite's 
propensity to extend the scope of its power, pushed the system toward a socialistic orientation. 
The final adoption of Arab socialism, however, marked the end of the pragmatic phase. There is 
no evidence to indicate that Nasser had strong socialist leanings, either before or after the 
revolution 225 
Nasser came to the conclusion that a firmer ideology was necessary to enable Egypt to 
modernise itself and he came to socialism as a last resort in the Charter of 1962. He announced 
that he would devote himself to the socialist ideology. 
Although Nasser proclaimed himself to be a scientific socialist, the socialism that he 
devised was quite far removed from classical scientific socialism. One of the most fundamental 
principles of scientific socialism is materialism, but a materialism based on an atheistic attitude 
224 Nasser's action demonstrated that Nasser himself assigned this dual leadership - Egypt and Arab - role to himself 
and to Egypt. G. A. Nasser, Philosophy of Revolution, pp. 61-62. 
225 R. H. Dekmejian, op. cit., p. 98. 
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could not be accepted at all by the Egyptian Muslims 226 So Nasser made an effort to devise a 
new application of socialism, which might suit the specific requirements of his country. As 
Nasser commented, "The broad lines of this pattern are socialism, co-operation and democracy, 
and our task is to adapt these principles to our circumstances and to proceed with the work of 
building a growing, intended society"227 
In an interview with a German broadcasting company in early 1965, Nasser invented 
the term, "Arab implementation of socialism" when asked about his view of the differences 
between original socialism and his own brand of socialism. This was an explanatory version of 
the Arab socialism that was one of Nasser's main ideologies. There were different expressions 
for Arab socialism similar to Nasser's, however. Ali Sabri suggested `Socialist implementation 
in Egypt' and the former Deputy President, Kamal ad-Din Rifat proposed the phrase `The Arab 
road to socialism'. Nasser addressed students at Alexandria University clearly in these terms: 
Socialism in general means the eradication of man's exploitation by man. 
But the socialist application varies from one country to another. There are 
people who like to call it Arab socialism on the basis that this is socialism 
with a particular trademark. It is my opinion it is an Arab application of 
socialism and not an Arab socialism. I believe that there is only one type 
of socialism and that there are basic socialist principles. 228 
The first job in adopting Arab-featured socialism was to criticise the existing dogmatic 
Marxism and to highlight its limitations and its fallacies in practice. Nasser was critical of the 
developmental stage of communism. Since the proletarian dictatorship succumbs to the 
monolithic communist party's autocracy, it is unlikely that the ideal of ultimate communism can 
be achieved. Nasser explained that Arab socialism adopted the principle of "democracy for all 
the people" and advocated the settlement of all class conflicts peacefully, unless the intrigues of 
reaction forced it to take a different course of action229 He also asserted that a new phase of 
contextualisation and application had to follow authentic Marxist theory without any dilutions. 
For Nasser, this new version of Marxism was Arab socialism, which could act as a practical 
226 Instead of adopting a historical materialism opposed to the Islamic catechisms, Nasser justified his socialistic 
approach by proposing and exemplifying the ideal of the Islamic ummah community which appears in the Quran 
and Hadith. The principles of the ideal socialist community of ummah were equality, social justice, prevention of 
monopoly, and the limited right to property. These principles might be attractive to Arab peoples for their 
character of genuine justice, supported by God. 
227 D. Hopwood, op. cit., p. 100. 
228 Fawzi Najjar, "Islam and Socialism in the U. A. R., " Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 3,1968, pp. 188; quoted 
in John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 324. 
229 Nissim Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology: Its Exponents and Crisis (N. Y.: John Wiley & Sons, 1974) p. 94. 
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means to achieve social justice, and was much more likely to be realised. He publicised his new 
brand of socialism as the most peaceful method for reaching the state of ultimate justice, not by 
the Marxists' revolutionary mechanism of conflict and violence, but by the mechanism of 
consensus and persuasion. 
Heikal confidently advocated Arab socialism in 1961 by comparing Arab socialism 
with classic communism. He pointed out seven differences between Arab socialism and classic 
communism. The first difference is the view of class. Communism advocates the dictatorship of 
the proletariat as represented by the communist party, whereas Arab socialism suggests "the 
melting away of class differences". According to Heikal, Arab socialism does not intend to 
destroy the bourgeois class in severe class conflicts, but tries to integrate the classes of society 
by reducing the possibility of class conflicts in a moderate way. Nasser thought that the most 
appropriate identity for this integrated society must be `the Arab identity', thus he put the word 
`Arab' in front of the word `socialism'. 
The second point of difference follows from the first: "Communism considers every 
man of property an exploiter, and therefore seeks his destruction... Arab Socialism differentiates 
between property belonging to the exploiting classes and property which represents work and 
endeavour. " While communism liquidates the exploiter physically, Arab socialism tries to 
disarm and disable him, and then welcomes him into the new society, in which all classes are 
transformed into a single class. 
Thirdly, Arab socialism seeks property and capital redistribution through compensation, 
but in communism, property and titles are made forfeitable by the government without any 
proper compensation or consideration. 
The fourth point related to the view of private individuals and the role of the `state'. 
Communism regards an individual as a unit of labour, but Arab socialism regards an individual 
as a crucial element in the composition of a society. In this context, the `state' in communism is 
merely a puppet of the ruling class which acts as a preserver of vested interests. However, in 
Arab socialism, the `state' plays a crucial role in protecting peoples' right and interests. 
The fifth point concerns the means of achievement. Communism justifies severe 
conflicts, revolutionary sacrifice and violence, as necessary for the achievement of an ideal 
communist society in the future. Arab socialism, on the other hand, seeks people's happiness in 
the present, not the future. Heikal gave Stalin's performance as an example, and criticised 
communism as an `ideology that is completely preoccupied with the future' 
The sixth point of difference between communism and Arab socialism, Heikal 
continues, is "the difference between literal duplication and free adaptation, between inertia and 
movement, and between blind dogmatism and free thoughts. " Heikal classified Arab socialism 
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as an empiricist ideology, and communism as a doctrinaire's ideology. As Nasser put it "we do 
not open books and copy from them; we open the book of our reality and try to find solutions 
for our situation" 
The final point which Heikal makes is the difference in the political institutions. 
According to him, "Communism requires that the organisation of political action be exclusively 
in the hands of the communist party... Arab socialism believes that the organisation of political 
action should embrace the whole nation, and should be based on a frame of national unity. " 
Heikal concludes his comparison with a brief polemic against the communists, "Those who 
believe that evolution has only one way before it, a way whose beginning is capitalism and 
whose inevitable end is communism, imagine that history marches in a blind alley. Such a blind 
alley never existed! 1"23° 
The Arab socialism that Nasser proposed seemed to have something in common with 
Islamic principles of humanism, such as equality, social justice, and brotherly affection. 
Nasser's version of socialism did not satisfy the Soviet leaders and ideologues. They wanted a 
whole-hearted adoption of classical Marxism and had little patience with the Egyptian 
compromise. 231 Dogmatic Soviet ideologues denounced Nasser's socialism for its 
misinterpretation of genuine communism, and its deviation from the authentic path of 
communism. They alleged that Nasser's socialism was not real socialism, but fatalism, the 
absence of faith in science and its findings, was slovenly, refused to submit to the requirements 
of life, and also rejected the planning or regulation of life. 
Nasser's Arab socialism is a typical example of a ruling ideology. It was formed on the 
basis of the leader's strategy, not of his ideological beliefs. Arab socialism grew in importance 
as an alternative to pan-Arabism when Cairo's position as leader of the Arab nationalist 
movement was threatened following Syria's secession from the U. A. R. in September 1961. 
Rejwan notes that the immediate rise of Arab socialism after the collapse of the U. A. R. meant 
that Nasser tried to use his socialist ideology as an alternative ideology to maintain his position 
in the region 232 
Nasser recognised socialism as an ideology that had two implications in practice. The 
first was its potential for achieving rapid modernisation and development. The second was its 
potential role in providing the basis for a social welfare system for the Egyptian people. 
Although Nasser adopted socialism as his main ideology, however, this did not mean that the 
230 Muhammad Hassan Heikal, Al Ahram, 4`h of Aug. 1961, quoted in ibid., pp-96-98- 
23 1 Nasser's closest relationship was with President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who taught him the concept of a 
socialism not subservient to Soviet communism, and worked out in the closest possible conformity with local 
conditions. Ibid., p. 101. 
232 Ibid., p. 99. 
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Egyptian economic system was controlled only by socialism. 233 Socialism in Egypt consisted of 
a mixed economy where the private sector, which included light industry, private possession of 
property, and domestic business transactions, coexisted with a broad public sector. Nasser's 
economic system under the slogan of Arab socialism may be understood as a unique socialist 
economic system. It adopted the merits of capitalism despite the Charter, which officially 
proclaimed that capitalism had been eradicated 234 
5.3.1. Official Statement of Arab Socialism - The Charter 
In May 1962, Nasser promulgated The Charter of National Action as the official 
guideline for Egypt. It proclaimed that Egypt was to embark on a course based on the principles 
of socialism. This was the first serious attempt to define an ideology of the revolution. 
The Charter was largely devoted to socialism and referred to it as the only way to 
achieve economic development and modernisation. The two aims of Arab socialism were said 
to be `justice' and `sufficiency'. It read, "This is not confined to the mere re-distribution of the 
national wealth among the citizens but foremost and above all it requires the expansion of the 
base of this national wealth, so as to accede to the lawful rights of the working masses. This 
means that socialism, with its two supports, sufficiency and justice, is the way to social 
freedom"233 According to the Charter, there is no way to reap the fruits of everyone's toil if 
Egypt does not stick to the principles of socialism. Nasser asserted that it was Egypt's destiny in 
the 20th century to adopt socialism as its major ideology. "The socialist solution was a historical 
inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspiration of the masses and the changing nature of 
the world in the second part of the 20th century"236 The Charter also stipulated the establishment 
of a new integrating organisation, Arab Socialist Union (A. S. U. ), which could be a crucial 
factor in bringing about major changes in Egyptian and Arab politics. 237It describes the real 
situation and the expected state of the Egyptian economy in detail. In fact, it seems that the 
Charter attempted to explain and justify all those policies that had been formulated by Nasser's 
regime following the 1952 coup. It also attempted to provide a firm doctrine for comprehensive 
development in Egypt, which included politics, economics, social-cultural potentiality, and 
233 Raymond William Baker, Egypt's Uncertain Revolution under Nasser and Sadat (Cambridge: Ilarvard University 
Press, 1978) p. 175-176. 
234 Ibid., p. 177. 
235 Chapter 6. "On the Inevitability of the Socialist Solution, " The Charter of National Action, p. 227. 
236 Ibid. p. 227. 
237 Panayiotis J. Vatikiotis. The History of Egypt, p. 400. 
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amongst other things, to facilitate a prosperous future for Egypt 238 
The most important achievement necessary for progress in Egypt was the management 
of the economy. Consequently, the first socialist issue to be tackled was that of nationalisation 
and of dealing with the private sector. The principles for dealing with the public and private 
sectors demonstrated clear distinctions between Nasser's Arab socialism and classical socialism. 
These principles were summed up in the Charter as follows: 
First, in the field of production in general: The major skeleton of the 
production operation, i. e. the railways, roads, ports, airports, the sources 
of energy, the dams, means of sea, land and air transportation and other 
public services should be within the framework of public ownership. 
Second, in the field of industry: The majority of the heavy, medium and 
mining industries should be part of public ownership. Although it is 
possible to allow private ownership in this domain, such private 
ownership should be controlled by the public sector owned by the people. 
Light industries must always be beyond monopoly. Though this field is 
open to private ownership, the public sector must have a role enabling it 
to guide that industry in the people's interests. 
Third, in the field of trade: Foreign trade must be under the people's full 
control. Thus all import trade must be within the framework of the public 
sector. Though it is incumbent upon private capital to participate in 
export trade, the public sector must have the main share in that field to 
preclude all possible fraudulency. Insofar as a percentage could be set in 
that field, the public sector must be in charge of three quarters of exports, 
while encouraging the private sector to shoulder the responsibility for the 
remaining share. The public sector must have a role in internal trade. The 
public sector should, within the coming eight years - the remaining 
period of the first overall development plan for doubling the national 
income in ten years - be in charge of at least one quarter of the internal 
trade means service and distribution against reasonable profit which 
under no circumstances should reach the extent of exploitation. 
Fourth, in the field of finance: Banks should be within the framework of 
public ownership. The role of capital is a national one and should not be 
left to speculation and adventure. In addition, insurance companies 
should be within the same framework of public ownership for the 
protection of a major part of national savings and to ensure its sound 
orientation. 
Fifth, in the domain of land: There should be a clear distinction between 
two kinds of private ownership - that which opens the gates to 
exploitation, and non-exploiting ownership which does its share in the 
service of the national economy while serving the interests of the owners 
238 Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism 1952-1965 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 132. 
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themselves. In the field of ownership of rural land, the Agrarian Reform 
laws have limited individual ownership to one hundred feddans. Yet the 
spirit of the law implies that this limitation should cover the whole family, 
namely father, mother, and children out of age, to avoid clustering 
together maximum ownerships allowing some form of feudalism. This 
spirit can be made to rule within the coming eight years provide the 
families affected by that law sell the land in excess of those limits in cash 
to the Agricultural Cooperative Societies or to others 239 
As can be seen from the above principles, the Charter proposed nationalisation of 
major industries and the expansion of the public sector in order to establish a socialist state, but 
this did not mean the total eradication of the private sector. Instead, the Charter advocated the 
coexistence of private and public sectors on the premise that the public sector had the initiative 
in the overall economic system. As the Charter states, "By encouraging competition within the 
framework of the general economic planning, the private sector is also an invigorating element 
in the whole economy. "240 
Although private possessions were allowed in specific areas such as land, light 
industry and the domestic trade market, the level of production and the whole production 
process had to be supervised by the government. All the actions of and output from the public 
sector were controlled and managed by the state itself. Managing organisations in the public 
sector had to be supervised by the cabinet that was chaired by the President. The official process 
by which individual companies in the public sector were controlled followed a four-stage 
process, along a chain of command which consisted of: `President - Minister - Chief Officer of 
Cooperative - Chief Executive Officer of Company unit'. Some small enterprises in the manual 
industry, which did not depend on massive cash flows or a high-level of technology, remained 
in the private sector, but the government controlled these companies by restricting the supply of 
raw materials and capital. 24' 
In the field of trade, the Charter stipulated that domestic trade should be limited to 65% 
of public sector goods, and international trade should be no higher than 25% of the whole public 
sector. However, as it became known that 219 people had monopolised the whole market, all 
the wholesale trading companies were nationalised 242 Only some personal service areas, which 
depended on personal labour, such as individual lessons and individual transportation 
239 The Charter ofNational Action, pp. 230-232. 
240 Ibid., p. 242. 
241 Ahnad N. Azim, "Egypt: The Origins and Development of a Neo-Colonial State, " in Burch Berberoglu (ed. ) 
Power and Stability in the Middle East (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1989) p-7- 
242 Ibid., p. 7. 
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companies, remained in the private sector. 
Though the Charter admitted that capitalism was an efficient 
ideology in making good 
economic progress, it considered capitalism to be a new form of colonialism 
for exploiting other 
developing countries. This idea originated from the observation that the economic achievements 
in the developed countries heavily depended on the exploitation and the plundering of other 
nations. With this logic, the Charter proposed a confrontational attitude towards the 
Western 
countries and concluded that the underdeveloped peripheral states were not able to achieve 
economic development through capitalism since they could not overcome the 
dependence 
system of the world economy. Patrick O'Brien pointed out that the 
Egyptian capitalists were not 
reliable. They made great fortunes by exploiting the labourers, and 
had monopoly power in 
every industry without taking any business risks 243 
One of the most noticeable features of the Charter lies in Chapter 9- Arab 
Unity. As 
mentioned above, the U. A. R. was brought to an end by Syria's secession in 1961, which meant 
that Nasser's drive for Arab nationalism had lost its momentum. In this context, 
Nasser 
proposed the formation of a new socialist ideology by means of the Charter. Nasser's undying 
passion for Arab unity can be seen in Chapter 9 of the Charter. 
Nasser emphasised the role of the U. A. R. but showed a changed attitude towards the 
speed of achievement by saying that "Arab unity is not a uniform constitutional form that must 
inevitably be applied. It is rather a long path with several stages leading to the ultimate aim"244 
Practical steps towards Arab unity were refined and proposed in the Charter as follows: i) A 
peaceful start, ii) Scientific application of all the progressive concepts of unity, iii) Practical 
efforts to fill the economic and social gaps stemming from the difference in the stages of 
development of the various peoples of the Arab Nation, iv) Paving the way for new intellectual 
trends for overcoming intellectual disintegration in the Arab world 243 Despite the fact that the 
main purpose behind Nasser's proclamation of the Charter was to launch a new socialist 
ideology for Egypt, the noticeable implication of the Arab unity factor in the Charter was that 
Nasser did had not given up his passion for pursuing hegemony in the Arab world by means of 
the Arab unity movement which he had initiated. In this context, Arab socialism came to the 
fore in the Arab world as a major ideology, which may be described as an eclectic socialism 
mixed with Arab nationalism. 
243 P . O'Brien, op. cit., p. 202. 244 The Charter of National Action, p. 257. 
2451bid., p. 258. 
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5.3.2. An Advance Guard of Arab Socialism: The Arab Socialist Union 
5.3.2.1. Germination of the A. S. U. 
In his speech in July 1961 at the National Congress, Nasser was very emphatic about 
the necessity of a new political organisation to replace the National Union. The reason Nasser 
worked out such a detailed plan for this was because all political parties chased their own 
classes' interests, and depended on the exclusive coalition of feudalists and capitalists, not on 
the ordinary people. From his experiences Nasser concluded that there were no political 
organisations for all the classes of Egypt, particularly for the people at grass-roots level. He 
thought that reactionary politicians had spoiled the National Union, and so believed that a 
comprehensive and pure organisation was required to represent all the Egyptian people 
properly. 246 With the new organisation, Nasser intended to strengthen his regime through 
coalitions with people at the grass-roots, particularly the labour and peasantry class 247 
As the National Congress officially acknowledged the Charter, the A. S. U. was 
proclaimed as a unitary political organisation in Egypt. The principles of Arab socialism that the 
Charter proclaimed were `freedom', `unity' and `socialism'. 248 The A. S. U. was launched as an 
advance guard of Egypt's socialism. 
Although the Arab Socialist Union was established as a replacement for the National 
Union, its pyramid-shaped structure, covering village levels at the base up to the government at 
the top, was not appreciably different from that of the National Union. However, there were two 
notable differences between the National Union and the A. S. U. 249 
The first difference was the introduction of vocational representation. This meant that 
in excess of 50% of the A. S. U. had to be composed of labourers and farmers at every level of 
the organisation. The second difference lay in the `workshop unit representation system'. All 
workshops, companies, cooperatives, administrative organisations, syndicates and national 
enterprises had the right to elect their own representative by voting. The delegates elected 
through this system represented around 18.5% of the A. S. U. This system was devised as a 
reflection of Nasser's attempt at broad nationalisation and industrialisation that required an 
efficient method of mobilising and controlling labourers in the industrial sector. After the 
246 Le Monde, 13`h of March 1962, quoted in A. A. Malek, Egypt, p. 343. 
247 Jung Yeol Yoo, "The Study on the Party System of Underdeveloped Country, " The Middle East (Seoul: Ea Moon 
Gak, 1988) p. 9. 
248 D. Hopwood, op. cit., p. 90. 
249 P. J. Vatikiotis, The History of Egypt, p. 400. 
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collapse of the U. A. R., Nasser had to prevent reactionary groups from opposing his government, 
and his priority was thus the interests of the workers in an effort to restrain potential 
adversaries 250 
Nasser described the Arab Socialist Union as `the Union of labourers' forces' (Tahaluf 
al-Quwa al-'Amilah), but his ideas about the working class had only a diagrammatic existence. 
Nasser did not think that labourers were able to have any organising autonomy for their own 
interests. 25' Even though Nasser admitted to the existence of class struggle and to the inequality 
which prevailed in society, he did not accept the Marxist's doctrine of inevitable violent class- 
based revolution. Basically, Nasser thought that once labourers and farmers become the 
majority in a society, there would be no need for a violent revolution. Nasser's vision of the 
A. S. U. was as a method for achieving the goal of an ideal Arab socialism by peaceful means. 
5.3.2.2. Structural Reform of the A. S. U. by Ali Sabri 
In 1968, the number of members of the A. S. U. was five million, among them half a 
million people played a leading role in the Union, and the number of core members having 
rights of decision-making at every level was approximately 20,000. out of a total of 6,888 basic 
units, 314 (4.6%) basic units were delegated from the urban areas, 4,103 (59.5%) basic units 
belonged to the rural areas, and 2,435 basic units were `workshop units' (35%). 
Figure 4.2 The first organisation of the Arab Socialist Union (1963 -1965) 
The President (al-Rais) 
V (appointment) 
The Supreme Executive Committee (al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Ulya) 
V (appointment) 
General Secretariats (al-Sikritariyyah al-Ammah) 
11 (independent relationship) 
Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah) 
A (election) 
250 Ilya Harik, "The Single Party as a Subordinate Movement: The Case of Egypt, " World Politics Vol. 26, No. 1 (Oct. 
1973) p. 86. 
251 Ibid., p. 87. 
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District Council (al-Majli al-Mahalli) 
A (election) 
District Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Mahalliyah) 
A (election) 
Basic Units (20 committees) (al-Wihdat al-Asasiyya) 
(election) 
Members of the Union (Udwiya al-Ittihad) (recruited by recommendation) 
A upward participation /V downward commanding / II equilibrium 
Members of the Supreme Executive Committee and the General Secretariat's were 
appointed by President Nasser. Generally, Free Officers and their aides were recruited as 
members of the General Secretariats, and the majority of members of the Supreme Executive 
Committee of the A. S. U. were mostly Nasser's ministers and advisers. 
The structure of the A. S. U. was quite hierarchical. The apogee of this hierarchy was 
the President. He had the ultimate right to appoint people to crucial positions in the A. S. U., but 
at the level of counties and districts, leading members were elected by free votes from the 
members. Consequently, influential members at the county or district level were mostly 
intellectuals, educated farmers, teachers and public servants. Nasser's land reform policy after 
the coup enlarged the opportunities of political participation for those people who had had no 
power to take part in political affairs when they were dominated by exclusive groups of great 
land owners. Those who had possessed more than 25 feddans were not allowed to be elected as 
representatives at any level 252 
At the highest levels, there was no clear distinction between the A. S. U. and the general 
administrative organisation of the Egyptian government. Many high positions in the A. S. U. 
overlapped with those of government officials. After all, the A. S. U. functioned as a 
governmental organisation 253 
In 1965, Ali Sabri took up the post of Secretary General of the A. S. U., and made an 
effort to introduce radical reforms to the organisation. He tried to isolate local elites that had 
been elected to the `basic units' that made up the base of the A. S. U. pyramid. He then took the 
next step of formulating `leadership groups' in all villages, cities, factories and work places. The 
252 Leonard Binder, "Political Recruitment and Participation in Egypt, " in Joseph Lpalombara and Myron Weiner 
(ed. ), Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) p. 233. 
253 D. Hopwood, op. cit., p. 91. 
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members of such `leadership groups' were not selected by mean of elections, but by the 
appointment of provincial governors and the national secretariat. These `leadership groups' 
were his ambitious device for having control over the entire system. The leadership groups were 
supposed to play a key role in Sabri's reformed organisation. 
The Sabri initiatives would have made the A. S. U. a formidable structure with 
professional full-time agents, quasi-military organisations, and carefully selected activists at all 
levels, to lend a sense of direction and purpose to an otherwise formless congregation. Sabri's 
ultimate targets of radical reform were much more ambitious. He proposed these targets in an 
interview with Lutfi al-Kholi, 
i) to place the direction of the public sector and the administration under 
the A. S. U. in order to evict the `reigning bureaucracy' 
ii) to place the labour unions and professional syndicates under A. S. U. 
control, and promote revolutionary elements within them 
iii) to form a Central Committee that will be the brain of the A. S. U. and 
will supervise the government 254 
Sabri's intention of reorganising the A. S. U. was to make the A. S. U. a more 
hierarchical system. 255 He abolished the `Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah)' and 
`District Council (Majlis al-Mahalli)' which were elected, and put another executive group - the 
Provincial Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Muhafazah) into the chain of command. 
Figure 4.3 The new shape of the A. S. U. created by Ali Sabri (1965 -1968) 
The President (al-Rais) 
V (appointment) 
The Supreme Executive Committee (al-Lajnah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Ulya) 
V (appointment) 
General Secretariats (al-Sikritariyya al-Ammah) 
V (appointment) 
254 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - The Political Economy of Two Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 323. 
255 I. Harik, op. cit., p. 94. 
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Provincial Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Muhafazah) 
Provincial Council (Majlis al-Muhafazah) : abolished 
(appointment) District Council (Majlis al-Mahal) : abolished 
District Executives (al-Haiah al-Tanfidhiyya al-Mahalliyah) 
V (appointment) 
Leadership Groups (al-Haiah al-Qiyadiyyah) 
Basic Units (20 committees) (al-Wihdat al-Asasiyya) 
Members of the Union (Udwiya al-Ittihad) 
(A upward participation by election /f downward commanding by appointment) 
Sabri's passion was too strong to be accepted by many others. With his newly- 
structured A. S. U., he tried to step into the next stage by destroying old elites and vested 
interests, and to put the state bourgeoisie in the public sector and the civil service. This caused 
severe protests, particularly from technocrats like Aziz Sidqi. Non- professional people were 
present at all levels of the public sector. Many people agreed that the interference of the A. S. U. 
committee in administration and production activities caused trouble. It is quite clear that the 
A. S. U. was established as a political organisation to mobilise the people, but its intervention in 
the government's administration resulted in the overall weakness of the Union and in severe 
tensions between the A. S. U. and many other political actors. The defeat in June 1967 put an 
effective end to the reforming process 256 
5.3.2.3. Corporatist Character 
In order to strengthen and guarantee his regime's security, Nasser needed to have a 
comprehensive political organisation which could mobilise the people in line with the regime's 
intentions. With this organisation Nasser tried to create a good relationship with the public and 
private sectors. This was the factor of corporatism. 257 
In other words, since ideological propaganda could not control the whole workforce at 
every level, a comprehensive political organisation that could persuade all workers to join was 
essential. For this purpose, Nasser decided to create a corporatist political organisation. 
256 J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 324. 
257 E. K. Trimberger, op. cit., p. 278. 
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Waterbury agreed with the view that the A. S. U. was the apparatus of corporatism, but 
he pointed out that the Egyptian attitude towards corporatism was quite eclectic and steady. So 
the completed form of corporatism in Egypt came to appear with the establishment of the 
A. S. U., which followed the failures of two prominent political organisations - the Liberation 
Rally and the National Union 258 The Liberation Rally was organised by the Free Officers who 
tried to mobilise Nasser's support groups, but it was unsuccessful due to a deficiency in 
planning and management techniques, the Free Officers' lack of political experience and skills, 
and the absence of a firm ideology. 259 After the dissolution of the U. A. R., the National Union 
was accused of being a tool of the reactionary group, and was finally replaced with the A. S. U. 
As mentioned above, the A. S. U. regulation required that at least 50% of the 
membership should be allocated to farmers and labourers through the principle of `work force 
or vocational unit representation'. This regulation was enacted in order to encourage their active 
participation. This was the first step toward corporatism. 260 With regard to Alfred Stepan's view 
of corporatism as part and parcel of the broader process of restructuring relations between the 
various sectors of society and the state, 261 the organising `corps' units, which did work similar to 
Ali Sabri's reforms, played the role of agents for the state of Egypt. 
In short, the main purpose of the A. S. U. in the relationship between the state and its 
units was to encourage mass mobilisation and to control and supervise political participation at 
every level in Egypt. By means of its propaganda, the A. S. U. conducted surveillance of 
potential reactionary groups, and instructed the people to be obedient to the regime, which is a 
typical feature of corporatism. In this context, it may be said that the A. S. U. functioned as an 
advance guard of Nasser's authoritarianism. 
258 J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 312. 
259 Manfred Halpen, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1963) p. 309. 
260 E. K. Trimberger, op. cit., p. 284. 
261 Alfred Stepan, The State and Society, Peru in Comparative Perspective, p. 47. 
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6. The Ideology of Park - Mechanism for Domestic Control 
and National Security 
Unlike Nasser, President Park formulated no significant creative ideology. Chung Hee 
Park came to power through the military coup of May 1961. The coup had overthrown the 
Second Republic of Korea that had been established by the 19th April student revolution in 1960. 
The Second Republic of Korea was a legitimate republic, and was being run completely 
democratically. As a result, Park's regime embarked on a new government with a serious lack 
of legitimacy and security. 
In this context, Park's only option for survival was to depend entirely on support from 
the U. S. Under the harsh conditions of the Cold War, from the beginning of his regime, he had 
no autonomy to decide on an ideology. Park's regime was forced to become a faithful front-line 
camp of the U. S. in the Cold War, and hence there was no room for progressive ideologies such 
as Marxism or socialism. Only a thorough anti-left ideology prevailed throughout the country, 
with the sole objective of domestic integration, which caused great suffering to the people who 
wanted a democratic regime. 
Ironically, Park's anti-communism made a contribution towards the rapid development 
of the Korean economy by means of strong mass manipulation, and the reign of terror. There 
have been controversial arguments when evaluating Park's performance. However, quite a few 
scholars and commentators believe that Park's performance was essential as far as the rapid 
development of the Korean economy is concerned, but that many of the people suffered greatly 
at the hands of his tyrannical authoritarian regime. 
6.1. Park's Nationalism - For the Development of the Economy 
6.1.1. Nationalism in Park's Ideology 
In the first stages, Park and his military junta had no specific ideological attitudes? 62 
262 At the early stage of Park's military regime, right after the coup, his first actions in an attempt to gain public 
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The only thing that his ideological attitude could be presumed to obtain was a revolutionary 
pledge. From the pledge, which was proclaimed by the revolutionary council straight after the 
coup, anti-communism was clearly his main ideal. At that time, the U. S. government and even 
the communist regime of North Korea did not have any idea at all as to what Park's ideological 
attitude really was. Park contrived to win over some intellectuals, politicians and journalists to 
his side by giving them important positions in the government, and he had them work out an 
ideological rhetoric for his regime. 263 
6.1.1.1. The Military Administration Period (1961-1963) 
On 16`' of May 1961, Park overthrew Myon Chang's the Second Republic government 
by means of a coup designed by parts of the Korean Army and the Marine Corps. Their rhetoric 
of legitimisation for the coup was mainly criticism of the Myon Chang's government with the 
descriptions of "the incapability of the politicians", "the increasing threats of the North Korean 
communists" and "the extremely chaotic situation of Korean Society"264 At the same time, Park 
employed rhetoric that expressed his intention to more into a new ideological phase such as, 
`Firm anti-communism', `Economic development', and `Establishment of a new political 
order'. 265 After the `Five-year economic development plans' were released, his main targets 
were set up as being an `independent economic system', `industrialisation', `expansion of main 
industries' and `aspirations for economic growth' 266 
In fact, at that time, an elaborate ideological framework had not been worked out, and 
just a few slogans and some rhetoric were used as propaganda to persuade people to accept the 
new military regime. At that time, the concept of `nationalism' had not yet appeared. 
6.1.1.2. The First Half of the Third Republic (1963 -1967) 
support were to round up gangsters and remove the corrupt government officials. By doing this, he seemed to gain 
support from the progressive press such as Dong-A Ilbo, and Sasanggye. But Park's regime in its first phase had 
no concrete ideas about the future. Sang Woo Lee, "Park Chung Hee's Regime, The Backdrops of His Power 2- 
Improvised Ideology of 16`h of May Revolution, " Shin Dong-A, May 1985.: Yoon Keun Kim, Marine Corps & 
5.16 - Behind Story & Autobiography of General Kim, (Seoul; Bumjo Sa, 1987) pp. 184.187. 
263 Although most intellectuals protested against the suppressive ruling style of Park's government during his whole 
term as President, not a few of intellectuals supported Park's regime. Those who helped Park's government to 
formulate ideologies and logic to persuade the people were admitted into core position of the regime. See Sam 
Woong Kim, Traitors, (Seoul: Chung Sa, 1989). 
264 Speech at the National Press Club of the U. S. A. (16`h of November 1961). 
265 Inauguration Speech of Supreme Committee for National Rehabilitation (3`d of July 1961). 
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Park did not keep his promise of transferring power to the civil government as soon as 
possible 267 Instead of stepping down from power and returning to the Army, Park retired from 
military service and took part in the presidential election under the slogans of `liquidation of the 
disgraceful history of Korea', 268 and `completion of the sacred military revolution'. 269 Park's 
mention of `nationalism' made its first appearance at this time. `Liberal democracy based on 
nationalism' was his first mention of nationalism. 270 Although it appeared that this general 
concept of nationalism included the idea of Western democracy, hidden intentions lay behind it. 
In reality, whenever a contradiction between the values of democracy and the national interests 
appeared, Park would stand on the side of the national interest. This was merely a plausible 
excuse for his non-democratic and autocratic actions. In this context, he emphasised a `unique 
type of democracy in Korea'271, which was different from authentic Western democracy, in that 
he declared that the key to genuine democracy lay solely in economic development. 272 
The other noteworthy point is the Korea-Japan agreement on the normalisation of 
diplomatic relations in 1963 on the premise of compensating Korea for colonial exploitation 
during 1910-1945. When Park signed the agreement, his speech read "In rapidly changing 
international relations, one is necessarily required to have a broad and comprehensive attitude 
towards the world in order to be able to stand as a dynamic member of the world. 273 
Compromising with Japan is an essential part of the process of gaining financial aid to build up 
0 
our economy"274 
Nationalism on the Korean peninsula is inspired primarily by resentment of Japan. As 
mentioned in previous chapter, for the Korean people, who had been opposed by Japanese 
military rule for 36 years, the notion of `nationalism' was automatically linked to anti-Japanese 
sentiments. It is quite ironic that Park tried to bring about reconciliation with Japan in order to 
obtain funding for his development plans under the slogan of `nationalism'. The concept of 
Korean `nationalism' is incompatible with pro-Japan sentiments. Massive protests followed 
Park's decision to sign the Korea-Japan agreement on the normalisation of diplomatic relations. 
266 The Annual Administrative Policy Speech (5th of January 1962). 
267 Verse 6, Pledge of Revolution (12`h of August 1961). 
268 Speech at accepting candidacy for the 7`h presidential election (30`h of August 1963). 
269 Speech at the ceremony of General Park's retirement from the R. O. K. Army (13t1 of August 1963). 
270 The public commitment of the presidential candidate (23rd of September 1963, Korean Broadcasting System). 
271 Speech at the canvassing tour for President at Choong Ang High school (28`h of September 1963). 
272 Speech at the 19`h Celebration Ceremony for National Independence Day of the Republic of Korea (15`h of August, 
1964). 
273 Special Statement by the Presidential Office concerning Korea-Japan Talks for reestablishment of diplomatic 
relations (26th of March 1964). 
274 Presidential message to the people (26`h of June 1964). 
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6.1.1.3. The Second Half of the Third Republic (1967 -1972) 
In 1967, Park was inaugurated as the 6th President of the Republic of Korea. He 
invented a new concept of nationalism - `Nationalistic democracy'- which was based on the 
ideas of national independence and national subjectivity. 275 According to this, all politics had to 
be dependent on economic objectives, and the most important goal was `efficiency'. 
On 4`h of July 1974, joint communique between North and South Korea regarding a 
peaceful reunification process between the two sides, peace movements, and a strong hope for 
unity throughout the whole Korean peninsula, was proclaimed. However, Park insisted on 
accusing the North Korean leader Il Sung Kim as a 'warmonger' 276and criticised the North 
Korean government for being an `invader and inhumane'. 277 As a leader of a developing country, 
he explained to the people that his priority should be to obtain foreign funds for development, in 
spite of the fact that this would imply a political dependency on foreign countries. For him, the 
first concern was not `national dignity or self respect' but `foreign capital and techniques'278 for 
development. 
Outwardly he emphasised national independence and dignity, but practically he sought 
to attract foreign capital, with the rhetoric that economic prosperity meant genuine national 
independence. At the first stage of development, all developing countries have to depend on 
foreign countries that can provide financial aid. 
He also drew the finalised line of the wage level for labourers with the statement as 
follows: "A reasonable wage not dependent on productivity would encourage labourers to keep 
their jobs. Frequent higher wage demands from labourers could not be good for the whole 
nation, "279 He made no attempt to disguise his intentions of sacrificing the interests of the work 
force. 
6.1.1.4. The Fourth Republic - the Yushin Constitution (1972 -1979) 
The gateway to the Fourth Republic of Korea was the enactment of the Yushin 
Constitution in 1972. In his inauguration speech, Park showed a tendency towards a type of 
statism which would cause totalitarianism by saying that "under the new Yushin Constitution, 
275 Speech about "The Desire for a Self-Supporting Economy" (15`h of April 1967, Korean Broadcasting System). 276 Press Conference (25`h of April 1969). 
277 Speech at the Graduation of the Korean Military Academy (30`h of March 1972). 278 Press Conference (25`h of April 1969). 
279 Speech at the Commemoration of Labour day (10`h of March 1971). 
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all Koreans should regard themselves as being part of the country and hence should devote all 
their energy to build up national strength". 280 The . Yushin Constitution was devised on the 
assumption of Park's presidency for life by abolishing the presidential elections, and this 
increased the problem of legitimacy for Park's regime. 
Against this background, an absolute form of authoritarianism aimed at controlling all 
actions and even the slightest movement had spread throughout the country. At this time, Park's 
rhetoric was `prosperity of the nation through firm national security'281. This emphasis on the 
issue of national security prohibited people from expressing their own political views and from 
seeking freedom and human rights. 
6.1.2. The Characteristics of Park's Nationalism 
As mentioned above, Park continued to emphasise `nationalism' and `independence'. It 
thus appears that the word `nationalism' meant a lot to Park's regime. His interpretation of 
`nationalism' had specific characteristics as follows: First, he had a negative view of Korean 
history. He seemed to have a sort of derogatory feelings about the historical background of 
Korea. 
It is of no use at all to look back at our disgraceful history before our 
gaining liberty from Japan, and to bewail our misfortune. I had to hang 
my head in shame whenever I thought of the dishonourable experiences 
throughout our history... But the most regretful thing is that we were not 
able to build a great wealthy country even though 19 years had passed 282 
In addition, he criticised Korean history as one of factionalism. This kind of criticism 
was exactly the same as that used by the Japanese colonial government to contempt for 
Korea. 283 Park enumerated the negative factors of Korean history: i) lack of self confidence, ii) 
lack of pioneering spirit, iii) egoism, iv) excessive expectation of windfall income, v) lack of 
280 Inauguration speech of the 8th Presidency (27`h of December 1972). 
281 Annual Press Conference (13th of January 1973). 
282 Speech at the 19th Celebration Ceremony for National Independence Day of Republic of Korea (15th of August, 
1964). 
283 Man Yeol Lee, "Historiography of Scholars under Japanese Colonialism, " Korea's Recognition of History (Seoul: 
Chang Jack & Bipyoung Sa, 1976) pp. 515-519. 
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honour, vi) lack of sound criticism 284 All these factors were taken from a historical view of 
Korea under imperialism and from the point of view of toadyism. 
The only positive feature of Korean history for him was `the legacy of overcoming 
national crises'. Over the past four thousand years, Korea had been invaded by most of the 
dynasties of China, Japan, and Mongolia, more than a thousand times. Nevertheless, Korea had 
never ceased to exist and had not been annexed by any foreign power, except by the Japanese 
military government during 1910-1945. Park explained that the reason why Korea had been able 
to survive the invasions was due to the existence of outstanding messianic heroes who appeared 
and saved Korea in times of crisis. Park focused on this kind of messianism. He reasoned that 
even though the competence of the Korean people as a whole was exceptionally weak, a few 
gifted heroes always appeared to save and revive the country. This was a typical leader-centred 
paradigm. 
In general, those who try to formulate a nationalist ideology as their main source of 
motivation tend to focus on excellence, potential, and unrealised capability, and try to mobilise 
the people by encouraging pride in their identity. Yet Park used miserable examples and 
displayed the wretchedness of their heritage before the people in order to make them feel as if 
they needed a heroic figure to save them and their country. This epistemology of history was 
constructed in order to justify a military coup which overthrew the most legitimate government 
in Korean history. 
Secondly, Park laid the blame for the national crises exclusively on internal and not 
external factors. His blame was directed particularly at the separatism and factionalism of the 
Chosun dynasty of the Yi monarch, incompetent leadership, an irresponsible elite and an 
apathetic population in modern Korean history. He did not mention external exploitation and 
foreign influence. This type of conclusion causes problems, because when it comes to a national 
crisis, if external factors such as imperialism or colonialism are totally ignored, the diagnosis of 
cause and result may well be wrong. 
One of the political mentalities which prevailed in Third World countries was the 
sentiment of anti-imperialism. Japan, the U. S. and the Soviet Union were all recognised as 
imperial powers, but Japan is the most notable imperial state from a Korean perspective. 
In fact, due to Japan's deforcement, Korea experienced a painful period under the 
tyranny of the Japanese government. Also, the occupation of South and North Korea by the U. S. 
and the Soviet Union respectively caused the division of the Korean peninsula. However, it 
appeared that Park was completely unaware of this, but rather on occasion actually showed 
284 Chung liee Park, The Pathway to the Future of our Nation (Seoul: Dong-A Chulpan Sa, 1962) pp. 85-96. 
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affection towards Japan. A letter Park wrote to his brother-in-law just before the coup reveals 
his attachment to the Japanese culture when he cites a poem about a Samurai's pledge. Even as 
President of Korea, he still enjoyed singing Japanese military march songs. 
His strong attachment to Japan was shown when he established the Yushin 
Constitution. The Yushin Constitution that was enacted in October 1972 was the crystallisation 
of his passion to replicate Japan in his regime. The Yushin Constitution was a real duplicate of 
the Meiji Yushin in Japan, which gave rise to the modernisation of Japan. So his role-model for 
economic development was definitely Japan in this context. His admiration for Japan meant that 
he was unlikely to possess any anti-imperialist sentiments. The only positive view that Park had 
of Korean history, `The legacies of overcoming national crises' was just rhetoric to mobilise the 
people by making them see the present situation as another serious crisis in Korean history. 
Thirdly, Park emphasised the idea of heroism. According to him, in order to make 
progress, heroic leadership is necessary. Throughout Korean history, sporadically emerging 
heroes had led the people to security and prosperity. This emphasis relates to his self image, and 
was tantamount to putting himself forward as one of the prominent heroes of Korean history: 
My first concern is how to destroy defeatism, and how I can create self 
respect and and independent spirit among the people. I am quite sure that 
if a certain leader who has patriotic consciousness and the feeling of the 
sacred mission to revive our country was at the head of our country, then 
we would see a prosperous Korea and new opportunities of national 
revivalism.... 285 
This tendency to identify himself as a hero became much stronger after the launch of 
the Yushin Constitution. Presidential elections were abolished and replaced by the Electoral 
College voting system which fully supported Park's regime and guaranteed his life-long 
presidency. Park thought of himself as a pre-destined leader for the development of the Korean 
economy. This way of thinking was probably caused by a kind of obsession. 
The fourth feature of Park's nationalism was that national development was identified 
solely with economic progress. This view dominated the country for eighteen years, the whole 
of his period in office. As seen in the `Revolutionary Pledge', the escape from extreme 
destitution was the first objective of the coup in 1961. Rapid economic growth was the decisive 
factor when it came to policy making. Therefore economic development overrode all other 
factors, such as politics and culture, and individual sacrifice for the sake of this development 
285 Chung flee Park, Potential of Nation, p. 89. 
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was taken to be a necessary condition. This was a strong form of statism far-removed from the 
classical form of nationalism. For the sake of economic development, the notion of 
`nationalism' was utilised as a mass-mobilising mechanism. 
Park's strong drive for an independent economy was emphasised throughout his period 
of rule, however it was practically impossible to set up a completely independent system. In the 
development process, Park's government had to rely on foreign capital and technology. Also, 
they had to convert from the Import Substitution Industry (I. S. I. ) policy to an export-oriented 
drive, which deepened their dependence on foreign countries. 
The fifth aspect of Park's peculiar nationalism was its limited application in terms of 
geography. The concept of `nation' indicated South Korea only, even though South and North 
Korea have many things in common, such as the same language, the same characters and system 
of writing, and the same culture. He frequently stressed the idea that the `state' should take 
priority over the `nation'. Although Park talked a lot about peaceful reunification with North 
Korea, it seemed that he always had feelings of enmity against North Korea. 
In brief, Park's concept of nationalism may be summarised as follows; i) nationalism 
could be achieved only through economic development, ii) the cause of the national crisis must 
be related to the absence of an heroic leader, iii) nationalism is incompatible with pluralism or 
factionalism, iv) Korean history is a shameful history, v) North Korea should not be included in 
the term `nation', which was the goal of Park's regime. 
6.1.3. Economic Nationalism - The Issue of the Korea-Japan Talks on 
Compensation for Colonialism 
The term `economic nationalism' implies that the first priority of nationalism is 
economic development. This concept originates in Park's belief that all meaningful 
achievements in non-economic fields, such as politics and culture, necessarily require the strong 
fundamentals of economic progress. Park mentioned his `economic nationalism' when he wrote, 
"Our first priority must be economic prosperity rather than politics or culture"286 
Park concluded that the student revolution of April 1960 and the coup of 1961 
occurred as a result of economic hardships. "The real reason that we had to go through two 
political upheavals was destitution. People strongly wanted to escape from the indigent 
conditions, this desire to escape from their poor situation brought about our revolution"287 He 
286 Chung Hee Park, State, Revolution and Me, (Seoul: Ji Gu Chon, 1997) p. 313. 287 Ibid, p. 309. 
154 
defined the meaning of politics thus, "Politics is not a special thing. It is not a philosophical, or 
an ethical, or a cultural thing. Politics is just an apparatus to help people make enough money 
for living. That is it. "288 
Whenever Park had to make a decision on policy priority, his `economic nationalism' 
influenced his policy making process and put economic goals at the top of the list. Amongst his 
five grand objectives of `Independence', `National Security', `Reunification', `Democracy' and 
`Industrialisation', `Industrialization' had always been emphasised as a matter of urgency. It is 
understandable that, with limited resources, Park had to find a way of enlarging those resources, 
and increasing financial affluence, in order to pursue other objectives afterwards. Indeed, to 
Park's regime, it was obvious that economic development could strengthen national security. He 
said, "There is no better way of rooting up communism than by an economic revival that has 
grown by the sweat of our brows and our tears of sacrifice. In other words, if we can build a 
better, richer society, then we have defeated communism. "289 He continued to comment on 
democracy and culture, "Needless to say, genuine democracy could be achieved through 
establishing economic fundamentals" 290 "Without food and money, there will be no 
culture. "291 Park even identified his coup in 1961 as `the gateway to the National Industrial 
Revolution'292 
In short, the most outstanding feature of Park's nationalism was his excessive emphasis 
on economic factors as a trigger for national prosperity, amongst the many other items on the 
national agenda. He used `nationalism' as mere propaganda for legitimating his harsh drive 
towards economic development. Even though he put the notion of `nationalism' at the forefront, 
he was not interested in promoting nationalist sentiments by means of persuasive propaganda 
concerning national historical background, national potential, or self-respect. 
The Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 were a clear watershed for Park. They provoked a 
feeling of hostility towards Japan. At that time, the Korean people felt a severe form of enmity 
towards Japan, not only because of the trauma caused by their colonial experiences, but also 
because of the feeling that Japan had actually benefited from one of the most tragic incidents in 
their history, the Korean War. For the Korean people, it was clearly unfair that Korea had been 
divided rather than Japan, when Japan was actually responsible for the Second World War. 293 In 
288 Ibid, p. 259. 
289 Chung Nee Park, The Pathway to the Future of our Nation, p. 281 
290 Chung lice Park, State, Revolution and Me, p. 338 
291 Ibid., p. 313. 
292 Ibid., p. 314. 
293 Most Korean people believed that Japan should have been held responsible for World War II. As Germany was 
divided into two parts, Japan should also have been divided. But Korea was divided. This was traumatic for 
Koreans. 
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addition, after the restoration of independence, notorious pro-Japanese factions, who had been 
living off the Japanese colonial government during the colonial period, were appointed as high- 
ranking officials by the U. S. military interim government and President Syngman Rhee. Most 
pro-Japanese factions were cruel to those who were involved in independence movements and 
persecuted them. Thus, it was deemed unacceptable that pro-Japanese factions from the colonial 
era should live well without being prosecuted. 
In this context, Park ignored people's resentment towards Japan, because he was aware 
that it would be impossible for him to propel an economic drive with the limited aid of the U. S. 
Thus, he had to forge a coalition by official diplomatic means with Japan, who could give the 
Korean government a good deal of financial aid. 
In this situation of great resentment towards Japan, anti-Japan movements were an 
obvious choice for a nationalist drive. But Park ignored the people's sentiments and instead 
sought financial aid in practical ways, the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 being a good example of 
this. From 1945 until that time, there had not been a single attempt at reconciliation with Japan. 
Park's first concern was not to satisfy the people's feelings, but to obtain practical benefits in 
the form of war compensation. 
The Korea-Japan Talks became an arena where Park's `economic nationalism' clashed 
with the `protest nationalism' 294, which originated in the Japanese colonial era. The only reasons 
for continuing with the Korea-Japan Talks in the face of such massive protests were 
economic 295 In order to obtain funding, Park had to put up with severe protests. Those who 
protested against the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963 believed that a compromise settlement would 
force Korea under Japanese influence again, in the form of an economic domination, which 
could be seen as second occupation of Korea by Japan. Park's `economic nationalism' was 
diametrically opposed to the `protest / resistant nationalism' 296 which was very common in 
countries newly liberated from colonial power. 
6.1.4. Ideological Influences on Park 
The reasons behind Park's choice of a strict form of `economic nationalism' for 
294 Byung Ki Song, "Wijung Chuksa Movement, " Yong Hee Lee, and Jae Bong Roh, op. cit., p. 63. 295 There is a different interpretation for the reasons behind the Korea-Japan Talks. Park's preference for Japanese 
culture and his experience as an officer in the Japanese army could have been the reasons behind the Talks; Dong 
Sung Kim, A Study on Korean Nationalism (Seoul: Orum, 1995) p. 178, p. 183. 296 K. 11. Yoo described the Korean-Japan Talks as the conflict between 'calculative patriotism - pro-talks' and `emotional patriotism - con-talks'; Kun Ho Yoo, "Turmoil and Completion of Korean-Japanese Agreement, " 60 
Big Affairs agitating Modern Korea, (Seoul: Shindong-a, 1988) p. 149. 
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enhancing the state's wealth can be traced to some extent. The most efficient method of 
attaining legitimacy for an unstable regime is to show the people concrete result such as 
improvement in the quality of life as quickly as possible. As mentioned in previous chapters, 
Park's regime was fragile because Park and his military junta overthrew the fully legitimate 
democratic government. He needed a carrot to offer the people as proof of his regime's 
successful performance. Consequently, he had to concentrate on the economic drive. 
In addition to this, Park's ideal role model for political performance was the Japanese 
Meiji Yushin (Reformation), and his ultimate objective was the wealth and military strength of 
the state. This objective of Park's nationalism was a very close imitation of the Meiji Yushin's. 
In order to achieve the target of building a wealthy nation, therefore, Park concentrated on the 
economy. 
It is helpful to look at Park's educational background in order to understand his pro- 
Japanese sentiments. He was born in 1917 under the rule of Japanese imperialism. From 1932, 
when he was 15, to 1944 when he was 27, he went to Daegu teacher training school which was 
organised by the educational authority of colonial government of Japan, Manchuria Military 
Academy, and the Japanese Military Academy in succession. During the most sensitive, 
juvenile and adolescent period of his life, he had been socialised under the austere Japanese 
education system including military academies, aimed at cultivating elites who could devote 
themselves to the expansion of Japanese military imperialism. 
According to Gap Je Cho's close investigation into Park's school life, under the 
Japanese school policy of discriminating against Korean pupils, which included prohibiting the 
use of the Korean language and forcing pupils to change their Korean names to Japanese ones, 
Park might have developed strong contempt for the Japanese oppressors and a feeling of 
helplessness. However, there is no clear evidence of his resentment against the Japanese 
military imperialists, rather, he seems to have admired Japanese bellicosity, a typical example 
being the Samurai culture 297 Instead of being involved in independence movements, as many 
nationalists would have been, he concentrated on getting promoted as high as possible in 
Japanese military. In gaining this promotion, he tried to overcome the experience of personal 
sufferings under Japanese persecution that he had had to endure. It is understandable that he had 
strong attachments to the military. His values had been seriously influenced by military 
sentiments due to his 10 years' experience and education in Japanese military academies. 
Indeed, he quite often expressed a preference for a nationalism originating in Japanese 
297 Gap Je Cho, Park Chung Nee, (Seoul: KKachi, 1994) p. 62, p. 69, p. 90. 
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militarism at the round table discussions when he was designing the coup 298 
The origin of Japanese military nationalism was the Meiji Yushin. The Meiji Yushin 
was a prominent ruling ideology aimed at the elevation of Japan's position in the world, which 
mobilised people under the slogans of `industrialisation' and a `wealthy and strong Japan'. It 
played a part in justifying the state-led authoritarian mobilisation system. 299 The Japanese 
nationalism that Park tried to copy and transplant into Korea can therefore be categorised as a 
similar type to the `German economic nationalism' of the 19th century, as mentioned above 300 
The practical character of Park's nationalism originated in his attachment to Samurai 
or the Japanese code of the warrior. The Samurai culture clearly contrasted with the traditions of 
Confucianism which prevailed throughout the Chosun dynasty. Confucianism focused on forms, 
morals, and justice, whereas the Samurai culture emphasised power, usefulness, and material 
gain. 301 Park criticised the `Yangban (aristocratic)' culture in Korea, which had emphasised 
morality and formality throughout the 500 years of the Chosun dynasty. He asserted that the 
tradition of the `moral state of Korea' should be replaced by the `pragmatic state of Korea', 
which can be seen to represent the `economic state'. Joong Myung Chun's recent research into 
Park's nationalism concluded that Park's idea of the pragmatic `economic state' was a 
noticeable feature of the desire to escape from the obstinate tradition of formalism and moralism. 
Chun described Park' term of government as `the era of exception'. 302 
It seems that Park became drewn to the Samurai culture while attending the military 
academies in Manchuria and Japan. The principles of education of those academies combined to 
produce an attitude of `unconditional winning'. The atmosphere of this educational background 
must have influenced the formation of Park's nationalism. 303 
6.1.5. Changes in Park's Nationalism 
From the moment he took power, Park showed no interest in `national dignity' per se, 
despite the fact that he had always spoken of nationalism as though it were a trademark of his 
298 Byung Joo Lee, Portraits of the President (Seoul: Seo Dang, 1991) pp. 95-96. 
299 Yoshimi Yoshiaki, "Formation of Fascism in Japan, " in Takahashi Hanahachiro, T. S. Choi (tr. ) Modern History of 
Japan (Seoul: Jishik Sanup Sa, 1981) pp. 191-195. 
300 Charlmers Johnson has described the Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian model and the Bismarckian-Meiji authoritarian 
model as two noteworthy policy-models of late developmental states.: Charlmers Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? 
- The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995) p. 45. 
301 Joon Seok Han, Literary Culture and Military Culture (Seoul, Dana, 1991) p. 63. 302 Joong Myung Chun, Seeing through Korean Politics (Seoul: Gil An Sa, 1995) pp. 17-37. 
303 Joon Seok Han points out that the successful achievement of Korean economic development in the 1960s and 
1970s was due to the importation of the military culture which had been introduced by Park from Japan into 
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regime. He just used the term `nationalism' as rhetoric to cover up his other intentions. The way 
he made use of the terms changed slightly throughout his regime. At first, in an attempt to 
acquire legitimacy for his regime, he used the rhetoric of the `national crisis' in order to gain the 
support of the people. In the late 1960s he used the phrase `national awakening and national 
development' to mobilise people towards a concrete target of economic development. In the 
1970s, his desire for a life-time presidency encouraged him to devise a new slogan: `unique type 
of Korean nationalism and democracy' to overcome massive protests against his dictatorship. 
Consequently, he used nationalism in order to legitimise his regime, to achieve social 
stability, and to increase the pace of economic development. Approaching the 1970s he tried to 
link nationalism with national security, related to anti-communism. Outwardly he expressed 
himself as a genuine pro-unification agent, but his attitudes and policies relating to the 
unification of the Korean peninsula were based on extreme anti-unification sentiments. 
His constant attitude of pro-Japanese and pro-American dependence proved that his 
nationalism was merely a device to make his regime more effective and to legitimise his rule. In 
short, his nationalism was the product of a mixture of personal background, attachment to 
Japanese militarism, and the regional political situation, including the division of the Korean 
peninsula. 
Park's nationalism functioned as his major ruling ideology. This ideology played a 
crucial role in the rapid economic development of Korea, but it sacrificed political and 
economic independence to external powers such as the U. S. and Japan. At the same time, it 
consolidated the harsh authoritarian order by the centralisation of power and excessive emphasis 
on efficiency. This modified nationalism undermined the fundamentals of national unity. 
Although toadyism was officially rejected, penetrations of the U. S. and Japan's intervention in 
various parts of the country deepened, and their influence increased. Ironically, the penetration 
of external power into the country caused a weakening of `national consciousnesses', yet all 
these things were justified as necessary parts of economic development. 
Park's methods of administration were dictatorial. He made decisions without 
consultation. Due to the immaturity of civil society and a political system that was not 
institutionalised, these characteristics of his leadership were quite effective. In this context, 
Park's economy-centred nationalism was connected to the motivation for industrialisation. 
`Revolution from above'304propelled the state-initiated industrialisation. Even though there were 
numerous side effects of that forced industrialisation, Park's regime was able to achieve a high- 
level of industrial isation and economic development that could support a regular army and keep 
Korean politics as a principle of state management. Ibid., p. 157. 
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the state's administration system running. At the same time, this material infrastructure 
stimulated civil society to come to the forefront of politics, which suggests that the formation of 
fundamentals is linked to the democratic institutionalisation of politics. At least Park's 
prediction was fulfilled. He said that the economy should be considered as the first priority, and 
then political freedom and democracy would follow automatically. 
However, Park's nationalism caused a serious crack in Korean politics. He believed 
that political freedom should be limited temporarily in order to achieve industrialisation more 
efficiently. As the growing civil society and the increasing desire for political freedom caused 
by the economic development put pressed on Park's regime, Park began to regard all the 
protests against his government as anti-national rebellions. This showed that Park's regime had 
become one of extreme authoritarianism. 305 Park clashed with the `civil nationalists', who 
believed that the most important values for building sound nationalism were democracy and 
freedom. 306 In the 200' century, civil nationalism became a universal value to be sought after by 
those who tried to establish nationalism beyond the territories of the West. Korea was no 
exception. The Korean people experienced the student revolution in April 1961, which meant 
that they had come to realise the meaning of genuine democratic movements in terms of the 
sovereignty of the people. It showed the seeds of an awareness of civil nationalism in the 
Korean people. Although the seeds of that awareness were sown in 1960, however during the 
period of Park's regime, it was thoroughly overwhelmed by Park's economic nationalism 
movement. With rapid economic development grew civil consciousness, which became strong 
enough to struggle against an economic nationalism which was only interested in development. 
A deep-rooted dilemma for Park's nationalism was that he had to enjoy a 19'h century- 
type nationalist movement for rapid development within a 20`x' century environment ripe for the 
spread of freedom and democracy. The political conflicts and the severe cracks in society during 
Park's regime originated in this fundamental dilemma. But these cracks and conflicts were 
unavoidable. 
6.2. Anti-Communism 
304 See E. K. Trimberger, Revolution From Above (New Brunswick: Transaction, Inc., 1978). 
305 Sei Joong Kim "Study on the Formation Process and Development of an Authoritarian Regime in view of the 
power politics approach, " Presented at the annual conference of Korean Political Science Association in 1993. 306 Sei Joong Kim, "October Yushin and the Democratisation Movement - an Elite Perspective Approach" Korean Political Science Association (ed. ), Modern Political History of Korea (Seoul: Bup Moon Sa, 1995) pp. 442-480. 
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Ideologies with the prefix `anti-' can hardly be seen to compose an elaborated ideology. 
Anti-communism cannot be said to have any notable ideological features. Merely proclaiming 
an adverse position to communism cannot express a regime's political vision and lead the 
people in line with the philosophy of the leadership. However, under Park's regime, anti- 
communism meant a lot to the Korean people and to Park himself. 
Since the Korean War in 1950, South and North Korea have felt extreme hatred 
towards each other. Further, it may be said that both leaders, Park and Kim, secured their 
respective regimes against the dangers of collapse by taking advantage of this mutual hatred. 
They utilised this hatred as a tool of domestic suppression. Some political movements for 
freedom and democracy against Park's government were repressed and incapacitated by violent 
gales of anti-communist sentiment on charges of acts that were advantageous to the enemy, that 
is, the North Korean government. Using `anti-communism' to justify suppression was a major 
technique of Park's regime in managing anti-government movements. Consequently, even 
though Park's anti-communism was not an elaborated form of ideology, it is worth exploring in 
order to clarify Park's performance. 
As mentioned above, it seemed that Park might have suffered from an obsession born 
when he was deeply involved in the South Korean Labour Party movement307before the Korean 
War. Any kind of pro-communist expressions, even somewhat progressive argument in favour 
of working class rights, were strictly prohibited. Park's anti-communism was definitely not a 
well-organised ideology. However, in all activities under his regime, anti-communism played a 
key role as an effective guiding code to instruct all social issues such as unification, politics, 
economy, and military issues. The anti-communism of Park's regime was automatically linked 
with anti-North Korean ideology in various ways. 
6.2.1. Park's Anti-Communism Law and the Issue of Unification 
- Method of Domestic Suppression 
Immediately after the coup in 1961, Park's new military government employed a 
307 The South Korean Labour Party (S. K. L. P., Nam Ro Dang) movement that was founded by Hun Young Park, one 
of the most prominent communists in Korean history, was a remarkable communist movement in the southern 
part of the Korean peninsula before the Korean War. At that time, many intellectuals and students in South Korea 
were attracted by this communist movement. When Chung lice Park was in the Korean Army as an officer, he became a member of this party as a result of the influence of his communist elder brother, Sang lice Park. But as 
soon as he was arrested by military police in 1949, he disclosed the party's secrets and was released. After two 
years of retirement, he returned to the Army in the turmoil of the Korean War. 
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severely suppressive policy regarding the various opinions about reunification with North Korea. 
Park made a resolution concerning unification, which was that there was no way to unify the 
Korean peninsula other than by `totally defeating and eradicating communism'. He regarded 
even the mention of a `peaceful process of unification' as an undermining threat. This strongly 
worded resolution resulted from a sense of impending crisis on the part of the military regime. 
Finally this resolution materialised into an Anti-Communism Law308 on 3`d of July 1961. 
The increasing expectation of unification and the pervasive unifying movements 
throughout the country after the student revolution of April 1960, threatened the very reason for 
the existence of the military regime. 309 In this context, two remarkable incidents - the 
indictment for Yong Joo Hwang's article and the prosecution of Min Ho Suh, who suggested 
peaceful communications with North Korea - took place. 
The Chief Executive Officer of one the most influential media companies the Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation, Yong Joo Hwang, was arrested in November 1964 in violation of the 
Anti-Communism Law. He contributed an article entitled "Indomitable desire for a united 
government of Korea - the contents and direction of nationalistic democracy" to a journal called 
Se Dae ('generation') in October 1964. In that article, Hwang made four important suggestions 
which were: i) The North Korean government should be acknowledged as an independent 
government, ii) Both governments should sign a nonaggression treaty, iii) Both Korean 
governments should join the United Nations simultaneously, iv) A federation of both regimes 
and general election under the supervision of the U. N. should be considered in the future. 
He was prosecuted for violating Article 4 of the Anti-Communism Law, which 
prohibits praise, encouragement, and sympathy for North Korea. According to the 
announcement made by the Attorney General, only the opinion of `defeating and eradicating 
Communism' was allowed to be proposed and expressed by law. 
From that moment on, this article was abused politically and became an effective tool 
in the suppression of Park's political opponents and activities that were opposed to the 
government's policies. The incident of the prosecution of Congressman Suh was one of the 
most outstanding examples of that abuse. The leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, Min Ho 
Suh, asserted that the unification of Korea should proceed in accordance with the U. N. 's 
initiative, and communication at the civil level by parties, such as the exchange of letters, 
should be activated in order to create an environment of unification. His idea of letter 
308 The Law regarding punishment for participation in communist-related movements and assistance to the 
movements, which was composed of sixteen articles and an additional clause. This law was abrogated and 
attached to the State Security Law in 1980. 
309 Man Yeol Lee, "The Development of the Korean Christian Movement for Reunification, " Study on Christian 
History (Seoul: Institute for Korean Christianity History Studies, 1992). 
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exchanging for the separated families in both countries was regarded as helping the enemy. This 
case was pretty controversial. Even though there were some opinions that this case exceeded 
authority, nobody could alter the conviction. Suh was imprisoned for seven years. These two 
cases became the starting point for Park's severe suppression of opinions opposed to his regime 
with the censorship tool of the legal apparatus - the Anti-Communism Law. 
Consequently, discussions concerning reunification came to be extremely limited 
under the thought control censorship of Park's regime. Park made this matter clear: "Kim's 
North Korean government is a war criminal. There is absolutely no possibility of seizing a 
chance to talk and compromise with them"310 Park thought that the North Korean government 
did not belong to the authentic and acknowledged nation of Korea, because he believed Kim 
was just a puppet of the Soviet Union. Therefore the direction of Park's idea of unification was 
not one of `national peace construction' but one of `economy first, unification second' based on 
the premise of economic superiority to North Korea. 
However, in the late 1960s, the era of detente came to the forefront of international 
politics. Time was ripe for a new phase of peace construction. The Nixon doctrine provided the 
logic for this detente. In these circumstances, South-North Korean talks on peaceful coexistence 
were unavoidable. The South-North Joint Communique for peaceful reunification was 
announced on 4th of July 1972 after the exchange of secret envoys. It was not long before Park's 
hidden intentions were revealed. He used this peaceful atmosphere to launch a new 
constitutional republic - the Fourth Republic, guided by the Yushin Constitution. On 17`h of 
October 1972, he made a special announcement about the new constitutional scheme being a 
crucial method for a peaceful unification. But, in fact, this constitution was aimed at achieving 
Park's lifetime presidency. 
As a matter of fact, under this new constitution, there were some noteworthy changes 
in Park's standpoint on unification. He started expressing the notion of `mutual competition 
with the North' instead of `defeating and eradicating the North'. This reflected the fact that the 
South's economy had overtaken that of North Korea. The seven-year programme for the 
economic development of North Korea fell through and was extended by three more years in 
order to hit the targets. On the other hand, South Korea's five-year economic development plan 
was very successful. It meant that the economic fortunes of the two countries, favouring North 
Korea in the 1960s, underwent a dramatic reversal in the South's favour in the 1970s. In short, 
Park showed a slight change in his way of thinking about unification from one of extreme 
hatred towards the North Korean communist regime to proposing the concept of competition 
310 Press conference, Dong-A Jibo (East Asia Daily Newspaper) 9`h of June 1966. 
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with the incompetent communist regime. However in spite of this slight change, he strictly 
prohibited broad discussions and the making of statements about the unification topic without 
the government's official permission. 
6.2.2. Anti-Communism for National Defence and Security - Participation in 
the Viet Nam War 
Park's anti-communism was also connected with the concept of national defence and 
security issues. In 1965, as the Viet Nam War escalated and intensified, Park asserted 
emphatically that it was time to set up a regional alliance for solidarity under the slogan of anti- 
communism. At the same time, he emphasised the crisis situation in national security in South 
Korea due to the U. S. 's regional focus being now restricted to the Viet Nam front. He said, "It is 
quite predictable that while the eyes of the whole world are on the Viet Nam War, China and 
North Korea might play a very dangerous game, such as invading South Korea"311. Actually he 
was arguing from a self-centred angle. His participation in the Viet Nam War was justified as 
essential for maintaining peace and democracy in South East Asia, but he blamed North Korea 
for its support of the communist Viet Cong as an act of aggression. "North Korea is one of the 
main parts of this war of aggression, Kim is invading Viet Nam now... But we are just 
protecting our friendly nation, Viet Nam, and freedom because Viet Nam requested our help"312 
The U. S. 's intervention and the Korean Army's participation in the Viet Nam War were 
justified as a `modern crusade for the protection of freedom'. 
At that time, most intellectuals in South Korea taking critical stances against Park's 
regime had understood the meaning of entering into the Viet Nam War very superficially. In 
reality, there was no military pact between South Korea and Viet Nam. Viet Nam was not a 
member of South East Asia Treaty Organisation (S. E. A. T. O. ), and there were no obligatory 
conditions in the mutual defence treaty between Korea and the U. S. Therefore, there was 
definitely not a single obligation to take part in the Viet Nam War. 
Park used his explicit ideology of anti-communism to justify his participation in the 
war. However, his intention was to acquire financial compensation from the U. S. for his part in 
the war. Park believed that he would be able to get massive financial and military support from 
the U. S., and he predicted that it would give rise to a special procurement. With this economic 
boom, Park intended to propel the second term of the five-year economic development plan. 
311 Dong-A Ilbo, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 12`h of June 1965. 312 Dong-A Ilbo, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 10 of June 1968. 
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Park made the decision for the Korean Army to participate in the war in March 1966. This 
would stop the U. S. government from reducing military aid that had been supplied by the 
Kennedy administration, and Korea would get the $1.5 billion as a long-term loan in 
consideration for her part in the war. In addition, participation in the Viet Nam War was 
accompanied by the export of civil manpower. In 1968, the component ratio of whole exports 
indicated that exports to Viet Nam took third place behind the U. S. and Japan, and the invisible 
trade balance was 36% of all exports in 1968 due to the special procurement boom caused by 
the war. 
Park's regime gained much greater autonomy as a result of the Viet Nam War. The 
government had exclusive power to distribute capital to various sectors. In this context, Park 
could launch his ambitious and controversial policy - the heavy chemical industry drive. 
6.2.3. Anti-Communism and the Ideology of Dependent Capitalism 
- Contradictions with Nationalism 
The other role of Park's anti-communism was as an instrument for supporting 
dependent capitalism. In creating the sense of an impending security crisis in confronting the 
North Korean communist regime, Park made the people believe that the only solution was to 
achieve superiority through rapid economic development. Park mentioned this immediately 
after the coup, "Except winning the war, the best way to defeat the invasion of the North is the 
realisation of unbeatable economic fundamentals that can be built only by concrete plans and 
programmes"313 
The motivation for development was thus provided by identifying an adversary. This 
formulation subordinated economic factors to political logic. As a result, practical economic 
theories to 'do with development strategy came to be a matter of secondary consideration. Park's 
political aims outweighed all other economic considerations. Therefore strategies of economic 
development for Park's regime came to be guided by the state's control and initiative. This 
state-led economic development strategy was heading for dependent capitalism based on 
exclusive monopolies and benefits to particular companies. 
For this purpose, Park desperately needed money from the outside. He highlighted the 
competitive situation on the Korean Peninsula and the severity of the Cold War. Whenever he 
tried to get financial aid from outside, he would emphasise the fragile situation in Korea and 
threaten the American-centred Western bloc by mentioning the possibility that they could lose 
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their front line in the Cold War system. 314 In this context, it is worth taking a look at the process 
of the Korea-Japan Talks of 1963. 
The American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, pushed Park to develop a formal 
partnership with Japan, even though resentment of Japan was still rife in Korea. Until that time, 
there had been no official diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan since 1945, the year of 
liberation. The U. S. government focused a practical containment strategy to prevent the Soviet 
Union and communist China from advancing southward into East Asia. In order to contain the 
two great communist powers, an alliance between South Korea and Japan was essential. 
Actually Park thought that South Korea had protected Japan in the battles against the 
communists. So he guessed that South Korea deserved compensation equivalent to the cost of 
protecting Japan against communist intervention. Park agreed to the U. S. 's proposal and 
officially demanded compensation for the Japanese colonial invasion. He attempted to justify 
his efforts to normalise diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan by the ideology of anti- 
communism. He urged people to accept that the present security situation was critical, and tried 
to persuade them that it was less important to express national resentment and hatred towards 
Japan, than to gain substantial financial aid in order to secure the country from the communists' 
threats. However, people's revulsion towards the talks increased. 
On 29th of January 1964, the Secretary of the State for the U. S. arrived in Korea to call 
upon the Korean government to begin talks with Japan. This visit stimulated anti-Japanese and 
anti-American sentiments and caused a student demonstration on 24`" of March. With that as a 
beginning, on 3`d of June, a nationwide demonstration broke out to protest against the Korea- 
Japan Talks. At first, the protest only dealt with opposition to the Korea-Japan Talks, but later 
this protest developed as resistance and opposition to Park's regime itself. The demonstrators 
raised controversial issues in public, such as the illegitimate coup in 1961, widespread 
corruption in the government, tip-off politics, monopolised comprador capital, and dependence 
on external power. 
Confronting serious resistance to the regime and even facing demands for a change of 
political power, Park proclaimed martial law and arrested the leaders of the demonstration. They 
were prosecuted for high treason. Immediately after these prosecutions, on 18`h of July, the 
Minister of Home Affairs announced that the demonstrations had been manipulated by North 
Korea. On 14th of August, the Public Prosecutor's Office gave out the results of the 
investigations into the demonstrations, and announced that the extreme leftist movement, the 
`People's Revolutionary Party' had planned and executed all demonstrations. 
313 Dong-A Ilbo, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 2nd of June 1961. 
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The Korean Central Intelligence Agency (K. C. I. A. ) arrested 41 members of the 
`People's Revolutionary Party' including progressive intellectuals, journalists, professors and 
students. According to the K. C. I. A., this party had been supported by North Korea, had planned 
to overthrow Park's regime and tried to establish a socialist regime, which would be backed up 
by North Korea. However, close investigation proved nothing concerning any intentions of 
rebellion or treason. Nevertheless, Park ordered the General Prosecutor's Office to proceed with 
the indictment for treason. This order repelled the prosecutors in charge, and three prosecutors 
resigned. 
However, the Minister of Justice presented the results of the investigation differently. 
"The People's Revolutionary Party was established according to the North Korean Labour 
Party's platform, and it manoeuvred from behind at all the demonstrations from 24`h of March to 
3rd of June in order to overthrow the South Korean government". 
In spite of this strong accusation by the Minister of Justice, there was no proof that this 
party had any connection with the North Korean government. Finally only 12 members of the 
P. R. P. were accused of violations of Article 4 of the Anti-Communism Law -'Regarding Praise, 
Encouragement and Sympathy for North Korea'. 
Movements to oppose the policy of dependence on external support, particularly 
Japan's financial loan and the U. S. 's military aid, proclaimed that this dependence would cause 
big trouble in the future. It was asserted that deepening the dependence would subject Korea to 
a second colonial agony. Park's response to these movements was to charge them with pro- 
communism. Most student movements at that time such as the `Comparative Study Conference 
of Nationalism', `East Berlin Students Movement', and `Unity Revolution Party' were accused 
of being pro-communist movements backed by North Korea. However, it has been proved that 
most of these allegations were unfounded. 
Park tried to depend on external sources to accumulate capital, and for investment for 
industrialisation. Park was able to finalise the compromise with Japan by an agreement to 
normalise diplomatic relations on 22nd of June 1965 315 However, as these talks met a deadlock 
due to massive protests, Park used his anti-communist ideology as a way out of the difficulties. 
Confronting the nationwide demonstrations resulted in damage to his `nationalistic democracy'. 
In addition, the government's violent suppression of opposing groups through harsh martial law 
and the garrison decree undermined the regime's authority. 
31 4 Dong-A Ilbo, (East Asia Daily Newspaper), 9th of June 1961. 
315 Detailed compromises were made as follows, i) Unconditional grant type aid - $3 billion, ii) $2 billion loan at the 
annual interest rate of 3.5% by Japanese government, iii) Private industrial loan - $1 billion. Yong Bok Kim, 
"Korea-Japan relations -A distorted connection, " in Research Fellowship for Korean Politics, Beyond Park 
Chung Hee (Seoul: Pooreun Soop, 1998) p. 371. 
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7. Conclusion 
As discussed above, while a dominant ideology is formed by means of a long process 
of inductive reasoning, a ruling ideology may be invented in a deductive manner and put into 
practice by leaders for the purpose of effective ruling. The leaders of newly emerging countries 
or military regimes that took power by means of military coups needed to set up a concrete 
ideology to secure their regimes. Constructing a ruling ideology for the purpose of 
administration was the first job that leaders of such regimes had to accomplish. 
Nasser's representative ideology was a combination of nationalism and socialism. 
When he first launched nationalism as his formal ideology, he focused on an Egypt-centred 
nationalism. However, the predicament of the Arabs influenced him to give it a broader identity 
- Arab nationalism. He made enthusiastic efforts to realise the glory of the Arab world by means 
of Arab unity. The first concrete outcome was the establishment of the U. A. R. with Syria. Due 
to Nasser's monopoly of power in the Republic, and Syrian feelings of being deprived of and 
isolated from power, the U. A. R. finally and somewhat inevitably collapsed. 
Nasser tried to move into the next phase of his ruling ideology, which was Arab 
socialism. Although he described his official ideology as socialism, he did not give up the `Arab 
cause'. So he devised a combined ideology, namely, Arab socialism. The specific ethnic 
indication of Arab and the universal concept of socialism were organised into Nasser's 
prominent ideology. His socialism was quite different from classical `scientific Socialism'. Arab 
socialism refused to accept the notions and preconditions of classical Socialism such as the 
`dictatorship of the proletariat', the `materialistic view of history', the `inevitable destruction of 
capitalism', and the `necessity of violent revolution'. 
Nasser's Arab socialism was a moderate and modest form of Socialism. The ultimate 
aim of Arab socialism was Arab unity, resting on social justice and perfect equality. However, 
defeat in the 1967 War against Israel weakened the passion for this new type of socialism as a 
method of Arab unity. It seemed that Nasser was not interested in the elaboration of his 
ideology in terms of theory, but that he focused on the performance of the ideology. The 
function of Nasser's ideology was to help him attain hegemony in the Arab region. By 
emphasising Arab unity, he was able to bring into being a united state, the U. A. R. In spite of its 
brief lifespan, it made Nasser one of the most outstanding figures in the history of the Arab 
world. Nasser's ideology was also linked with anti-imperialism, anti-Western sentiments, and a 
non-alignment policy to form a positive and extensive type of ideology. 
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Park's ideology was in complete contrast to that of Nasser. While Nasser's ideology 
played a role in his attaining hegemony in the Arab region, Park's ideology focused on the 
regime's security and its preservation. Like Nasser, Park had chosen nationalism as his main 
ideology, but there was a big difference between Nasser's nationalism and Park's nationalism. 
While Nasser tried to escape from the imperial system and build up a strong unified Arab state 
with the nationalist sentiment, Park's nationalism depended on foreign powers. The first aim of 
Park's regime was rapid economic development, as a result of its initial lack of legitimacy. By 
achieving rapid development, Park tried to gain legitimacy through performance. This 
nationalism could be categorised as the `economic nationalism' that Germany espoused in the 
19th century. 
The other ideology of Park's regime was anti-communism. As with his nationalism, 
Park made thoroughly use of anti-communism for the purpose of regime security and economic 
development. He suppressed those who opposed his regime by accusing them of being pro- 
communist. The Anti-Communism Law was an effective tool with which Park could coerce the 
opposition. 
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V. OUTPUT OF ECONOMIC POLICY 
- STATE CAPITALISM VS. STATE-LED CAPITALISM 
1. Introduction 
I. I. State and Development 
Mark Cooper emphasised the emerging role of the state by commenting, "one of the 
most dramatic developments in the social structure of the Third World countries in the post 
World War II era has been the expanding role of the state"316, The issue of the `role of the state' 
has come to the fore as the main agenda by which to explore the development of Third World 
countries. 
The World Development Report, issued in 1983 by the World Bank, accentuated the 
importance of the state's role317 in the economy of developing countries. According to the report, 
the dominant role played by the state in the economy is one of the chief characteristics common 
to most Third World economies. 318 This may be described as the `developmental role of the 
state'. In other words, economic performance and the state-led development programme are 
given prime importance in Third World countries, rather than, for instance, security or welfare 
matters. The growth of the economy in Third World states is synonymous with the growth of 
316 Mark N. Cooper, "State Capitalism, Class Structure, and Social Transformation in the Third World: The Case of 
Egypt, " International Journal ofMiddle East Study, Vol. 15, (1983) p. 451. 
317 It is obvious that there are various meanings of the word of `state'. The first concept is the traditional one that the 
`state' is composed of the government and the public sector. Secondly, the state can be seen as being composed of 
the leaders and managers in the commanding positions of the political institutions, including the President, Prime 
Minister and members of the cabinet. Lastly, in the broadest sense, `state' encompasses not only the government 
and the economic apparatus, but also ideological state apparatuses, such as the government education system and 
the means of communication. Mourad Magdi Wahbar, The Role of the State in the Egyptian Economy (Ithaca 
Press, 1994) p. 4. 
318 IBRD, World Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) pp. 48-49. In the developing 
economies, the contribution of `state-owned enterprises' to total capital formation is 'at least a quarter and in a 
few cases significantly more'. The state is also the largest employer in the modern sector in many developing 
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the state itself. This manifests itself as growth in state employment, state investment, state 
revenue and the output growth of state-owned enterprises. 319 
In this context, one of the most prominent roles of the state may be defined as leading 
and supervising the development programme. It is well known that in the case of late-developed 
countries, the state plays a `developmental role in capitalist transformation' 320 As mentioned 
above, the role of the state is not limited to supplying material resources and guidance, but it 
also needs to promote an ideology of developmentalsim to legitimise the modernisation project 
itself. Gellner's linkage321of nationalism to industrialisation and Gershenkron's emphasis on the 
importance of `an ideology of delayed industrialisation' as being necessary to "break through 
the barriers of stagnation in a backward country... to place its energies in the service of 
economic development"322emphasise this point. The slogan of `Defensive modernisation' in the 
Meiji Yushin era in Japan, as well as various other types of developmentalsim in many 
developing countries in the Third World, illustrate how the state invents and promotes specific 
logics and ideologies to legitimise its modernisation project and mobilise both human and 
material resources. 
While developmentalsim accompanies modernisation, its role often goes beyond 
legitimising the modernisation project. It is also used to justify authoritarian politics. It is well 
known that many Third World nations confronting the people's demand for democratisation 
perversely established military and authoritarian regimes in the 1960s and 1970s under the 
pretext of `national development'. In these countries, the catchphrase `national development and 
economic progress' played a key role in protecting the authoritarian regime. It is natural that 
most leaders of authoritarian regimes put the first priority of their political direction on 
economic development, for the sake of their regime's security. Related research into 
`modernisation of developing countries' shows that only the state is able to generate the most 
efficient energy to propel the developmental programme in developing countries 323 
This developmental state must have strong autonomy to make the most of its capability 
and mobilise the state's resources up to the highest level, for the purpose of propelling its 
development strategy by preventing class struggle, and conflicts among various interest 
countries. Ibid., p. 5. 
319 Ibid., p. 49. 
320 See Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) and Charlmers Johnson, 
MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). 
321 See Ernest Geilner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
322 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962) p. 29. 
323 Related articles can be found in Min Ho Gook (ed. ), Political System and Economic Success of Newly 
Industrialised Countries in East Asia (Gwang Joo: Jeon Nam University Press, 1995). 
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groups. 324 The administrative process of planning and managing this development programme is 
not only an economic or business matter, but also an obviously political matter, because the 
process of development may well be accompanied by political conflicts and social 
dissatisfaction. Consequently, the capability of a developmental state depends on its political 
autonomy. In this context, it is understandable that there is a tendency for the state to be inclined 
to adopt an authoritarian regime in order to achieve that autonomy. Since liberal democratic 
mechanisms have not been settled in developing countries, these developmental states use the 
authoritarian ruling method to control the political tensions and conflicts which are the 
inevitable side effects of the developmental process 325 In the authoritarian regimes of Nasser 
and Park, economic development was the priority, ahead of all other policies. They had strong 
state autonomy even though the means they chose for development were different. 
1.2. The Overdeveloped State in Post-Colonial and Peripheral 
Countries 
The concept of the `peripheral state' has been used as a topographical metaphor that 
symbolises its situation of isolation from and exploitation by the core states. Before exploring 
the nature of peripheral states, it is necessary to differentiate between two terms. These terms 
are `peripheral' and `post-colonial', used as descriptive terms of the nature of the state in the 
Third World. Even though both terms refer to a similar phenomenon, there is a slightly different 
nuance. Most peripheral states are post-colonial in the sense of their having had a past 
experience of foreign military intervention and political domination by external powers. The 
nature of the state in these colonial societies is bound to be determined to a large extent by the 
colonial power. 326 It is clearly the case that, as post-colonial states, Nasser's Egypt had been 
influenced by the administrative methods of British colonialism and Park's Korean government 
had been affected by the Japanese domination over the Korean peninsula. 
324 For a general discussion about the relations between state and development, see Linda Weiss & John M. Hobson, 
States and Economic Development, (London: Polity Press, 1995). 
325 Sei Joong Kim, "Historical and Political Understanding of the Industrialisation System of Park Chung liee, " 
Korean Political Science Review, Annual Conference of Korean Political Science Association 1999, p. 2. 
326 This situation is quite obvious in the administrative and repressive apparatus that exists to extract surplus value 
and channel it to the centre of power. The functions of these apparatuses change in post-colonial societies, but 
their structure remains as it was before the post-colonial era. Therefore a strong police force or an efficient tax 
collecting system can be used by the colonial power or by its post-colonial successors. 
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The difference between a post-colonial state and a peripheral state can be seen as one 
of stage 327 For the first few years after liberation from the colonial country, the independent 
state is usually administrated by colonial legacies such as its police system, government 
organisation and taxation system, because newly liberated states do not have the capability to 
invent a totally new administrative system of their own. However, as more determinants become 
relevant, the state becomes increasingly shaped by developments within its society, as well as 
by the world economy. This process of de-colonisation is important in the course of 
strengthening the Third World state. During the colonial period, the state apparatus is 
strengthened in order to maximise surplus extraction. For example, a national army, and a police 
force are created, fundamental infrastructure such as railways and motorways are built, and a 
bureaucratic organisation for taxation and agricultural work is activated. In this context, with the 
sudden withdrawal of the colonial power, an `overdeveloped' state remains with strong state 
autonomy until it is transformed into a peripheral state. 328 
In the overdeveloped post-colonial state, the expanding role of the state originates from 
the intention to increase the influence of local capital. Therefore, at the very first stage of 
industrialisation, it is necessary for industrial expansion to take place so that there can be a 
unified market system. Also, nascent industries need to be protected and subsidised and an 
orderly and docile labour force needs to exist. This leads the nascent bourgeoisie to call for a 
strong, industrialising state capable of promoting its interests. As it grows stronger, the state is 
able to acquire increasing autonomy from the bourgeoisie and gradually starts to replace the 
bourgeoisie in the task of industrialisation. 
A noticeable feature of an overdeveloped state is the importance of the army as a 
repressive apparatus, which has a legal monopoly on violence. The army has several advantages 
which allow it to control the state. The military authority is a force for modernisation, 
indoctrinated with the necessity for efficiency and modernity, and it is also relatively well 
organised and disciplined. The army has the monopoly on violence, which allows it to extract 
surplus value from society through the control of the state apparatus. The army is also trusted, in 
the first instance, by the industrialising bourgeoisie, to control the population, integrate the 
national market, and cooperate in the modernisation and industrialisation of the economy. 
However, as the military circle increases its power and influence over the whole economic 
sector, they come to realise that the rising industrial class is unable to undertake the task of 
327 Clive Y. Thomas, The Rise of the Authoritarian State in Peripheral Societies (London: Heinemann, 1984) pp. 64- 66. 
328 Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies : Pakistan and Bangladesh, " in Harry Goulbourne, (ed. ), 
Politics and State in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1979) pp. 40-41. 
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industrialisation and modernisation and so take over its economic functions. 329 In these 
circumstances, the army, the most efficient apparatus of an overdeveloped state, becomes the 
prime activator of economic development. 
Alavi's concept of the `overdeveloped' state is not just limited to the cases of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh with which he dealt. Rather, it is relevantly applicable to most Third World 
countries, which have experienced colonialism before the independence. At the same time, Saul 
applied Alavi's proposition of the `overdeveloped state' to Tanzania, 330 and Choi applied it to 
the Korean political situation. 331 With the autonomy and power of an `overdeveloped state' 
inherited from colonial countries, economic development could be planned and propelled much 
more energetically by the state. The reasons why the economic functions of the state have been 
stressed in these countries is due to the underdevelopment of the private sector caused by the 
undifferentiated capitalist mode of production, and the state directly possessing the means of 
production and controlling the whole economy as a major actor. 332 In other words, the state has 
to perform crucial roles, such as those of supplier and distributor, by taking charge of the 
directorship of the economic system, rather than merely acting as a supervisor, or a mediator of 
a free market system. This role of director of the economic system gives the state much stronger 
autonomy. 333 
1.3. State Capitalism vs. State-led Capitalism 
There was strong desire to build up genuine self-determination in newly emerging 
countries after both World Wars. Even though many nations gained nominal independence, 
practically, they were still influenced by foreign powers in various ways. In this context, aiming 
at the completion of independence, every government in the newly emerging countries 
attempted to realise unimpaired self-determination. Due to the after-effects of colonialism, 
reactionary groups remained influential and attempted to control the newly liberated 
government. In these the circumstances, the new leadership had to confront those groups which 
329 Guillermo O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State, " Latin 
American Research Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1979) pp. 3-38. 
330 John S. Saul, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Tanzania, " Socialist Register (London, 1974) pp. 349-372. 
331 Jang Jip Choi, "The Formation of the Overdeveloped State, and the Cracks in the Political Structure, " Study on 
Korean Society 3 (Seoul: Hangil Sa, 1985) p. 191. 
332 Hamza Alavi, op. cit., p. 62. 
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were trying to protect their vested interests. In this context, situations of impending internal 
conflicts called for radical intervention by a strong regime, such as a military leadership. 
Park's coup took place in this kind of atmosphere. In spite of outward differences from 
Park's case, in a similar context, Nasser's coup was aimed at the eradication of British colonial 
intervention and the building up of Egyptian sovereignty. Both leaders probably felt the same 
kind of sentiments, specifically that if the situation were to continue, their own independence 
would be at risk. 
The first task of Nasser and Park was to strengthen their power bases and to solidify 
their support at the popular level. In order to do this, they needed to press for improvements in 
the quality of life, which meant a rise in the standard of living. First of all, when they came to 
power through the coup, they did not have a concrete ideology nor an elaborated strategy related 
to economic policy. Both leaders' economic orientations were probably shaped through their 
respective experiences. They came to demonstrate their own strategies for economic 
development after many trials and considerations. The two economic policy lines that emerged 
were strikingly in contrast to one another. 
According to Amin's view, the newly independent Third World country dominated by 
the petty bourgeoisie had a `choice of paths of socio-economic development', either towards 
capitalism or towards socialism. 334 Which path was chosen seemed to be mainly a matter of the 
taste and preferences of the particular person in power, the political regime. 
The development and fate of the economic structures in the Third World 
countries depend largely on the nature of the political regimes in the 
given countries, on their social and political orientation, and on the 
evolution of their economic policies 335 
... the progressiveness of the economic measures taken by the state, and 
of the state sector itself, is proportionate to the progressiveness of the 
ruling circles in the developing country concerned. 336 
The most decisive factors in formulating a development strategy and its characteristics, 
therefore, are the regime's inclinations or the leadership's preferences. In this context, Nasser 
chose a pro-socialist `state capitalism' for economic development. On the other hand, Park's 
333 Clive Y. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 76-77. 
334 Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976) pp. 97-98. 335 Ibid., p. l 11 
336 Ibid., p. 126. 
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policy line could be identified as `state-led capitalism', which had a pro-capitalist slant. To trace 
the implications of their economic policy options, these two kinds of orientation must be 
examined. This chapter explores the characteristics of and the differences between the two 
orientations, and examines the reasons why the two leaders adopted very different lines of 
economic policy 337 
1.3.1. State Capitalism - Pro-Socialist Option 
Even though there are a variety of definitions of `state capitalism', the most concise 
one is "a system where the state owns and manages whole enterprises for the purpose of making 
a profit by the mechanisms of efficient control and supervision until whole private sectors will 
be replaced by public sectors" 338 
There are two contrasting lines of interpretation of state capitalism. According to the 
socialist theoreticians of the Soviet and Third World countries, state capitalism is as one of the 
337 The aim of this chapter is not to analyse the causality and process of the two leaders' economic management in 
detail, but to compare and trace the characteristics and the result of both conservative economic strategies for an 
overview. In a dependent society, the concept of economic development was analysed in various ways. 
Commentators in the main have studied the development in terms of Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), and 
many Marxists have placed emphasis on the terminology of development in the developing countries. Regarding 
Newly Industrialised Countries, see James Caporaso, "Industrialisation in the Periphery: The Evolving Global 
Division of Labour, " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1981); David B. Yoffie, Power and 
Protectionism: Strategies of the Newly Industrialising Countries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983). 
A Marxist analysis may be found in Bill Warren, "Imperialism and Capitalist Industrialisation, " New Left Review, 
No. 81 (1973); Martin Landsberg, "Export-Led Industrialisation in the Third World: Manufacturing Imperialism, " 
The Review of Radical Political Economics, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1979); Joan Robinson, Aspects of Development and 
Under-development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), A critique of Warren from the leftists can 
be found in James Petras (with Philip McMichael and Robert Rhodes), "Industrialisation in the Third World, " in 
Petras, Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1978). These approaches emphasise mainly the internal and external conditions and the concrete process of 
development of developing countries, but the interactions between external and internal variables related to 
dependent industrialisation, and the mutual interactions between political variables and economic variables have 
been neglected. Hence, these approaches could not help us to understand the developing phase as a whole, which 
includes class struggles, and correlations between economic factors and political factors and between internal and 
external aspects. These kinds of limitation were tackled logically by some post-dependency theorists such as 
Cardoso, Evans and so on. In analysing dependent developments, they were interested in the role of the state and 
its reciprocal relations with private sectors. Simultaneously, they notice the relations between political factors and 
economic factors. It is easier to understand the relations between state capitalism and state-led capitalism in the 
light of these correlations of internal, external factors or state, private sectors. 
338 James Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World, " Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1976) pp. 90- 
97. Young Bum Cho, Capitalism in the Third World: Marxist State Capitalism and the North-South Conflict 
(Seoul: Han Wool, 1985); the perfect form of state capitalism could be realised by socialist states. In socialist 
countries, the major actor in production and making a profit is the state itself. Further, in a competitive market, 
the state could provide the labour force with the highest level of wage, thus, the state could monopolise the 
surplus profits created. Edward S. Malecki, "Theories of Revolution and Industrialised Societies, " Journal of 
Politics (November 1973) pp. 948-985. 
176 
steps on the way to the realisation of genuine communism. 339 On the other hand, the scholars of 
the capitalist line assert that state capitalism is not a comprehensive system but just an 
institution for temporary adjustment. This line is requested when the nationalisation of the 
private sector is needed due to circumstances beyond the control of private enterprises, such as 
the creation of a munitions boom for national security reasons. 340 However, originally, the 
notion of `state capitalism' was invented by Marx and developed by Lenin, which means its 
etymological origin came from socialist theoreticians. Particularly, when Lenin drew up the 
New Economic Policy (N. E. P. ) in 1921, this interim strategy to achieve genuine socialism was 
described as a stage of `state capitalism'. 
Many scholars have explored the generalised form of the politics and economics of 
state capitalism in the Third World. They seem to agree on the characteristics of state capitalism 
at the descriptive / empirical level. Cooper summarises those characteristics of state capitalism 
as follows, 341 
1) The origin of state capitalism lies in weak peripheral economies with a 
weak national bourgeoisie and disorganised popular classes. 
2) State capitalism involves a nationalistic reorientation of economic 
resources through moderate agrarian reform, nationalisation of basic 
industries, centralization of finance, and an expansion of social services. 
3) There exists a state-centred interest group which is grounded in this 
reorientation of economic activity and which attempts to dominate 
society through essentially bureaucratic means. 
4) The societies remain capitalistic, in spite of the expanding role of the 
state. In fact, the expansion of the state is seen as a buttress to capitalism. 
5) State capitalism fails to transform the society in its fundamental 
structure and is quite unstable. 
Nasser's Egypt may be seen as one of the best examples of these characteristics of state 
capitalism. Egypt broadly reduced the private sector without eradicating whole private 
companies. She nationalised and controlled much economic activity, without reforming the 
339 Karen Pfeifer, "Three Worlds or Three World Views? - State Capitalism and Development, " Middle East Report: 
Middle East Research and Information Project (Washington D. C., 1979) p. 6. 
340 Economist Rudolf Goldshield tried to systematise state capitalism in terms of macro-economics. lie urged the 
state to be a grand entrepreneur in order to confront unbeatable individual capital. His proposition to move to state 
capitalism is clearly categorised as a capitalist view of state capitalism. Doo San Encyclopedia of Social Science 
(Seoul: Doo San Chulpansa, 2000) p. 427. 
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whole system of new economic relations. This measure of nationalisation could be seen as 
dependent on the populist nature of the regime. 
In this type of populist system, the state dominates the economy, but cannot transform 
it, neither into a genuine socialist economic system which guarantees perfect equality nor into a 
dynamic capitalist system. The two-fold failure of the transformation to a more stable system of 
socialist or capitalist economy renders it rather unstable, not in terms of a potentially genuine 
transformation, but in terms of a perpetual oscillation between various mixes of the public and 
private sectors inside the structure of the economy. This oscillation is quite a common 
phenomenon observable in Third World countries which take state capitalism as their main 
strategy for running the economy. 342 
1.3.2. State-led Capitalism - Capitalist Development Strategy 
As mentioned above, state intervention in the economy is one of the most conspicuous 
factors in Third World countries. State-led capitalism is characterised by a specific typology of 
state intervention in the economic system, which is distinguished from state capitalism by the 
approach to dealing with private companies. Even though the state controls and supervises the 
private sector in a very strict manner, the state never tries to transform the dominant private 
sector into the public sector. In state-led capitalism, the relationship between the state and 
private enterprise may be described as a companion relationship, where the state plays the role 
of a superior companion taking a commanding position and the private companies are obedient 
to the state as inferior companions 343 
Put simply, state-led capitalism does not attempt to replace whole private enterprises 
with nationalised companies. On the contrary, it has the somewhat limited intention of making 
some leading public companies play the role of `test pilot', in specific areas where there are 
high risks for private investment, such as building up the fundamental infrastructure. Also, other 
frontier industry and high technology industries, which need massive investment into basic 
scientific research and development, could be the subject of state intervention. With the guiding 
and leading role of the public sector, state-led capitalism makes an effort to activate the private 
341 Mark N. Cooper, op. cit., p. 45 1. 
342 Ibid., p. 452. 
343 This dominance-subservience relationship between the state and the private sector is a typical feature of so-called 
`Korea Incorporated', which is contrasted with 'Japan Incorporated', that indicates that the private sector is on an 
equal footing with the state. II Sagong, L. P. Johns, Economic Development and the Role of the State and 
Entrepreneurs (Seoul: Institute of Korean Economy Development, 1981) p. 99. 
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sector until private companies are able to become the main actors based on market mechanisms. 
Ultimately, the government of state-led capitalism hands over the state-owned public enterprises 
to the private sector through steady privatisation when the capability of the private sector 
reaches the required conditions. 344 
An unequal development strategy is a feature of state-led capitalism. The economic 
development drive depending on `market rationality' is not yet applicable to state-led capitalism 
due to the unripeness of capitalism. It has to depend on `planning rationality' instead. 345 
According to `planning rationality', state-led capitalism should choose a few industries for 
investment from amongst all the economic sectors. This system of selection inevitably causes an 
`unequal development strategy'. Concentrated investment is focused on the industrial sector and 
bigger enterprises, rather than an agriculture and smaller companies, in order to maximise the 
investments effect - the so-called `laser beam effect'. 346 
In order to drive forward this unequal development strategy, it is necessary for the state 
to provide the economy with an adequate level of technology and capital. The state plays a 
crucial role in importing and introducing technology and capital from foreign countries. By 
putting into practice various export supporting policies, and by proclaiming reformed financial, 
fiscal, and revenue policies, the state becomes the main actor in controlling and supervising the 
private sector. 347 
Practically, this `planning rationality' development strategy can be fruitful. For 
instance, the Korean state-led capitalism under Park allowed the state to achieve a fundamental 
reform of the industrial structure, increase GNP, and dramatically develop the manufacturing 
industry. 
Table 5.1349 The Overall Results of State-led Capitalism in Korea 
1962 1972 1981 
GNP per Capita ($) 87.0 306.0 1,607.0 
Manufacturing Industry (%) 11.1 22.3 35.9 
Heavy Chemical Industry (%) 28.6 34.9 51.1 
Gross amount of Export ($m) 54.8 1,624.1 21,253.8 
344 Kwang Joo Park, The State Theory of Korean Authoritarianism: Praetorian Neo-Mercantilism under the State-led 
Capitalist System (Seoul: Ingan Sarang, 1999) pp. 198-199. 
345 Dal Joong Chang, Economic Control and Political Authoritarianism: The Role of Japanese Corporations In 
Korean Politics, 1965-1979, (Seoul: Sogang University Press, 1985) p. 90. 
346 For further reading on the `laser beam effect', see Albert Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959); Joel Migdal, "Policy and Power: A Framework for the Study of 
Comparative Policy Contexts in Third World Countries, " Public Policy, No. 25 (Spring 1977) pp. 251-254. 
347 Concerning state intervention in the private sector by the mechanism of control and supervision, see 11 Sagong, 
L. P. Johns, op. cit., pp. 108-177. 
348 Gwang Ho Yoo (ed. ), Modern History of Korean Economy, (Seoul: Institute for Korean Studies, 1987), p. 178. 
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The negative aspects of state-led capitalism are clear. The cosy relationship between 
politics and economics causes a weakening in the autonomy of private companies, and 
consequently politics comes to dominate economic sectors. In this context, a preponderance of 
the state sector in the exclusive relationship between politics and economics leads to an 
excessive dominance by the state over other sectors. This means that political movements 
demanding the transformation of the authoritarian regime into a genuine democracy are not able 
to pursue their demands. In addition, since the state fully supports and gives big favours to the 
big private enterprises, the working classes are prevented from pursuing their own pursuit of 
rights and interests. The state controls the wage system, but stands on the side of enterprises, 
which causes resentments amongst labour organisations. 
In short, the main characteristic of state-led capitalism is a development strategy 
formed from the coalition economic system between the public and private sector. The state 
performs both planning and controlling roles as a strict supervisor. The most outstanding 
difference between state-led capitalism and state capitalism is that under state-led capitalism, 
the private sector is built up and encouraged under the guidance of the state 349 Korea under 
Park's regime is one of the best examples of state-led capitalism. Park established a few state- 
owned companies such as the Pohang Steel Company (POSCO), the Korean Electric Power 
Company (KEPC), Korean Telecom (KT) and the Korean Petroleum Company (KPC). At the 
same time, he made big concessions to private conglomerates (Chaebul) such as Samsung, 
Hyundai, Daewoo, and LG, by means of preferential treatment, such as waiving taxation, giving 
financial support, and guaranteeing them a monopoly of specific sectors. As a result of the rapid 
growth of private conglomerates under the guidance of state supervision, many state-owned 
enterprises were privatised after the 1970s. After this wave of privatisation, the main role of the 
state changed to that of supporting actor. 35° 
1.3.3. The Core Differences between State Capitalism and State-led 
Capitalism 
In order to compare the concepts of state capitalism and state-led capitalism, it is 
necessary first to establish some criteria for comparison. Three criteria which differentiate state- 
349 Peter L. Berger, Won Hee Lee (tr. ), Revolution of Capitalism, (Seoul: Eul Yoo Munhwa Sa, 1987) p. 185. 
350 Sang Cheol Yoon pointed out that the reason why privatisation in Korea went well without any problems was the 
absence of a public enterprises' bourgeoisie. Sang Cheol Yoon, "State-Capital Relations Viewed through the 
Analysis of Korean Public Enterprises: Focus on 1960s and 1970s, " in Association of Korean Social History 
Studies (ed. ), Social Change after the Independence, (Seoul: Moonhak Gwa Jisung Sa, 1986) pp. 163-187. 
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led capitalism from state capitalism are proposed by focusing on the state's roles: i) the matter 
of the degree of state intervention in economic management through indirect involvement, ii) 
the extent of dependency on the world capitalist system, and iii) the state's attitude towards the 
populace class (mainly working classes). 
First, under state-led capitalism, nominally the state professes itself to be a liberal actor 
operating on the primary principles of the free market economy. Outwardly, there are no 
restrictions on the private capital's sphere of economic activity or on the accumulation of capital. 
However, in some situations, the state might override this principle of a free market economy 
and intervene for a particular purpose, for example, to achieve rapid growth in GNP in a short 
space of time. This means that the role of the state is exceptionally broad and strong. 
State-led capitalism does not intend to accomplish the radical change by overthrowing 
the existing class structure by opposing dependence on foreign economies. One of the principal 
purposes of the state sector in becoming the dominant actor under state-led capitalism is to exert 
its best efforts to attract foreign capital. In a situation of deficiency of investment funds for 
industrialisation in developing countries, foreign capital might be the only means of achieving 
economic development. In this context, the state, which has monopolised the right to distribute 
foreign loans, holds absolute power over all economic sectors. All private companies have to be 
aware of the state's intentions and obey its' will, in order to rotate sufficient capital. With this 
method of intervention, the state plays the most influential role in the management of even the 
private sector. 
Secondly, countries adopting state-led capitalism depend on world capitalism much 
more than those adopting state capitalism. Generally, state-led capitalist states adopt neo- 
mercantilism35' as their main strategy for economic development. This means that the economy 
might be dependent on the market at a global level. Such a state tries to introduce foreign capital 
into its economy to boost its fundamental industry through investment. In so doing, its economy 
inevitably becomes dependent on the world market. 
By contrast, state capitalism is relatively independent of the influence of the world 
capitalist system. All the resources required for economic development in state capitalism 
should be gained on the basis of sufficiency. It regards financial flows from the outside as the 
first step towards a new phase of dependency on imperial powers. The political masters of state 
capitalism try to nationalise whole sections of the private sector and to confiscate the properties 
351 The main features of neo-mercantilism are trade protectionism, as industrialisation-centred strategy for 
development, the principle of development first, distribution second, and economic nationalism. Joel S. Migdal, 
op. cit., pp. 251-255; Edgar S. Furniss, The Position of the Labour in a System of Nationalism (New York: 
Houghton Miffin, 1920) p. 7., quoted in Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 
Vol-11, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1968) p. 966. 
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of foreigners. 
The third point is that, for the most part, the economic drives of state-led capitalism 
tend to favour the propertied classes. In order to concentrate on the accumulation of capital, 
state-led capitalism intentionally ignores the interests of the lower classes. Thus, the 
accumulated capital might be invested directly in state economic development programmes 
propelled by small numbers of big companies, and not in the welfare system. In this context, the 
national profits tend to be shared by a few oligopolistic clusters. Welfare concerns are inclined 
to be neglected under the pretext of the present task of rapid development. Young Myung Kim 
satirised this attitude of the state in state-led capitalism as indicating an entrepreneurial 
character, rather than the genuine meaning of the state, which should act according to the 
people's interests. 352 It could be said that the most important priority of state concern is 
`economic profit' rather than overall improvement of people's quality of life. Under a state-led 
capitalist regime, while those who demand equal distribution of outputs from economic 
production are suppressed, small clusters of capitalists and entrepreneurs are fully supported by 
the state. Industrialisation is the state's first step towards improving the structure of the 
economy. After the political upheavals of 1971 (October Yushin) in Korea, an extreme feature 
of the capitalist-favoured policy was vigorously pursued. 
The Korean economic drive was justified by its rapid growth. It is said to be the most 
successful example of a state-led capitalist development policy. Even though the state-led 
capitalist strategy does not guarantee economic development automatically, in the Korean case 
at least, it is obvious that the state-led capitalist strategy was successful in achieving rapid 
economic development. However, some commentators and economists assert that Korea's 
striking development was achieved by threatening methods of mobilising the people and the 
suppression of dissent in the context of an acute mutual antagonism between South and North 
Korea. Because of this, commentators assert that Park's economic drive should be seen as a 
provisional method which might only be affective for a temporary period. 
352 Young Myung Kim, Military Dominance and Political Economy in the Third World -A Comparative Study of Brazil, South Korea, Peru and Egypt (Seoul: Han Wool, 1986) p. 120. 
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2. Egypt - State Capitalism 
When the Free Officers' coup took place in 1952, most Egyptians were living in poor 
and unhealthy conditions. The average real income level was extremely low, and worse than 
that, the national income was exceptionally unevenly distributed. Egypt's per capita national 
income was about £42 sterling which was just one tenth of Britain's. Particularly, in the 
agricultural sector, the average annual income of ordinary farmers was only £22 sterling per 
year, and a labourer's average daily wage was merely 10 pence. 353 Life expectancy for males at 
birth was only 35 to 36 years. Even though special procurements due to World War II and the 
Korean War brought about a slight increase in income in Egypt, the population explosion 
counterbalanced the increase. Under these conditions of deprivation, the matter of the 
improvement in the people's quality of life had to be settled without delay. There was no option 
for the Free Officers. This poverty played a role in encouraging Nasser's regime to act on behalf 
of the lower-middle classes instead of choosing to represent the bourgeoisie. 
As a matter of fact, at the moment of seizing power, the economic preference of the 
new military regime was not obvious. Trimberger commented that the ambiguity in the 
economic direction of the military regime was due to the Free Officers' preoccupation with 
preventing reactionaries from compromising the regime's security. Nasser's circumspection in 
concealing his regime's strategy was thus a means of restraining reactionary groups until the 
regime had achieved a sufficient level of security and stability. 
As Hamrush attests, "When the armed forces moved on the evening of 23"d of July, the 
abolition of feudalism was one among the goals they sought to attain, but they had not prepared 
a project or an integrated plan... ". 354 The military junta's first priority seemed to be the 
eradication of feudalism and colonial legacies resulting from Western imperialism. In an 
interview with Al Ahram Newspaper, although Nasser revealed his uncertainty about a concrete 
direction for his regime, his intention to eradicate the unpleasant legacies of the ancien regime 
was in evidence. He also hinted at the existence of differences in political ideas among the Free 
Officers, which might cause possible disagreement when they made a decision on economic 
development strategy; 
353 Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 1. 
354 J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 265. 
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The political ideas of the Free Officers differed, according to their 
temperaments and the family or social milieu from which they 
came. ... What we all wanted was to purge the army, rid the country of foreign occupation and establish a clean, fair government which would 
work sincerely for the good of the people. Once in power, we found 
ourselves faced with the difficult problem of establishing a political, 
social and economic programme. It was necessary to improve. We did 
our best. The divergence of political ideas then obliged us to separate 
from those who did not agree to apply the majority decisions of the 
Council of the Revolution and then those of the Government we set up ass 
It may thus be argued that, at the very first moment of coming to power, Nasser had no 
concrete idea as to the direction Egypt should take, or how to achieve the desired prosperity. 
However, after a while, as soon as Nasser felt confident of his regime's security, he was able to 
begin to construct his own policies and to reveal his idea of reforming Egypt along the socialist 
lines of state capitalism. 
2.1. The Foundations of Egypt's State Capitalism 
In order to examine the foundations and the results of Egypt's state capitalism, two 
dimensions must be considered. The first is the international background affecting the 
appearance of state capitalism in Egypt, the second is the domestic conditions behind its 
appearance. 
2.1.1. International Background 
In fact, the notion of state capitalism can be applied to most peripheral states' 
economic policies, especially those which have been carried out by progressive left-wing 
regimes. In the situation of bringing to an end the era of colonialism after World War II, the 
international atmosphere changed dramatically. In the midst of this reshuffling of the world 
order, the rapid emergence of state capitalism in the peripheral world may be attributed to the 
decline of the influence of traditional colonialism in the developing countries. As the traditional 
355 Robert Stephens, op. cit., p. 112. 
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colonial powers' influence diminished, newly emerging states came to possess "the room for 
freedom of the state to act in international relations"356in spite of its short duration. Those 
changes in international politics made the leaders of peripheral states feel that they could try to 
pursue their own strategies without the intervention of foreign powers. Nasser's revolutionary 
policy utilised this atmosphere in international relations. 
After a while, the world order was reorganised in line with the Cold War system, 
replacing the chaotic vortex of the decolonisation era. The U. S. and the Soviet Union came to 
the forefront of international politics as the main actors in the bi-polar system, replacing the 
colonial system of the Western European countries. At the beginning of the Cold War, Egypt 
was beyond the concern of either of the superpowers. 
During this transition period, there were two important issues holding the U. S. 's 
strategic interest. The focus of the whole world was on the Korean War, and on the possibility 
of its escalating to World War III. The participation of the People's Republic of China in 
particular frightened the U. S., due to the possibility of bringing about another World War. The 
Korean Peninsula was not just a frontline of Korean Civil War but the hottest battleground of 
the Cold War. 
Another major concern of the U. S. at that time was to restore and revitalise Europe, 
and to create a debouche in the European market. Also, as the Cold War became more intense 
between the West and the East, Nasser was able to maintain relative autonomy when it came to 
dealing with the Eastern and Western blocs. Consequently, Nasser was able to display his 
ability to operate between the two superpowers by adopting his representative foreign policy - 
his non-alignment policy. Nasser proclaimed his policy of neutrality in foreign relations at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955 held by nationalist leaders such as Nehru, where Sukarno 
demonstrated the growing autonomy of the Third World in international politics 357 
At the beginning of Nasser's emergence, as British influence as a symbol of 
colonialism steadily diminished and East-West conflicts escalated, the new regime in Egypt was 
able to acquire relative autonomy. In this context, Nasser and the Free Officers came to realise 
that they would be able to accomplish radical reforms. 
Nasser's state capitalism was introduced by the Free Officers, who recognised that the 
international atmosphere was favourable to strong state autonomy. However, in the late 1960s, 
particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 War defeat, the weakening of state 
356 Ellen K. Trimberger, op. cit., Ch. 5; Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord 
and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966) Ch. 8. 
357 Gamal Ahmad Amin, "External Factors in the Reorientation of Egypt's Economic Policy, " in Malcolm 11. Kerr 
and El Sayed Yassin, (eds. ), Rich and Poor States in the Middle East (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982) 
pp. 294-299. 
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autonomy was one of the causes for the collapse of Egypt's state capitalism. 
2.1.2. Domestic Factors 
Egypt had no experience of genuine laissez-faire economic system at any period in her 
history. Even though, between 1860 and 1952, Egypt had nominally claimed to operate by the 
free market system, this was always controlled by the state sector. This was because, historically, 
the state sector had to control the irrigation systems, which had always been a most important 
issue for the Egyptian economy, based as it was on predominantly agricultural production. As a 
typical hydraulic society, Egypt could rely on the monopoly of the state to deal with any 
potential conflicts caused by managing the irrigation system. 
The new military regime had to confront a crucial question immediately after the coup 
in 1952. The question concerned how they could reshape Egypt and how to develop the 
economy as soon as possible. Even though Egypt had been troubled with poor conditions in the 
agricultural sector, which had been the basis of the Egyptian economy throughout history, there 
was not much room for reforming the structure of the agricultural sector at that time. 
Consequently, the only possible option for Nasser was to focus on large-scale 
industrialisation as quickly as possible. But there existed certain obstacles to industrialisation, 
such as capital deficiency, low level of technology, high cost of raw materials and lack of 
availability of foreign exchange. Thus, Nasser could not allow the private sector be a major 
actor in economic development, in such a situation of poverty which lacked any proper 
fundamentals. 
In addition, because Nasser's political style was hard-shelled and stubborn, he 
managed the Egyptian economy in an autocratic manner without any room for flexibility. lie 
strictly adhered to the principle of the state's direct involvement and leadership in economic 
development. Nasser believed that greater government intervention in the economy and central 
planning were essential for guaranteeing rapid growth. In this context, the principles of an 
expanded public sector and direct intervention by the state in the economy were accepted. 
2.2. The Performance of Egypt's State Capitalism 
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In this thesis, the concept of state capitalism is applied only to the radical reformation 
of the economic structure that was targeted by peripheral states' governments. The first steps in 
the establishment of a firm state capitalism should be to strengthen the state sector, to deal with 
any potential reactionary groups and to attain popular support as far as possible. Therefore, the 
typical strategies of state capitalism may be described as follows: i) dissolution of oligarchic 
dominance through land reform, ii) nationalisation of main industries and financial institutions, 
iii) achievement of relative autonomy in the international arena, iv) a populace-centred 
distribution policy. 
This classification is the same as that of Petras and Cooper, S8 but different from that of 
Fitzgerald, 359 which placed great emphasis on the entrepreneurial function of the state. Although 
the idea of the entrepreneurial role of the state might be essential in order to expand 
understanding of the increasing load of the state under the dependent capitalist system, it is not 
helpful in classifying various types of state intervention. This is because the entrepreneurial 
function of the state is not only applied by regimes which adopt state capitalism, but is also 
introduced by various other types of regime in developing countries. 
2.2.1. Land Reform - Dissolution of the Oligarchic Class and Strengthening 
of the Middle Class 
The first step towards changing the outdated structure of the Egyptian economy was to 
dissolve the old elites and introduce the process of industrialisation. The embodiment of that 
step was the all-important Land Reform Law issued in September 1952,360 just six weeks after 
the coup. By proclaiming Law 178 (1952), land ceilings were imposed, which effectively 
limited the enormous power of the agrarian bourgeoisie. The main concerns of the Land Reform 
Law, which have been amended twice (1961,1969), were with placing a limit on ownership of 
land, with the process of land redistribution, and with organising and managing collective farms. 
The original intention behind the Law was not to destroy whole system of private land 
ownership, but to dissolve the oligarchic stratum which dominated the whole country before the 
358 James F. Petras, "State Capitalism and the Third World, " Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 6, No. 4 (1976), 
pp. 432-433; Mark Neal Cooper, The Transformation of Egypt: State and State Capitalism in Crisis, 1967-1977 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) p. 16. 
359 Alex Dupuy and Barry Trudu;, "Problems in the Theory of State Capitalism, " Theory and Society, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1979); E. V. K. Fitzgerald, "State Capitalism in Peru: A Model of Economic Development and Its Limitations, " in 
McClintock and Lowenthal, The Political Economy of Peru, 1956-1978 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979) 
360 Nadia Ramsis Farah, "Political Regimes and Social Performance: The Case of Egypt, " in Saad Eddin Ibrahim 
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military coup. For the purpose of eradicating this potentially reactionary group, which was the 
most representative and influential power base of the ancien regime, Nasser's first action was 
land reform. 
The table below illustrates the changing phases of land ownership in Egypt in the five 
decades prior to the coup of 1952. It clearly shows the overall inequality in land distribution for 
more than fifty years. This long-term inequality had caused the landowning class to stick to the 
ancien regime as crucial supporters, anxious to protect their own properties and assets. 
Table 5.2. Landownership 1894-1952 
Small holdings Medium-sized holdings Large holdings 
(less than 5 feddans) (5 to less than 50 feddans) (50 feddans and more) 
Area Owners Ratio Area Owners Ratio Area Owners Ratio 
(000fds. ) (000s) (000fds. ) (000s) (000fds. ) (000s) 
1894 935 1,778 2,006 
1900 1,113 761 1.46 1,757 141 12.5 2,244 11.9 188.6 
1910 1,370 1,247 1.10 1,636 132 12.4 2,459 12.4 198.0 
1920 1,549 1,714 0.90 1,725 140 12.3 2,261 13.5 167.4 
1930 1,715 2,053 0.84 1,755 144 12.2 2,307 12.8 180.2 
1941 1,910 2,348 0.81 1,775 148 12.0 2,158 12.0 179.8 
1952 2,122 2,642 0.80 1,817 148 12.3 2,042 11.8 173.0 
Percentages 
1894 19.8 37.7 42.5 
1900 21.8 83.3 34.3 15.4 43.9 1.3 
1910 25.1 89.6 29.9 9.5 45.0 0.9 
1920 28.0 91.8 31.2 7.5 40.8 0.7 
1930 29.7 92.9 30.4 6.5 39.9 0.6 
1941 32.7 93.6 30.4 5.9 36.9 0.5 
1952 35.5 94.3 30.4 5.3 34,1 0.4 
Source: Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy 1952-1972 (Oxford: Oxford Univesity Press, 1974) p. 61. 
The enactment of Law 178 in 1952 fixed a 200 feddan ceiling on individual possession 
of land, and strongly prohibited private mortmain, except the right to transfer another 100 
feddans to wives and children. All landowners who possessed more than 200 feddans were 
forced to dispose of their excess area of land with an entitlement to compensation in the form of 
national bonds. The requisitioned land was divided into small units and distributed to the small- 
size land farmers or propertyless farmers. Selling and subletting this distributed land was strictly 
prohibited and subdivision through inheritance was not permitted. 361 
Other laws concerning the elaboration of land reform as major amendments to the 
original Land Reform Law in 1952 were introduced in 1961 and in 1969. The Second Agrarian 
(eds. ) Developmentalism and Beyond (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1994) pp. 136.137. 
188 
Reform Law of 1961 adjusted the ceiling on personal possession of land down to 100 feddans, 
and in August 1969, the ownership ceiling was lowered to 50 feddans. 
The distribution of land ownership after the enactment of a series of Land Reform 
Laws is set out chronologically by Waterbury, as shown below: 
Table 5.3. Distributional Impact of Land Reforms362 
Law Year Related Matters 
Effected 
Area 
(feddans) 
Law 178 1952 The First Agrarian Reform Law (Ceiling up to 200feddans) 450,305 
Law 152 1957 Taking over public wa f land 110,451 
Law 127 1961 The Second Agrarian Reform Law (Ceiling up to 100feddans) 214,132 
Law 44 1962 Taking over private waqf land 38,336 
Law 15 1963 Prohibition of ownership of agricultural land by foreigners 61,910 
Transferring sequestered property to public ownership 45,516 
Law 150 1964 Coop purchases of land (Ceiling up to 50 feddans) 25,807 
Land turned over to agrarian reform by organizations and agencies 25,979 
Law 50 1969 The Third Agrarian Reform Law 30,000 
Total 1,002,436 
Land returned as a result of legal appeals 72,137 
Net takeover 930,299 
Distributed as of 1967 
754,487 
to 318,000 families 
On the whole, through the reforming process, large land ownership diminished as a 
proportion of the total cultivated surface. Just before the establishment of the First Agrarian 
Reform Law in 1952, only 0.4% of landowners possessed 33 percent of the cultivated area, 
those who had more than 50 feddans lost 15 percent of the cultivated area. 363 From the 1952 
reform to 1965,671,000 feddans were distributed to small landowners who had less than 5 
feddans, and the cultivated area of medium sized holding owners (five feddans to fifty) steadily 
increased. Nasser's land reform resulted in a new phase in the structure of land ownership. The 
political and economic influence of large landowners - 0.5% of total landlords - who possessed 
35% of the whole cultivated area before the coup moved to middle-range landowners 364 
The noticeable point is the maintenance of stability and the strengthening of the 
influence of the middle-range landowning class holding 21 to 50 feddans. At the initial stage, 
this class, which possessed 21 to 50 feddans, constituted the rural middle class, but after land 
361 R. Mabro, op. cit., p. 65. 
362 J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 266. 
363 Ibid., p. 267. 
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reform it moved up and came to be categorised as the rural upper class. Table 5.4. shows that, at 
the moment of promulgating the Land Reform Law in 1952, the number of this class of 
medium-sized land owners - 21 to 50 feddans - was 22,000, but had increased to 29,000 in 1965. 
Their cultivated area increased to 815,000 feddans from 654,000 feddans during the same 
period. 
Table 5.4. The Changing Phases of Land Owning Structure in Egypt (1952-1965) 
Small 
Holdings Medium-sized Land Owners Large-sized Land Owners Sum 
<5 feds. 5-10 10 - 20 20 - 50 50 -100 100-200 >200 
Land 1952 2,642 79 47 22 6 3 2 2,801 
Owners 1965 3,033 78 41 29 6 4 0 3,191 
(OOOs) Variation +391 -1 -6 +7 +1 -2 +390 
Land 1952 2,122 526 638 654 430 437 1,177 5,984 
Surface 1965 3,693 614 527 815 392 421 0 6,462 
(000fed. ) Variation +1,571 +88 -111 +161 -38 -16 -1,177 +478 
Result of 
Land 
Ceiling +1,353 -875 +478 
Variation Other 
Polices +218 +88 -111 +161 -38 -16 -302 
Source: Mahmoud Abdel Fadil, Development Income Distribution and Social Change in Rural Egypt, (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975) p. 24 
It may be said that land reforming process under Nasser's regime was performed and 
propelled with political, rather than economic, connotations. Actually, agrarian reform was a 
political issue of great significance even before the 1952 coup. The full implications of a labour- 
surplus society with relatively fixed cultivable land resources came to be connected with serious 
political issues. There was sporadic political violence in rural areas regarding the matter of 
harsh tenancy agreements. 365 
In this context, the first aim the reform process was to reshuffle the landowning 
structure, which had been dominated by the large-sized landowners, the main actors of the 
Egyptian oligarchic class. Mahmoud Hussein suggests that Nasser's land reform policy was 
intended to incapacitate the oligarchic class from the core of political activity, and that, in 
addition, it threatened the existence of the dominant class which was strongly united by the 
364 C. p Park, op. cit., p. 142. 
365 After the World War II, land hunger drove up cash rents to the extent that about 60% of all Egypt's land was let 
out each year at rates that equaled 75% of net income. Gabriel Saab, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 11; J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 264. 
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agrarian bourgeoisie 366 Through this process of land reform, the new military government was 
able to debilitate the vested power coalition of the ancien regime. 367 This meant that state 
capitalism in Egypt strengthened its own autonomy to a sufficient degree in domestic politics. 
The reactionary movements against Nasser's government were gradually emasculated 368 
Unlike Nasser's treatment of the agrarian bourgeoisie, his treatment of the industrial 
bourgeoisie was not aimed at dissolution or debilitation. Because the level of industrialisation of 
the Egyptian economy was relatively low at that time, industrial capitalists were not regarded as 
posing a serious threat to the regime. As British influence in Egypt had been eroded by the end 
of World War II, the regime was able to secure its autonomy by means of the initial land reform 
without any further obstruction, even at this early stage. With this autonomy, Nasser's 
government was able to expand its reform programme into other areas such as nationalisation, 
and expanding the public sector. 
Class-consciousness was not prevalent in Egypt at the early stage of Nasser's regime. 
The state was not dominated by specific strata. However, as the proportion of state intervention 
in the Egyptian economy extended, the state came to manifest its concern with class issues. The 
rapid expansion of the public sector created a `state bourgeoisie'. However, the appearance of 
this `state bourgeoisie' did not mean that the state sector possessed full autonomy from the class 
structure, but only indicated that the state had started to exert a strong influence on the Egyptian 
economy. 
2.2.2. Nationalisation and Extension of the Public Sector 
While the Revolutionary Command Council (R. C. C. ) immediately proclaimed their 
intentions to industrialise after the coup, due to its rudimentary level of understanding of the 
economy, a concrete strategy for industrialisation was not proposed for quite a while. This 
uncertainty drove the members of the R. C. C. to seek and adopt the forms of economic 
development typical in other developing countries, according to a number of basic assumptions 
366 Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945 - 1970 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975) p. 125. 
367 Nasser's antagonism of the classes of capitalists, landowners, and industrialists clearly contrasted with the 
Prussian leader Bismark's attitude toward those classes. A. Perlmetter's analysis of J. Petras and R. Laport, which 
claimed that Nasser's and Bismark's attitude to the ruling classes such as capitalists, industrialists, and 
landowners had similarities is not accurate. See Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: Praetorian State (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1974) p. 59; James Petras & Robert Laporte, Cultivating Revolutions (New York: Vintage, 
1971) p. 285. 
368 Strategically, Nasser's government resorted to some appeasement measures such as exact compensation for the 
land reform and nationalisation, and the issue of national bonds and distribution to investors to prevent those 
ruling classes from resisting Nasser's regime. Patrick O'Brien, The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System, 
(N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 210. 
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concerning a rapid economic development drive led by the state which was similar to Park's 
state-led capitalism 369 
The equivocal stance on economic strategy in the early stages of Nasser's regime is 
illustrated by the fact that Egypt's economy remained dominated by the private sector until the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal. The state did not intervene deeply in the economy. The role 
of the state was confined to some irrigation projects and the development of small parts of the 
social welfare system. This kind of noncommittal attitude was caused by the Free Officers' 
efforts to avoid the enmity of countries of the Western bloc, who might be suspicious if they 
thought Egypt was inclining towards a progressive, leftist line. However, more fundamentally, 
the core members of the coup did not have solid confidence or concrete programmes for 
political and economic development, but only an obscure sense of nationalism or nominal 
reformism. 
Table 5.5. Public and Private Shares in Industrial Investment, 1952-960370 
(E£ million: current prices) 
Public Share Private Share Total 
1952-53 1.4 28.1 29.5 
1953-54 4.6 22.6 27.2 
1954-55 6.0 27.6 33.6 
1955-56 7.9 41.3 49.2 
1956-57 8.5 22.6 31.1 
1957-58 5.1 30.5 35.6 
1958-59 17.4 30.4 47.8 
sources: Figures for public investment from Patrick O'Brien, op. cit., 1966, p. 328, citing 
NBE Bulletin 4 (1961): pp. 408-409. Total figures from Donald C. Mead, Growth and 
Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy, (Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, 1967), 
p. 290; UAR Statistical Atlas, 1962. It does not seem plausible that there was on private 
investment in 1959-1960. These figures therefore must be taken as indicating general 
trends and relative orders of magnitude. 
The critical watershed for the transition into energetic state capitalism was the Suez 
War. Nasser's regime embarked on a radical full-scale intervention in the economy at the 
outbreak of the Suez War in 1956. Between 1956 and 1957, the private sector began to be 
transformed into the public sector. Nasser's government confiscated many foreign interests in 
the Egyptian economy for the purpose of capital accumulation. The state annexed the banking 
369 Those basic assumptions were not very different from the state-led development strategy seen in Korea. Those 
assumptions were the state's role in taking on big projects which the private sector was incapable of 
implementing, due to the necessity of heavy industrialising projects and manufacturing, and the importance of the 
agricultural sector. J. Waterbury, op. cit., pp. 57-58. 
370 Ibid., p. 62. 
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sector in order to control the financial system. A series of radical drives for state initiative in the 
economy fuelled the rapid transition into state capitalism. In January 1957, a series of laws were 
introduced. Through Law 22,23, and 24, the whole banking sector related to foreign trade was 
fully Egyptianised. 371 
Nasser nationalised the Misr Bank (Bank of Egypt)372 and the Ahali Bank (Central 
Bank) in February 1960 and also the Belgian and International Banks in early 1961. At the same 
time, he embarked upon a new diplomatic policy - positive neutralism - towards the Arab world 
as well as Third World countries, which showed his intention to stand on the side of the Eastern 
bloc and establish a socialist way of economy - state capitalism. A series of nationalisations 
after the Suez War indicated Nasser's intention rapidly to expand the public sector. After the 
promulgation of Laws 117,118, and 119, Nasser's government unreservedly proclaimed itself a 
socialistic regime, which meant that they tried to expand the public sector as much as they could. 
After that, Egypt's economic system gradually started to take on a centralised character, which 
may be defined as a planned economic system. The state's possession of private property 
expanded enormously, as Mabro states, 
By 1963 public ownership had extended to all financial institutions, 
public utilities, and transport (except taxis), and to almost all industrial 
establishments of significant size, to large construction and haulage firms, 
department stores, and big hotels. The public sector also controls the 
export-import trade and the marketing of major agricultural crops 373 
Between 1952 and 1966, approximately E£700 million' worth of shares and assets 
were transferred to the public sector 374 Eventually the public sector's investment extended to 
90% of the total investment in Egypt, until Sadat's open door policy (infitah) in 1974 changed 
the form of Egyptian economic policy. 375 
371 "Nine banks, including Barclay's and Credit Lyonnais, were sold to the Egyptian public sector banks. Nearly two 
hundred foreign-owned insurance companies were purchased by three newly created Egyptian insurance 
companies. Other French and British control of the Economic Organisation, a public holding company created in 
January 1957" quoted in Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
372 At the time of nationalisation, Misr Bank had E£100 million worth of deposits, and ran a monopolised company 
of textile production. A plausible excuse for the dissolution of the big conglomerates such as the Misr group was 
'destruction of monopoly'. 
373 Robert Mabro, The Egyptian Economy: 1952-1972 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 125. 
374 After land reform, through a series of nationalisation policies, Nasser's state capitalism acquired many assets. By 
the land reforms of 1952 and 1961 Egypt was able to acquire approximately E£203 million, Suez Canal Company 
shares were worth E£27 million, acquisition of British and French companies was worth E£30 million. Through 
the nationalisation of Bank Misr, the Egyptian government attained E£100 million. And following 
nationalisations of private enterprises during 1961-1967, it made approximately E£402 million. Anouar Abdel 
Malek, Egypt: Military Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1968) pp. 151-155. 
375 Khalid Ikram, Egypt: Economic Management in a Period of Transition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
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Waterbury lists the economic levers in the hands of the state, with its new, aggressive 
regional policy based on Arab socialism, during the second year of its Five Year Plan 376 
i) all banking and insurance 
ii) all foreign trade 
iii) all `strategic' industries, and, in a general way, all medium and heavy 
industries; all major textile, sugar-refining and food-processing plants 
iv) most maritime transport and all air transport 
v) all public utilities and urban mass transit (except taxis); some 
interprovincial transport, modest public housing 
vi) limited portion of urban retail trade 
vii) major department stores, hotels, cinemas, and theatres 
viii) all newspapers (taken over in 1960) and publishing houses 
(monopolistic control of importation and distribution of newsprint and 
other paper) 
ix) all reclaimed land, a large segment of land taken over through land 
reform, all main irrigation and drainage canals 
x) agricultural credit and basic agricultural inputs - fertilisers, certified 
seed, pesticides 
xi) all major construction companies 
xii) large infrastructural assets such as the High Dam (and all others) and 
the Suez Canal; all ports and port facilities 
The catchphrase `Arab Socialism', devised and expressed by Nasser's regime, justified 
the radical state interventions, even though Nasser's economic policy did not depend on a 
concrete classical socialist ideology but more on the situation that he was in. Indeed, as Mabro 
points out, "nationalisation is ultimately a political action related to Nasser's persistent drive for 
hegemony", 377Nasser's state capitalism was thus strongly linked to his political intention of 
attaining regional hegemony. It meant that his economic management could not be characterised 
as `revolutionary' `authentic' or `ideological' founded on concrete conviction. Rather, his state 
Press, 1981) p. 22. 
376 J. Waterbury, op. cit., p. 76. 
377 R. Mabro, op. cit., p. 128. 
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capitalism could be considered to represent `improvised', `pragmatic' and `realistic' attitudes 
responding in line with the situational variations, without an immutably solid doctrinal standard. 
2.2.3. People-centred attitude 
For Nasser's military regime, the most important matter of concern was the regime's 
security itself. For a long time, the Egyptian people had suffered from extreme destitution, 
legacies of colonial intervention and Farouk's oppressive administration, and so it was obvious 
that the new military regime's first target was to destroy the remaining vestiges of colonialism 
and Farouk's feudalism. In order to do this, Nasser needed the support of the majority - the 
lower middle class and the poorest class - and hence proceeded to adopt the egalitarian policies 
related to equal distribution for the poorer classes. 
As a matter of fact, it was relatively easy for Nasser as a new leader of Egypt to gain 
the support of the populace. Resentment at the ancien regime was massive. Nasser merely had 
to demonstrate an attitude of concern for the people. In this context, it can be seen that one of 
the most important differences between Nasser's economic management and that of Park was 
Nasser's people-centred attitude. Although land reform was not enough to improve the 
desperate situation of the poorest class, it brought about opportunities for the lower-middle class 
to become involved in the process of extensive redistribution of cultivated land to the people in 
the name of equality and justice. 
In addition to land redistribution, Nasser's government improved various laws and 
regulations relating to general welfare such as education, the public health service, and social 
welfare facilities for poverty-stricken people. 378 Amended labour laws granted new benefits to 
manual workers in construction and industry, and the `employment drive' committed the 
government and the public sector to recruiting a large number of new employees. The Egyptian 
people could share the benefits of this series of people-oriented policies. 379 
Populace-centred policies brought about an enormous socio-economic redistribution of 
wealth. As a result of this, centralisation of wealth started to decline at a remarkable pace. At 
the same time, as possibilities for social mobilisation proliferated, the existing alienated class 
was encouraged to take part in the political and social process as a vigorous actor. Most of all, 
the extended public sector and full-scaled nationalisation gave Nasser's government the 
opportunity to develop for pro-worker policies. 380 
378 Ibid.., p. 109. 
379 Ibid. p. 109; Ikram, op. cit., pp. 24-25. 
380 Ikram, op. cit., p. 24. 
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Despite the series of people-centred policies enthusiastically put into practice by 
Nasser, some serious problems were encountered. First of all, there were problems of financial 
deficiency in meeting the cost of constructing and maintaining the social security network. The 
social structure of Egypt maintained its capitalist characteristics without a conversion into 
genuine socialism, which meant that the redistribution of political powers and economic wealth 
could not be attained. With the limited resources available, the construction of an ideal welfare 
system was impossible. In addition, these policies diverted the resources needed for investment 
in industrial production. Part of the reason for the high cost of redistribution and greater equity 
was inefficiency in the public sector production process and the stimulation of consumption at 
the expense of production38' 
This kind of people-oriented economic policy made the financial situation of Egypt 
more difficult and weakened state autonomy due to the resultant lack of capital resources. 
2.3. The Limits of Egypt's State Capitalism 
State capitalism had serious shortcomings and led to vulnerability. This vulnerability 
can be seen at two levels - the domestic and international levels. First, there is an inevitable 
contradiction between two axes - the issues of `development and distribution'. The contradiction 
between the issue of capital accumulation for industrialisation and that of equal distribution has 
been considered to be a common problem in state capitalism. Generally, it is not possible for 
peripheral states to possess a sufficient level of political autonomy and economic resources to 
be able to fulfil both targets simultaneously. The regime of a developing country which adopts 
the state as the imitator of economic development has to face the dilemma of choosing between 
capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth. 
In a similar context, at the international level, one of the most decisive limits to state 
capitalism is the contradiction between the state's efforts to maximise capital accumulation and 
its efforts to gain economic independence. Without financial aid from outside, it is quite 
difficult for developing countries to find adequate funds for investment and for driving their 
economic policies. Thus most developing countries which try to achieve rapid economic 
development experience the conflict of choosing between state autonomy and capital 
381 J. Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat - the Political Economy of Two Regimes, p. 207. 
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accumulation. 
All state capitalist endeavours to industrialise independently of foreign intervention 
have been in vain, because of the lack of indigenous capital resources. In this context, the state's 
autonomous policies are damaged by the powers of Multi-National Companies (M. N. C. s), 
Centre-states, and international finance organisations for the evangelising open door economy 
in the world market system. The industrial bourgeoisie connecting with foreign capital also 
weakens state autonomy. Decreased state autonomy decelerates the progress of restructuring the 
economic system and increases the pressure to an open the economy to the outside. As a result 
of these limitations, Egypt eventually abandoned her autonomous progressive policies and 
transferred to conservative state-led capitalism in the 1970s, as soon as Sadat came to power. 
2.3.1. Tensions between Accumulation and Distribution 
In general, most developing countries in the Third World have been troubled with a 
critical dilemma between the diversification of social strata and a deficiency of resources to 
satisfy the various social strata. As social strata become more diverse, each stratum starts 
claiming its own rights and privileges. These states are forced to choose between two things: 
people-centred progressive reforming and developmental industrialisation ignoring the people's 
welfare 382 If a developing country were to try to achieve both these goals, the results would 
probably be a total failure in economic management. 
In terms of economics, a double target strategy - accumulation and distribution - might 
cause ineffectiveness of the public sector and a total lack of resources for investment in 
industrialisation, since massive resources would be invested directly in the reforming process, 
such as land reform, and the strengthening of the welfare system. 
In terms of politics, state capitalism generates discontent in all social classes. While the 
upper class is dissatisfied with the reforming policies, lower classes complain that the ongoing 
economic reformation is inadequate to satisfy their needs and desires. 
In this context, while the upper class affirms that privatisation is the only way to realise 
economic prosperity in the long run, the lower class demands more benefits from the 
government and emphasises the necessity of constructing a comprehensive welfare system. 
These ceaseless double-sided attitudes and conflicts tend to weaken state autonomy, which 
means that those attitudes also tend to weaken the basis of state capitalism. 
382 Hirschman categorised the typology of dependent states as 'entrepreneurship' for capital accumulation and 
'reformer' for the distribution. See Albert 0. Hirschman, "The Turn to Authoritarianism in Latin America and the 
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The socialist strategy of economic management of Nasser's state capitalism could not 
be transformed into a genuine socialist economy. And it is obvious that his strategy was not 
designed to change in the direction of a dynamic capitalist system. Consequently, the overall 
economic system under Nasser's regime was relatively unstable, since there was no clear 
distinction between state-ownership and non-state-ownership in the public sector. 383 The 
fundamental problems of the Egyptian economy under Nasser's government derived from the 
process of transition from a feudal system to a modern capitalistic system, but the state of Egypt 
was unable to realise where the problems were coming from, and in which direction it was 
headed. They had no idea how to accomplish this radical transition 384 
Due to its failure to put into practice appropriate economic policies, Nasser's 
government attained neither the dynamic development resulting from being propelled by 
capitalism, nor the radical structural reform which is produced by the creation of a genuine 
socialist state. This failure not only upset those who hoped eagerly for the creation of an 
egalitarian state, but also let down the industrial capitalist class as a result of the state's 
excessive intervention in the private sector. 
Nasser's effort to fulfil the various social demands led to a financial resource crisis. As 
a result of this crisis, the state was forced to expand the public sector exorbitantly. The financial 
crisis intensified and the overall economic conditions of Nasser's government went downhill 
rapidly, due to an extremely low level of productivity within the public sector and the 
monopolisation of monetary resources by the upper class385 
Since excessively high consumption and demands for class-based benefits on the part 
of dominant groups such as the state bourgeoisie and the upper-middle class impeded essential 
investment in primary industry, the improvement of the productivity of domestic industry was 
barely accomplished. In these difficult conditions of low productivity in the industrial sector, 
and due to Egypt's economic situation of financial deficiency, Nasser's government was unable 
to invest in industry in a capitalist way, or to adopt a system of populist redistribution in a 
socialist way. 
Inexperienced public sector administrators exacerbated the financial crisis. The 
systems and structures of the public sector were inordinately inefficient. Nasser's defeat of 1967 
War has generally been considered to be the main cause of the crisis in his regime, but the 
failure of state capitalism as the development strategy which Nasser adopted for Egypt was a 
Search for Its Economic Determinants, " in Collier, The New Authoritarianism. pp. 87-98. 
383 Cooper, op. cit. p. 2. 
384 Hussein, op. cit., p. 95. 
385 Ibid, p. 35; J. Waterbury, op. cit., pp. 90-100. 
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more important factor to be considered as undermining the regime's credibility. 
Confronting this weakness of the state capitalism of Nasser's government, Sadat's 
Egypt was inclined to rely on the conservative dependent development approach supported by 
Western capitalist states. The first concern of economic policy was dramatically changed to 
capital accumulation. In order to do this, the incentives of investment for the private sector were 
increased and an open-door policy (infitah) was adopted by Nasser's successor immediately 
after his death. 
2.3.2. Deepening Economic Dependency and Radical Changes in the 
Environment of International Politics. 
Egypt's state autonomy achieved by the nationalisation of key industries was self- 
contradictory. Even though Nasser had chosen a policy of non-alignment, the autonomy he 
gained from the Western countries meant military and economic dependence on the Soviet 
Union. For that reason, the dependence of Egypt on external powers did not disappear when the 
Western powers were expelled from her territory, but was merely transferred to another one 386 
In the Cold War atmosphere of the late 1960s, it was hard to find a developing country which 
was completely independent of both the West and the Soviet Bloc. Genuine state autonomy 
existed only in rhetoric at that time. 
However, after the 1967 War, as financial aid and military support from the Soviet 
Union sharply decreased, Nasser could not drive economic policies according to his version of 
state capitalism and he was incapable of supporting the Arab - Africa liberation movements any 
longer. 387 This meant that U. S. influence in the region increased. Consequently, political and 
economic intervention by the U. S. in Egypt and some other Middle Eastern countries deepened 
considerably. In this context, the destiny of developing countries such as Egypt was certainly 
dependent on one of the two power blocs no matter what their own ideological attitudes were. 
Economic interventions in the Middle East by the Western countries illustrated 'neo- 
colonialism', whereby foreign powers regarded some Middle Eastern developing countries as a 
new market for their exports and countries from which they could import raw material including 
oil and natural gas. This was particularly the case for the U. S., which had difficulty in 
dominating and penetrating the worldwide export market due to competition from a newly 
rising rival Japan and the restored European countries. Third World countries such as those of 
386 J. Waterbury, op. cit., pp. 395-399. 
387 G. A. Amin, op. cit., p. 300. 
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the Middle East came to be recognised as potentially fertile frontiers in terms of international 
trade interest. The oil resource in particular was the main target of the M. N. C. s of the U. S. and 
Europe. Moreover, due to his defeat in the 1967 War, Nasser's situation was deteriorating. 
As a result, Nasser's state capitalism may be described as a failure, and the regime was 
thus unable to ignore pressure for an open-door economy from technocrats, commercial 
capitalists and industrial capitalists 388 The failure of state capitalism thus led to the open-door 
policy under Sadat's government shortly after Nasser's death. 
2.3.3. Changes in State Capitalism in Egypt 
The innate limits of Egypt's state capitalism caused various problems in the country's 
economic situation. The economic predicament appeared in forms such as balance of payments 
deficits, unbalanced national finances, severe inflation, and a high-level of unemployment. As a 
last resort, Egypt changed its economic strategy to a conservative policy of privatisation from 
1974 onwards, which was similar to the Korean economic strategy of state-led capitalism 389 
Egypt's open-door economic policy was officially proclaimed in October 1974 by 
Sadat. By amending Law 43 (32nd Amendment), the influx of foreign investment was permitted 
and encouraged in various sectors of the Egyptian economy. This 32nd Amendment granted 
many benefits to foreign investors in order to induce direct investment into Egypt390 Contrary to 
Sadat's expectations, however, the Amendment did not immediately lead to a rapid influx of 
foreign capital in the form of direct investment. According to Abdel-Khalek, foreign capital was 
going into non-productive sectors, such as banking, insurance, and various service industries, 
instead of into building an infra-structure for industry and agriculture, which was urgently 
needed. 391These circumstances deepened the dependence of Egypt's economy upon foreign 
capital. 
Abdel-Khalek points out that some businesses were much more dependent upon 
foreign capital than others. These included banks, investment companies, the tourist industry, 
transportation, mass communication, various service industries and advisory projects. Some 
sectors like general industry and agriculture remained in domestic hands. Therefore, as Abdel- 
388 Gouda Abdel-Khalek, "The Open Door Policy in Egypt: Its Contribution to Investment and Its Equity 
Implication, " in Kerr and Yassin, Rich and Poor Countries, pp. 263-264. 
389 Indirect state intervention in the economy by controlling the private sector, heavy reliance upon external powers, 
excluding the people's participation in the decision-making process, and withholding investment in the welfare 
system. 
390 Abdel-Khalek, op. cit., pp. 263.270. 
391 Ibid., p. 271. 
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Khalek states, the preponderance and concentration of investment by the preference of Egypt's 
financial management in the specific areas where foreign capital poured in as mentioned above 
symbolised the trend for the Egyptian economy came to depend on the world capital system. 392 
Infitah was accompanied by rapid and wide-ranging privatisation. Even during the last 
stages of Nasser's government, partial privatisation had been formally introduced with the 
official proclamation of the open-door economy in 1968393. This was the trigger for embarking 
on radical privatisation. However, more than 75% of the GNP was produced by the public 
sector even under Sadat's government. Marvin Weinbaum claims that this public sector was the 
prime cause of depression in the Egyptian economy, due to chronic problems such as over- 
employment, deficiency of investment resources, controlled prices, and an inappropriate wage 
system etc. 394 
This change to the privatisation of the public sector led to an inevitable slowing down 
in the economic reform process. Overall welfare conditions and redistribution deteriorated 393 In 
conclusion, Nasser's attempt to adopt and manage a state capitalist strategy was discarded by 
the subsequent regime because he was unable to overcome the typical innate contradictions of 
state capitalism: the contradiction between accumulation and distribution in the face of 
extremely limited resources. 
392 Ibid, pp. 272-273; see Waterbury, op. cit., pp. 123-158. 
393 Waterbury, op. cit., p. 167. 
394 Marvin G. Weinbaum, "Egypt's Adjustment to a Global Market Economy: The Role of the U. S. Economic 
Assistance, " paper presented at the 79th Annual Conference of Association of American Political Scicnce 
(Chicago, 1983) p. 11. 
395 Ibid., p. 13. 
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3. Korea - State-led Capitalism 
Commentators and scholars frequently use adjectives such as `remarkable', 
`extraordinary', `dramatic' and `spectacular' to describe South Korea's economic performance, 
which was led by President Park during the 1960s and 1970S. 396 Table 5.6. illustrates Park's 
economic performance in a concrete way. One reason for this effusiveness is that the South 
Korean economy has, to all appearance, consistently achieved and often surpassed the ambitious 
targets set by planners for economic growth and development as Table 5.7. demonstrates. In this 
process, the initial actor, the state, played a strong leadership role, which the Koreans had never 
experienced before. It is said that this kind of economic performance could not have been 
achieved in South Korea without the active role of the state. This characteristic of economic 
leadership was different from Nasser's, although both Korean and Egyptian leaders 
demonstrated a similarly strong charismatic leadership. 
Table 5.6. Economic Performance under Park's Regime 
The Rate of Export Per capita Population 
Agricultural 
Economic ($ million) GNP ($) (000) 
Sector / 
Growth (%) Industry 
1961 5.6 40.7 82 25,766 38.7% 
1962 54.8 87 26,513 39.8% 
1972 Annu9 3Ave. 1,624.1 318 33,505 28.7% 
1979 . 15,055.5 1,640 37,534 22.9% 
1980 -3.7 17,504.9 1,592 38,124 17.8% 
sources: Yong Bok, Kim, "Was Developmental Dictatorship Necessary?, " Beyond Chung Nee Park, p. 268. 
Table. 5.7. Targets and Achievement of Park's Programme of Economic Development 
I" FYP 1962-1966 2" FYP 1967-1971 
Growth Rate Target Achievement Target Achievement 
GNP 7.1% 8.3% 7.0% 11.4% 
Agricultural Sector 5.7% 5.5% 5.0% 2.0% 
Manufacturing Sector 15.1% 14.8% 10.7% 20.9% 
Social Infrastructure 5.4% 8.9% 6.6% 13.2% 
sources: Man Jei Kim, Modernisation of Korean Society and Economy (Seoul: KDI, 1985) p. 271. 
396 In 1962, the GNP of South Korea was $23 billion and National Income per capita was merely $87. But in 1979 
when Park's regime ended, the GNP was $614 billion and NI per capita was elevated to $1,640. Economic 
Planning Board, Major Index of Economy (Seoul: E. P. B., 1989). 
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Like Nasser, Park was initially unable to show the people a concrete direction, which 
he intended to take in order to improve the desperate economic conditions. Also, his ideological 
character was uncertain. At first, it was not obvious whether he preferred a progressive, socialist 
direction, or that of a more conservative capitalism. This kind of uncertainty was understandable, 
because at that time the class structure of South Korea was undifferentiated, and the officers 
who led the coup were unprepared to adopt a well-defined development strategy. So they did 
not have a detailed economic development plan when they first took up the reins of power. 
In this context, the new military government was urged to choose an appropriate 
strategy to achieve rapid economic development and to clarify the direction in detail as soon as 
possible. Inevitably, Park's regime had to confront the problem of a lack of legitimacy, because 
the regime that they had overthrown known as the Second Republic, had been established by the 
student revolution of 19`" of April 1960, and was a genuinely democratic regime set up by 
Koreans themselves without any foreign help or intervention, though there had been a certain 
amount of chaos during it. The new republic had adopted the European parliament system as its 
political model and the overall appearance of the political system was remarkably democratic. 
Park's military regime thus faced the displeasure of the nation for having led `the 
armed forces that demolished the democratic government'. Park's regime made a decision to 
acquire legitimacy through rapid economic development, as a symbol of the capability of the 
government. The lack of legitimacy of Park's regime pushed Park to seek a quick demonstration 
of his efficiency by selecting the strategy of economic development. In this context, Park was 
obliged to adopt a `developmental state' scheme which emphasises state's capability to achieve 
development as the origin of legitimacy. 397 
The general character of the bureaucrats and military elites in the early stages of Park's 
regime cannot be described as `radical' or `progressive' but relatively `conservative', even 
though they had solid backgrounds in the low-income working class and propertyless class. This 
conservative attitude was connected to state-led capitalism. The state provided protection for 
domestic capitalists by allowing monopolisation of specific industries, but on the other hand, the 
low-income working class and propertyless class were denied share in the fruits of economic 
development, even though they dedicated themselves to the government's strong drive for 
economic development by providing labour at very low wages. With limited human capital and 
a lack of natural resources and capital, Park's regime inevitably had to depend on foreign funds 
and support, which could provide basic `seed money' for economic development. 398 
397 Andrew Cooper, "State Power and Pattern of Late Development: A Comment on Zhao and llall, " Sociology 
Vol-28, No. 2 (1994) pp. 539-546. 
398 This kind of development strategy can be described as `dependent development' a term which was devised by 
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3.1. Foundations of Korean State-led Capitalism 
3.1.1. Peculiarities of Korea - Background of Korean State-led Capitalism 
3.1.1.1. Strong Hierarchical System - Confucianism 
Similar to other East Asian states such as China, Taiwan and Japan, Korea has been 
heavily influenced by Confucianism and this continues even up to the present moment. 
Confucianism consists of a strongly hierarchical structure based on a `commanding - 
obedience' system. 
The first introduction of Confucianism into Korea was by the Kingdom of Koryo in 
120'Century. After the establishment of Yi dynasty of Chosun Kingdom in 1392, Confucianism 
was declared as the main principle of administration of Chosun. From that time on, it has 
continued to influence Korean society until now. The fundamentals of Confucianism, which 
were introduced and adopted in Korea, have been a strict obedience and dedication to the 
powers in conjunction with a strict social hierarchy. All peoples of community are obliged to 
demonstrate their faithfulness and allegiance to the higher positions. Traditional hierarchy of 
Korean culture proposes the oneness of the utmost group of `King - Teacher - Father' (System 
of Goon Sa Bu Ilche). 399 People should be forced to be obedient to that group. In addition to that, 
there have been gender and generation discriminations that men are considered to be superior to 
women, and elders superior to youngsters. It may be said that these traditional background of 
Confucianism played a conductive role of political authoritarianism in Korea. According to 
Erich Fromm, the consciousness of `superiority and inferiority' and `dominance and obedience' 
is one of the crucial foundations of authoritarianism. 400 Although the Korean people were 
occasionally troubled by the harsh rules of an oppressive regime, the basic attitude towards that 
troublesome regime was one of subservient obedience. 
Peter Evans, and the term 'associated dependent development' was invented by Fernando Herique Cardoso. The 
concept of state-led capitalism includes basic elements of dependent development, but more important subjects of 
state-led capitalism are the analysis of characteristics and process of state intervention in economic development 
and its results. 
399 Gregory Henderson, Korea: the Politics of the Vortex (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968) p. 25. 
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Confucianism emphasise the role of good government and good quality of education in 
order to build up a better community. Particularly, in thought of Mencius, one of the influential 
thinkers of ancient China, the ideal government is the rule of a wise king, and practical 
organisations of scholar-bureaucrats. People should believe the ruler's capability and capability, 
and, of course, obedience as well. In this context, a peculiar aristocratic system of strata in 
Korea appeared. It was Yangban system which divided the aristocracy into two categories of the 
scholar-bureaucrats and military noblemen. This concept of social hierarchy which had been 
accepted by people without any serious resistance helps to explain the nature of Korean state- 
led capitalism which was performed by strong drive of state sector and bureaucrats. 
Although the Confucian tradition has brought many benefits to Korea, it has influenced 
the people with negative perspectives, too. First of all, there has been a serious vocational 
discrimination in Korea. (Sa-Nong-Gong-Sang, hierarchical system of the scholars-farmers- 
artisans-tradesmen) Confucianism had looked down on some practical business field of 
economy and hence has instilled a strong anti-business sentiment in the minds of the Korean 
people. Furthermore, the exceptional emphasis on the value of family has produced the 
nepotism which caused inefficiency and corruption. Park had to attempt to eradicate this legacy 
of nepotism as soon as he began the economic development programmes. 
3.1.1.2. The Legacies of the Colonial Experience 
Experience of Japanese colonialism is one of the backgrounds of state-led capitalism 
executed by Park's government. Although there was very strong resentment to Japanese 
influence in Korea, many bureaucrats and military officers were educated under the Japanese 
system and particularly, President Park himself had a strong affection towards Japanese culture 
and whole social systems in general. He internalised the core values of Japanese culture and 
concrete method of economic development. 
The aspect of contemporary Japan that Park's regime admired most was its ability to 
industrialise and achieve rapid economic development by means of opening the country to the 
Western world. Meiji Yushin, which was performed for the purpose of achieving the 
mercantilistic aim of "enriching the nation and strengthening arms" (Du Gook Gang Dyung 
Chaek) was a standard to imitate for Park's government Although, they felt severe resentment 
against Japan, Koreans could not deny the fact that Japanese financial support had played a key 
role in the reconstruction of the nation after the Korean War. This understanding is connected to 
400 Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1972), pp. 163-201. 
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the Korea-Japan Talks in 1963, one of the most severe ordeals for Park. 
3.1.1.3. The Impact of the Korean War 
The most tragic moment throughout the whole history of Korean peninsula is Korean 
War. It is obvious that Korean War affected the geopolitics of international relations in 1950s. 
In addition to the implications of Korean War in terms of international politics, its consequences 
of Korean economy were enormously significant as a fundamental of economic development. It 
is ironic that the disastrous devastation of economic situation, caused by Korean War, 
encouraged the sentiment of solidarity of various sectors of Korean people for the sake of 
revitalisation of own country. 
As well as sentiment of solidarity, the Korean War brought about revolutionary 
changes in prevalent value system which had been influenced by Confucianism over five 
centuries. First of all, the preference of governmental or academic careers above vocations of 
practical business field almost disappeared. People tended to choose more practical and 
profitable vocations such as mercantile field or military service. In addition to that, total 
destruction of economic fundamentals of Korea eradicated social prejudice of class 
consciousness and enlarged social mobility. 
One of the most significant consequences of Korean War is that the miserable situation 
of War made a hotbed of new professionalism of military sector. Military officers who had been 
trained by Japanese Army education system were able to get a political influence as the result of 
the War. After the War, power of military sector in Korea dramatically increased. 
In addition to the role of making nursery for appearance of new professionalism of 
military sector, the result of participation in the War of multi national armies of U. N. had a great 
impact on the mentality of Korean people. Because Korean people had been troubled with 
ceaseless invasions by outer countries, xenophobic sentiments had prevailed throughout the 
history of the Korean Peninsula. Under the circumstances of prevalent xenophobic mentality in 
Korea, Yi dynasty of Chosun Kingdom strictly adhered to the seclusionism. However, the 
U. N. 's entry into the war brought about a new stage of accepting the outer powers as partners 
for the sake of mutual benefits. Having experienced this kind of friendly mentality with outer 
powers for the first time, Korean people realised that it was possible for them to work together 
with foreigners for mutual benefit. This experience was a crucial moment for South Korea when 
it comes to her entire dependence on Western influence of state-led capitalism. 
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3.1.2. State Autonomy of Park's Government 
In terms of the relationship between state and society, traditionally, the state sector in 
Korea has dominated all levels of society. For a long time after independence, the state sector of 
Korea was able to sustain its dominance over society due to its overdeveloped state system and 
undeveloped society sector. This state dominance over society in Korea was strengthened and 
maintained by successive military authoritarian regimes. 
Visible achievements of rapid economic development transformed the situation in 
state-society relations, which meant that the state's dominance over society decreased. In 
addition, as the Korean economy entered the international economic system, the character of 
Korean society became more diverse, and social class structure was divided into many levels. 
Therefore the penetration capability40' of the state naturally diminished, and the power of the 
people correspondingly increased. 
However, unlike Latin American countries, in spite of the awakening of people's class 
consciousness, class struggle itself, which might have been organised by the proletariat, barely 
existed under Park's government. In fact a number of progressive parties which had emerged to 
protect the rights of the working class did not survive under Park's regime. 
The working class in Korea had very little opportunity to participate in politics as a 
major actor. They had no experience of organising a representative system for the protection of 
their interests, because the state strictly prohibited any kind of political movement by the 
working classes or any form of organised labour groups. In addition, the Confucian ethos, which 
emphasises harmony, peace and obedience, restrained the working class from resisting the 
government. This attitude could be described as `necessitarianism' or `fatalism'. 
Anti-communist sentiments strengthened the autonomy of Park's government. The 
disastrous experience of the Korean War deeply affected the Korean people. Severe resentment 
against the North Korean government and the communist bloc arose from the hardships of the 
War. Also, the continuous threat from North Korea drove Park's regime towards strict anti- 
communism. In this context, all progressive thoughts and expressions were condemned as pro- 
communist and sometimes progressive scholars or commentators were even prosecuted with the 
charge of treason. There was a prevailing tendency in Korea at that time to consider the labour 
movement and the pro-communist movement as the same thing. In these circumstances, Park's 
regime was able to exercise considerably more state autonomy compared to other regimes in the 
401 Binder and Coleman listed five types of crisis in developing countries as follows, i) identity crisis, ii) participation 
crisis, iii) legitimacy crisis, iv) penetration crisis and v) distribution crisis; James S. Coleman, "The Development 
Syndrome: Differentiation - Equality - Capacity, " in Leonard Binder et at., Crises and Sequence in Political 
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Third World, in order to control and mobilise the country. 
On the other hand, when it came to foreign affairs, state autonomy was relatively weak. 
Korea achieved independence from Japan immediately after World War II, not by herself but as 
a result of decisions made by external powers. The Yalta conference made the critical decisions 
concerning the mandatory administration of the Korean peninsula, and divided it into two. 
While the Soviet Union occupied the northern part of the Peninsula, the U. S. 's military 
government in South Korea (U. S. A. M. G. I. K) administered the country for three years. At first, 
the South Korean government had to rely on the U. S. Extreme poverty made the Korean elites 
dependent on the U. S. The support from the U. S. in the form of aid funds and goods was crucial 
for the Korean people in the South. 
Due to a lack of capital and natural resources, and because of the weakness of the 
domestic market, the Korean economy had to depend on the international market system and on 
the world trade system. This meant that the Korean economy was extremely vulnerable to 
external economic forces. Consequently, the well-balanced tripartite alliance of state-foreign 
capital-domestic capital402 which can be seen in Brazil, did not exist in Korea. The state of 
Korea was deeply dependent on foreign capital. There were no initiatives to negotiate with 
M. N. C. s. 
3.2. Performance of Korean State-led Capitalism under Park's 
Regime: Induced Modernisation403 
3.2.1. Export-Oriented Drive 
Bella Balassa asserted that the developmental strategy in some N. I. C. s in East Asia 
was carried out through the method of a strong export-oriented policy standing on the principle 
of comparative advantage in world trade economy. Export-oriented drive contributed to build up 
the fundamentals of economies of scale and overcame the limits of domestic market capacity. 
Thus, technocrats of N. I. C. s tended to adhere firmly to outward economy - export-oriented 
Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) Ch. 2, pp. 73-1 00. 
402 Peter Evans, "Shoes, OPIC, and the Unquestioning Persuasion: Multinational Corporations and the U. S. - Brazilian Relations, " in Richard Fagen (ed. ), Capitalism and the State in the U. S. - Latin American Relations 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979) pp. 305-310. 
403 To further an understanding of the notion of 'induced modernisation', see Szymon Chodak, Societal Development 
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drive. 404 Park's export-oriented drive was one of the most outstanding examples of the 
developmental strategies of N. I. C. s. 
After the success of Park's military coup, the Korean economy began a process of 
rapid industrialisation and development. In spite of the initial desperate conditions, the GNP of 
South Korea had grown by almost thirty times in the two decades after Park embarked on his 
first Economic Development Five-Year Programme (E. D. F. Y. P. ) in 1962. The Korean economy 
underwent a fundamental reformation and transformation. Manufacturing and heavy & chemical 
industries replaced primary industries such as agriculture, fishing, and forestry. 
Korean economic policy could be characterised as strongly outward-orientated, as 
reflected in the rapid increase in and sustained level of its export of manufacturing products. 
According to statistics, the ratio of exports, as a proportion of GNP, remarkably increased from 
7.4% in 1967 to 27.2% in 1977 and 36.7% in 1987. The share of Korean trade in the world trade 
arena was elevated dramatically from an insignificant proportion in 1962 to 2% in 1990.405 
There is noticeable substantiation that outward economies in certain countries have grown faster 
than those depending on the domestic production and relatively closed market system. Even 
recent research shows that open economies are clearly associated with superior economic 
performance. 406 In some ways, it might be true to say that the benefits of outward economy are 
greater than what might be reasonably attributed to the achievement of allocative efficiency 
alone. 407 The Korean preoccupation with an export-oriented economy could be described as the 
most important motivator of Park's economic strategy for rapid development. As a matter of 
fact, Park had no choice but to adopt an export-oriented strategy due to the limitations of Korea 
at that moment, such as a small domestic market, a surplus labour force, a small cultivatable 
surface, and insufficient capital. 408 Another reason for Park's immediate choice of the export- 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
404 Bela Balassa, "The Lessons of East Asian Development: An Overview, " Economic Development and Cultural 
Change, Vol. 36, No. 3, April 1988, p. 279. 
405 Korean Development Institute, The Overview of Korean Economy 1960s-1990s (Seoul: KDI, 1999) p. 2. 
406 David Dollar, "Outward-oriented Developing Economics Really Do Grow More Rapidly?: Evidence from 95 
LDCs, " Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 3, April 1992, pp. 540-542. 
407 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 2; Krueger and others argue that open economies are more flexible than 
import-substituting economies because they have greater 'cushions' of unessential imports to squeeze under 
adverse circumstances. Anne O. Krueger (eds. ), Export-Oriented Development Strategy: The Success of Five 
Newly Industrialising Countries, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); According to Westphal, Kim and Dahlman and 
others, openness can also facilitate the absorption and mastery of foreign technology. Larry E. Westphal, (cds. ), 
"Exports of Capital Goods and Related Services from the Republic of Korea, " World Bank Staff Working Paper 
No. 629 (Washington D. C.: The World Bank, 1984); Nishimizu and Robinson have shown that the rate of 
technical progress was faster in countries with outward oriented policies than in those pursuing an import 
substituting strategy. Meiko Nishimizu, Sherman Robinson, "Trade Policies and Productivity Change in Scmi- 
Industrial Countries, " Journal of Development Economies, No. 16 (1984) pp. 177-206. 
408 Paul W. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the Republic of Korea (New I laven: Yale University Press, 
1977) p. 106; Rob Vos, "External Dependence, Capital Accumulation and the Role of the State: South Korea 
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oriented strategy was former President Rhee's poor record of growth, caused by the failure of 
his ambitious import substituting industrialisation (I. S. I. ) policy. Under Park's regime, while 
exports were an obsession, major efforts were directed at import substitution for two products - 
arms and rice 409 
Exports were strongly encouraged by some supporting organisations such as the 
Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA)410 and the Korean Trade Association (K. T. A. ). 
These organisations set and monitored entire procedure of export drive continuously, allocated 
credit and fund for enhancing export motivation, and maintained an export-friendly tax and 
trade scheme. The notable feature of KOTRA is that it was not a governmental organisation. 
KOTRA was established by export-orientated companies themselves, despite it was clearly an 
instrument to propel export drive in line with the government's main objective. This is one of 
the distinctive aspects of the Korean state-led economy. In the similar context, K. T. A. was a 
leading apparatus in promoting contact between government and private sector. The KTA's 
Special Fund for Export Promotion established in 1969 was accumulated and reserved as 1% of 
whole imports 411 
The encouragement of the expansion of exports was channelled through the financial 
loan mechanism, which was controlled by the government. The government allowed loans to 
specifically designated industries or activities. It also adjusted the interest rates on loans 
according to the performance of exports. 
In this context, companies and related industrial associations clearly internalised the 
government's intentions and concrete policies of export-oriented strategy. They were required 
to carry out the government's export drive in exchange for preferential treatments provided in 
the form of provision of infrastructure and special funds described as `modestly pro-export bias' 
of the government. 412 The criterion for evaluating the performance was the total amount of 
exports, not net profit. In this context, it can be easily understand most companies demonstrated 
attitudes of adaptation of the growth-at-all-cost strategy. The matter of size of production, 
marketing and investment in technology was important for gaining the governmental supports, 
because Park's government had a preference for economies of scale. Park's government 
1960-1977, " Development and Change, Vol. 13, No. 1, (1982) p. 106. 
409 David I. Steinberg, The Republic of Korea - Economic Transformation and Social Change, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1989) p. 136. 
410 KOTRA was established in 1964 in order to promote export and to do market research. By 1984 its annual budget 
was $10 million provided by the government. With financial support of government, KOTRA operated more than 
200 branch offices in various trading positions abroad. 
411 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 3. 
412 Ibid.; see Larry E. Westphal, op. cit., (1978) 
210 
rewarded the large scale of business performance with better access to financial support. 413 
The various schemes of export encouragement under Park's regime were summarised 
by Heba A. Handoussa as followsat4: 
i) Exporters were given unrestricted access to imported capital and 
intermediate goods, together with tariff exemptions on certain 
commodities. Tariffs were rebated after goods are shipped. When exports 
were less than expected, the importer would be made to pay the 
difference in the tariff due. In 1965, tariff exemption was also extended 
to all domestic suppliers of exporting firms. 
ii) A 50% reduction on direct taxes was allowed on all income earned in 
exporting and this incentive measure lasted until 1973. Exporters were 
also exempted from the payment of any indirect taxes both on major 
intermediate inputs, whether imported or purchased locally, and on 
exported products. 
iii) Selective use of an `export-import' link system entitled specific 
exporters to import certain popular goods that were not otherwise 
approved for import, thereby giving these exporters additional profit from 
the trading activity. 
iv) Government used the method of subsidised medium and short term 
credit as an incentive to exporters who could borrow foreign exchange to 
finance their fixed assets or working capital needs at substantially 
preferential rates. For example, in 1965, when the interest rate reforms 
had increased the rate to 26% for domestic borrowing, preferential loans 
were offered to exporters at 18%. 
v) Government also used the often criticised wastage allowance as an 
additional bribe to coax exporters. These generous duty free allowances 
for loss or spoilage of imported intermediates permitted the earning of 
premiums on the domestic sale of unused imports. 
vi) A number of other export incentives - of lesser significance - were 
utilised by Park's regime. Accelerated depreciation was allowed since 
1966 for exporting enterprises, small price reductions on railroad and 
electricity rates (estimates at 0.4% of export value in 1968) were 
introduced in 1967, and a relaxation of tax surveillance on selected 
export achievers was also reported. 
413 Danny M. Leipziger, "Industrial Restructuring in Korea, " World Development, Vol. 16, No. 1, (1988) pp. 121.135. 
414 Heba A. Handoussa, "The South Korean Success Story: Comparison and Contrast with Egypt, " L'Egpte 
Contemporaine, No. 403, (Jan. 1986) pp. 20-23. 
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The wide range of export incentives and the selectivity of their use demonstrate the 
extent to which the entire government machinery became oriented to the attainment of export 
targets. 
3.2.2. Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation 
Throughout the 1960s, Park's strong export-oriented policy proved to be more 
successful than expected. Particularly, the strategy of exporting light industrial products made a 
great contribution to enhancing the scale of the Korean economy and contributed remarkably to 
the expansion of exports. However, this strategy did produce some negative results. As the 
dependence on foreign capital for importing raw materials grew, the expansion of exports ended 
up causing a sizable deficit in the international balance of payments. 415 This worsening of the 
international balance of payments situation made Park seek an efficient method of reducing the 
imports of basic materials such as steel, metals, and refined petroleum etc. for industrialisation. 
Under the circumstances, a strong drive for Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation. 
(H. C. I. ) came to be the most representative industrialising policy of the latter half of Park's 
regime. On 12`h of January 1973, the Korean government announced the launch of a new 
industrialisation scheme with its `Heavy and Chemical Industrialisation proclamation' 416 With 
this proclamation, Park's government started concentrating their support on certain 
conglomerates to encourage their participation in H. C. I., while on the other hand, Park's 
oppression of the working classes intensified. 
The first support activity was the establishment of the promotional organisations. The 
proclamation in 1973 was a command to propel forward H. C. I. Immediately after the 
proclamation, the 'H. C. I. Promotion Council' was established as the command head quarters of 
H. C. I. This council drew up the master plan and the time schedule for the rapid accomplishment 
of H. C. I. Under this council, there was a subsidiary organisation, the H. C. I. Executive Board. 
415 The import inducing coefficient had grown from 0.22 in 1963 to 0.26 in 1970. This coefficient caused the deficit 
of international balance payments to get worse. The deficit in Korea's current balance which was $5.5 million in 
1962 increased up to $6.23 billion. Dae Hwan Kim, "Chung lice Park's Policy of Heavy and Chemical 
Industrialisation" in Dong-A Ilbo Sa, How To Review the Modern History of Korea - Chung llee Park and 5.16 
(Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo Sa, 1990) p. 319. 
416 Before the proclamation of the H. C. I. plan, there were several enactments of laws related to the heavy and 
chemical manufacturing industry: the Machinery manufacturing promotion law in 1967, the Electronic industry 
promotion law, the Textile & Chemical industry promotion law, and the plan for automobile industry promotion 
in 1969. In 1970, the basic plan for the shipbuilding industry, and the law for steel & iron industry promotion 
were established. With these series of laws related to heavy industrialisation, the government supported this sector 
with the tools of finance and taxation favours. Korea Industry Bank, High level of Industrial Structure, (Seoul: 
K. I. B., 1985) p. 45. 
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This board was invested with complete authority to make, propel and evaluate the various 
policies concerning H. C. I. promotion 417 
At the same time as setting up command organisations, concrete processing plans were 
made. First of all, the six strategic industries were selected418and various programmes, such as 
the `plant location allocating programme', 419 the `five-year plan for the promotion of the 
machinery industry', and the `supporting programme for the localisation of machinery', 
followed. 
The other support activity consisted of fiscal preferences. Most tax obligations for the 
promotional H. C. I. were waived for at least five years, and often cut in half for an additional 
three years. The government depended on its control of the credit system to provide six strategic 
industries of H. C. I. with the privilege of access to considerably subsidised bank loans with 
beneficial conditions. 420 The establishment of the National Investment Fund (N. I. F. ) was a 
symbol of the encouragement of H. C. I. in the form of fiscal preference, as shown in the table 
5.8. N. I. F. was introduced in 1974 in order to financially promote the H. C. I. drive. 
Table 5.8. Financial Support of the National Investment Fund 
(Billion Korean Won) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 Total 
The NIF(A) 
Support HCI(B) 
626 1,066 
323 477 
1,607 2,013 3,626 4,397 
938 1,485 2,523 3,152 
4,384 
2,967 
5,430 
3,830 
23,149 
15,715 
Ratio (B/A) (%) 54.8 44.7 58.4 73.8 69.6 71.7 67.7 70.5 67.9 
Source: The Ministry of Finance, The White Paper on Financial Investment, 1982 
As a result of the government's exceptional concentration on IL. C. I., the proportion of 
H. C. I. in the Korean industrial economy grew to 52.6% in 1980. The enhancement of II. C. I. in 
Korea contributed to the transformation of the industrial structure into one fit for economics of 
417 Byung Yoon Park, "The Inside Story of Heavy and Chemical Industry, " Shin Dong-A, May 1980. 
418 The six strategic industries were defined as: steel, petrochemicals, metals, shipbuilding, electronics, and 
machinery. Most of all, steel, petrochemicals, and metals were regarded as crucial industries of H. C. I. in Korea 
"with a view to enhancing self sufficiency in industrial raw materials". Won Chul Oh, heavy and Chemical 
Industry (Seoul: Heavy and Chemical Industry Promotion Council, 1975) p. 11. 
419 The H. C. I. Executive Board gave the job of finding the optimum locations for building the H. C. I. complex the 
Toyo Engineering, Japanese expertise and JGC group. Based on their investigative reports, the location of the 
HCI complexes was finally settled. Gwang Mo Kim, Industrial Development of Korean and Ileavy and Chemical 
Industrialisation Policy (Seoul: Ji Goo Mun Hwa Sa, 1988) pp. 212-214. 
420 Loans by the Korea Industry Bank rose from 71.3% of all loans to the manufacturing sector in 1973 to 86.5% in 
1976. Dae Hwan Kim, op. cit., p. 305. 
.' 
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scale, and laid the cornerstone for strengthening the industrial infrastructure. 
However, there are some controversial assessments of H. C. I. in Korea. Excessive 
preferentialism to the conglomerates caused over-investment 
in certain areas. 421 This over- 
investment was a major cause in creating some improperly managed enterprises due to 
overheated competition for the occupation of profitable areas. Worse than that, the second oil 
crisis in 1979 and stagnation in international economy severely damaged H. C. I.. in Korea. The 
working ratio of H. C. I. dropped dramatically. 422This situation resulted in the burden a large 
foreign debt. 
The World Bank made an assessment of H. C. I. by mentioning as follows: 
The H. C. I. drive was overambitious and resulted in serious 
misallocations of resources. Nevertheless... many of the goals of that 
policy were in fact achieved. Exports of H. C. I. did not quite reach the 
target of 50% of total exports by 1980, but exceeded the target only a few 
years later and reached 56% in 1983... In a comprehensive dynamic 
perspective, (they concluded), it is difficult to demonstrate that an 
alternative policy would have worked better. 423 
Table 5.9. The Progress of H. C. I. (%) 
H. C. I. 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1973 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
19.0 
31.9 
37.8 
40.5 
46.4 
46.8 
48.5 
48.8 
51.2 
52.6 
Light Industry 
81.0 
68.1 
62.2 
59.5 
53.6 
53.2 
51.5 
51.2 
48.8 
47.4 
Source: Bank of Korea, National Income of Korea, 1982 
421 Yong Chul Park, South Korea's Experience with Industrial Adjustment in the 1970s, Asian Regional Team for 
Employment Promotion, (Bankok: International Labour Organisation, 1983) p. 1 7. 
422 The working ration in H. C. I. in 1980 was as follows; oil refinement 86.0%, steel 70.6%, electronics and 
automobile 51.2%, metals 47.8%, and general machinery 34.8%. Korea Exchange Bank, Monthly Review (Seoul: 
K. E. B., December, 1980) p. 6. 
423 World Bank, Korea: Managing the Industrial Transition, Vol. II (Washington, D. C., 1987) p. 45. 
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3.2.3. The Front-line Apparatus for State Capitalism in Korea 
Korea's rapid economic development was due to the practice of state-led capitalism. 
Many commentators and scholars attribute the success of Korean economy to market- 
conforming policies or market-guided policies, but it is useful to see the situation not only with 
retrospection and with the theoretical perspectives, but also from the viewpoint of the 
responsible post 424 According to Duk Woo Nam, the former Minister of Finance Department of 
Korea, 
"In the 1960's, Park's government had to take the initiative in almost all 
areas of development effort. It was busy introducing new institutions and 
reforming existing ones, building up social infrastructures, negotiating 
with foreign governments and international organisations for economic 
assistance, undertaking strategic investment projects, both public and 
private, and above all, campaigning to mobilise and motivate people 
towards fulfilling the development objectives. "425 
According to Soon Cho, there is clear evidence that "the system of resource use in 
Korea throughout the period of rapid growth, and particularly during the 1970s, deviated 
markedly from the competitive market system". 426 Chung flee Lee points out that Park's 
government and private sector established a quasi-internal organisation, which could allocate 
capital efficiently 427 In this context, the overall success of Korean economy revolved around as 
follows: 
i) Korea's bureaucracy and planning apparatus, led by the Economic 
Planning Board. 
ii) the unique relationship between business and government. 
iii) the intangibles of policy-making which revolve uniquely around 
culture and country-specific circumstances, but which account in large 
measure for the pragmatism, consistency, and decisiveness of policy 
formulation and implementation. 428 
424 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 28. 
425 Duk Woo Nam, "Korea's Economic Take-off in Retrospect, " paper presented at the 2nd Washington Conference 
of the Korean-American Economic Association (Washington D. C., 1992) p. 7. 
426 Soon Cho, The Dynamics of Korean Economic Development, (Seoul: Institute of International Economics, 1990) 
p. 36. quoted in Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 28. 
427 Chung Hee Lee, "Government, Financial Systems and Large Private Enterprises in the Economic Development of 
South Korea, " Korean Perspective Vol. 20,1988. pp. 187-197. 
428 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 28. 
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3.2.3.1. The Institutions of the Government - Role of the Commanding Officer 
for State-led Capitalism 
The argument linking the politics to the South Korean industrialisation strategy has a 
simple logic. The state acted largely as an agent for large industrial firms, providing capital both 
to promote aggregate growth and to secure financial support for political objectives. 429 For this 
purpose, Park utilised various institutions to ensure that his state-led capitalism worked well. 
Amongst the various institutions, the most directive institutions were governmental institutions 
and organisations. 
After coming to power, Park devoted his attention to the achievement of rapid 
economic development and national security. It seems that he did not want to abandon 
capitalism, but preferred to keep state dominance as well. In this context, he seemed to believe 
that in order to attain rapid economic development, a restructuring of the governmental 
organisations would be inevitable. He attempted to abolish the existing cabinet style of 
government, and tried to form a new shape of government in which power and authority were 
concentrated in the presidency. In this context, as the first step of building up the strong 
presidential initiative, Park established a special organisation that would not only formulate 
consistent economic policies but also coordinate their implementation. For the purpose of 
fulfilment of this intention, he finally established the Economic Planning Board (E. P. B. Gyung 
Jei Gi Hweg Won). 
Established in 1961, the E. P. B. combined several policy functions previously entrusted 
to different ministries as follows: 
i) The planning function, originally located with the Ministry of 
Reconstruction, which had worked with U. S. A. I. D. in the aftermath of 
the war. 
ii) The power to prepare the government budget, which was removed 
from the Ministry of Finance. 
iii) The function of collecting and evaluating the national census and 
other statistics which was taken from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 430 
429 Stephan Haggard and Chung-in Moon, "The State, Politics, and Economic Development in Postwar South 
Korea, " in Hagen Koo (ed. ), State and Society in Contemporary Korea (London: Comcll University Press, 1993) 
p. 56. 
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Responsibility and jurisdiction over the inflow of foreign capital and technology were 
vested in the E. P. B. as well. The E. P. B. had three main functions: 
i) It planned and formulated economic policy programmes. 
ii) It coordinated economic policies implemented by individual Ministries 
on a continuing basis. 
iii) It supervised and evaluated the performance of economic policies 
devised by the government 431 
The E. P. B. became a `big brother-ministry' which had both initiative and prestige in 
governmental performances in order to achieve effective coordination of various policies of 
economy matters. Its managing director was appointed to be the Deputy Prime Minister. When 
it comes to the ranking chart of the government, the managing director of the E. P. B. was just 
under the Prime Minister. 
In addition to the leading role of the E. P. B., some other institutions were reorganised 
or launched in order to propel the economic development programmes of Park's regime. 
Amongst various institutes for economic development, three of them are noteworthy. These are 
the Office of National Tax Administration (O. N. T. A., Gook Sei Chung), the Office of Labour 
Affairs (Ro Dong Chung) and the Ministry of Science and Technology (M. O. S. T., Gwa Hak Gi 
Sool Cheo). 
First, O. N. T. A. was in charge of all the taxation through vigorous enforcement of 
existing tax laws. In order to achieve effective tax collection, O. N. T. A. set up a tax collection 
situation room in the Presidential Office under the Park's direction. 432 President Park himself 
used to check progress on meeting tax collection targets on a daily basis. O. N. T. A. played role 
of a supervisor to control all the revenue of individual companies. As a matter of fact, the 
O. N. T. A. was a supervising agency to oversee all the activities of business sector by means of 
taxation which the President was strongly concerned about. 
Secondly, it is noteworthy to look at the establishment of the Office of Labour Affairs. 
As mentioned before, Park's regime excluded workers and peasantry when it comes to plan the 
development programmes of economy. As time went, Park realised the peaceful relationship 
with labour class would be necessary in order to avoid labours' strong resistance to 
430 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 29. 
431 Ibid. p. 29. 
432 Dong Kyu Choi, The Government in the Age of Rapid Growth (Seoul: The Korea Economic Daily Press, 1992) 
pp. 33-34. 
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government's drive of `labour-exclusionary' attitude. As the tool of pacifying the working 
class' wrath, the Office of Labour Affairs was launched. In addition to that, Park was worried 
about the possibility that trade unions could be controlled by North Korean regime. Under the 
circumstances, it was inevitable for Park to conduct surveillance of labour movements which 
could threaten the security and stability of Park's regime. 433 
The third new shape of governmental organisation of Park's regime was the M. O. S. T. 
As the overall situation of Korean economy remarkably grew up, Park came to be aware of the 
urgent need to increase the introduction of new foreign technologies and to develop its own 
technologies. In this context, in order to achieve these objectives, the Bureau of Technologies, 
established in the E. P. B., was transformed and expanded into an independent Ministry. 434 This 
Ministry played a key role of building fundamentals of H. C. I. later. 
3.2.3.2. The Chaebols: Role of the Advance Guard for State-led Capitalism 
A peculiar terminology `chaebol' means a `great conglomerate' in Korean. When it 
comes to evaluation of the economic development process in Korea, Chaebol has a unique 
implication. Chaebol played a crucial role of the advance guard for Korea's state-led capitalism 
backed by governmental organisations which were mentioned above. 
Principally as a result of Park's preference for economies of scale, the industrial 
structure became increasingly concentrated in the 1970s. From the initial stage of Park's 
economic development programme, Korean government made out that companies could 
compete in the international market only if they were a certain minimum size. This kind of 
interpretation was reinforced when the government introduced the H. C. I. strategy in the 1970s, 
The representative nature of the H. C. I. strategy may be described as `capital intensive 
industrialisation' and typical example of `economies of scale'. 
The most efficient governmental method of controlling big companies was the finance. 
Industrialists had to rely exclusively on bank loans which were totally controlled by the 
Ministry of Finance in Korean government. K. D. I. report points out how government control the 
business sector with the method of finance: 
When interest rates on bank loans were set below market clearing levels, 
demand for loans exceeded supply. It was therefore necessary for the 
government to ration loans by non-price mechanisms, which led to a 
433 Korean Development Institute, op. cit., p. 30. 
434 Ibid., p. 30. 
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concentration of economic power in the hands of a limited number of 
firms. Over time, loans were readily available only to those "strategic" 
industries favoured by the government. 435 
Table 5.10. Increasing in Numbers of Subsidiary Companies of Chaebols 
12 Great Chabols 
Hyundai 
Samsung 
Daewoo 
LG 
Hyosung 
Kookjei 
SK 
Samhwa 
Ssangyong 
Keumho 
Lotte 
Kolon 
Daehan Electronic Wire 
Existing Companies 
9 
24 
10 
17 
8 
7 
8 
10 
17 
9 
6 
15 
6 
Increased Companies 
s 1974-1978) 
31 
33 
35 
43 
24 
22 
23 
30 
20 
17 
18 
22 
22 
The consequence of this concentration of business is that Chabol augmented the 
synergy effect in the context of `economies of scale'. This positive contribution of the Chaebol 
need to be seen alongside some negative ones as well: 
When different firms or business units with different specialties are 
combined to form a Chaebol, initially the synergy effects are multiplied, 
and business risks are reduced. However, as the number of firms and 
units increase, profitable units have to be called on to subsidise the 
inefficient and unprofitable ones (particularly through cross-holdings of 
equity). This tends to lock in resources in inefficient areas. In addition, 
the overall vulnerability of the group to business fluctuations increases. 
In the opinion of many, this is precisely the position which some Korean 
conglomerates have now reached 436 
Another consequence of the formation of the Chaebol is that they prevented steady 
development of small and medium-sized industries because Chaebol monopolised all the 
financial credits. The vulnerability of small and medium-sized industry has been considered to 
aas Ibid., p. 35. 
436 Ibid., p. 36. 
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be the weakest link in industrial structure of Korean economy. 
Because of the exclusive privilege of the Chaebol which had been guaranteed by 
Park's regime, Korean people came to have negative views on the Chaebol and its behaviours. 
In this context, the capitalist system itself as a whole was regarded as a negative system for the 
populace classes. In a view point of the public, the appearance of the Chaebol was an 
predictable result of capitalistic development drive. As a matter of fact, being placed under the 
protection of Park's regime, the Chaebol attempted to play a role of vanguard in Korea's state- 
led capitalism. 
3.3. The Limits of Korean State-led Capitalism 
3.3.1. The Exclusion of the Agrarian Sector and Labour Class 
During the development period, the agrarian sector was particularly retarded in 
comparison with other sectors due to the excessive concentration of investment in the 
manufacturing sector and HCI programme. The lower-price system of grains designed to curb 
inflation caused a serious rural exodus to the urban areas, which brought about massive 
urbanisation and increasing unemployment. 
Although Park introduced a movement in the agrarian sector aimed at promoting 
agrarian productivity and controlling the rural population - the `New Village Movement' (Sae 
Maeul Woondong), - the disparity between the agrarian sector and the manufacturing / IICI 
sector widened enormously. 
Table 1Table 5.11. The Status of the Agrarian Sector (%) 
1965 1975 1980 
Percentage of Arable Surface 22.9 22.7 22.2 
Planted Area / Arable Surface 158.0 125.0 
Percentage of Farming Population 55.1 38.2 28.4 
Gross Product of Agrarian Sector / GNP 37.6 24.9 15.1 
Family Income of Agrarian Sector / Manufacturing Sector 99.7 67.1 64.0 
Source: Byung Dong Lee, "Park Chung Ilee and New Village Movement, " in Dong-A llbo Sa. op. cit., p. 368. 
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This kind of sectoral inequality undermined Park's strong drive for economic 
development by focusing on the manufacturing and HCI sectors. A gradual increase in 
dissatisfaction in the agrarian sector and amongst the labour force, which were alienated from 
the dominant coalition of the government and the Chaebol, became a great menace to Park's 
regime in the late 1970s. 
Another factor which undermined the success of Park's state-led capitalism was the 
exclusion of labour. The state-led capitalist strategy for economic development leads inevitably 
to problems of increased inequality and a deepening dependency on the world capitalist 
system. 437 In this context, the exclusion of the labour class from the distribution of the 
achievements of the rapid economic development came to be extremely problematic, and the 
ordinary people became more and more dissatisfied with such explicit inequality. 
The tripartite relationship of `state - capital - labour' under Park's regime could be 
characterised as `inclusion of capital and exclusion of labour'. This explicit pro-con attitude is 
typical of Park's state-led capitalism. According to Kohli, Park's state-led capitalist model 
comprised three factors, as follows: i) a strong state which was able to control and manipulate 
the whole society, ii) a dominant coalition of state - capital - army, iii) the systematic 
mechanism of continuous suppression and exclusion of farmers and labourers 438 
In order to achieve rapid economic development, the state intentionally excluded and 
suppressed the labour class. The demands of labourers for the enhancement of the welfare 
system and for the construction of a social security network for the poor was refused under the 
slogan of `Growth First'. While the bottom 40% of the population occupied 18% of GNP, top 
20% of the population in Korea possessed 45% of GNP in 1978439 Even though this statistic 
illustrates the fact that the distribution of Korean wealth was relatively better than in other 
developing countries in the Third World, inequality prevailed throughout the class structure in 
Korea. 44o 
The culmination of inequality when it comes to income distribution was the period of 
437 H: lio Jaguaribe, Economic and Political Development: a Theoretical Approach and a Brazilian Case Study 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp. 190-191. quoted in Y. M. Kim, op. cit., p. 132. 
438 Atul Kohli, "Where Do High. Growth Political Economies Come From? - The Japanese Lineage of Korea's 
Developmental State, " World Development, Vol. 22, No. 9 (September, 1994) pp. 1269-1270. 
439 D. C. Rao, "Economic Growth and Equity in the Republic of Korea, " World Development, Vol. 6, No. 3, (1978) 
p. 108. 
440 Irma Adelman and Roinson Sherman, Income Distribution Policy in Developing Countries: A Case Study of 
Korea (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978), quoted in Y. M. Kim, op. cit., p. 134. 
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the HCI drive 44' On every occasion when there was a conflict between labour and capital, the 
state intervened and stood on the side of capital. The state used the slogans `economic 
development' and `national security' as excuses for rejecting the demands of the workers. In 
addition, through the retrogressive revision of the Labour Law, all the activities of trade unions 
were illegalised in 1972 under the Yushin Constitution. 442 
Park's suppressive policy brought about a split in the country. This dichotomy between 
`dominant coalition of state, army, and Chaebol' and `protest coalition of labourer, farmer and 
some anti-government intellectuals' undermined the security network of Park's regime. A crisis 
developed in the political situation, and it proved to be irrevocable. 
3.3.2. Corruption in the Business-Government Nexus (Chungkyung yuchak) 
Park's strategy was to exclude the classes of ordinary people in order to afford crucial 
preference to a small number of enterprises. The special favours given to those enterprises were 
exemption from taxation, special loans, and the guarantee of a monopoly in a specific area. The 
freeze on private debt in 1972 was the biggest favour granted to Chaebols, and the measure of 
290' of May 1973 established sub-financial institutions for the encouragement of financial 
support to big businesses. Between 1972 and 1979,60% of policy-loans and more than half of 
general bank loans were injected into the one hundred business groups. By the end of the 1970s, 
the entire Korean economy was dominated by the few largest Chaebols. 443 The big five 
Chaebols' growth rate was up to 30.1% at its highest point during the latter half of Park's 
regime, while the national economic growth rate was only 9.9%. 444 And the total production of 
the top fifty Chaebols on a value-added basis accounted for 43% of GDP in 1978 445 
After the launch of the ambitious HCI project in 1972, Park reinforced his pro-Chaebol 
strategy by granting a broader range of privileges, such as heavily subsidised credit, guaranteed 
shares in the domestic market, and relaxed foreign exchange regulations, which caused a 
strengthening of the `business-government nexus'. As a result of the existence of this nexus 
between business (Chaebol) and government, most Chaebols became characterised as `political 
capitalist' 446 Chaebols had to provide bureaucrats and politicians with regular black bribes in 
441 D. C. Rao, op. cit., p. 309. 
442 Yoon Hwan Kim, "Labour Problems during Industrialisation, and the Labour Movement, " Rediscovering Korean 
Society (Seoul: Han Wool Chulpan Sa, 1985) pp. 361-366. 
443 S. Haggard and C. I. Moon, op. cit., pp. 79-80. 
444 Ho Jin Kim, "Leadership and Ruling Strategy of Chung Hee Park, " in Dong-A Ilbo Sa, op. cit., p. 33. 
445 Han Gook Ilbo, 29th September, 1981, quoted in Haegun Koo, op. cit., p. 80. 
446 Chan 11 Park, "The Characteristics of Economic Aid from The U. S. and Its Consequences, " Yoon liwan Kim, 
order to ensure that their benefits and privileges from the authorities continued to be 
forthcoming. 
At the same time, this nexus became an obstacle to the democratisation of Korean 
politics, it created a lowering in the overall competitiveness of the business sector in the Korean 
economy in the long run, by inhibiting free competition, in the absence of any state intervention. 
It may be said that these negative effects of the business-government nexus were an 
unavoidable feature of Park's state-led capitalism, since he concentrated solely on the speed and 
visible outputs of economic development. 
(eds. ) Process ofKorean Economy (Seoul: Dol Bae Gae, 1981) p. 73. 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter explored economic policies of both regimes in terms of attitude of 
economic strategy - Nasser's state capitalism and Park's state-led capitalism. In developing 
countries, the active role of state is essential to drive the economic strategy. State plays a key 
role of supervising and leading the development programmes. Although, in Nasser and Park's 
regimes, state functioned as the most important role of a main actor in various administering 
programmes, the ways of state's intervention were quite different from each other. 
Nasser's state capitalism was similar to socialist economic strategy. He emphasised the 
egalitarian distribution and dissolution of oligarchic bourgeoisie at the initial stage of his regime. 
In a concrete way, his affiliations with populace classes were in conjunction with his regime 
characteristics - `people-inclusionary'. As the result of inefficiency of excessive expanding 
public sectors and radical nationalisation, the fundamentals of Egyptian economy became 
weakening. In addition to that, the problems of tensions between accumulation and distribution, 
deepening economic dependence on outer powers brought about structural change in the 
opposite direction by Sadat's open-door economy. 
Park's economic drive may be described as state-led capitalism. With the tool of strong 
hierarchical tradition, state dominated other sectors as big brother. Contrary to Nasser's state 
capitalism, Park's state-led capitalism did not attempt introduce socialist measure when it came 
to state's role in economic development. Instead of nationalisation or expanding public sectors, 
Park encouraged small clusters of private companies to act advance guard of Park's economic 
development programme. Park's economic drive excluded the populace classes such as peasant 
and workers who belonged to lower-middle classes. Although Park was able to achieve a 
remarkable economic development by means of the planning scheme of four stages of five-year. 
economic-development-plan, his abnormal favouritism to a small number of conglomerates 
made a big trouble due to lack of the competitiveness of big companies. Consequently, 
overdeveloped conglomerates became one of the critical reasons for financial crisis of Korean 
Economy in 1997 in the long run. Park's economic drive could be described as `pcople- 
exclusionary' characteristics in terms of his attitude towards the populace classes in the course 
of economic development. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: 
COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
We have so far examined two authoritarian regimes in terms of their ideological 
orientations, the output of their economic policies, and on the basis of leadership characteristics 
which were determined by the issue of legitimacy. The examination has rendered several 
theoretical and empirical implications. By way of concluding this study, the researcher will 
present a comparative assessment of the performance of both regimes - that of Gamal Abdul 
Nasser in Egypt and that of Chung Hee Park in South Korea. 
1. Comparative Assessment 
I. I. Similarities 
There are several similarities between Nasser's and Park's regimes. Amongst those 
similarities, four aspects are particularly worthy of note. First of all, both countries had 
experience of being ruled by a colonial power. Thus, Egypt and Korea had resentment towards 
their colonial countries - Britain and Japan respectively. In this context, the military regimes 
established by Nasser and Park had to clarify both their attitude toward the colonial power and 
their evaluation of the colonial period. For those who had experienced humiliation of foreign 
intervention, the attitude of new regimes towards colonialism would be critical issue. 
Secondly, both regimes existed on the basis of military neo-professionalism, one of the 
prominent characteristics of military intervention in the Third World, as Alfred Stepan points 
out. The overdeveloped military sectors of both regimes, trained by former colonial military 
organisation, overruled other sectors. After the War in Korea, owing to an ambitious military 
training programme for Korean Army officers, the most talented men of ability throughout the 
country flocked to the army. This symptom of preponderance in vocational preference was the 
main cause of the development of neo-professionalism. In Egypt as well, the British military 
training system was well organised at that time, and military officers who were trained in the 
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modernised educational system were superior to any other vocational groups. 
Thirdly, both leaders maintained their regimes' security in a non-democratic way 
through the personalisation of power, although their characters were very different from each 
other. They transformed their regime's outward appearance into that of a civilian government, 
even though their power bases still lay in the military sector. With this transformation, both 
leaders attempted to attain exclusive ultimate power in Egypt and South Korea. 
Lastly, despite the nine year gap between the appearances of the two regimes, the 
international Cold War situation remained the same - one of unlimited competition between the 
East and West. In these circumstances, the political situations of Third World countries were 
heavily influenced by the strategy of the two opposing blocs. Thus, examining the reactions of 
regimes in developing countries to the Cold War system could be an effective way of figuration 
of determining the characteristics of these regimes. 
1.2. The Legitimacy Issue and Its Consequences 
The most outstanding difference between the regimes of Nasser and Park lies in the 
question of legitimacy. Generally speaking, when a leader came to power, his or her first 
concern was how to acquire legitimacy for his regime, in order to secure its stability. In order to 
deal with the matter of legitimacy, three dimensions are examined. 
The first dimension to be considered is the leader's personal background. It is quite 
simple. A person with a good record could easily acquire legitimacy. By contrast, if a person's 
background were not good enough for him to be accepted as leader of a certain community by 
the people, or if he had some stains on his career, legitimacy would be a problem. Particularly, 
in newly emerging countries in the Third World which had experienced a colonial period, the 
leader's vocational background during the period of colonialism, and his or her attitude towards 
the colonial power, could be considered to be crucial factors in determining whether or not he or 
she could gain the support of a people who had anti-colonial sentiments. 
From this point of view, Nasser had no particular problems in gaining the support of 
the people. He had joined student movements to protest against British domination in Egypt and 
had even organised a demonstration to resist the interventions of imperialism. The Egyptian 
people acknowledged Nasser as their legitimate leader without hesitation, despite his military 
coup. 
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Park's case was totally different. There were obvious reasons for his lack of legitimacy 
in his vocational background. The first reason was his role as a Japanese military officer in 
repressing the liberation movement for Korea's independence, and the second stain on his 
career was his participation in a secret communist movement while in the Korean army. It was 
ironic that Park subsequently banned all communist movements and purged any anti-regime 
movements on charges of involvement in communism. 
Secondly, the process of power attainment has a crucial role to play in affecting 
legitimacy. Generally, if a military regime wants to make sure of legitimacy, the regime which 
they overthrew would have to be regarded as a malignant regime, and the new military 
leadership must persuade the people to believe that the ancien regime was a vicious one with 
tools of political propaganda. Although the main motivation behind the military coup may have 
been greed for power, the new leader should rationalise his military intervention by exposing 
the evil character of the former regime. For Nasser, this task was relatively easy. Since King 
Farouk's incompetence in dealing with foreign influences and domestic depravity had been 
obvious to his people, Nasser's military coup, which was justified by criticising King Farouk for 
his subservience to foreign power, his meanness, corruption of political core and poor 
performance in the Palestine War, was seen as no bad thing. 
Park's situation was quite different. The Second Republic of Korea, which Park 
overthrew, was the first democratic government in the entire history of the Korean Peninsula. 
This republic was established with the sacrifice of students' lives in April 1960. During the 
transition period from the presidential system to the parliamentary system, there were some 
chaotic incidents due to the lack of any charismatic central power, such as President Rhee. In 
the context of constant threats from North Korea, military officers created the sense of an 
impending security crisis. Under these circumstances, Park's coup was carried out and he seized 
power in Korea. Although this justification seemed to be understood by the ordinary people in 
Korea, it was not accepted by students and intellectuals, who had dedicated themselves to the 
establishment of the Korea's first democratic government. Since Nasser did not suffer from a 
lack of legitimacy in the power attainment process, he was able to obtain sufficient autonomy to 
administer the country. Park, however, could not succeed in removing the stains of `military 
leader who overthrew the genuine democracy', thus he was forced to focus on economic 
performance alone for the purpose of securing his regime's stability. 
The last dimension of the issue of legitimacy concerns the `regime's performance'. As 
mentioned above, Nasser was free of legitimacy problems. With the autonomy gained on the 
basis of sufficient legitimacy, he was able to concentrate on several political issues without 
serious hindrances. He attempted to inculcate the spirit of Arab unity in the Arab people, and 
227 
achieved the concrete realisation of his desire, the U. A. R., despite its short life. Above all things, 
the most outstanding feature of Nasser's political performance was his non-alignment stance in 
the arena of international politics. Nasser's independence of action may be seen to be closely 
linked with his solid legitimacy. In contrast, politically, Park did not possess any autonomy. 
Because of his lack of legitimacy, he had to adopt repressive methods of administration in 
domestic affairs. In addition to this, in the circumstances of the severe Cold War, as a buffer at 
the forefront of the bi-polar conflict, Park's regime had no option but to rely totally on the 
U. S. 's financial and military assistance. Thus, there was no room for political autonomy in 
relation to foreign powers. In this context, Park had to concentrate on economic performance 
and its visible outputs. His strict adherence to economic performance brought about 
dramatically rapid economic development unparalleled anywhere else in the world at that time. 
Through this economic development, Park tried to make up for the weakness of his legitimacy. 
1.3. Leadership Characteristics 
1.3.1. Personal Traits of Highly Personalised Leadership 
Analysing characteristics of certain leadership may be carried out in two dimensions - 
the factor of leader's personal traits and surrounding situational factor. Although it is obvious 
that both dimensions of traits and situation should be dealt with simultaneously in order to 
execute an accurate analysis, sometimes the traits of approach of leadership analysis would be 
regarded as the more relevant factor to exemplify a leadership's characteristics than the 
situational approach when it comes to leadership analysis of the newly emerging countries. In 
newly emerging countries, the political factor of personal leader could be considered to be the 
most influential variable due to the low level of political institutionalisation and highly 
personalised political system. 
In this context, classification of leader's traits can be useful for exemplification of 
Nasser and Park's leadership. For this classification of Nasser and Park's traits, essential factor 
to consider is the matter of legitimacy. As Raymond Grew points out in Chapter III, the matter 
of legitimacy may be positioned at the core when it comes to a regime's confrontation with 
various crises - identity, participation, penetration and distribution. In other words, a regime's 
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failure to secure legitimacy could quite possibly cause the instability and even collapsing of 
regime. Leaders in developing countries who recognise the importance of legitimacy tend to 
react to the legitimacy matter seriously. In this context, both leaders' way how to tackle the 
legitimacy issue may be determinant factor of forming the traits of their leadership. 
Amongst many important traits that leaderships expose, five articulated traits, 
classified by Peter Northouse, may be useful; intelligence, self-confidence, determination, 
integrity and sociability. While Nasser had no serious weak points in those traits, Park had 
difficulties in his self-confidence, integrity and sociability out of five representative traits of 
leadership. This weakness in several major traits of Park was caused by his lack of legitimacy 
which was linked with his regimes' character - exclusive and introvert. 
1.3.2. Idiosyncrasies of Nasser's and Park's Leadership 
In addition to the personal traits of respective leaders as mentioned above, there are 
noticeable differences in leadership's idiosyncrasies. By using the personality model of political 
leaders proposed by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, three types of idiosyncrasies 
of leadership could be applied to Nasser and Park's leadership. First type of idiosyncrasy 
classification is, with the regard of the adherence to leader's own ideology and belief, 
personality of `doctrinaire / opportunist'. Nasser adhered to his own ideological belief - 
secularistic Arab nationalism and socialism. In contrast, Park basically had the attitude of 
opportunism which is demonstrated by inconsistency in between his ideological attitude and his 
performance after seizing power. 
Secondly, in terms of classification of `idealist / realist' which is determined by the 
feasibility of realisation, Nasser may be categorised as an idealist leader who persisted in 
attempting to realise his ideal of Arab cause for the purpose of attaining regional hegemony. On 
the contrary, Park thoroughly held fast to his principle of maximising the national interests. 
Thus, he demonstrated highly calculated attitude in his performance and tended to adhere to 
materialistic results. 
The third classification of idiosyncrasies is `fighter or gambler / planner or prudent'. 
This classification relates to outward style how a leader puts into practice concrete polices. 
Nasser was a good example of fighter style leadership. Whenever he faced crucial moment, he 
played high stakes despite the existence of risks. In contrast, Park's leadership style was that of 
a typical planner. His main consideration at every stage of policy enforcement was the matter of 
profit or loss. He performed excessively elaborate considerations and predictions in every single 
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process of policy making procedure. 
1.3.3. Role Orientations 
Another feature of leadership characteristics of Nasser's and Park's regime is their role 
orientation, which refers to the central emphasis leaders impose when they put into practice 
their own policies. This classification of role orientation influences the formation of regime's 
characteristics directly and distinguishes between Nasser's leadership and that of Park. 
With regard to classification of leadership by role orientation, Nasser's leadership may 
be categorised as popularity-oriented (Follower-centred) leadership which was in collaboration 
with the people's desire. His regime's performance was determined by his aim to satisfy the 
desire of populace level and to govern in their interests. Popularity-oriented feature of Nasser's 
leadership made his government populist regime. 
On the other hand, Park' leadership appeared task-oriented feature as leadership of 
entrepreneur. He disregarded people's demand and only sought his own desire of profitable 
government performance. He suspended any progressive measure for building the welfare 
system for the lower-middle classes. Instead, all the government's actions were projected into 
the materialistic productiveness. Park constantly examined detailed programmes of economic 
development and supervised the entire administering procedure of his government as if he was a 
C. E. O. of private company. 
1.4. Ideology: Extrovert Features vs. Introvert Features 
Ideology is the crucial factor for integration. In Third World countries, ideology is 
particularly important because most non-democratic regimes tend to mobilise the people by the 
leader's arbitrary intentions, which can be set out in the form of an ideology. With regard to 
Nasser and Park, their ideological attitudes were strikingly in contrast to each other. 
Nasser adopted nationalism and socialism as the main ideologies for his regime. By 
means of a strict adherence to these ideologies, Nasser tried to obtain regional hegemony, and 
he actually came to the forefront of Middle Eastern politics as the most prominent leader of the 
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Arabs and as an important figure in international politics as well. In contrast, Park focused 
exclusively on internal integration and domestic development by means of his own particular 
brand of nationalism, which justified the oppressive mature of his regime under the pretext of 
`rapid economic development to overcome prevailing destitution'. He also emphasised anti- 
communism with the rhetoric of `threats from the communist North Korea'. This rhetoric of 
hard-line anti-communism was devised under the circumstances of mutual hatred between 
North and South in order to mobilise the people and suppress any protest against the regime. 
1.4.1. Nationalism: Nasser's Pursuit of Regional Hegemony vs. Park's 
Pursuit of Economic Development 
Even though Nasser and Park both adopted `nationalism' as their main ideology, the 
outcomes of nationalism under the two regimes were remarkably different. Nasser's nationalism 
was based on the premise of regional integration - Arab unification, with a crucial role being 
played by the nucleus state, Egypt. Thus, Nasser's nationalism supported his implicit intention 
to become an Arab leader. Park's brand of nationalism was a type of economic nationalism, 
which drove the people to focus solely on economic development under the slogan of a `the 
better life'. Various political movements for democracy were repressed. 
Nasser's Arab nationalism emphasised the major role of Egypt in the movement 
towards Arab unification. His intention behind the scenes seemed to be to acquire hegemony in 
the region by means of the rhetoric of Arab unification. As a matter of fact, the direct practical 
beneficiaries of Arab unification would be Nasser's regime and the Egyptian people. 
Consequently, Nasser's ambitious attempt to establish the U. A. R. was regarded as an attempt to 
expand his own and Egyptian influence in the Arab world. 
Nasser tried to expand his influence in the region by espousing the Arab cause, and to 
attain political autonomy as a prominent leader. On the other hand, Park's economic nationalism 
was devised as a survival strategy under the Cold War system and as a way of providing his 
regime with some stability. Thus, Park concentrated his energies on the issue of economic 
development and improvement of productivity. His rhetoric for the economic drive - `the better 
life' - remained the main discourse over the twenty years of his regime. He utilised nationalism 
as the main force behind the achievement of rapid economic development. 
1.4.2. Nasser's Arab Socialism vs. Park's Anti-communism 
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Nasser's socialism differed from scientific socialism in the strict sense of the term. He 
was not a genuine socialist. Immediately after coming to power, he eradicated the communist 
movements in order to get rid of the greatest potential threat to this regime. More than that, 
historical materialism, which is the socialist fundamental premise of atheism, was contradictory 
to the theistic principle of Islam. In this context, Nasser highlighted the peculiarity of his 
socialism with its connotations of `theistic socialism or divine socialism'. In addition to this, he 
tried to combine the general concept of socialism with the specific term `Arab'. By using a 
universal ideological structure, he intended to justify his specific situation and to promote the 
generality of his regime's public policy. Park's representative rhetoric `Koreanised democracy' 
was along the same lines. 
The explicit pledge of Arab socialism was `justice and equality in distribution which 
was ordered by Allah'. Having experienced Western colonialism, the Egyptian people, who had 
also suffered from the mentality of social deprivation, seemed to agree with the principles of 
Lenin's theory of `imperialism'. In addition to a strong anti-imperialist mentality, the passion 
for genuine egalitarianism amongst the poor in Egypt played a key role in producing for 
Nasser's socialism. 
It is true that Arab socialism was an alternative ideological framework which came to 
the forefront due to the failure of Nasser's nationalist drive. After the collapse of the U. A. R., as 
the conflict between Egypt and the West escalated, Nasser proposed this type of ideology - Arab 
socialism - for the purpose of breaking the deadlock. However, after Nasser proclaimed positive 
neutralism as his main strategy of foreign policy, influenced by the Bandung conference, it 
appeared that he intended to adopt a socialist line in collaboration with the Soviet bloc. Despite 
Egypt's professing itself to be a non-aligned state, Nasser maintained an amicable affiliation 
with the Eastern bloc. With regard to domestic implications, socialism was used as the method 
of solidifying the domestic coalition. The A. S. U., the forefront organisation of Arab socialism, 
utilised the ideology of socialism as its apparatus of domestic integration. 
Nasser defined Arab socialism as the final stage in the historical development process. 
In the same way that the ideal communist society was considered to be the perfect form of 
society from a Marxist point of view, Nasser asserted that Allah's divine will would be realised 
by the establishment of Arab socialism in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition to the 
aim of domestic stability, Nasser promoted this idea with the aim of solidifying his relationship 
with the Soviet bloc. 
The salient features of Nasser's Arab socialism could therefore be summarised as 
follows: First, it appeared in the context of rapid changes in the political situation. The 
vulnerability of Arab nationalism was revealed when the U. A. R. collapsed, which meant that 
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the ideological mainstay for the integration of the nation disappeared. After a series of 
international incidents such as intervention in the Yemen War, the collapse of Ben Bellah 
regime, and conflict with the U. S., Nasser started to incline towards socialism. In other words, 
Nasser's socialism could be described as a `situation forced' ideology. Secondly, the transition 
to socialism gave rise to Nasser's economic strategy: state capitalism. From this moment on, the 
dissolution of the monopolised rights of the bourgeoisie and private capital began. Thirdly, 
since the meaning of the term `Arab socialism' was not elaborated, it was difficult to understand 
its real implications. Thus, practically, the concrete strategy of Arab socialism was not clear. It 
was perceived as merely a combination of dogmatic socialism and conservative nationalism, 
like a dialectical synthesis. Arab socialism is seen as striking `a virtuous balance' thereby 
creating a "Third type of Society". In short, the main aim of Nasser's Arab socialism was to 
ensure an adequate level of autonomy in international politics and to maintain the mobilisation 
system in the domestic arena. 
Park's extreme anti-communist line came to the fore with both internal and external 
aims. In domestic affairs, Park's anti-communism resembled the MaCarthyism which swept 
America in the 1960s. Anti-communism played a role in maintaining the regime's security by 
manipulating the threat of potential political enemies. Even demands for worker's rights were 
turned into communist movements by the regime, and any criticism of his regime's performance 
was regarded as a communist conspiracy. Apart from these negative characteristics, anti. 
communism was an effective device for controlling and mobilising the people in the economic 
development drive. 
Externally, Park's anti-communism was an important factor behind the military 
coalition with America. The first concern of the U. S. in East Asia was the Soviet intention to 
expand its influence at the front line of the Cold War, East Asia. The R. O. K. -U. S. Combined 
Forces Command (C. F. C. ), headed by American generals, interfered in Korean politics. It 
appeared more like an invigilator. In this context, in order to ensure full support from the U. S., 
Park had to satisfy America that his regime adhered closely to hard-line anti-communism as a 
bulwark of the forefront of the Cold War. However, during the last stages of Park's regime, 
Park clashed with the Carter administration, because President Carter announced the withdrawal 
of the U. S. army from Korea. From that moment on, Park's anti-communism had to face a new 
era of self-reliance in terms of national defence. 
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1.5. Economy 
1.5.1. The State Capitalism of Nasser: Inclusionary Features 
Nasser's economic drive was expressed as state capitalism, which was similar to the 
socialist economic strategy. He expanded the public sector and tried to destroy the vested rights 
with the tools of state capitalism. Although in the initial stages of the regime, there were some 
indications of a capitalist development strategy, Nasser eventually decided to eradicate the 
oligarchic power groups and comprador capitalists who supported the old regime and derived 
benefits from foreign imperialism. 
Through the progressive policies of nationalisation and expanding the public sector, 
Nasser tried to establish a people-centred welfare system. However, there were certain 
limitations that he was unable to overcome. Egypt's current economic problems stem largely 
from the legacy of state capitalism, instituted by President Nasser in the 1960s. The state-owned 
industries, especially in manufacturing, suffer from gross inefficiency, over-manning and very 
low productivity and profitability. The loss-making state-owned firms are a serious drain on the 
treasury. Consequently, the overall economic situation has become depressed. Nasser's foreign 
policy - non-alignment of positive neutralism - was effective in giving him autonomy in 
international politics, however, in terms of economic efficacy, his foreign policy did not help 
Egypt to push forward the economic development programme. It was a policy that was effective 
politically, but not economically. 
The typical limitations of classic socialism - problems of accumulation and distribution 
- affected the foundation of the regime. Ultimately, although Nasser may be considered to have 
been a successful leader who was able to attain political autonomy and legitimacy, his failure in 
economic development did a great damage to his regime. 
1.5.3. The State-led Capitalism of Park: Exclusionary Features 
In terms of the state's intervention in the economy, both regimes were far from the 
classical meaning of capitalism. Although the economic strategy of both regimes depended on 
the exclusive role of the state, Park's economic strategy was strikingly different from Nasser's, 
which emphasised the socialist characteristics of expanding the public sector and nationalisation 
as the pre-stage of genuine socialism. 
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As a matter of fact, Park's economic development drive was determined by the 
environment of international politics. Park did not have any autonomy to adopt his own 
economic policy without consideration of the U. S. 's strategic initiative in East Asia. In this 
context, there was no room to accommodate any features of a socialist character in South Korea. 
In this context, Park's regime, which had been troubled with the problem of legitimacy, 
had to concentrate on economic development under the slogan of `national development and 
economic growth for the better life', in the hope that this would satisfy the people and thus 
provide Park's regime with some legitimacy. A large introduction of foreign capital was 
necessary for economic development. With this tool of foreign capital, Park's regime had 
absolute authority to control the private sector. Park utilised private companies as the vanguard 
of economic development, while himself holding full power over the private sector behind the 
scenes. This was state-led capitalism. 
Park's drive for rapid economic growth may be divided into three periods: import 
substitute industrialisation at the early stage - export oriented industrialisation at the middle 
period - heavy & chemical industrialisation at the final stage. During the entire period, no direct 
nationalisation or expansion of public sector took place. Instead, from behind the scenes, the 
state dominated the private sector with the tool of foreign capital, and by the taxation system 
initiated by the E. P. B. During this process, conglomerates which had been exclusively 
supported by the government in order to lead economic development appeared. In the end, since 
these conglomerates had grown up with the help of exceptional favours from the government, 
the private sector had to be absolutely subservient to the regime, for example providing black 
money and campaign funds, in order to secure their vested rights. 
Consequently, with the exception of a small number of conglomerates, medium and 
small-sized enterprises were not able to be competitive. Overdeveloped conglomerates were not 
troubled by the principles of free competition. Many of these conglomerates became insolvent 
in 1997, which caused a financial crisis in Korea. 
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2. Final Words 
The present situation in Egypt is quite different from that in South Korea. With regard 
to economic development, South Korea has been running ahead of Egypt. The eighteen years' 
duration of Nasser's and Park's regimes could be considered to be critical in deciding the 
destiny of the two countries in modern history. Until Nasser appeared and came to power in 
Egypt, the Farouk monarchy had been a puppet regime operated by British colonialism. In 
South Korea, the trauma caused by the Korean War prevailed throughout the country in the 
1950s. In addition, due to the after-effects of the student revolution in 1960, South Korea was in 
an absolutely chaotic situation when Park came to power. Therefore, the two regimes of Nasser 
and Park could be regarded as the key variables in shaping the modern states of Egypt and 
South Korea. 
At the time when Nasser and Park seized power, the potential for economic 
development was much higher in Egypt than in South Korea, which had been burnt to the 
ground during the war. Park's economic achievements are therefore worthy of close attention. 
Over the eighteen years of his rule, GDP increased almost 27 times, and the annual average 
economic growth rate was 9.1%. The foundations for becoming one of the ten greatest trading 
countries in the world were established under Park's regime. His economic development 
strategy - state-led capitalism - has also been continued by his successors, President Doo Whan 
Chun, Tae Woo Roh, Young Sam Kim and Dae Jung Kim. 
Egypt possessed far more favourable conditions for development, for example, large 
holdings of foreign currency and a secure and autonomous state. Despite these advantages, 
however, Nasser's economic development strategy was unsuccessful. In this context, Nasser's 
successor, Anwar Sadat discontinued Nasser's development strategy and adopted an open-door 
policy, despite having adhered to strict socialism when he was a military officer. Since then, the 
present President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, has continued to put into practice Sadat's economic 
policy. 
In this dissertation, the distinctive differences of the performance of each regime have 
been looked upon as important, despite the fact that both leaders had similar positions and 
backgrounds, used neo-professional military intervention in praetorian political situations, and 
depended upon the process of the personalisation of power. As a result of the differences in their 
leadership characteristics, the outcomes of their performance were remarkably different. 
With a strong level of state autonomy in domestic and international politics, Nasser put 
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into practice a populist economic strategy and foreign policy. He attempted to acquire 
hegemony in the Arab region and to become a prominent leader in that area. Although, he 
received massive support from the populace and main discourse of Arab initiative, concrete 
improvements in the people's quality of life and in economic conditions seemed to be relatively 
neglected. 
The sole priority of Park's regime was economic growth. He had begun with a serious 
lack of legitimacy. It seems that he made up his mind to focus solely on improvements in 
material in order to legitimate his regime. By means of the Korea-Japan Talks for the 
normalisation of diplomatic relations and the Korea-U. S. security treaty, Park obtained capital 
and military support from Japan and the U. S. despite furious protests by the people. By 
depending on the U. S. and Japan's support, he gave up state autonomy for the sake of domestic 
economic development. 
It is not productive to attempt to mark which regime was the better. In terms of 
building the self respect of the nation and securing diplomatic autonomy in international politics, 
it may be said that Nasser was superior to Park. Nasser brought emotional satisfaction to the 
Egyptian and Arab peoples by struggling against the impregnable colonial powers. He was 
regarded as the man who eradicated the prevailing defeatism in the Middle East, like a 
reincarnated Saladin in 20`h century. In contrast, in terms of the improvement of people's quality 
of life, Park was more successful than Nasser. Despite his shameful dependence on foreign 
powers, Park was constantly driving his economic strategy - dependent developmental ism. It 
may be said that Park bartered national self-respect for economic development and 
improvements in the material life of the people. 
In this dissertation, several issues have been explored. The legitimacy issue and its 
effect on leadership characteristics, ideology formation and its domestic applications, and 
remarkable differences in the economic policies of both regimes have been the subjects of this 
dissertation. The main focus has been on individual leadership and its responses to different 
situations. For a more comprehensive examination, features of the international political and 
economic environment should also be considered as main variables of the research, in addition 
to personal leadership and its consequences. These will be the subject of future research into 
military authoritarianism. 
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